

Disclaimer

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Final Investigation Report No.5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025

Inter-Departmental Fire Investigation Task Force

May 2026

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Foreword

This report was compiled based on the information available as of the date of completion. Accordingly, if further information comes to light, the report may require modification to reflect a reassessment of the existing material or to incorporate new information, either before or during the Independent Committee's inquiry or during the Coroner's inquest.

An Interim Investigation Report was issued in February 2026 and all findings from that Interim Report have been incorporated into this Final Report. Any new information that has become available has also been included and is noted in the footnotes for clarity and transparency.

List of Abbreviations

ADO	Assistant Divisional Officer
Amb	Ambulance
BA	Breathing Apparatus
BD	Buildings Department
BO	Buildings Ordinance
BS	British Standards
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CFD	Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFO	Chief Fire Officer
China Status Development	China Status Development and Engineering Company Limited
CL	Circular Letter
CoP on MoE 1976	The Code of Practice on Provision of Means of Escape in Case of Fire and Allied Requirements 1976
DCFO	Deputy Chief Fire Officer
DCP	Director's Command Post
DD	Deputy Director of Fire Services
DDC	Deputy Divisional Commander
DO	Divisional Officer
D of FS	Director of Fire Services
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EMSC	Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre
EMSD	Electrical and Mechanical Services Department
EN	European Standard
ELD	Electricity Legislation Division
ERT	Emergency Response Team
FAS	Fire Alarm System
FE	Fire Extinguisher
FH/HR System	Fire Hydrant / Hose Reel System
FL	Fanling
Fn	Fireman
FR	Fire-retardant
FS	Fire Services
FSCC	Fire Services Communications Centre
FSD	Fire Services Department
FSI	Fire Service Installations or Equipment
FStn	Fire Station
GB	GuoBiao
GL	Government Laboratory
GSO	Gas Standards Office
HA	Housing Authority
HB	Housing Bureau
HKO	Hong Kong Observatory
HKPF	Hong Kong Police Force
HO	Housing Ordinance
HOS	Home Ownership Scheme

HP	Hydraulic Platform
ICU	Independent Checking Unit under the Housing Bureau
IFITF	Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force
LD	Labour Department
LRU	Light Rescue Unit
MBIS	Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme
MP	Major Pump
MRU	Major Rescue Unit
MSA	Mine Safety Appliances, or MSA Safety Incorporated
MW	Megawatts
MWCS	Minor Works Control System
M&M	Management and Maintenance
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NTE	New Territories East
NTN	New Territories North
NTS	New Territories South
OC	Owners' Corporation
Oic	Officer-in-charge
Ops	Operations
PDA	Pre-determined Attendance
PFn	Principal Fireman
PMC	Property Management Company
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRH	Public Rental Housing
PStnO	Probationary Station Officer
P&C	Public Safety and Corporate Strategy
RFSIC	Registered Fire Service Installation Contractor
RHP	Reserve Heavy Pump
RI	Registered Inspector
R/F	Roof Floor
R/T	Radio Telephone
SAR	Search and Rescue
SB	Security Bureau
SDO	Senior Divisional Officer
SFn	Senior Fireman
SPCU	Safety Policy and Compliance Unit
SST	Safety Support Team
SStnO	Senior Station Officer
ST	Sha Tin
StnC	Station Commander
StnO	Station Officer
TP	Tai Po
TL	Turntable Ladder

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Incident Brief

- 1.1.1 On 26.11.2025 at about 1451 hours, the Fire Services Communications Centre (FSCC) received a building fire call¹ at Wang Cheong House of Wang Fuk Court. A full No.1 Alarm Fire Pre-determined Attendance (PDA), along with additional fire appliances², was immediately dispatched.
- 1.1.2 The initial attendance was led by Senior Station Officer (SStnO) HUI Kin-on. In view of the rapid fire development and more resources required for firefighting and rescue, the fire was raised to No.3 Alarm at 1502 hours (about six minutes after his arrival at 1456 hours). At 1519 hours, Assistant Divisional Officer (ADO) CHEUNG Lok-hang took on the role of Incident Commander upon his arrival at scene. Ten minutes later, Divisional Officer (DO) LAM Ho-chun arrived and took over as Incident Commander of the No.3 Alarm Fire.
- 1.1.3 Shortly thereafter, DO LAM Ho-chun raised the fire to No.4 Alarm at 1534 hours. A total of 48 fire appliances and 13 ambulances, with 269 Fire Services (FS) members, were dispatched to the scene. Deputy Chief Fire Officer (New Territories North) (DCFO(NTN)) WONG King-man and Chief Fire Officer (New Territories North) (CFO(NTN)) TANG Wing-wah took on the role of Incident Commander of the No. 4 Alarm Fire at 1550 hours and 1618 hours respectively.
- 1.1.4 In face of the development and the continued increase in assistance calls, Deputy Director of Fire Services (Operations) (DD(Ops)) CHAN Derek Armstrong upgraded the fire to No. 5 Alarm at 1822 hours and assumed overall command. By that moment, a total of 116 fire appliances and 55 ambulances with 718 FS members were dispatched.
- 1.1.5 The fire was eventually surrounded at 2131 hours on 27.11.2025 and brought under control at 0315 hours on 28.11.2025. The fire was largely put out at 1018 hours on 28.11.2025. During the whole firefighting and rescue operation, over 100 persons were rescued by the Fire Services Department (FSD). Tragically, 79 individuals sustained injuries and 168 lives were lost, including one FS member.

¹ The informant reported that a fire with an explosion had occurred at the scaffolding installed along the external wall of Wang Cheong House of Wang Fuk Court.

² Additional fire appliances were turned out in response to the renovation works being carried out and the defective fire service installations (FSI) of the buildings.

1.2 The Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force

- 1.2.1 Given the severity of the No. 5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po, an Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force (IFITF) was established to conduct a comprehensive investigation into (i) the cause of the fire, (ii) its rapid spread and (iii) the factors contributing to the high number of casualties.

1.3 Believed Cause of Fire

- 1.3.1 Based on available evidence, the fire is believed to have originated from the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House.
- 1.3.2 Excavations at the suspected point of origin revealed debris up to 2 meters high, consisting of construction materials such as safety nets³, toe-boards, polystyrene window covers, carton paper boxes and backing paper from mosaic tiles. Among these, paper-based materials were highly susceptible to smouldering when exposed to glowing sources like lit cigarettes. Two cigarette ends were discovered at the site, raising the possibility of improper disposal of smoking materials as the ignition source.
- 1.3.3 With no other ignition sources identified, the IFITF concluded that the fire was most likely accidental, possibly caused by lit cigarette end(s) igniting combustible materials at the point of origin.

1.4 Spread of Fire

- 1.4.1 The fire development at Wang Fuk Court was highly complex, with the modes of fire spread exhibiting intricate and multifaceted behaviours. The IFITF broadly identified three dominant and interconnected modes of fire spread:
- **Rapid Vertical Fire Spread along the Re-entrant:**
The fire spread rapidly across 31 levels through the re-entrant, driven by intense heat and flames that fueled its vertical progression.
 - **Façade Fire Turning into Interior Fires:**
Flames on the building's façade penetrated units through openings, such as windows, exhaust fans or by radiant heat.
 - **Secondary Ignitions via Embers, Droplets and Debris:**
Burning embers, flaming droplets and falling debris ignited combustible materials on façades, ground levels or nearby areas.

³ In the context of this report, the term “safety nets” refers to those used to envelop bamboo scaffolds for protection against falling objects. Additionally, “safety nets” also corresponds to “protective nets”, as stated in the Practice Note for Registered Contractors 85.

- 1.4.2 As a result of fire spread, 924 flats in Wang Fuk Court sustained varying degrees of fire damage. In particular, Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House and Wang Sun House were severely affected by the fire.

1.5 Circumstances leading to Heavy Fatalities and Causalities

- 1.5.1 The fire claimed 168 lives and injured 79 individuals. The IFITF identified several key factors contributing to the high number of fatalities and injuries:

- **Rapid and Extensive Fire Spread**
The extreme rate of vertical fire spread, which was driven by a combination of factors such as the chimney-like re-entrant, unfavourable weather conditions, combustible envelopes, the presence of safety nets and canvas potentially lacking fire-retardant (FR) properties, as well as the accumulation of combustibles on the flat roofs, left residents with limited time to react, reducing opportunities for safe evacuation.
- **Fire-Damaged Combustible Envelope Blocking Exits**
Flaming scaffolding and debris accumulated at ground level obstructed entrances, rendering escape impossible and impeding rescue efforts.
- **Failure of Fire Alarms**
Fire alarm systems (FAS) failed to actuate in six of the eight blocks, delaying alerts and evacuation.
- **Polystyrene Window Covers**
These covers obstructed visibility, delayed occupant response, contributed to fire spread and generated toxic gases such as carbon monoxide.
- **Compromised Tenability in Means of Escape**
The openable windows in the lift lobby on each floor, as well as the staircase windows that were replaced with movable boards on some floors, allowed smoke and heat to enter corridors and staircases, hindering evacuation as well as firefighting and rescue operations.

Chapter 2 – Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Due to the severity of the fire damage and the large number of casualties and fatalities resulting from the incident, the IFITF was established on 28.11.2025 to investigate the incident.

2.1.2 The IFITF comprises representatives from FSD, the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), the Buildings Department (BD), the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), the Independent Checking Unit (ICU) under the Housing Bureau (HB), the Labour Department (LD) and the Government Laboratory (GL) as well as fire engineering professionals.

2.2 Composition of the IFITF

<i>Role</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>Department / Unit</i>
<i>Leader</i>	Mr. YIU Men-yeung Assistant Director (New Territories South)	FSD
<i>Member</i>	Mr. CHIK Kin-hang, Alex Chief Building Surveyor (New Territories East (2) and Rail)	BD
	Mr. LEUNG Yiu-hong Chief Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (Electricity Legislation); and Mr. HUI Wing-koon, Joe Chief Engineer (Gas Standards A)	EMSD
	Dr. LEE Wing-man Senior Chemist (Chemical Sciences Section)	GL
	Mr. TANG Yick-kay, Basil Senior Superintendent of Police (Crime New Territories North Headquarters)	HKPF
	Mr. HUI Choi-wah, Anthony Chief Maintenance Surveyor (Independent Checking Unit)	ICU

<i>Role</i>	<i>Member</i>	<i>Department / Unit</i>
<i>Member</i>	Mr. YUEN Tsz-lok, Murphy Chief Occupational Safety Officer (Operations)	LD
	Professor YUEN Kwok-kit, Richard	Fire Engineering Professional

2.3 Terms of Reference

- 2.3.1 The IFITF focuses on two primary objectives:
- (i) Investigating the cause of the fire and how it spread; and
 - (ii) Determining the factors that led to heavy casualties.
- 2.3.2 The Terms of Reference are outlined in **Appendix A-1**.

Chapter 3 – Methodologies

3.1 Investigation Methodologies

3.1.1 The investigation was conducted with reference to international standards, including 中國消防救援領域行業標準 XF/T 812-2008 《火災原因調查指南》 and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 “Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations”, which include the following elements:

- Scene Examination
- Evidence Collection
- Witness Interviews
- Laboratory and Expert Analysis

3.2 Scene Examination

3.2.1 The examination included a systematic inspection of the fire scene, focusing on fire patterns, smoke movement, structural damage and photographic/video documentation.

3.3 Evidence Collection

3.3.1 The task involved securing and preserving physical evidence, including burnt materials, scaffolding bamboo, safety nets and polystyrene window covers, toe-boards and canvas, as well as ensuring that the chain of evidence was maintained to meet court standards. Voice recordings of radio communications, closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, photos and video captured during the incident were also examined.

3.4 Witness Interviews

3.4.1 Statements were obtained from witnesses, including workers, evacuees and frontline firefighters to gather first-hand accounts of the incident.

3.5 Laboratory and Expert Analysis

3.5.1 Collected samples were submitted to accredited laboratories for chemical analysis, material testing and combustion property testing. Bench-scale experiments, computer simulations and full-scale fire tests were also conducted. Furthermore, the autopsy reports were reviewed.

Chapter 4 – Background Information of Wang Fuk Court

4.1 General Description of Wang Fuk Court

4.1.1 Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po is a residential development under the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS). Under the Scheme, the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) builds homes for sale to eligible households at discounted prices. Completed in 1983, Wang Fuk Court comprises 8 domestic blocks, each with 32-storey tall, (i.e. G/F, 1/F to 31/F), namely:

- Wang Yan House (Block A);
- Wang Tao House (Block B);
- Wang Sun House (Block C);
- Wang Kin House (Block D);
- Wang Tai House (Block E);
- Wang Cheong House (Block F);
- Wang Shing House (Block G); and
- Wang Chi House (Block H).

In total, 1,984 domestic flats are provided in Wang Fuk Court, all of which were sold to eligible buyers in the 1980s.

4.1.2 Pursuant to the Buildings Ordinance (BO) (Cap. 123) and the Housing Ordinance (HO) (Cap. 283), HA buildings, including new construction sites of HA and existing public rental housing (PRH) estates without any part sold or otherwise disposed of by HA, are exempt from the provisions of the BO. As such, the design of Wang Fuk Court (being a new construction site at the time of development) was exempt from the BO, but HA had developed it with reference to the prevailing statutory provisions as well as relevant codes of practice or guidelines issued by the then Building Authority.

4.1.3 The typical floor plan of Wang Cheong House, which closely resembles the floor plans of other buildings in Wang Fuk Court, is shown in **Figure 4-1**. There are four wings in each block, with each wing comprising two domestic flats and connecting to the lift lobby. There is a re-entrant between two wings and there are four re-entrants on the exterior of each block extending from the 1/F to the roof, as shown in **Photo 4-1 (a) & Figure 4-2**.

- 4.1.4 Each block of Wang Fuk Court has two staircases arranged in a scissor configuration⁴. Of the two staircases⁵, only one provides access to the roof, while the other terminates at the 31/F. At each staircase landing, a marking showing the corresponding floor level was provided, as shown in **Photo 4-1 (c)**.⁶ Three firemen's lifts are provided to each block to serve all floors, with each lift stopping at every three floors.
- 4.1.5 On every floor, one window is provided in the staircase and another window is provided in the lift lobby. One of the re-entrants is located immediately outside the lift lobby window, as shown in **Photos 4-2 (a) & (b) & Figure 4-3**, whereas another re-entrant is located immediately outside the staircase window, as shown in **Photos 4-3 (a) & (b) & Figure 4-4**.
- 4.1.6 Post-fire inspections revealed that there were minor alterations in some of the domestic flats. Although such alterations did not contribute to the fire development, the layout plans are attached in **Appendix A-2** for reference.
- 4.1.7 From a technical perspective, fire safety in buildings can be divided into two main categories: "active fire safety provisions" and "passive fire safety provisions", both of which work together to ensure the overall building fire safety.
- 4.1.8 **Active fire safety provisions** refer to FSI that operate during a fire. For instance, fire detection system and FAS can identify a fire at an early stage and alert occupants to evacuate promptly, sprinkler system activates automatically to suppress flames and limit their spread and fire hydrant and hose reel system (FH/HR System) provides essential means for extinguishing fires.
- 4.1.9 **Passive fire safety provisions** are embedded in the design and construction of the building itself. They prevent the spread of fire and smoke, maintain structural stability and ensure sufficient means for occupants to evacuate while enabling fire personnel to carry out rescue and firefighting operations. Examples include fire-rated partitions and fire doors, which must provide adequate resistance to minimise the spread of fire and smoke; structural components that require certified fire resistance ratings to preserve integrity during a fire incident; and escape routes must also be designed with sufficient width and protective measures to allow safe evacuation.

⁴ Two independent, interlocking flights of stairs stacked vertically.

⁵ On the ground floor, one staircase provides access to the lift lobby and the main building entrance, while another staircase leads to the rear exit. The rear exit features a smoke-stop door fitted with a horizontal bolt, as shown in **Photo 4-1 (b)**. A door sensor, which is not equipped with a locking mechanism, is also installed at this exit. When the door is opened, it triggers an audible buzzer and/or transmits a signal to the security office. It is important to note that this door sensor is not connected to, nor does it form part of, any fire service installations. It is installed exclusively for security and property management purposes.

⁶ No floor-level signage was observed at the staircase landings after the fire, as shown in **Photo 4-1(d)**.





Figure 4-1: Typical Floor Plan of Wang Cheong House



*Photo 4-1 (a):
Wang Fuk Court
(Photo Taken in 2023)⁷*



*Figure 4-2:
Locations of Re-Entrants
in Wang Cheong House*

⁷ Consent from Mr. Austin Bell had been obtained for incorporating his photo into the report.



Photo 4-1 (b): Rear Exit at Wang Cheong House



Photo 4-1 (c):
Staircase Landing of 10/F, Wang Kin
House (Before the Renovation Works)



Photo 4-1 (d):
Staircase Landing of 10/F, Wang Kin
House (Photo Taken After the Fire)




Photo 4-2 (a):
Lift Lobby Window
(Before the Renovation Works)




Figure 4-3:
Location of Lift Lobby Window



Photo 4-2 (b): Lift Lobby Window
(Photo Taken After the Fire)



Photo 4-3 (a):
Staircase Window
(Before the Renovation Works)




Figure 4-4:
Location of Staircase Window



Photo 4-3 (b): Staircase Window
(Photo Taken After the Fire)

4.2 FSI Provisions [Active Fire Safety Provision]

- 4.2.1 All blocks of Wang Fuk Court are provided with the following FSIs:
- Manual FAS
 - FH/HR System
 - Fire Extinguisher (FE)
 - Emergency Lighting System⁸ (EL System)
- Such provisions comply with the “Codes of Practice for Minimum Fire Service Installations and Equipment and Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Installations and Equipment (1979)”, which was applicable at the time of Wang Fuk Court’s development.
- 4.2.2 According to the Fire Service (Installations and Equipment) Regulations (Cap. 95B), the owner of any FSI shall have such installation or equipment inspected by a Registered Fire Service Installation Contractor (RFSIC) at least once every 12 months.
- 4.2.3 The annual inspection for all blocks of Wang Fuk Court was carried out by the RFSIC, Victory Fire Engineering Limited, in March 2025. According to the certificates submitted to FSD, all the FSIs provided were in compliance with FSD requirements and should be operable. Although the systems were generally satisfactory in condition, several minor defects were identified and required follow-up or repair action⁹.
- 4.2.4 Between April and September 2025, shutdown notifications¹⁰ of FSI were submitted to FSD by another RFSIC China Status Development and Engineering Company Limited (China Status Development), reporting that the shutdown of the sole FH/HR system to each block was required.
- 4.2.5 After receiving the said shutdown notifications, personnel from Tai Po Fire Station (TPFStn) conducted on-site risk assessment and advisory letters were issued to remind the owners to maintain fire safety within the buildings while the systems were non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works.

⁸ The provision of EL system is not a mandatory requirement (i.e. over-provision).

⁹ Advisory letters were issued to Wang Tao House, Wang Kin House and Wang Chi House for defects that did not impair the system’s designed function; while warning letters were issued to Wang Sun House and Wang Tai House.

¹⁰ Shutdown notifications were submitted by China Status Development in respect of Wang Tai House & Wang Chi House on 7.4.2025, Wang Kin House on 16.5.2025, Wang Shing House on 16.6.2025, Wang Sun House on 4.7.2025, Wang Tao House on 11.7.2025 and Wang Yan House & Wang Cheong House on 4.9.2025.

4.3 Fire Resisting Construction [Passive Fire Safety Provision]

- 4.3.1 At the time of construction of Wang Fuk Court, the prevailing standard on fire resisting construction was stipulated in the Building (Construction) Regulations as well as the Code of Practice on Provision of Means of Escape in Case of Fire and Allied Requirements 1976 (CoP on MOE 1976).
- 4.3.2 According to the CoP on MOE 1976, windows in the external walls of the staircases were not required to be fire-rated unless they oppose and are within 6m of (i) the opposite side of a street; (ii) the lot boundary, not being a common boundary with the street; or (iii) any other building on the same lot. As such, the upper parts of the windows at the lift lobbies as well as in the staircases of the eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court were openable, while the lower parts of the windows were a fixed light, (as shown in **Photos 4-2 (a) & 4-3 (a)**).

4.4 Management of Wang Fuk Court

- 4.4.1 As mentioned in paragraph 4.1.1 above, HOS courts are developed by HA for sale to eligible households at discounted prices. When an HOS court is completed and sold or divested, the management and maintenance (M&M) responsibilities initially rest with HA until the establishment of an Owners' Corporation (OC). Once an OC is established, HA would transfer the M&M responsibilities to the OC. The OC may appoint its own Property Management Company (PMC) to carry out such duties and both the OC and its appointed PMC must comply with the provisions under the Building Management Ordinance (Cap. 344) and the Deed of Mutual Covenant of the development.
- 4.4.2 In the case of Wang Fuk Court, all 1,984 flats were sold to eligible buyers in the 1980s. Following the establishment of the OC of Wang Fuk Court in January 1997, HA transferred the M&M responsibilities to the OC in November 1997.
- 4.4.3 The current PMC appointed by the OC of Wang Fuk Court is ISS EastPoint Property Properties Limited (置邦興業管理有限公司)¹¹, which provides security guards stationed on the ground floor with patrol services for all blocks. Additionally, a CCTV system¹² with round-the-clock surveillance was installed in each block, covering all three lifts, front building entrances and the bicycle parking areas.

¹¹ According to the minutes of OC's meeting held on 7.12.2025, published on the OC's website, 置邦興業有限公司 (i.e. ISS EastPoint Properties Limited) was the PMC of Wang Fuk Court.

¹² The CCTV system covering the lifts and main entrance of Wang Cheong House was found to be malfunctioning; therefore, relevant footage was unavailable.

4.5 Major Renovation Works at Wang Fuk Court

- 4.5.1 Under the Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme (MBIS)¹³, owners of buildings aged 30 years or above (except domestic buildings not exceeding three storeys) who are served with statutory notices are required to appoint a Registered Inspector (RI) to carry out the prescribed inspection and supervise the prescribed repair works found necessary for the common parts, external walls and projections or signboards of the buildings¹⁴.
- 4.5.2 The prescribed inspection and repairs under MBIS¹⁵ cover external elements and other physical elements, structural elements, fire safety elements, drainage system and unauthorized building works¹⁶.
- 4.5.3 As mentioned in paragraph 4.1.2 above, HA buildings, including new construction sites of HA and existing PRH estates without any part sold or otherwise disposed of by HA, are exempt from the provisions of the BO. Yet, estates/courts developed by HA with any part thereof sold or otherwise disposed of are subject to the BO. For these estates/courts, pursuant to the Delegation Instruments made by the Director of Buildings, the ICU is delegated with authority from the BD to act as the Building Authority to exercise the relevant statutory control, in accordance with the BO and the policies and guidelines issued by the BD.
- 4.5.4 *The Case of Wang Fuk Court*
- 4.5.4.1 For Wang Fuk Court, which was developed by HA but divested to individual owners, the ICU assumes the role of the BD for implementation of the MBIS and Minor Works Control System (MWCS), including issuing statutory notices, handling related complaints and enquiries and processing minor works submissions, etc.

¹³ Full implementation of MBIS commenced in June 2012 to address the long-standing problem of building neglect and to ensure building safety in the long run.

Source of Reference: <https://www.bd.gov.hk/en/safety-inspection/mbis/index.html>

¹⁴ Since 1992, the then Director of Buildings and Lands authorised officers of the Housing Department to take up the duties and responsibilities under the BO on behalf of the Building Authority to exercise building control over sold buildings under the HOS. This authorisation has been redirected to officers of the ICU since 2004 and continues till now. The latest authorisation by the Director of Buildings to the ICU covers matters regarding control of sold HOS buildings under the BO, including implementation of the MBIS and the Mandatory Window Inspection Scheme, the MWCS, processing alterations and additions submissions and handling of related reports, complaints and enquiries. Wang Fuk Court is a sold HOS development and is thus regulated by the ICU under this authorisation.

¹⁵ Source of reference: Code of Practice for the MBIS and The Mandatory Window Inspection Scheme 2012 (2023 Edition).

¹⁶ The unauthorized building works to be identified shall cover those in the common parts of the building; on the exterior other than the common parts of the building (such as external wall, roof or podium, yard or slope adjoining the building); and on the street on which the building fronts or abuts.

Source of Reference: <https://www.bd.gov.hk/en/safety-inspection/mbis/scope-and-standards/index.html>

- 4.5.4.2 The eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court were selected as target buildings for implementation of MBIS in 2014. The ICU served the statutory notices under MBIS to the OC of Wang Fuk Court on 10.6.2016. The OC of Wang Fuk Court subsequently appointed an RI on 5.11.2019 to carry out the prescribed inspection and supervise the prescribed repair works according to the requirements under MBIS.
- 4.5.4.3 The overall scope of the repair and renovation works was decided by the OC, which was more than those prescribed repair works under MBIS. It is noteworthy that the proposed works in respect of replacement of the existing windows with fire-rated windows¹⁷ at the staircases are not one of the prescribed repair works under the MBIS, but an optional works item as shown in the inspection report submitted by RI.
- 4.5.4.4 It is noted that the renovation work of Wang Fuk Court commenced in 2024. The OC engaged the Prestige Construction & Engineering Co. Limited (宏業建築工程有限公司) as the contractor for this renovation project.
- 4.5.4.5 The external wall repair work was included as part of the renovation work. For this purpose, scaffolding works commenced outside the external walls of all blocks of Wang Fuk Court since July 2024, according to the record provided by the PMC. These scaffoldings¹⁸ (comprising bamboos, wooden planks, toe-boards, safety nets, canvas¹⁹ and nylon strips²⁰) enveloped all blocks entirely from the G/F to the R/F, as shown in **Photo 4-4** and **Photo 4-5**.

¹⁷ In accordance with the eight submissions under MWCS by the Authorized Person to the ICU, all existing windows at staircases would be replaced with fire-rated windows with fire resistance rating of -/60/60 (i.e. ensuring 60 min of both integrity and insulation).

¹⁸ Relevant required standard could be found in the Code of Practice for Bamboo Scaffolding Safety issued by LD, as well as the Guidelines on the Design and Construction of Bamboo Scaffold and relevant Practice Notes and Circular Letters (CLs) issued by BD.

Source of Reference:

- <https://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/os/B/Bamboo.pdf>
- <https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/en/resources/codes-and-references/code-and-design-manuals/GDCBS.pdf>
- https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/en/resources/codes-and-references/practice-notes-and-circular-letters/circular/CL_UFRPNSTPSFBCDRMW2023e.pdf
- https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/tc/resources/codes-and-references/code-and-design-manuals/MW/MWTGc_amendment_oct2025.pdf

¹⁹ Safety net, screen, tarpaulin or plastic sheeting used to cover the façade of buildings under construction, demolition, repair or minor works should have appropriate fire retardant (FR) properties in compliance with a recognised standard, such as GuoBiao Standard (GB) 5725-2009, British Standards (BS) 5867-2:2008 or NFPA 701:2019, as specified in the Code of Practice for Bamboo Scaffolding Safety issued by LD and the CL issued by BD.

²⁰ Nylon strips are used for knotting in bamboo scaffoldings.

4.5.5 Observations After the Fire

- 4.5.5.1 Catch-fans²¹ with protective screens atop were positioned outside the scaffoldings to intercept and contain the paths of falling objects at the building exterior. These catch-fans, along with safety nets, played an integral role in preventing falling debris and ensuring the safety of passers-by underneath, as shown in **Photo 4-6**.
- 4.5.5.2 Wooden planks²² were laid as working platforms to facilitate workers carrying out work at the building exterior and to prevent them from falling from height, as shown in **Photo 4-7**.
- 4.5.5.3 Toe-boards²³, with a minimum height of 200mm, were also provided to prevent workers or objects from falling from height, as shown in **Photo 4-8**.
- 4.5.5.4 For all blocks of Wang Fuk Court, all the existing staircase windows, the upper parts of which were openable, were proposed to be replaced with fire-rated windows²⁴ as part of the renovation works of Wang Fuk Court. As explained in paragraph 4.5.4.3 above, such proposed works were not a prescribed repair item under the MBIS regime; but given that it was categorized as a type of minor works under the MWCS²⁵, as shown in **Photo 4-3 (b)**, relevant minor works submissions were submitted to the ICU under MWCS. While it was indicated in the relevant minor works submissions that all windows at staircases would be replaced with fire-rated windows, it was only revealed after the fire that some windows at the staircases had been replaced with movable boards, most of them believed to be wooden²⁶, to provide convenient access for workers to the scaffoldings, as shown in **Photos 4-9 (a) to (c)**, at the following locations:

²¹ A sloping catch-fan at not more than 15m vertical intervals to give minimum horizontal projection coverage of 1,500mm should be provided according to the Code of Practice for Bamboo Scaffolding Safety issued by LD and the Guidelines on the Design and Construction of Bamboo Scaffold issued by BD.

²² For the purpose of occupational safety, proper working platforms, made of wooden planks / boards, shall be provided for construction works involving working at height so as to ensure that the works can be carried out safely according to the Code of Practice for Bamboo Scaffolding Safety issued by LD.

²³ The relevant requirement for toe-boards can be found in the Code of Practice for Bamboo Scaffolding Safety issued by LD for the purpose of occupational safety.

²⁴ According to Clause 23 of the CoP on MOE 1976, which was the prevailing standard at the time of construction of Wang Fuk Court, the provision of fire-rated fixed windows at staircases was not required.

²⁵ MWCS aims to facilitate building owners and occupants in carrying out small-scale building works safely and lawfully through simplified requirements.
Source of Reference: <https://www.bd.gov.hk/doc/en/resources/codes-and-references/practice-notes-and-circular-letters/pnap/APP/APP147.pdf>

²⁶ The post-fire investigation revealed two types of movable boards present at the site: (i) boards entirely made of wood and (ii) boards constructed with wood on one side and aluminium composite panels on the other. In both cases, gaps and holes were observed in the boards, allowing smoke and heat to infiltrate into the staircase, even when the boards were in a closed position.

<i>Building</i>	<i>Staircase</i>	<i>Floor</i>
<i>Wang Yan House</i>	Rear staircase	between 3/F & 4/F
	Front staircase	between 8/F & 9/F
	Rear staircase	between 15/F & 16/F
	Rear staircase	between 19/F & 20/F
	Front staircase	between 24/F & 25/F
	Front staircase	between 28/F & 29/F
<i>Wang Tao House</i>	Front staircase	between 4/F & 5/F
	Front staircase	between 10/F & 11/F
	Rear staircase	between 15/F & 16/F
	Front staircase	between 20/F & 21/F
	Front staircase	between 26/F & 27/F
<i>Wang Sun House</i>	Rear staircase	between 5/F & 6/F
	Front staircase	between 10/F & 11/F
	Rear staircase	between 15/F & 16/F
	Rear staircase	between 19/F & 20/F
	Front staircase	between 24/F & 25/F
<i>Wang Kin House</i>	Front staircase	between 4/F & 5/F
	Rear staircase	between 9/F & 10/F
	Rear staircase	between 15/F & 16/F
	Rear staircase	between 19/F & 20/F
	Front staircase	between 24/F & 25/F
<i>Wang Tai House and Wang Cheong House</i>	Rear staircase	between 5/F & 6/F
	Front staircase	between 10/F & 11/F
	Rear staircase	between 15/F & 16/F
	Front staircase	between 20/F & 21/F
	Rear staircase	between 25/F & 26/F
<i>Wang Shing House</i>	Rear staircase	between 3/F & 4/F
	Rear staircase	between 9/F & 10/F
	Front staircase	between 14/F & 15/F
	Rear staircase	between 19/F & 20/F
	Front staircase	between 24/F & 25/F
<i>Wang Chi House</i>	Front staircase	between 4/F & 5/F
	Rear staircase	between 9/F & 10/F
	Front staircase	between 14/F & 15/F
	Rear staircase	between 19/F & 20/F
	Front staircase	between 24/F & 25/F

Photos and detailed descriptions of the construction materials used for all movable boards are provided in **Appendix A-30**.

- 4.5.6 To probe into the configuration of renovation work in each block of Wang Fuk Court, the only undamaged building, Wang Chi House, which was observed to be very similar to the undamaged parts of other blocks, was studied in detail subsequent to the fire:
- 4.5.6.1 At the open ground surrounding Wang Chi House, a significant quantity of construction materials was found, including safety nets, wooden planks, bamboo and other covered construction materials, as shown in **Photo 4-10**.
- 4.5.6.2 Covered walkways were provided at the building entrance, shielding personnel underneath from falling debris, as shown in **Photos 4-11 (a) & (b)**.
- 4.5.6.3 During the renovation, the scaffolding erected blocked the building name. As a remedial measure, the building name was printed on paper, laminated and taped outside each block, as shown in **Photo 4-11 (c)**. Meanwhile, no signage indicating the floor level was observed at the staircase landings, including at Wang Chi House.
- 4.5.6.4 A considerable amount of combustibles, including bamboo, wooden planks, safety nets, nylon strips and canvas, was located at the re-entrants, as shown in **Photos 4-12 (a) to (d)**. Especially at the re-entrants with windows immediately outside the lift lobby and staircases, where a triangular channel extending from the flat roof to the roof level was observed, as shown in **Photo 4-13**.
- 4.5.6.5 Polystyrene window covers²⁷ were found covering the windows of most flats, lift lobbies and staircases to protect window glass from accidental impacts, as shown in **Photos 4-14 (a) to (c)**.

²⁷ Polystyrene window covers have been commonly referred to as “foam boards” in news reports and on social media.



Photo 4-4: Renovation of Wang Fuk Court in 2024



*Photo 4-5: Photo Showing Different Combustibles in the Scaffolding
(Bamboo, Safety Nets, Canvas and Nylon Strips)*




Photo 4-6: Catch-Fans Outside the Scaffoldings




Photo 4-7: Close-Up View of the Working Platforms




Photo 4-8: Toe-Boards on the Working Platforms Inside Scaffolding



Photos 4-9 (a) to (c): Replacement of Windows With Movable Board



*Photo 4-10: Construction Materials Scattered at
Ground Level Around Wang Chi House*







Photo 4-11 (a): Covered Walkway at the Main Entrance of Wang Chi House



Photo 4-11 (b): Rear Exit of Wang Chi House



Photo 4-11 (c): Printed Building Signage at Wang Chi House



Photos 4-12 (a) to (d): Re-Entrants at Wang Chi House



Photo 4-13: Triangular Channel Leading From the Flat Roof to R/F
at the Re-Entrant



Photos 4-14 (a) to (c): Polystyrene Window Covers

Chapter 5 – The Fire Development

5.1 Discovery of Fire

5.1.1 At 1451 hours, the informant, Mr. YIP [REDACTED]²⁸, who was at the cycling path near Wang Cheong House, discovered a fire at Wang Fuk Court and immediately called 999 to report the fire (Location Map at **Figure 5-1**). According to the video provided by Mr. YIP, the fire was observed to have started on the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House (Screenshot shown in **Photo 5-1** and layout plan at **Figure 5-2**).

5.1.2 However, the investigation revealed that the fire might have started prior to Mr. YIP's report. According to CCTV footage, embers were observed falling onto the bicycle parking area of Wang Cheong House at approximately 1443 hours²⁹ (Screenshot shown in **Photo 5-2**).

5.1.3 Moreover, the following witnesses³⁰ who were present at Wang Cheong House at the material time reported discovering the fire prior to Mr. YIP's observation:

	Name	Identity	Location	Time of Fire Discovery
1	HE [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	3/F Scaffolding	The exact time of discovery remains uncertain.
2	CHUNG [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	4/F Scaffolding	
3	FANG [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	Scaffolding between 3/F – 4/F	
4	TAM [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	Scaffolding between 5/F – 6/F	
5	CHAN [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	Scaffolding between 5/F – 6/F	At about 1440 hours
6	ZHENG [REDACTED]	Construction Worker	Scaffolding near Flat 5 [REDACTED]	At about 1440 hours
7	SUEN [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Occupant	Flat 21 [REDACTED]	At about 1430 hours
8	CHUNG [REDACTED]	Security Guard	G/F Security Counter	At about 1448 hours

²⁸ Witness Statement of YIP [REDACTED] at **Appendix A-28** refers.

²⁹ Although the time shown on CCTV was 1444 hours, the system was approximately 42 secs ahead of the Hong Kong Observatory (HKO) reference time, making the actual time approximately 1443 hours.

³⁰ Witness statements from (i) HE [REDACTED], (ii) CHUNG [REDACTED], (iii) FANG [REDACTED], (iv) TAM [REDACTED] (v) CHAN [REDACTED], (vi) ZHENG [REDACTED], (vii) SUEN [REDACTED] and (viii) CHUNG [REDACTED] at **Appendices A-4 to A-11** refer.

- 5.1.4 According to the construction workers³¹ who were working on the exterior wall scaffolding between the 3/F and 6/F of Wang Cheong House, they noticed the smell of smoke and observed a fire on the subject flat roof. One of the workers on the scaffolding on the 4/F reported that the fire spread along the safety nets from below³². In response, some of them attempted to put out the fire using a hose and buckets of water, but to no avail. This action was evidenced by CCTV footage from Wang Cheong House, which recorded someone shouting³³ ‘喂！著火呀！拎條水喉嚟呀！’ at approximately 1448 hours³⁴.
- 5.1.5 Furthermore, the security guard, Ms. CHUNG [REDACTED]³⁵, attempted to activate the fire alarm using the break glass unit on the 1/F of Wang Cheong House after discovering the fire at 1448 hours. However, her attempt was unsuccessful and no alarm sound was triggered.
- 5.1.6 According to the statement provided by the occupant of Flat 21 [REDACTED], she and her neighbour noticed a burning smell as early as 1430 hours.
- 5.1.7 Given that multiple witnesses had likely become aware of the fire before it was reported by the informant, Mr. YIP, at 1451 hours, the IFITF considers that, had an emergency call been made immediately upon these earlier observations, the initial FS attendance could have been mobilised to the scene sooner. Such earlier mobilisation might have enabled firefighting operations to commence when the fire was at a comparatively earlier stage of development, with a corresponding potential to limit subsequent fire spread. Given the extremely rapid development of the fire, as later evidenced by the vertical spread along the re-entrants and the early multi-storey involvement within a minute, the IFITF further considers that, in such circumstances, even a difference of a few minutes in the timing of the first emergency call may critically affect the stage at which firefighting operations can commence and, consequently, the prospects of limiting further fire spread.
- 5.1.8 In conclusion, although the fire was first reported at 1451 hours, evidence from witnesses and CCTV footage indicates that it started earlier, likely between 1430 hours and 1443 hours. Despite extensive efforts, the exact time of the fire’s occurrence could not be definitively determined.

³¹ Witness statements of construction workers at Appendices A-4 to A-9 refer.

³² Witness statement of HE [REDACTED] at Appendix A-4 refers.

³³ The CCTV camera was not aimed in a way that could capture the individual(s) involved, resulting in no one appearing in the footage.

³⁴ Although the time shown on CCTV was 1447 hours, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1448 hours.

³⁵ Witness statement of CHUNG [REDACTED] at Appendix A-11 refers.





Figure 5-1: Map Indicating the Informant's Location



*Photo 5-1:
Screenshot From the Informant's Video
at About 1451 Hours (Discovery)*



*Figure 5-2:
Layout Plan Showing the Fire Origin*



Photo 5-2: Embers Falling Onto Bicycle Parking Area

5.2 Spread of the Fire

5.2.1 Background

- 5.2.1.1 To facilitate the analysis of fire spread, the different façades of Wang Cheong House are presented by direction (North re-entrant, North-east façade, East re-entrant, South-east façade, South re-entrant, South-west façade, West re-entrant, North-west façade), as shown in **Figure 5-3**.




Figure 5-3: Directional Representation of Wang Cheong House Façades

5.2.2 Wang Cheong House

- 5.2.2.1 The video provided by the informant clearly showed the fire spreading through the **east re-entrant** of Wang Cheong House. **Photo 5-3** illustrates the fire spreading to about the 4/F at about 1455 hours; while **Photo 5-4** shows the fire spreading to about the 8/F at about 1457 hours³⁶, shortly after the FS arrival at 1456 hours.
- 5.2.2.2 At 1458 hours, the fire intensified and developed vigorously, accompanied by falling debris, bamboo and construction materials, as shown in **Photos 5-5 (a) to (c)**.
- 5.2.2.3 A severe fire was then observed on the open ground outside the **south-east façade** of Wang Cheong House at approximately 1501 hours, indicating that the fire had spread beyond the building, as shown in **Figure 5-4 (a)** and **Photos 5-6 (a) & (b)**. At 1503 hours, a video provided by a passer-by, Mr. [REDACTED] HUI, showed the fire rapidly spreading along the **south re-entrant**, as seen in **Photo 5-6 (c)** and **Figure 5-4 (b)**.³⁷
- 5.2.2.4 Although the fire at the lower portion of the scaffolding on the **south-east façade** was observed to have died out at approximately 1508 hours, visible flames were still present on the open ground outside the **east re-entrant**. Video footage provided by the informant clearly shows that the fire had spread to the open ground outside the **south-west façade** of Wang Cheong House, in the area between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, at about 1508 hours, as shown in **Figure 5-5** and **Photos 5-6 (d) & (e)**. At the same time, heavy smoke was observed pouring along the **south re-entrant** and drifting towards Wang Tai House, likely under the influence of wind³⁸, as shown in **Figure 5-6** and **Photo 5-6 (f)**.
- 5.2.2.5 At about 1509 hours³⁹, a photo provided by Mr. CHAN [REDACTED], Occupant of Flat 6 [REDACTED] of Wang Cheong House, showed the fire rapidly spreading from the G/F to the top of the building along the **west re-entrant** of Wang Cheong House, as shown in **Figure 5-8** and **Photo 5-7 (a)**.
- 5.2.2.6 At about 1515 hours, SStnO HUI Kin-on observed the fire had spread into the units on the lower portion of the **south-east façade** of Wang Cheong House, as illustrated in **Figure 5-7**.⁴⁰

³⁶ No time discrepancy was noted between the informant's phone time and the HKO reference time.

³⁷ After the submission of the interim report, video footage from Mr. [REDACTED] HUI was obtained, showing the rapid fire spread in the south re-entrant. No time discrepancy was observed between Mr. HUI's phone time and the HKO reference time.

³⁸ An east to south-east wind, at approximately 14 km/hr, was recorded by HKO at 1500 hours on 26.11.2025.

³⁹ After the submission of the interim report, a photo from Mr. CHAN [REDACTED] confirmed that the rapid fire spread in the west re-entrant occurred at 1509 hours. As no time discrepancy was found between Mr. CHAN's phone and the HKO reference time, the reported time was revised from 1511 hours to 1509 hours.

⁴⁰ Witness Statement of SStnO HUI Kin-on at Appendix A-29(B) refers.


- 5.2.2.7 Around the same time, another video provided by the informant showed that the scaffolding on the **south-east façade of Wang Tai House** was alight and that **an area of vegetation** opposite Wang Cheong House, across Island House Lane, was also on fire, as shown in **Figure 5-9** and **Photos 5-7 (b) & (c)**. Meanwhile, the blaze in the area between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House remained severe.
- 5.2.2.8 The scaffolding of Wang Cheong House was well alight, with large quantities of burning bamboo and miscellaneous materials falling and obstructing the building entrances. As a result, firefighters were unable to enter the building and could only carry out external firefighting operations outside Wang Cheong House.
- 5.2.2.9 As captured on Now TV footage, the fire was emerging from broken windows on the lower floors of the **north-west façade** of Wang Cheong House at approximately 1545 hours, as shown in **Photo 5-8** and **Figure 5-10**.



Photo 5-3:
Fire Spread to About 4/F
at About 1455 Hours



Photo 5-4:
Fire Spread to About 8/F
at About 1457 Hours



Photos 5-5 (a) to (c) :
Fire Intensified and Engulfed the Entire
East Re-Entrant of Wang Cheong House
With Falling Debris at 1458 Hours



Photos 5-6 (a) & (b): Fire Spread to the Open Ground outside the South-East Façade of Wang Cheong House at About 1501 Hours




Figure 5-4 (a): Map Showing the Recording Location at 1501 Hours



Photo 5-6 (c):
Fire Spreading Along the South Re-
Entrant at 1503 Hours



Figure 5-4 (b):
Map Indicating the Fire Spread at Wang
Cheong House



Photo 5-6 (d):
Visible Flame Still Observed at the Open Ground outside the East Re-Entrant at 1508 Hours



Photo 5-6 (e):
Fire Spread to the Open Ground Between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House




Figure 5-5: Map Showing the Recording Location at 1508 Hours



Photo 5-6 (f):
Heavy Smoke on the South-East Façade
at 1508 Hours




Figure 5-6:
Map Showing the Recording Location
at 1508 Hours



Figure 5-7: Location of Fire Spread at 1515 Hours



Photo 5-7 (a):
Fire Spreading Along the West
Re-Entrant at 1509 Hours




Figure 5-8:
Map Indicating the Fire Spread at Wang
Cheong House



Photo 5-7 (b):
South-East Façade of Wang Tai House
Alight at 1515 Hours



Photo 5-7 (c):
An Area of Vegetation opposite
Wang Cheong House Alight
at 1515 Hours



5.2.3 Wang Tai House

- 5.2.3.1 The fire spread to Wang Tai House via flying embers was observed around 1500 hours. Construction workers⁴¹ reported fire spreading to the safety nets on multiple levels of Wang Tai House, including construction materials on the G/F, safety nets on the 9/F & 10/F and miscellaneous articles on the R/F. The situation at R/F is shown in **Photo 5-9 (a)**; while the situation at the scaffolding is shown in **Photo 5-9 (b)**.
- 5.2.3.2 A similar observation was reported by SStnO HUI Kin-on⁴², the initial officer-in-charge of the fire incident, who noted the fire spreading to the safety nets on the **east façade** of Wang Tai House, facing Wang Cheong House at approximately 1500 hours, as shown in **Figure 5-11**.
- 5.2.3.3 In addition to witness accounts, CCTV footage provided clear evidence of the fire spreading to Wang Tai House. At approximately 1509 hours⁴³, embers were observed falling onto the open ground in between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, igniting nearby combustibles. By 1516 hours, the area was obstructed by fallen burning bamboo debris, as shown in **Photos 5-9 (c) to (e)** and **Figure 5-12**.
- 5.2.3.4 As elaborated in paragraph 5.2.2.7, another video provided by the informant shows that at approximately 1515 hours, the scaffolding on the **south-east façade** of Wang Tai House, facing the cycling track, was alight, as shown in **Figure 5-9** and **Photo 5-7 (b)**.
- 5.2.3.5 Rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant was observed in three out of the four re-entrants of Wang Tai House, as shown in **Photos 5-10 (a) & (b)**, **Photo 5-11** and **Figure 5-13**. The first instance of vertical fire spread occurred along the **east re-entrant** of Wang Tai House at about 1516 hours (as shown in **Photo 5-10 (a)**). Shortly thereafter, a second instance of vertical fire spread was observed along the **south re-entrant** at about 1517 hours, as shown in **Photo 5-10 (b)**.

⁴¹ Witness statements from (i) POON [REDACTED], (ii) CHAN [REDACTED], (iii) HUI [REDACTED] and (iv) CHEN [REDACTED] at **Appendices A-13 to A-16** refer.

⁴² Witness statement of SStnO HUI at **Appendix A-29(A)** refers.

⁴³ Although the time shown on CCTV was 1510 hours, the system was approximately 61 secs ahead of the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1509 hours.

- 5.2.3.6 It is noteworthy that FS arrived at 1456 hours. Within 20 mins, the fire had rapidly spread from its point of origin on the flat roof of Wang Cheong House to multiple locations. The fire extended to the open ground surrounding Wang Cheong House, multiple façades of the building and different re-entrant spaces. It also spread into the residential units of Wang Cheong House. The blaze then progressed across buildings, reaching Wang Tai House and its re-entrant areas. The situation was further exacerbated by flying scaffolding debris falling from the building, which blocked entrances and significantly obstructed firefighting efforts.
- 5.2.3.7 At 1530 hours, another rapid fire spread was noted at the **west re-entrant** of Wang Tai House, as shown in **Photo 5-11**⁴⁴.
- 5.2.3.8 According to available materials, it was captured in the Cable TV footage that flames, originating from the ignited units, were observed issuing from the upper and mid-levels of the **south-west façade** of Wang Tai House at approximately 1553 hours, as shown in **Photo 5-12**.



*Photo 5-9 (a): Flying Embers Observed on the R/F of
Wang Tai House at About 1458 Hours*⁴⁵

⁴⁴ After the submission of the interim report, further investigation uncovered the rapid vertical fire spread at the **west re-entrant** of Wang Tai House. The spread is believed to have occurred at 1530 hours.

⁴⁵ Although the time shown on CCTV was 1457 hours, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1458 hours.



Photo 5-9 (b): A Reflection of the Fire was Captured by CCTV Installed on the Scaffolding of Wang Tai House at About 1503 Hours⁴⁶




Figure 5-11: Fire Spreading to the Safety Nets of Wang Tai House

⁴⁶ Although the time shown on CCTV was 1502 hours, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1501 hours.



Photo 5-9 (c): Embers Falling Onto the Open Ground Outside Wang Tai House



Photo 5-9 (d): Flaming Fire Observed



Photo 5-9 (e): Burning Bamboo Debris Piled up




Figure 5-12: Map Indicating the Footage Location



Photo 5-10 (a):
Fire Spread Along the East Re-Entrant
of Wang Tai House at 1516 Hours



Photo 5-10 (b):
Fire Spread Along the South
Re-Entrant of Wang Tai House at
1517 Hours



Figure 5-13: Map Indicating the
Fire Spread Along Re-Entrants at Wang Tai House



Photo 5-11: Rapid Fire Spread at the West Re-Entrant of Wang Tai House



Photo 5-12: Flames From Ignited Units on the South-West Façade of Wang Tai House

5.2.4 Other Buildings in Wang Fuk Court

5.2.4.1 During the fire, seven out of the eight buildings in Wang Fuk Court were set ablaze. In addition to Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, which have been detailed above, observations from frontline personnel suggest that the fire likely spread to the surrounding buildings in the following sequence:

	Building	Time of Spread
1.	Wang Shing House	15:20 hours
2.	Wang Kin House	15:25 hours
3.	Wang Sun House	15:25 hours
4.	Wang Tao House	15:39 hours
5.	Wang Yan House	16:04 hours

5.2.4.2 In addition to the buildings of Wang Fuk Court, Mr. TSANG [REDACTED]⁴⁷, a construction worker outside Flat 16 [REDACTED] of Wang Chi House, observed at an estimated time of 1500 hours a black, burning object with apparent weight falling from either Wang Cheong House or Wang Shing House. This burning object landed on the construction waste collection point of Wang Fuk Court, igniting the materials, as shown in **Figure 5-14**. This observation highlights the significant role of embers in contributing to the spread of the fire. The embers carried by wind or falling debris, acted as ignition sources, could spark secondary fires in different areas and accelerating the overall fire spread across multiple locations in the housing estate.

5.2.4.3 Another notable phenomenon observed during the fire was the rapid fire development within the re-entrants of Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House, Wang Shing House, Wang Tao House, Wang Sun House and Wang Yan House, as shown in **Figure 5-15**. This facilitated the rapid vertical spread of the fire across multiple levels. A detailed discussion would be provided in Section 6.2.1.




Figure 5-14: Fire Spread to the Construction Waste Collection Point

⁴⁷ Witness Statement of TSANG [REDACTED] at Appendix A-23 refers.




Figure 5-15: Rapid Fire Spread Along the Re-Entrants⁴⁸

5.3 Post-Fire Stage

- 5.3.1 Across the seven affected buildings, a total of 1,736 flats were assessed, of which the interiors of 924 flats sustained varying degrees of fire damage, while the interiors of the other 812 flats remained relatively unaffected despite that the exterior of the buildings had been damaged by the high temperature with prolonged exposure to fire. The post-fire conditions of the exterior of Wang Fuk Court are shown in **Photo 5-13**.
- 5.3.2 Over 50% of the interior of the flats in Wang Tai House, Wang Sun House and Wang Cheong House were severely damaged by fire. Details of the damage analysis are set out in **Appendix A-17**.
- 5.3.3 Although the interior of many flats in the other buildings sustained minimal or no damage from fire, seven out of the eight blocks (except for Wang Chi House) in Wang Fuk Court sustained varying degrees of fire damage. The post-fire exterior and interior photos of Wang Fuk Court are at **Appendices A-25 & A-26**.

⁴⁸ After the completion of the interim report, further investigation uncovered additional evidence of rapid fire spread. News footage revealed the fire's progression at the **north re-entrant** of Wang Sun House, while social media provided evidence of similar fire spread at the **west re-entrant** of Wang Tai House.

The investigation team made extensive efforts to search for clues and signs of fire spread across all buildings in Wang Fuk Court. Based on the available information, the identified rapid fire spread was marked in Figure 5-15. However, due to the limited availability of relevant footage and the restricted angles of the recordings, the findings may not fully cover all instances of such fire spread.

5.3.4 Apart from the physical condition of the interior of individual flats sustaining fire damage as explained in paragraphs 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 above, the seven affected buildings have been exposed to the fire as well as the water for firefighting for a prolonged period, hence, the building façades and structures as well as the building services systems such as lifts, electricity supply system, telecommunication system, water and gas supply system, drainage system, etc. have suffered severe damage. Therefore, the figures and information about the residential flats in paragraphs 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 are only recording the observations of the interior condition of the flats, but not the assessment on the overall habitability of the concerned flats and the entire Wang Fuk Court.



Photo 5-13: Post-Fire Condition of Wang Fuk Court

5.4 Response by FSD

5.4.1 Initial Response

5.4.1.1 Initially, one Hydraulic Platform (HP), one Major Pump (MP), one Light Rescue Unit (LRU), one Turntable Ladder (TL) and one Ambulance (Amb) were dispatched to attend the incident in accordance with the PDA⁴⁹.

5.4.1.2 Meanwhile, under the Contingency Plan for Wang Fuk Court under Major Maintenance Works, one additional MP and one additional LRU were also dispatched to attend the incident.

5.4.1.3 Under a separate departmental policy⁵⁰, due to the shutdown of the building's FSI at Wang Cheong House, one additional MP was dispatched to attend the incident upon receipt of the first fire call.

5.4.1.4 In summary, 1 HP, 3 MPs, 2 LRUs, 1 TL and 1 Amb were dispatched to attend the incident at the initial stage.

5.4.2 Incipient Stage of Fire

5.4.2.1 Upon receipt of more than one fire call, a Search and Rescue (SAR)⁵¹ team, comprising one HP and one LRU was also dispatched to attend the incident.

5.4.2.2 A MP, as Safety Support Team (SST)⁵², was also dispatched to attend the incident; while a LRU was also dispatched to convey Station Commander (StnC) Fanling Fire Station (FLFStn), ADO CHOW Tsz-ho, to the incident.

⁴⁹ The PDA specifies the mandatory minimum response that the FSD must mobilize for a given type of incident. It includes the required ranks of officers, as well as the number and types of fire appliances and ambulances to be deployed in response to fire and special service incidents.

⁵⁰ Paragraph 3.1.2 (a) of Departmental Policy Instructions / IV/ 4.2.16 "General Procedures for Handling Defective FSI/ FSI Shutdown" refers.

⁵¹ With a view to maximizing operational efficiency in multi-storey building fires when multiple fire calls or multiple assistance calls are received or when massive search and rescue/evacuation operation is anticipated, FSD has established a SAR strategy that involves deploying additional appliances beyond the initial attendance to ventilate staircases, perform search and rescue operations and facilitate evacuation. Each SAR Team comprises one pumping appliance (either an HP or MP) and one rescue appliance (either an Major Rescue Unit (MRU) or LRU). One Reserve Heavy Pump (RHP) equipped with a Positive Pressure Ventilation Blower and one Amb will also be dispatched with the first SAR Team. When receiving the 4th assistance request, the FSCC will dispatch an additional SAR Team comprising two fire appliances, as well as one Mobile Command Unit, to attend the incident. An additional talk group is exclusively allocated for SAR operations.

⁵² The SST assists the Incident Commander at the strategic level to monitor the operational safety and provide safety advice to frontline members.

5.4.2.3 The Incident Commander was SStnO HUI Kin-on, riding as Officer-in-charge (Oic) of Tai Po (TP)/HP, whereas the SAR team leader was Station Officer (StnO) WONG Tak-fai, riding as Oic of Tai Po East (TPE)/HP. In addition, Probationary Station Officer (PStnO) MA Man-ho, riding as Oic of Fanling (FL)/MP, took up the duty as SST at the very initial stage.

5.4.2.4 At the incipient stage, 2 HPs, 4 MPs, 4 LRUs, 1 TL, 1 RHP and 1 Amb with 61 FS members were dispatched to attend the incident, which equals to around 80% of required manpower deployment in a No.3 Alarm Fire (i.e. 79 FS members).

5.4.3 No.3 Alarm Fire

5.4.3.1 After the fire was raised to No.3 Alarm at 1502 hours, StnC TPFStn, ADO CHEUNG Lok-hang, arrived at scene at 1519 hours and temporarily took over command until Deputy Divisional Commander (New Territories East) (DDC(NTE)) LAM Ho-chun took over command as per relevant PDA.

5.4.3.2 Concurrently, the residents from the unaffected blocks were evacuating to the ground level on their own. At 1515 hours, Police set up FCP at scene. In line with usual collaboration, the police took initiative in evacuating residents in the surrounding using vehicle's public announcement system and loudhailers. Besides, Police Tactical Unit (PTU) entered Wang Chi House and Wang Yan House and successfully evacuated a total of 9 residents.⁵³ FS crews were tasked to activate fire alarms in the three unaffected blocks (i.e. Wang Tao, Wang Sun and Wang Kin House). They discovered that the FAS of the three blocks were inoperative. To buy critical time for residents to evacuate, FSD concentrated most available manpower on fire suppression at Wang Cheong and Wang Tai Houses to slow its progression towards the remaining not yet affected blocks.

5.4.3.3 Specialists and specialised units were dispatched to attend the incident after the fire was raised to a No.3 Alarm magnitude:

- Compartment Fire Specialists;
- Communications Support Team;
- Highrise Building Firefighting Specialists;
- Breathing Apparatus (BA) Unit;
- Tactical Support Unit; &
- Unmanned Aircraft System Team.

5.4.3.4 During the period of No.3 Alarm Fire, about 50 assistance calls from the public were received by FSCC. StnC FLFStn, ADO CHOW Tsz-ho, who arrived at scene at 1516 hours and subsequently assumed the duties of Rescue Officer, was responsible for the SAR operations at scene. In view of the overwhelming number of assistance calls, the Director of Fire Services (D of FS) YEUNG Yan-kin, Andy instructed the dispatch of 10

⁵³ Witness statement of CHEUNG Lui, Superintendent of Police, at Appendix A-109 refers.

additional SAR teams which was 10 times the usual deployment, each comprising 1 HP/MP and 1 MRU/LRU, to attend the incident.

5.4.3.5 To strengthen command and control, the Director's Command Post (DCP)⁵⁴ was also activated at 1520 hours.

5.4.3.6 Furthermore, D of FS instructed the mobilisation of about 80 uniformed members from non-operational units to set up a Support Centre with 18 dedicated telephone hotlines to collect updated situation of affected residents and provide on-going safety guidance⁵⁵, as shown in **Photo 5-14**.

5.4.3.7 At 1548 hours, ADO(Safety) CHOI Ka-wing arrived at scene to oversee operational safety matters.



Photo 5-14: Support Centre on 27.11.2025

5.4.3.8 Two TLs were deployed at this stage to suppress external fire spread to nearby buildings. The first TL arrived at the scene at 1504 hours and was positioned at the roundabout inside the Wang Fuk Court whereas the second TL arrived at the scene at 1523 hours and was positioned at Tai Po Road (Yuen Chau Tsai).

⁵⁴ The DCP was established to monitor the fire ground situation, ensure timely deployment of resources and orderly progression of SAR operations, as well as provide coordination, liaison and logistical support.

⁵⁵ The execution of the Call-back Mechanism (to update the situation of reported persons and to provide those with safety guidance) was handed over from FSCC to the Support Centre. Such arrangement alleviated the overwhelming workload from FSCC.

5.4.4 No.4 Alarm Fire

- 5.4.4.1 After the fire was raised to No.4 Alarm at 1534 hours, a total of 48 fire appliances, 13 Amb and 269 FS personnel, were dispatched to the scene. The manpower was about twice the PDA for a No. 5 Alarm Fire (i.e. 110 FS members). By 1534 hours, assistance calls from 35 units throughout Wang Fuk Court were received.
- 5.4.4.2 Within about an hour after the first report of fire, three TLs had arrived.
- 5.4.4.3 After the fire was raised to No.4 Alarm, DCFO(NTN) WONG King-man, took over command at 1550 hours.
- 5.4.4.4 At 1600 hours, Water Supplies Department was requested to increase the flow and pressure in the water mains in the vicinity to secure the water supply to fire appliances. Numerous portable pumps were also deployed to increase the jet pressure.
- 5.4.4.5 CFO(NTN) TANG Wing-wah assumed command at 1618 hours as per relevant PDA. At that instance, DCFO(NTN) WONG King-man was immediately redeployed as the Rescue Officer.
- 5.4.4.6 At 1610 hours, DD(Ops) CHAN Derek Armstrong arrived at scene to facilitate high-level communications, observe the operational progress and provide on-site strategic advice/instructions and support. He instructed that each building be assigned with a Senior Officer to direct firefighting and, where necessary, simultaneously oversee SAR operations.
- 5.4.4.7 There were six TLs at the scene at about 1621 hours.
- 5.4.4.8 By 1623 hours, assistance calls from 59 units throughout Wang Fuk Court were received.
- 5.4.4.9 At 1630 hours, DO(Safety) Gerald KWOK arrived at scene and assumed the duties of overseeing operational safety at scene.
- 5.4.4.10 Meanwhile, at 1640 hours, Deputy Director of Fire Services (Public Safety and Corporate Strategy) (DD(P&C)) WONG Ka-wing arrived at the Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre (EMSC) of the Security Bureau (SB) to facilitate high-level communication and maintain close liaison with other Government Bureaux and Departments regarding the fire's latest developments.

5.4.5 No.5 Alarm Fire (Peak Deployment)

- 5.4.5.1 DD(Ops) CHAN Derek Armstrong raised the fire to No.5 Alarm and assumed overall command at 1822 hours. At this instance, 116 fire appliances, 55 ambulances and 718 FS personnel were dispatched to attend the incident.
- 5.4.5.2 At the same instance, assistance calls from 82 units had been received. In this regard, DCFO(Fire Safety) WONG Sze-lut, Sunny, was directed by DCP to attend at 1906 hours to facilitate the communication for SAR operations among the fire ground, FSCC and the Support Centre as a special arrangement. By the conclusion of the incident, more than 100 persons were rescued from various locations in Wang Fuk Court. In addition to attending all assistance calls at 373 different locations⁵⁶, all remaining units on all floors of the affected blocks were attended by FS members to check for possible casualties.
- 5.4.5.3 As one of the special arrangements under these exceptional circumstances, CFO(New Territories South)(NTS) YIU Men-yeung was dispatched to attend the incident at 1925 hours to oversee operational safety.
- 5.4.5.4 By 2100 hours, 25 Senior Officers and Directorate Officers⁵⁷, including the ranks of D of FS, DD, CFO, DCFO, SDO and DO from both operational and non-operational units, were in attendance and engaged in various roles. By 2230 hours, more than 980 FS personnel were dispatched to attend the incident, reflecting a **scale of mobilisation significantly greater than that of a typical fire incident**.
- 5.4.5.5 By the conclusion of the incident, 8 TLs were deployed at strategic locations including the emergency vehicular access of Wang Fuk Court, Tai Po Road (Yuen Chau Tsai), Island House Lane and Yuen Shin Road.
- 5.4.5.6 As a special relief arrangement at 0900 hours on 27.11.2025, coach services were employed to convey fresh manpower en-bloc from different fire stations to the scene for changeover.
- 5.4.5.7 A summary and comparison of the appliances and manpower deployed for this incident, relative to a typical No.5 Alarm Fire, is provided in the following table.

⁵⁶ Following a thorough review of operational records, the assistance calls were found to cover 373 locations rather than 347.

⁵⁷ Following a thorough review of attendance records, the total number of Senior Officers and Directorate Officers who attended the incident was amended from 22 to 25.

Time	Alarm	Appliances Dispatched	Manning Dispatched	Relative to No.5 Alarm Fire PDA
1451 hrs	No.1	Time of Call		
1456 hrs		Arrival		
1502 hrs	No.3	13	61	
1520 hrs		Set up DCP (deployed 10 additional SAR Teams) and Support Centre manned by about 80 staff		
1534 hrs	No.4	61	269	Appliance : 2.3 Times Manning : 2.4 Times
1822 hrs	No.5	171	718	Appliance : 6.6 Times Manning : 6.5 Times
2230 hrs		221	989	Appliance : 8.5 Times Manning : 9 Times

5.4.6 Summary of Special Arrangements

- 5.4.6.1 Given the complexity and challenges of the fire, the FSD recognized that the strategy could not rely solely on established action plans to address the situation. Instead, the strategy needed to adapt and respond dynamically as the incident evolved.⁵⁸ The aforementioned special arrangements have been tabulated as below; these arrangements, not covered under existing procedures and guidelines, helped enhance operational efficiency of frontline Officers:

⁵⁸ The FSD opted against an alert through the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which disseminates public announcements and messages to mobile service users via mobile networks during emergency situations such as extreme weather, major public safety incidents and large-scale public health incidents. Activation would take time and could prompt residents to evacuate through smoke-filled common areas, placing them at greater risk.

Special Arrangements	Details
Early Activation of DCP	• D of FS instructed the early activation of the DCP.
Strengthening Command Structure	• Senior Directorates were deployed to both the scene and the EMSC of SB to ensure seamless communication and coordination across all levels of the operation; • DCFO WONG King-man was assigned by the Incident Commander to take on the role of Rescue Officer and oversee SAR operations, a role typically undertaken by the first attending ADO; • DCFO WONG Sze-lut, Sunny was directed by DCP to the scene to facilitate the communication for SAR operations among the fire ground, FSCC and the Support Centre; • CFO YIU Men-yeung was directed by DCP to the scene to monitor operational safety issues which would typically be undertaken by the Senior Officer of Safety Policy and Compliance Unit (SPCU); and • DD CHAN Derek Armstrong instructed that Senior Officers be assigned to lead firefighting operations and SAR operations for each affected building.
Exceptional Resources Deployment	• D of FS instructed FSCC to dispatch 10 additional SAR Teams; • Mobilisation of about 80 uniformed members to establish a Support Centre. This was intended to manage the surge in assistance calls and alleviate the heavy workload of the FSCC; • As at 2100 hours on 26.11.2025, a total of 25 Senior Officers and Directorate Officers, including the ranks of DO, SDO, DCFO, CFO, DD and D of FS from both operational and non-operational units, were present at the scene. These officers played critical roles in commanding and coordinating the response to the fire. This arrangement is far beyond the PDA for a No.5 Alarm Fire; and • Special relief arrangement was made by using coach services to convey the fresh manpower en-bloc from different fire stations to the scene for changeover.

5.4.7 Shutdown of FH/HR System During the Operation

- 5.4.7.1 As noted in paragraph 4.2.4, the FH/HR systems of each block were shut down. During the post-fire investigation, it was confirmed that both the FH/HR system and the FAS were shut down across all eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court before the incident. Comparatively, the IFITF determined that the failure of the FAS was the more critical factor than the shutdown of FH/HR system in contributing to the heavy fatalities and casualties (details provided in Section 10.4). Nevertheless, observations regarding the FH/HR system are detailed below.
- 5.4.7.2 Outlets are installed within protected staircases on each floor. In a typical building fire, firefighters deploy one or two hoses from the hydrant system for firefighting. The water supply comes either from the building's fire service tank or from fire appliances via the inlet, with fire pumps maintaining pressure and flow. During a prolonged firefighting operation, firefighters have to rely on a continuous supply from the appliances once the building's tank is exhausted. Normally, a malfunctioning hydrant system would affect water pressure for firefighting on upper floors.
- 5.4.7.3 However, the Wang Fuk Court fire was an extreme case. In the early stage, when the fire spread rapidly along the external wall, FSD tackled the fire by deploying water jets from the open ground. Water was supplied directly from fire appliances outside the building; thus, the internal hydrant system was not yet in used by firefighters at that stage. When the fire spread indoors, the fallen burning articles, such as bamboo scaffolding, foam boards, wooden planks and canvas piled up on the ground and prevented firefighters from entering. In the later stage, failure of the fire pumps in the fire hydrant systems did hinder firefighting on upper floors. However, portable booster pumps were strategically deployed by firefighters at mid-levels to maintain pressure and flow. The inoperative fire hydrant system posed challenges to firefighting operations; however, these challenges were not insurmountable. Frontline personnel successfully navigated these difficulties.
- 5.4.7.4 The hose reel system is designed for occupants to extinguish small indoor fires in the early stage under safe conditions. Hose reels can cover all areas on the same floor but require manual operations by the occupants. This system can be effective if residents detect a fire early, quickly run out the hose reel from the corridor through the unit to the window and apply water to the fire.

- 5.4.7.5 If the hose reel system is under maintenance or out of service, temporary alternatives should be provided, such as placing 9-liter water fire extinguishers on every other floor. However, in the Wang Fuk Court fire, by the time residents noticed the fire, it had already become severe. As a result, the hose reel system or its alternative water fire extinguisher would not have been suitable for extinguishing a fire of this magnitude.
- 5.4.7.6 Given the extreme circumstances detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the shutdown of the FH/HR system had minimal impact in this unprecedented situation. The presence or absence of water in the fire service water tank at Wang Fuk Court was unlikely to have a significant influence on the overall firefighting operation.

Chapter 6 – Cause and Spread of Fire

6.1 Cause of Fire

- 6.1.1 Based on the available evidence, the fire is believed to have originated from the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House.
- 6.1.2 Neither traces of accelerants nor evidence of suspicious activity immediately prior to the fire were identified at the scene. Accordingly, a **deliberate act with the use of accelerant is considered unlikely** to be the cause of the fire.
- 6.1.3 According to the statements of the construction workers, at the material time, only mosaic tile installation work was being carried out in the vicinity. There was no indication at the scene of any welding process that could have generated molten metal droplets as a potential ignition source.
- 6.1.4 Excavations in the vicinity surrounding the suspected point of origin were carried out by the FSD. Subsequently, FSD, GL and EMSD conducted their independent investigations and follow-up examinations separately. All departments submitted their investigations in writing to the IFITF, which have been incorporated into this report and are attached in the appendices as follows:
- **Appendix A-18**: Report from the Fire Investigation Team of FSD
 - **Appendix A-3-8** ^[59]: Statement from Dr. LEE Wing-man of GL
 - **Appendix A-20**: Report from the Electricity Legislation Division (ELD) of EMSD
 - **Appendix A-21**: Report from the Gas Standards Office (GSO) of EMSD
- 6.1.5 Post-fire inspections conducted by the EMSD ruled out both electrical faults and Liquefied Petroleum Gas-related causes as potential causes of the fire.

⁵⁹ **Appendix A-19** of the Interim Report of IFITF has been re-arranged as **Appendix A-3-8** in the Final Report.

- 6.1.6 Debris up to 2m in height was located at the suspected point of origin, as shown in **Photo 6-1**. After removing the burnt debris that had fallen from above during the fire, the debris at the bottom was examined and found to comprise various construction materials, including remnants of safety nets, toe-boards and polystyrene window covers⁶⁰, as shown in **Photo 6-2**, two cigarette ends, one of which is shown in **Photo 6-3**, a woven plastic sack containing a collection of backing papers of mosaic tiles and a substantial amount of burnt remnants of carton paper boxes, as shown in **Photo 6-4**. The accumulation of combustible materials in the area could have served as fuel for the fire.
- 6.1.7 Among the materials found at the suspected point of origin, paper-based items such as carton paper boxes and the backing papers of mosaic tiles were susceptible to smouldering⁶¹ when exposed to a glowing source, such as lit cigarettes.
- 6.1.8 Evidence of smoking was observed in multiple locations. Two cigarette ends were found at the affected flat roof. Additionally, numerous cigarette ends were discovered on the bamboo scaffolding of Wang Chi House, indicating that smoking and the improper disposal of cigarette ends were not uncommon practices at construction sites, as shown in **Photos 6-5 (a) to (d)**. Further supporting this observation, CCTV footage captured construction workers smoking on the R/F of Wang Cheong House, as shown in **Photos 6-5 (e) & (f)**. Furthermore, at least 5 occupants of Wang Cheong House had occasionally noticed that the smell of smoke and the presence of cigarette butts on the scaffolding⁶². One of them⁶³ even reported witnessing a worker smoking on the scaffolding.⁶⁴
- 6.1.9 On the day of the fire, the HKO issued a Red Fire Danger Warning⁶⁵, with relative humidity levels measuring between 40% to 50% from 1500 to 1800 hours. These low humidity levels reduced the moisture content in materials, rendering them more prone to combustion and more conducive to fire spread. The dry atmosphere also facilitated the development of smouldering fires, which may initially go unnoticed, but could later develop into open flames, thereby further contributing to the fire's extensive spread.

⁶⁰ According to the Witness Statement (**Appendix A-57**) of CHAU [REDACTED], Occupant of Flat 1 [REDACTED] at Wang Cheong House, she noticed a large amount of waste, including polystyrene window covers, that had fallen from higher levels and accumulated on the flat roof outside her kitchen.

⁶¹ Unlike flaming combustion which produces visible flames, smouldering fire occurs when materials burn slowly without enough oxygen to sustain a flame. A smouldering fire can persist unnoticed for hours or even days and may later reignite into open flames when conditions become favourable.

⁶² Witness Statements of Occupants at **Appendices A-57** to **A-61** refer.

⁶³ Witness Statement of CHAN [REDACTED] at **Appendix A-62** refers.

⁶⁴ According to the statements and questionnaires of the occupants of Wang Fuk Court, 105 out of 2,011 reported witnessing smoking, smelling cigarette smoke or noticing cigarette ends within Wang Fuk Court during the renovation period.

⁶⁵ The Fire Danger Warning System aims at alerting the public to conditions in which fires may start and spread easily. The chance of fire outbreaks when fire danger warnings are issued is much higher than the average. The Red Fire Danger Warning will be issued when the fire risk is extreme. The issuance of warnings are based on: (a) weather conditions favouring the occurrence and spread of fires, such as low humidity and high wind speed; and (b) information on the dryness of vegetation supplied by the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department.

- 6.1.10 No other sources of ignition could be identified at the suspected point of origin. As such, with no contradictory evidence suggesting otherwise, the IFITF was satisfied that the fire was most likely accidental in nature. Most probably: A glowing source, such as a lit cigarette end, ignited combustible materials, such as carton paper boxes, at the scene.



Photo 6-1: Debris Piled up on the Flat Roof Outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House



Photo 6-2: Polystyrene Window Covers Found at the Suspected Fire Origin



Photo 6-3: One of the Cigarette Ends Found at the Subject Flat Roof



Photo 6-4: Burnt Remnants of Carton Paper Boxes



Photos 6-5 (a) & (b): Cigarette Ends Found on the
First Level Scaffolding at Wang Chi House



Photos 6-5 (c) & (d): Cigarette Boxes Found on the
First Level Scaffolding at Wang Chi House



Photos 6-5 (e) & (f): Construction Workers Were Smoking on R/F of Wang Cheong House at About 1411 hours and 1445 Hours⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Although the times shown on the CCTV were 1410 hours and 1444 hours respectively, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual times approximately 1411 hours and 1445 hours.

6.2 Hypothesis on Spread of Fire

6.2.1 Rapid Vertical Fire Spread

6.2.1.1 As outlined in Section 6.1, the fire was believed to have originated from the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House. Initially mild, the fire rapidly intensified, spreading uncontrollably along the vertical re-entrant filled with combustibles, eventually engulfing the entire re-entrant.

6.2.1.2 Fires typically self-extinguish when fuel near the ignition point is depleted. However, external fire spread can occur rapidly when abundant combustible materials are present on building façades or in surrounding areas.

6.2.1.3 In this case, the re-entrant's significant fuel load sustained the fire's progression. Combustible materials included:

- bamboo scaffolding,
- safety nets,
- wooden planks,
- toe-boards,
- canvas,
- nylon strips; and
- polystyrene window covers.

These materials provided a continuous fuel source across multiple levels, enabling rapid vertical fire spread, as shown in **Photos 6-6 (a) & (b)**.

6.2.1.4 Convective heat transfer played a critical role in the fire's rapid spread. The hot gases (comprising pyrolyzed gases⁶⁷ and gaseous combustion products, mixed with surrounding air) rose due to density differences, efficiently transferring heat.

6.2.1.5 Rising hot smoke and gases carried embers and particles upward, igniting combustible materials along the pathway. This process intensified the fire by creating a feedback mechanism, where higher temperatures further accelerated the blaze.

⁶⁷ Pyrolysis is the thermal decomposition of a material caused by high temperatures. This process breaks down the material's structure, releasing gases as by-products and leaving behind char, a carbon-rich solid residue. These gases, known as pyrolyzed gases, are often highly flammable and can ignite when mixed with the right amount of air and exposed to a heat source.

- 6.2.1.6 The vertical re-entrant, like other structural shafts such as lift shafts and light wells, naturally channelled rising smoke and hot gases. Its chimney-like configuration confined and directed their upward movement, allowing the fire to spread rapidly and engulf multiple floors in a short timeframe.
- 6.2.1.7 Winds⁶⁸ blowing into the re-entrant further intensified the fire by supplying abundant oxygen, accelerating the upward spread.
- 6.2.1.8 The construction materials collected at scene were examined by both GL and fire engineering professionals. The detailed examination reports are attached in **Appendices A-3-2 to A-3-9**. A summary of key findings from the available reports is presented in the following table.

<i>Materials</i>	<i>Key Findings</i>	<i>Examined by</i>
<i>Safety nets</i>	The safety nets were made of mainly polyethylene which is combustible. Regardless of their susceptibility to ignition upon flame impingement, the safety nets would inevitably be consumed in a well-developed fire and in turn serve as fuel to sustain and spread the fire. <u><i>Burning droplets generated from the combustion of safety nets would serve as new ignition source sparks new fire.</i></u> It is believed that different types of safety nets were used in Wang Fuk Court, as varying burning behaviours were observed even when testing samples collected from the same building.	GL <u>Appendices A-3-4, A-3-6 to A-3-9</u>
<i>Polystyrene window covers</i>	As reported in <u>A-3-3</u>, the material was confirmed to be polystyrene foam boards. Two types of polystyrene foam boards were identified in Wang Fuk Court. One type demonstrated self-extinguishment within 6 to 7 secs after the ignition source was removed; while the other was ignited by a direct small flame and sustained burning with the formation of flaming droplets. The burning behaviour of the latter matched the reported behaviour described in <u>A-3-2</u>. - the cover was readily ignitable with a naked flame - Burning droplets, which could serve as a source of secondary ignition, were observed.	GL <u>Appendices A-3-2 & A-3-3</u>

⁶⁸ An east to south-east wind, at approximately 14 km/hr, was recorded by HKO at 1500 hours on 26.11.2025.

Canvas⁶⁹

There were two types of canvas used to cover construction materials or to be laid along the interior of the working platform in Wang Fuk Court. They are mainly made of polyethylene or a mixture of polyethylene and polypropylene.

Laboratory examinations revealed that both types of canvas were more susceptible to sustained burning after flame impingement than the safety nets, with some producing burning droplets⁷⁰. Therefore, if a fire were to be initiated in the working platform, the canvas would easily ignite, quickly spreading the fire to nearby combustibles and leading to rapid fire development.

The risk of fire spread from building to building would be increased if they were all covered by combustible materials such as canvas and safety nets.

GL
Appendices
A-3-5 & A-3-6

Toe-boards

The boards were found to be orange corrugated polypropylene boards and were readily ignited by a direct small flame with the formation of flaming droplets.

GL
Appendix
A-3-3

Corrugated plastic boards

There are three types of corrugated plastic boards, i.e. 9mm-thick, 5mm-thick and 2mm-thick. The 9mm-thick boards were found to be less susceptible to ignition upon exposure to flame. The remaining two types were found to be readily ignited by the application of a flame and to sustain burning with the generation of burning droplets.

GL
Appendix
A-3-3

6.2.1.9 Detailed findings of the examination results are provided in **Appendices A-3-2 to A-3-9.**

6.2.1.10 Similar rapid vertical fire spread within the re-entrant was observed in other buildings.

⁶⁹ In this context, “canvas” refers to the “green plastic sheeting” and “blue-white plastic sheeting” mentioned in the reports from GL.

⁷⁰ Tests on 11 canvas samples collected from Wang Fuk Court or procured from local suppliers revealed that, except for one allegedly treated with fire retardant, all sustained flaming combustion for over 4 secs and produced burning droplets.

- 6.2.1.11 Cable TV footage provided a clear view of the fire spreading through the re-entrant of Wang Tao House, showing that the rapid vertical fire spread was likely caused by the ignition of pyrolyzed gases, generated from the pyrolysis of combustible materials (such as bamboo scaffolding, safety nets, canvas, wooden planks, toe-boards and polystyrene window covers), which had accumulated within the re-entrant, as shown in **Photos 6-7 (a) to (e)**.



Photos 6-6 (a) & (b): Continuous Fuel Source in the Re-Entrant



Photo 6-7 (a): The Re-Entrant of Wang Tao House
Remained Unaffected in 1600 Hours



Photo 6-7 (b): Flying Embers and Debris Spreading From Wang Sun House to Wang Tao House



Photo 6-7 (c): Suspected Pyrolyzed Gases From Combustibles Accumulated in the Re-Entrant



Photo 6-7 (d): Flaming Fire Observed in the Lower Portion of Wang Tao House



Photo 6-7 (e): Fire Spread Vertically throughout Wang Tao House

6.2.2 Fire Spread Into Units

- 6.2.2.1 As previously discussed in paragraphs 5.2.2.6, 5.2.2.9 and 5.2.3.8, it was observed that fire spread into different units of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House over a short duration. While the ignition of combustible materials inside the domestic units could possibly be attributed to radiant heat⁷¹, it is more likely that the fire was spread from the building's exterior to its interior through openings such as broken or open windows.
- 6.2.2.2 Once inside domestic units, the fire encountered a wide range of combustible materials, including furniture, curtains, bedding, clothing, paper, plastics and electronic appliances. These materials provided abundant fuel sources, allowing the fire to grow rapidly and sustain itself for an extended period.
- 6.2.2.3 The enclosed nature of the domestic units further intensified the fire. As more items ignited, the temperature within the units rose, causing additional materials therein to reach their respective ignition temperatures. This chain reaction accelerated the fire development, enabling it to engulf the entire unit, as shown in **Photo 6-8**.

⁷¹ Radiant heat: Heat that travel as invisible waves through the air. Radiated heat spreads in all directions and heats whatever it touches. Burning buildings can radiate heat to surrounding structures, sometimes even passing through glass windows and igniting objects inside.
(Source of Reference: NFPA
<https://www.nfpa.org/es/about-nfpa/press-room/reporters-guide-to-fire/all-about-fire>)



Photo 6-8: Multiple Units on Fire at Wang Fuk Court

6.2.3 Secondary Ignitions

- 6.2.3.1 Witness accounts and CCTV footage, as shown in **Photos 6-9 (a) & (b)**, revealed that **winds carried embers** — small, burning fragments of combustibles — to nearby structures, where they ignited safety nets, construction debris and other combustible materials. These embers posed a significant risk as they could travel long distances, land on exposed surfaces and ignite new fires far from the original source.
- 6.2.3.2 In addition to wind-driven embers, burning safety nets melted and dripped as **fire droplets** onto lower floors, serving as an ignition source for other combustible materials, as shown in **Photo 6-10**. **Falling debris** also contributed to the fire spread, igniting combustible materials on lower floors and at ground level.
- 6.2.3.3 At the time of the fire, the buildings in Wang Fuk Court were undergoing major renovation, which led to their external walls being surrounded by scaffolding and construction related materials. These materials included bamboo scaffolding, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, toe-boards, canvas, wooden planks, nylon strips, miscellaneous construction materials and debris (e.g. carton paper boxes and backing papers of mosaic tiles, etc.). Together, these materials created a combustible “envelope” enclosing the buildings and provided an abundant fuel source for the fire. This envelope allowed the ignition by the wind-driven embers, flaming droplets and falling debris.

- 6.2.3.4 Among these materials, the buildings in Wang Fuk Court were enclosed by safety nets, as shown in **Photos 6-11 (a) & (b)**. In general, if these nets were made of FR materials, even if ignited, the fire would likely have self-extinguished⁷² after the removal of the heat source, thereby minimizing the risk of igniting other combustible materials and reducing the overall spread of the fire.
- 6.2.3.5 The presence of safety nets potentially lacking FR properties, combined with dry and windy conditions created an ideal environment for the fire to spread and for embers to spark additional fires.
- 6.2.3.6 As mentioned in paragraph 6.1.9, the HKO issued a Red Fire Danger Warning on the day of the fire. Between 1500 and 1800 hours, relative humidity levels were recorded at 40% to 50%. These low humidity levels significantly reduced the moisture content of materials, making them more susceptible to ignition and accelerating fire spread. The dry atmospheric conditions also facilitated the formation of smouldering fires, which could initially go unnoticed but later reignite, further contributing to the extensive spread of the fire.
- 6.2.3.7 Winds intensified the fire's progression by supplying additional oxygen to the flames, increasing the fire's heat and causing it to grow more quickly and uncontrollably.
- 6.2.3.8 Winds further accelerated the fire's progression by carrying embers — burning fragments of construction materials — over considerable distances. These embers ignited combustible materials such as safety nets, construction debris and other items on nearby buildings and structures. The resulting fires at multiple locations made firefighting efforts significantly more challenging and complicated deployment strategies.
- 6.2.3.9 The combination of potentially non-FR safety nets and other combustibles, together with low humidity and strong winds, accelerated the fire's spread. Wind-transported embers, dripping fire droplets and falling debris continuously sparked new fires in surrounding areas. While some of these ignitions resulted in immediate visible flames, others may have caused smouldering fires — slow-burning, low-temperature fires that remained undetected. These smouldering fires posed a hidden danger, as they could persist unnoticed for hours or even days, and suddenly reignite into open flames when conditions became favorable, further complicating firefighting efforts.

⁷² For instance, according to the testing requirement under GB5725-2009 standard for safety nets, any flaming combustion is required to self-extinguish within 4 secs after the removal of the external fire source, which could significantly reduce the risk of fire spread.



Photos 6-9 (a) & (b): Flying Embers Suspected Spreading From
Wang Cheong House to Wang Tai House at About 1506 and 1511 Hours⁷³

⁷³ Although the times shown on CCTV were 1507 and 1512 hours, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual times approximately 1506 and 1511 hours.



Photo 6-10: Flaming Droplets From Burning Safety Nets



Photos 6-11 (a) & (b): Buildings in Wang Fuk Court Enveloped by Safety Nets

Chapter 7 – Scientific Analysis ⁷⁴

7.1 Background

- 7.1.1 In addition to the investigation methodologies outlined in Sections 3.2 to 3.4, fire engineering professionals engaged in Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) fire simulations and full-scale fire tests in Sichuan between late January, early February and April 2026 in order to examine the hypotheses in Chapter 6⁷⁵.
- 7.1.2 At the Sichuan University of Science and Engineering (四川輕化工大學), a three-storey model replicating the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 was constructed. This model was used to conduct a series of full-scale fire tests, including experiments within a cone calorimeter setup to measure the heat release rate (HRR), observe glass behaviour under fire, assess fire development and study the impact of materials such as **bamboo scaffolding, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, wooden planks, canvas and toe-boards** on fire spread⁷⁶.
- 7.1.3 Apart from providing visual observations of fire development under different scenarios, the data collected from the tests were used to validate the CFD fire simulation results and serve as a foundation for further CFD simulations of different fire scenarios.

7.2 Full-Scale Fire Tests

7.2.1 Test Setup

- 7.2.1.1 The three-storey model, approximately 9m in height, was constructed within a mega-scale cone calorimeter, as shown in **Photo 7-1 (a)**. The model replicated the portion of the re-entrant outside Flats 4 and 5 from the 1/F to 3/F levels of Wang Cheong House, as shown in **Figures 7-1 (a) & (b)**. Scaffolding, fitted with safety nets of varying FR properties, was erected around the model. Wooden planks and toe-boards were also included in the scaffolding setup, as shown in **Photos 7-1 (b) to (e)**.
- 7.2.1.2 Wooden cribs were used as the fire source in the tests, as shown in **Figure 7-2** and **Photos 7-2 (a) & (b)**.

⁷⁴ The new chapters, “Scientific Analysis” and “Validation of Hypothesis”, in the Final Report build upon Section 6.3 “Validation of Hypothesis” from the Interim Investigation Report.

⁷⁵ The expert report submitted by FE Professionals in Feb 2026, which was included in the interim report, has now been incorporated as Appendix A of **Appendix A-27**.

⁷⁶ According to the Cone Calorimeter Analysis, the fire behaviour of bamboo, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, wooden planks and toe-boards used in the fire tests was broadly comparable to that of the materials recovered from the scene. Details are provided in **Appendix A-27**.



Photo 7-1 (a): The Mega-Scale Cone Calorimeter



Figure 7-1 (a): Replicated Portion of Wang Cheong House




Figure 7-1 (b): Schematic of the Test Model⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Glass windows of six kitchens and six foyers were reconstructed to match the original layout; while staircase openings were fitted with either glass panels, Class B fire-rated glass windows with 60 min fire resistance period, wooden boards or aluminium composite panels.



Photo 7-1 (b):
Scaffolding Setup



Photo 7-1 (c):
External View With Safety Nets




Photo 7-1 (d):
Internal View of Scaffolding



Photo 7-1 (e):
Internal View With Safety Nets




Figure 7-2:
Location of the Fire Source on the Flat
Roof of the Test Model



Photo 7-2 (a):
Setup of Wooden Cribs as the Fire
Source



Photo 7-2 (b):
Setup of Wooden Cribs in the Test

7.2.2 Test Arrangement

7.2.2.1 A series of fire tests were conducted to examine:

- The impact of FR properties on fire development under different initial fire conditions⁷⁸ ;
- Fire hazards, spread risks and smoke toxicity⁷⁹ of polystyrene window covers;
- The effectiveness of opening protection materials in staircases;
- Secondary ignition behaviour and time-to-ignition analysis of construction materials involved; and
- The influence of FR properties in safety nets and canvas on fire development.

7.2.2.2 Thirteen major fire tests were conducted, with a brief summary provided in the table below. Detailed descriptions and results of the tests are available in Appendix A-27:

⁷⁸ Fire scenarios with initial fire sources having HRR below 1.5 Megawatts (MW) or approximately 2.5 MW were used in the fire tests.

⁷⁹ Among the 168 fatalities, toxicological reports indicated that 102 individuals had blood carbon monoxide saturation levels ranging from 15% to 80%.

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Polystyrene Covers	Canvas
1	Below 1.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified) ⁸⁰	No	No
2	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR) ⁸¹	No	No
3	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	No	No
4	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No	No
5	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	Yes	No
6	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	No
7	Below 1.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR) ⁸²	No	No
8	2.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No	No
9	2.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) ⁸³	Yes	Non-FR ⁸⁴
10	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	FR
11	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No	FR
12	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	FR
13	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	Non-FR

⁸⁰ **Sample 1 (Uncertified) safety nets:** It was procured from the supplier without any accompanying certification. Given the tight schedule, it was initially presumed that the safety nets lacked FR properties. Fire tests and safety net testing by GL were then carried out in parallel. However, subsequent testing by GL confirmed that, despite the safety nets being uncertified, the samples exhibited a certain degree of FR properties. (Appendix A-3-7)

Of the four samples tested, three met the requirements of the GB 5725-2009 standard, while one sample failed. These varied results suggest a potential inconsistency in FR properties of the safety nets. Therefore, Sample 1 was renamed from “non-FR safety nets” to “uncertified safety nets” to better reflect the findings. The “non-FR safety nets” as mentioned in the GL report at Appendix A-3-7 referred to this sample.

⁸¹ **Sample 2 (FR) safety nets:** It conformed to both GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008. No testing laboratory in Hong Kong was found capable of conducting fire tests in accordance with NFPA 701:2019.

⁸² **Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets:** Following the fire, FE professionals faced challenges in procuring safety nets that did not meet the standards of GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008. As a result, they resorted to producing such safety nets through induced thermal deterioration. Uncertified safety net samples were thermally deteriorated for at least 4 hours in an electric thermostatic forced-air drying oven (4 kW) at 120°C. The non-FR safety net used in the tests was non-compliant with both GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008 standards. Test reports are included in Appendix A-27.

⁸³ **Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets:** The samples were collected by the HKPF from Wang Chi House building façades and from some unused samples at ground level. They were subsequently sent to Sichuan for fire testing.

⁸⁴ While the canvas used in the test was not collected from the scene, its FR properties and its chemical composition were similar to the canvas from Wang Fuk Court. The test reports from GL are included in Appendices A-3-5 and A-3-6.

7.2.3 Key Findings From the Fire Tests

7.2.3.1 Prior to the conduction of 13 fire tests, three primary studies were carried out to establish a preliminary understanding of fire dynamics. The findings are briefly summarized in the following paragraphs:

- HRR study of the re-entrant configuration
- Fire severity analysis
- Comparison of fire behaviour of safety net samples collected from Wang Chi House

HRR Study of the Re-Entrant Configuration

7.2.3.2 An HRR study⁸⁵ was conducted to understand fire behaviour under both open and re-entrant configurations. The results showed the re-entrant configuration increased the peak HRR to slightly over 3 MW, compared with approximately 1 MW for the open configuration and exhibited a significantly faster growth rate.⁸⁶

Fire Severity Analysis

7.2.3.3 A fire test replicating the exact design at Wang Fuk Court⁸⁷ was conducted to evaluate fire development and severity. As shown in **Photos 7-3 (a) to (c)**. Initially, the fire developed slowly for the first 30 mins but then grew significantly at a rapid rate afterward.⁸⁸ This progression mirrored the rapid fire spread observed at Wang Fuk Court, where the fire engulfed multiple floors within minutes.

7.2.3.4 Fire and hot smoke were observed to spread into the units during the test. From approximately 30 mins onward, the foyer and kitchen windows of the re-entrant were progressively broken by the developing fire. This allowed naked flames and hot smoke from the re-entrant to enter the premises and ignite combustible materials inside the units.

⁸⁵ Fire tests used wooden cribs with a total mass of 184 kg as the fire source. To examine the impact of the re-entrant configuration on fire size, comparative tests were performed with and without the test model.

⁸⁶ A similar observation was noted for the small fire source, with its HRR measured at 0.6 MW in the re-entrant configuration and 0.4 MW in the open configuration.

⁸⁷ Scaffolding with four layers of horizontal working platforms, replicating the exact design at Wang Fuk Court, was constructed outside the three-storey model. Safety nets with FR properties enclosed the scaffolding, with wooden planks and toe-boards installed. Polystyrene window covers were not used. Due to the intense fire during the fire severity analysis, which consumed most combustibles in the re-entrant and made it challenging to isolate the individual effects of each component, subsequent tests used the same scaffolding model but reduced the number of horizontal platforms from **four** to **two** in the 13 fire tests.

⁸⁸ The HRR increased from 1 MW at 30 mins to 24 MW at 34 mins, peaking shortly afterward at 29 MW. This peak value was comparable to the burning intensity of a bus or heavy goods truck in a tunnel fire. (Source of Reference: NFPA 502: “Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways”, NFPA, 2026)

7.2.3.5 The measured heat flux in the re-entrant became extreme, peaking at over 100kW/m² and exceeding the radiative ignition thresholds⁸⁹ of approximately 20 kW/m² between 31 mins and 34 mins. Therefore, the possibility of radiative ignition remained plausible.

7.2.3.6 All safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks in the re-entrant area were consumed completely. Fire load estimations of re-entrant in the fire severity analysis are summarized in the following table.

Material	Weight before Test	Weight after Test	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	1296.20 kg	153.56 kg	1142.64 kg	17391.03 MJ	77.89%
Safety Nets	24.57 kg	0 kg	24.57 kg	265.00 MJ	1.19%
Toe-Boards	11.66 kg	0 kg	11.664 kg	270.25 MJ	1.21%
Wooden Planks	262.08 kg	0 kg	262.08 kg	3050.61 MJ	13.66%
Wooden Cribs	184.00 kg	101.20 kg	82.80 kg	1350.00 MJ	6.05%
Total Energy Released:				22326.89 MJ	100.00%

7.2.3.7 Bamboo was the dominant fuel source, contributing nearly 78% of the total energy released, followed by wooden planks (14%). Despite bamboo's dominance as a fuel, the test revealed that other materials, such as safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks, ignited first due to their relatively lower thermal resistance. As the fire intensified, bamboo, despite its relatively good thermal resistance, was eventually ignited since it is not a non-combustible material.



Photo 7-3 (a): The Fire Condition at 30 Mins With HRR at About 1MW



Photo 7-3 (b): The Fire Condition at 34 Mins With HRR Peaked at 29 MW

⁸⁹ A value of 20kW/m² represents the ignition flux at an ignition time of approximately 180s for box cardboard. (Source of Reference: R.D. Peacock (1999). Defining flashover for fire hazard calculations. Fire Safety Journal, 32(1999), 331-345.)



Photo 7-3 (c): Severe Fire Development Observed in the Test

Comparison of Fire Behaviour of Safety Net Samples Collected From Wang Chi House

7.2.3.8 Tests were conducted to evaluate the fire behaviour of the safety net samples⁹⁰ collected from Wang Chi House, as shown in **Photo 7-4 (a)** and **Figure 7-3**.

7.2.3.9 In the comparison tests, the safety nets collected from Wang Chi House exhibited a more rapid spread, even when compared to Sample 3 (Non-FR) safety nets, as shown in **Photos 7-4 (b) to (k)**. Furthermore, the safety nets collected from Wang Chi House were completely consumed by the end of the tests.



Photo 7-4(a):
The Mobile Platform Setup




Figure 7-3:
Schematic of the Test Setup⁹¹

⁹⁰ The unused Wang Chi House safety nets were each attached with a label showing that the manufacturer is 滨州市源进化纤绳网有限公司. According to information from the HKPF, the renovation contractor of Wang Fuk Court ordered a delivery of 2,500 safety nets to Wang Fuk Court which was marked as “綠不阻燃網” from the same manufacturer on 28.9.2025. The unused safety nets of Wang Chi House used in the tests were sampled from a total of 170 unused safety nets manufactured by the said 滨州市源进化纤绳网有限公司, which were placed on the ground floor outside Wang Chi House.

⁹¹ A mobile platform was set up in the re-entrant area for testing Sample 2 (FR), Sample 3 (Non-FR) and Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets. As shown in Photos 7-4 and Figure 7-3, either Sample 2 (FR) or Sample 3 (Non-FR) enclosed one side of the platform, while Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) enclosed the other. The safety nets were exposed to a fire source with an HRR below 1.5 MW placed in between.



Photo 7-4 (b): Limited Fire Damage on Sample 2 (FR)



Photo 7-4 (c): Extensive Fire Spread on Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)



Photo 7-4 (d): Post-Fire Condition of Sample 2 (Partially Intact)



Photo 7-4 (e): Post-Fire Condition of Sample 4 (Fully Consumed)



Photo 7-4 (f): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (2 mins)



Photo 7-4 (g): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (2 mins)



Photo 7-4 (h): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (10 mins)



Photo 7-4 (i): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (10 mins)




Photo 7-4 (j): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (20 mins)



Photo 7-4 (k): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (20 mins)⁹²

- 7.2.3.10 Detailed findings of the 13 tests are available in [Appendix A-27](#). Key findings most relevant to the rapid and extensive fire spread in Wang Fuk Court, including (i) secondary ignition, (ii) the influence of FR properties (safety nets and canvas) on fire development and (iii) the effectiveness of opening protection materials in the staircase, are reported here.
- 7.2.3.11 Notably, during the experiments, all combustibles within the re-entrant area were inevitably fully consumed when the initial fire source was sufficiently large. The use of [Sample 2 \(FR\) safety nets](#) resulted in a [comparatively lower peak HRR](#) and a noticeable [delay in fire growth](#). Furthermore, the FR properties effectively [prevented secondary ignition](#).

⁹² Replicated tests were conducted using safety net samples collected from Wang Chi House and provided by the HKPF. The samples were unused and without possible fire-induced deterioration. Similar observations were obtained.

Secondary Ignition

- 7.2.3.12 Secondary ignition was observed in tests involving Sample 1 (Uncertified), Sample 3 (non-FR) and Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets. The secondary ignition spread to safety nets located outside the re-entrant area, far from the original fire source. In addition, small fires propagating along the nets and flaming droplets were observed to ignite new fires. For illustration, secondary ignition observed in Test 3, as shown in **Photos 7-5 (a) to (h)**, was studied in detail.
- 7.2.3.13 The following key stages were observed during the secondary ignition process:
- Small fires spreading along the safety nets led to the formation of flaming droplets, as shown in **Photo 7-5 (a)**.
 - Flaming droplets dripped, causing additional fire spread, as shown in **Photo 7-5 (b)**.
 - As the fire propagated, fires on the nets or flaming droplets ignited easily ignitable materials, such as nylon strips, as shown in **Photos 7-5 (c) & (d)**.
 - The fire further spread to nearby combustibles, such as wooden planks and toe-boards, as shown in **Photo 7-5 (e)**.
 - The fire continued to generate flaming droplets, resulting in further fire propagation, as shown in **Photos 7-5 (f) to (h)**.
- 7.2.3.14 In summary, small fires consistently propagated along the surface of non-FR safety nets, uncertified safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, leading to the formation of flaming droplets. As the small fires advanced and the flaming droplets dripped onto adjacent areas, the fire ignited readily ignitable materials such as nylon strips. The ignition of these materials caused the fire to spread further to nearby combustibles, such as wooden boards and toe-boards, significantly escalating its intensity and propagation.
- 7.2.3.15 To facilitate understanding of the fire spread mechanism associated with secondary ignition, the time-to-ignition (TTI)⁹³ data for various construction materials provide valuable insights into their relative ignitability.
- 7.2.3.16 This TTI evaluation aligns with our observations. The analysis shows that toe-boards (16s to 42s) and nylon strips (36s) exhibit relatively low TTI values, indicating a higher susceptibility to ignition. In contrast, wooden planks and polystyrene window covers ignite at about (58s to 79s) and (31s to 67s) respectively, while bamboo demonstrates a substantially higher TTI of over 110 secs.

⁹³ Time to ignition (TTI) is the elapsed time from the start of radiant exposure to the first sustained flaming per ISO 5660, measured in a cone calorimeter. Specimens (100 × 100 mm) were wrapped in aluminium foil with the upper face exposed and tested 25 cm below the cone at a constant 35 kW/m² heat flux. For details, please refer to Appendix A-27.

(For reference: TTI of Carton Box – 11s)



Photo 7-5 (a):
Small Fires Spreading Along Safety
Nets, Forming Flaming Droplets



Photo 7-5 (b):
Flaming Droplets Dripping and
Spreading Fire



Photos 7-5 (c) & (d): Flaming Droplets Igniting Nylon Strips



Photo 7-5 (e):
Fire Spreading to Wooden Planks and
Toe-Boards




Photo 7-5 (f):
Flaming Droplets Causing Further Fire
Propagation



Photos 7-5 (g) & (h): Flaming Droplets Causing Further Fire Propagation

Influence of FR Properties in Safety Nets and Canvas on Fire Development

7.2.3.17 **Tests 11 to 13** were conducted with a small fire source to explore the relationship between fire severity and the FR properties of safety nets and canvas.

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Canvas
11	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	FR
12	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	FR
13	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Non-FR

7.2.3.18 Tests demonstrated that FR materials effectively reduce fire severity and limit fire spread to adjacent areas, as shown in **Photos 7-6 (a) to (b)**. In contrast, suspected non-FR materials, such as safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, promoted fire spread through secondary ignition, involving more combustibles and increasing total heat release, as shown in the fire load analysis below. However, the damage to the FR canvas remained limited, as shown in **Photos 7-6 (c) to (d)**.

7.2.3.19 The combined use of safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and non-FR canvas, allowed the fire to grow rapidly. The introduction of non-FR canvas further accelerated the fire growth, transforming limited and localized fires into a widespread and intense blaze, as shown in **Photos 7-6 (e) to (g)**. The resulting excessive heat release was sufficient to ignite bamboo sticks on a large scale, significantly increasing the HRR, as shown in **Figure 7-4**.

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	2.31 kg	35.16 MJ	9.6%
Safety Nets	5.64 kg	108.95 MJ	29.6 %
Toe-Boards	0 kg	0 MJ	0%
Wooden Planks	0 kg	0 MJ	0%
FR Canvas ⁹⁴	4.92 kg	88.58 MJ	24.1%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	36.7%
Total Energy		367.65 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 11

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	19.15 kg	291.37 MJ	20.1%
Safety Nets	18.32 kg	353.83 MJ	24.5%
Toe-Boards	3.34 kg	77.41 MJ	5.4%
Wooden Planks	39 kg	453.96 MJ	31.4%
FR Canvas ⁹⁵	7.51 kg	135.20 MJ	9.3%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	9.3%
Total Energy		1446.73 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 12

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	572.95 kg	8720.2 MJ	85.9%
Safety Nets	18.57 kg	353.7 MJ	3.5%
Toe-Boards	8.65 kg	200.42 MJ	2.0%
Wooden Planks	57.24 kg	666.27 MJ	6.6%
Non-FR Canvas ⁹⁶	4.19 kg	75.37 MJ	0.7%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	1.3%
Total Energy		10155.92 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 13

⁹⁴ Only about 32% of the FR canvas (by mass) and no wooden planks were damaged by fire in **Test 11**.

⁹⁵ About 48% of the FR canvas and 68% of the wooden planks were damaged by fire in **Test 12**.

⁹⁶ All non-FR canvas and wooden planks were completely consumed by fire in **Test 13**.




Figure 7-4: HRR Comparison Between Test 11, Test 12 & Test 13



*Photo 7-6 (a):
No Fire Spread Along Safety Nets
in Test 11*



*Photo 7-6 (b):
Post-Fire Condition in Test 11 Using FR
Safety Nets and FR Canvas*



Photo 7-6 (c):
Fire Spread Along Safety Nets in Test 12



Photo 7-6 (d):
Post-Fire Condition in Test 12 Using
Safety Nets Collected From Wang Chi
House and FR Canvas



Photos 7-6 (e) & (f): Fire Spread Along Safety Nets in Test 13



Photo 7-6 (g):
Post-Fire Condition in Test 13 Using
Safety Nets Collected From Wang Chi
House and Non-FR Canvas

The Effectiveness of Opening Protection Materials in Staircases

- 7.2.3.20 In Wang Cheong House, escape staircases were positioned next to the re-entrant, as shown in **Figure 7-5**. Post-fire investigations revealed that while fire-rated glass windows had replaced the original ones, some were substituted with movable wooden or aluminium composite boards. These boards had holes and gaps, allowing direct exposure between the staircase and the re-entrant.
- 7.2.3.21 Rapid fire spread along the re-entrant was observed early in the fire. **Test 9** was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of fire-rated glass windows, aluminium composite panels and wooden boards in covering window openings and their impact on evacuation. A piece of wooden board, aluminium composite panel and fire-rated glass window⁹⁷ were installed at the openings on the 3/F, 2/F and 1/F level respectively, as shown in **Photo 7-7**.

⁹⁷ Class B fire-rated glass windows with 60 mins fire resistance period were procured by the FE professional.

7.2.3.22 The materials used in the tests were mainly construction materials collected from Wang Fuk Court, including bamboo sticks, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, toe-boards and aluminium composite panels.⁹⁸ While the canvas used in the test was not collected from the scene, it had similar FR properties and chemical composition to the canvas from Wang Fuk Court.⁹⁹ Therefore, the test materials closely resembled those involved at Wang Fuk Court, except for a reduction in the number of horizontal platforms from four to two.

7.2.3.23 During the test, the wooden board on the 3/F (**Photo 7-8 (a)**) ignited at 4 mins 40 secs, followed by the aluminium composite panel on the 2/F (**Photo 7-8 (b)**) at 7 mins 49 secs. Both were completely consumed by fire, while the fire-rated glass window remained intact throughout the test, as shown in **Photo 7-8 (c)**. Although the aluminium composite panel showed delayed ignition, it still allowed smoke and heat to penetrate the staircase and ultimately ignited.

7.2.3.24 The maximum temperatures recorded at the aluminium composite panel and fire-rated glass window in **Test 9** are tabulated as below:

<i>Location</i>	<i>Material</i>	<i>Max Temp (Re-entrant Side)</i>	<i>Max Temp (Opened Side)</i>
1/F	Fire Rated Glass Window	1061 °C	56 °C
2/F	Aluminium Composite Panel	937 °C	605°C

7.2.3.25 The test demonstrated that the fire-rated glass window maintained significantly lower temperatures, ensuring that evacuation remained a viable option at the early stage.¹⁰⁰ This observation is further strengthened by **Test 13**, where all staircase openings were sealed with fire-rated glass windows. The maximum temperatures recorded, as summarized in the table below, further demonstrate that fire-rated glass windows effectively reduced internal temperatures and prevented smoke infiltration into the staircases at the early stage.

<i>Location</i>	<i>Material</i>	<i>Max Temp (Re-entrant Side)</i>	<i>Max Temp (Opened Side)</i>
1/F	Fire Rated Glass Window	1023 °C	30.8 °C
2/F	Fire Rated Glass Window	709 °C	45.8°C

⁹⁸ The wooden boards and fire-rated glass windows covering the staircase openings in the tests were procured by the FE professionals.

⁹⁹ Examination reports from GL at [Appendices A-3-5 & A-3-6](#) refer.

¹⁰⁰ According to the information submitted by the Authorized Person to the ICU, the newly installed fire-rated windows at the staircases were able to maintain their integrity and insulation up to 60 mins.




Figure 7-5: Floor Plan of Wang Cheong House




Photo 7-7: Installation of Wooden Board, Aluminium Composite Panel and Fire-rated Glass Window in Test 9



Photo 7-8 (a):
Ignition of Wooden Board
(4 Mins 40 Secs)



Photo 7-8 (b):
Ignition of Aluminium Composite Panel
(7 Mins 49 Secs)



Photos 7-8 (c) & (d): Post-Fire Condition



Photo 7-9:
Condition of Fire-rated Glass During Test 13

7.3 Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulation

7.3.1 Introduction

7.3.1.1 Fire engineering professionals utilized CFD simulations¹⁰¹ to demonstrate rapid vertical fire spread and wind-driven ember propagation. Due to the limitations of full-scale fire testing, CFD simulations were conducted with the following objectives:

- Assess the effects of wind on fire spread at Wang Fuk Court.
- Analyze the observed rapid vertical fire spread along external scaffolding and the fire dynamics within the re-entrant space during the fire incident.
- Compare fire development across scenarios with variations in initial fire size, safety net FR properties and different configurations.

7.3.2 Wind Effects on Fire Spread at Wang Fuk Court

7.3.2.1 The CFD model was developed using ANSYS Fluent software. A full-scale model of all eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court was created, incorporating the configuration, building height and separation based on building plan records.¹⁰² According to the HKO, the average wind speed and direction recorded at the Tai Po Kau Anemometer at 1500 hours on 26.11.2025 were approximately 14 km/hr and east to southeast respectively. These wind conditions were applied in the simulation to represent the wind profile at Wang Fuk Court during that time.

7.3.2.2 Wind vector contours at heights of 10m (bottom level), 40m (middle level), 80m (top level), 97m (rooftop level) and 120m (above the buildings) were plotted based on the simulation results for the scenario, as illustrated in **Figures 7-6 (a) to (f)**.

7.3.2.3 Significant smoke drifting was observed during the incipient stage of the fire, as shown in **Photos 7-10 (a) to (c)**. This drifting was effectively replicated and demonstrated by the CFD simulation.

¹⁰¹ CFD is the engineering practice of using computers to simulate how fluids (liquids and gases) flow, based on the fundamental equations of fluid mechanics. It combines mathematical modelling, numerical methods and high-performance computing to predict fluid behaviour in complex systems. In fire engineering, CFD models how fire, smoke, heat and toxic gases move through buildings and structures.

¹⁰² **Simulation Limitations:**

- **Buoyancy Effects:** The simulation does not account for buoyancy effects. As a result, the influence of the large fire plume driven by thermal buoyancy on the wind profile could not be analyzed.
- **Model Scope:** The model is limited to the eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court and does not account for nearby low-rise structures, landscape features or geographical variations. Nonetheless, the simulation provides a reasonable representation of wind behaviour at higher levels under the specified wind speed and direction.




Figure 7-6 (a): Wind Vector Contour (10m – Bottom Level)




Figure 7-6 (b): Wind Vector Contour (40m – Middle Level)




Figure 7-6 (c): Wind Vector Contour (80m – Top Level)




Figure 7-6 (d): Wind Vector Contour (97m – Rooftop Level)




Figure 7-6 (e): Wind Vector Contour (120m – Above Building)¹⁰³

¹⁰³ The wind profile indicated an increase in velocity as it flowed over the buildings in Wang Fuk Court.



Photo 7-10 (a):
Heavy Smoke on the South-East Façade
Wang Cheong House at 1508 Hours




Figure 7-6 (f):
Wind Vector Contours



Photo 7-10 (b):
Heavy Smoke on the South Re-Entrant of
Wang Cheong House at 1537 Hours



Photo 7-10 (c): Heavy Smoke From Wang Cheong House & Wang Tai House

- 7.3.2.4 The wind vector provided valuable insights into the trajectory of flying embers that could ignite new fires. Wang Chi House was the only unaffected building in Wang Fuk Court, a fact that can be explained by the wind profile. As shown in **Figure 7-7 (a)** and **Photo 7-11** buildings experiencing rapid fire spread along re-entrants are marked with red circles. However, as illustrated by the wind vectors, the wind did not carry embers towards Wang Chi House, which may account for its minimal damage.
- 7.3.2.5 For example, as detailed in paragraph 5.2.3.2, SStnO HUI observed the fire spreading to the safety nets on the east façade of Wang Tai House at approximately 1500 hours, marked by a black circle in **Figure 7-7 (b)**. This observation also aligned with the wind profile, which suggested that embers were likely carried by the wind towards that façade following the rapid fire spread along the **south re-entrant** of Wang Cheong House at nearly the same time.
- 7.3.2.6 Wang Kin House, despite being in the path of flying embers, sustained only minor damage. This may be attributed to the recirculation zone¹⁰⁴ formed around the building which likely extended the embers' travel distance, allowing them to cool before reaching the structure and reducing the risk of ignition, as illustrated in **Figure 7-7 (c)**.




Figure 7-7 (a): Wind Vector Contour (120m – Above Building) With Rapid Fire Spread Along Re-Entrants Marked

¹⁰⁴

A recirculation zone is a region where the fluid velocity locally reverses direction and forms a circulating loop. Instead of moving downstream, the flow rolls back upstream and creates a vortex-like structure.

(Source of reference: Duong, N. H., & Nguyen, T. D. (2002). Numerical study of the recirculation zone behind a building in the neutral and stable atmospheric boundary layer. Vietnam Journal of Mechanics, 24(2), 84–100.)



Photo 7-11: Smoke Clear Zone Above Wang Chi House




Figure 7-7 (b): Wind Vector Contour at 40m Height




Figure 7-7 (c): Wind Vector Contour at 80m Height

7.3.3 *Fire Dynamics Simulation: Model Setup and Scenarios*

The CFD Model Setup

- 7.3.3.1 To examine the impact of materials on rapid fire spread, a model was developed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS)¹⁰⁵ software. The full-scale model replicated the geometry of Wang Cheong House, including its external façade, re-entrant spaces, staircase enclosure and bamboo scaffolding from the incident.¹⁰⁶ **Figure 7-8 (a)** illustrates the computational domain and building model with the vertical scaffolding grid.¹⁰⁷
- 7.3.3.2 The ignition source in the model was located at the flat roof on the 1/F re-entrant outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House, as shown in **Figure 7-8 (b)**. The fire was designed to reach full size within 10 secs, skipping the smouldering phase.

¹⁰⁵ FDS is a CFD software developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology to simulate fire-driven fluid flow, especially smoke movement, heat transfer and combustion behaviour in buildings and outdoor environments.

¹⁰⁶ Bench-scale tests, including Thermogravimetric Analysis and Cone Calorimeter Analysis, were conducted to obtain material properties of combustibles for the model. The test samples consisted of materials collected from Wang Fuk Court or testing materials from Sichuan to ensure accurate representation. The test results, serving as simulation parameters, are detailed in the **Appendix A-27**.

¹⁰⁷ The computational domain extended 15m beyond the building footprint on each side and 10m above the roof, resulting in domain dimensions of approximately 65m (width) × 54m (depth) × 90m (height).

7.3.3.3 A staircase enclosure was constructed inside the building near the re-entrant where the ignition source was placed, as shown in **Figure 7-8 (c)**. Fire-rated glass windows were modeled along the staircase enclosure. To simulate the effect of the replacement of wooden boards at the window openings, another set up was modeled with opening on the 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F and 25/F replaced by wooden boards.




Figure 7-8 (a): Full-Scale Model of Wang Cheong House in FDS




Figure 7-8 (b): Location of Fire Origin




Figure 7-8 (c): Configuration of the Staircase Enclosure Near the Re-Entrant

Simulation Scenarios

7.3.3.4 Six core simulation scenarios were defined to observe the fire behaviour of the materials and evaluate the variables affecting fire spread, each categorized by the magnitude of the initial ignition source¹⁰⁸ as follows:

Large Fire Size (Ignition Source of 1MW)

Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers
1	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Yes
2	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes
3	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Yes

Small Fire Size (Ignition Source of 0.7MW)

Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers
4	Sample 2 (FR)	No
5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No
6	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No

¹⁰⁸ The ignition source used a t^2 -growing development with a constant growth time of reaching 1MW or 0.7MW at 10 secs.

7.3.4 Results for Large Fire Size Cases

7.3.4.1 As observed in the full-scale fire tests, when the fire size is sufficiently large, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed, regardless of whether an FR or non-FR safety nets are used. Therefore, only minor differences were expected across the three cases.

7.3.4.2 The simulation of the three large fire cases demonstrated rapid fire spread along the re-entrant. The HRR profiles for the three cases over time are plotted in **Figure 7-9**. Additionally, the times taken for vertical fire spread to reach the 10/F, 20/F and R/F¹⁰⁹ from the simulations are summarized in the table below:

Case	Safety Nets Used	Polystyrene Window Covers	Peak HRR (Time)	Time Fire Spread to		
				10/F	20/F	R/F
1	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Yes	834 MW (203 s)	120 s	130 s	137 s
2	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	755 MW (216 s)	129 s	137 s	146 s
3	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Yes	800 MW (201 s)	118 s	128 s	135 s

7.3.4.3 The simulation results revealed a slight delay in fire spread when FR safety nets were used compared to non-FR safety nets. For instance, the fire spread in Case 3 using Sample 3 (non-FR) reached the 10/F, 20/F and R/F faster than in Case 2 using Sample 2 (FR). The delay is likely due to the FR properties of the safety nets, which temporarily slowed the combustion process.

7.3.4.4 The HRR in all simulations was tremendous, as expected. As demonstrated in the full-scale fire tests, all combustible materials within the re-entrant were involved in the fire, leading to significant fire development and intense heat release.

7.3.4.5 The simulation results indicate that Sample 3 (Non-FR) safety nets exhibited faster fire development, reaching a peak HRR of 800 MW in 201 sec. Although Sample 4 safety nets collected from Wang Chi House were 2 secs slower in reaching its peak, they recorded the highest HRR of 834 MW among the three samples.

¹⁰⁹ The time of fire spread to reach 10/F, 20/F and R/F was determined using 3D visualization of the visible flaming zone based on the heat release rate per unit volume (HRRPUV) cut-off value of 80kW/m³, which is a well-established empirical value related to the amount of energy released per unit area of flame sheet adjusted for grid sizing.

7.3.4.6 The results suggest that the samples collected from Wang Chi House exhibited fire characteristics more similar to non-FR safety nets than FR safety nets, particularly in terms of fire spread rate and HRR. The differences became even more pronounced when exposed to a smaller fire source of 0.7 MW and in the absence of polystyrene window covers.






Figure 7-9: The HRR profile for Case 1 to Case 3

Case 1:
Safety Nets Collected From Wang Chi House With Polystyrene Window Covers

Legend: zone with a HRRPUV > 80kW/m³



Case 2: **FR Safety Nets With Polystyrene Window Covers**



Case 3: **Non-FR Safety Nets With Polystyrene Window Covers**




Figure 7-10: Visualization Snapshots of the Fire Spread Simulation

7.3.5 Results for Small Fire Size Cases

7.3.5.1 In Cases 4–6, different safety nets were used to envelop the building as outlined below, with the HRR profiles shown in **Figure 7-12**.


Case	Safety Nets Used	Polystyrene Window Covers	Peak HRR (Time)	Time Fire Spread to		
				10/F	20/F	R/F
4	Sample 2 (FR)	No	30 MW (268 s)	No Spread		
5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No	747 MW (271 s)	158 s	168 s	178 s
6	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	795 MW (272 s)	160 s	166 s	171 s

7.3.5.2 The simulation results demonstrated significant differences in fire development across the three cases. The use of Sample 2 (FR) safety nets showed that the fire could not sustain itself, with no rapid fire spread having occurred. In contrast, the use of Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets and Sample 4 safety nets collected from Wang Chi House resulted in significant fire spread and severe fire development.


7.3.5.3 The results further prove that the samples collected from Wang Chi House exhibited fire characteristics more similar to non-FR safety nets than FR safety nets, particularly in terms of fire spread rate and peak HRR.

Case 4:
FR Safety Nets Without Polystyrene Window Covers

Legend:  zone with a HRRPUV > 80kW/m³



Case 5:
Non-FR Safety Nets Without Polystyrene Window Covers



Case 6:
Safety Nets Collected From Wang Chi House Without Polystyrene Window
Covers




Figure 7-11: Visualization Snapshots of the Fire Spread Simulation




Figure 7-12: The HRR Profile for Case 4, Case 5 and Case 6

Chapter 8 – Validation of Hypothesis

8.1 Proposed Hypothesis

8.1.1 The fire phenomena in Wang Fuk Court were highly complex, with the modes of fire spread exhibiting intricate and multifaceted behaviour. These modes can be broadly categorized into three interrelated types:

- Rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant,
- Fire spread into flats, and
- Secondary ignitions of the building's combustible envelope.

8.1.2 The complexity arises from the dynamic interplay between these modes, each influenced by architectural features, material properties and environmental factors. The hypotheses for these mechanisms of fire spread are detailed in Section 6.2. To validate the hypotheses, evidence (including witness accounts, TV footage, full-scale fire tests and CFD simulations) was carefully analyzed to provide a clearer understanding of the fire's multi-dimensional dynamics.

8.2 Rapid Vertical Fire Spread

8.2.1 During the fire, multiple instances of rapid vertical fire spread were observed in different re-entrants, where the blaze consumed the entire re-entrant and spread across 31 levels almost simultaneously, as illustrated in **Photos 8-1 (a) & (b)**.

8.2.2 The post-fire investigation identified a significant accumulation of combustibles within these re-entrants. It was hypothesized that these materials, such as **bamboo, toe-boards, wooden planks, safety nets, canvas and nylon strips**, provided a continuous and abundant fuel source that sustained the fire. Moreover, the confined geometry of the re-entrants intensified the situation by restricting heat dissipation. This confinement led to the accumulation of heat, creating conditions favorable for the uncontrollable vertical spread observed in multiple re-entrants.

8.2.3 To validate the hypothesis, a series of full-scale fire tests was conducted. These tests were designed (i) to evaluate the role of the re-entrant's confined geometry and (ii) to assess whether the combination of combustibles within the re-entrants was sufficient to induce such rapid and widespread fire behaviour.



*Photos 8-1 (a) & (b): Rapid Vertical Fire Spread Along the Re-Entrant
Observed in Wang Tao House and Wang Yan House*

8.2.4 *Fire Severity From Identified Combustible Materials*

- 8.2.4.1 While the post-fire investigation identified a wide variety of combustibles in the re-entrant area, incorporating every material risked overcomplicating the fire phenomena and potentially obscuring critical details. Consequently, the IFITF prioritized common and essential construction materials that were both widely used and present at the scene (i.e. bamboo, safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks), to evaluate the fundamental mechanisms behind the rapid fire spread.
- 8.2.4.2 A fire severity analysis, as detailed in paragraph 7.2.3.3, was conducted to evaluate the impact of the identified combustibles. As illustrated in **Photo 8-2 (a)**, **the fire reached extreme levels of severity even when only the identified materials were included.** The peak HRR for a three-storey mockup reached 29 MW, comparable to the peak fire HRR of a bus or heavy goods vehicle in a tunnel fire. Given that the actual re-entrants span 31 storeys and contained additional combustibles (i.e. canvas, polystyrene window covers and backing papers of mosaic tiles) the fire severity could have escalated dramatically.
- 8.2.4.3 Although the combustibles within the re-entrant area were nearly fully consumed and contributed to the rapid fire spread, it is also noteworthy that subsequent tests demonstrated the use of FR safety nets resulted in a comparatively lower peak HRR and a noticeable delay in fire growth.

Material	Weight before Test	Weight after Test	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	1296.20 kg	153.56 kg	1142.64 kg	17391.03 MJ	77.89%
Safety Nets	24.57 kg	0 kg	24.57 kg	265.00 MJ	1.19%
Toe-boards	11.66 kg	0 kg	11.66 kg	270.25 MJ	1.21%
Wooden Planks	262.08 kg	0 kg	262.08 kg	3050.61 MJ	13.66%
Wooden Cribs	184.00 kg	101.20 kg	82.80 kg	1350.00 MJ	6.05%
Total Energy Released:				22326.89 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis



Photo 8-2(a): Fire Severity Analysis Showing Extreme Fire Severity

8.2.5 *Fire Dynamics in the Re-Entrant Area*

- 8.2.5.1 Full-scale fire tests in Sichuan demonstrated that the development of rapid fire spread is highly sensitive to the size of the initial fire source. The rapid spread was primarily driven by the burning of a substantial amount of combustibles present in the re-entrant space, with the configuration of the re-entrant further amplifying the fire's intensity and spread.
- 8.2.5.2 It is unsurprising that if the fire source had been large enough, it could have ignited all the combustibles within the re-entrant zone. However, the Wang Fuk Court fire is believed to have originated from a small glowing source, such as a lit cigarette end, which ignited nearby combustible materials. The progression of the fire, from a small fire, as shown in **Photo 8-2(b)**, to a rapidly spreading blaze that engulfed 31 levels, provides key insights into the dynamics of the Wang Fuk Court fire incident.
- 8.2.5.3 The cause of the fire was believed to be the improper disposal of cigarette end. While the windy and dry weather conditions contributed to its development, it was the abundant presence of combustible materials that played a crucial role in allowing the fire to grow in size, intensify and rapidly spread further to other combustibles within the re-entrant.

8.2.6 *Roles of FR Properties in the Fire Spread*

- 8.2.6.1 Safety nets and canvas were found to play a significant role in the fire's development within the re-entrant. Not only were they combustible, but they were also interconnected to the large quantities of other combustibles in the re-entrant. Once ignited, they promoted fire spread to nearby combustibles, further accelerating the fire's growth. Therefore, the use of safety nets and canvas with FR properties is essential to effectively prevent the development and spread of fire.
- 8.2.6.2 As demonstrated in **Test 11** conducted in Sichuan, the use of FR safety nets and FR canvas effectively prevented fire spread, keeping fire damage minimal from the source, as shown in **Photo 8-2(c)**.
- 8.2.6.3 In **Test 12**, safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and FR canvas were used. These nets worsened the situation by promoting secondary ignition, increasing the involvement of combustibles and raising the total heat released.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Most of the bamboo and the majority of combustibles in the re-entrant area remained unaffected during the test. It is important to note that only a limited amount of combustible materials had been placed on the scaffolding during the test. If more readily ignitable materials (such as carton boxes and backing papers of mosaic tiles) had been present on the scaffolding and flat roof, the outcome could have been significantly different.

- 8.2.6.4 In **Test 13**, the combination of safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and non-FR canvas resulted in rapid fire growth. This pairing of materials allowed small, localized fires to escalate into widespread and intense blazes. According to recordings provided by the informant, canvas-like materials were observed at the fire's point of origin on the flat roof areas outside Flats 104 and 105, where the re-entrant subsequently exhibited rapid fire spread across 31 levels afterwards.



Photo 8-2 (b): Fire Development at the Incipient Stage



Photo 8-2 (c): Fire Developed from a Small Fire Source During Fire Tests

8.2.7 Development of Rapid Fire Spread

8.2.7.1 Whether at the point of origin or during any of the other 11 occurrences¹¹¹ of rapid fire spread in the re-entrant area, the fire consistently began on a small scale. Two key factors drove its escalation: the accumulation of combustible materials and the presence of suspected non-FR materials in the re-entrant space. The build-up of combustibles provided a fuel source for fire development, while the non-FR materials facilitated fire growth and spread, ultimately allowing the fire to develop into a fully-fledged and rapidly spreading blaze.

8.3 **Fire Spread into Units**

8.3.1 Fire Damage Analysis

8.3.1.1 A detailed fire damage analysis is provided in **Appendix A-17**. The damage to the units is classified into four categories. To provide a clear understanding of the corresponding damage levels, four flats on the 1/F of Wang Yan House are used as examples.

- Red: Extremely severe damage (see **Photo 8-3 (a)**)
- Orange: Severe damage (see **Photo 8-3 (b)**)
- Yellow: Minor damage (see **Photos 8-3 (c) & (d)**)
- Green: Unaffected (see **Photo 8-3 (e)**)

8.3.1.2 Of the 562 units in Wang Fuk Court that sustained severe or extremely severe fire damage, 518 units (92%) were located adjacent to re-entrants where rapid fire spread was observed. This observation highlights the strong correlation between the rapid fire spread in the re-entrant and the extensive interior damage sustained by multiple flats.

8.3.1.3 As observed in news video footage, the fire had already spread into units following the rapid fire spread along the re-entrant. **Photos 8-4 (a) & (b)** of Wang Tao House illustrate these observations and are provided as references.

¹¹¹ Subsequent fire spreads were likely triggered by small secondary ignition sources, including fire embers, flaming debris and droplets, which will be further discussed in Section 8.4.



Photo 8-3 (a): Unit Sustained Extremely Severe Damage – Flat 02,
Wang Yan House



Photo 8-3 (b): Unit Sustained Severe Damage – Flat 01, Wang Yan House



Photos 8-3 (c) & (d): Unit Sustained Minor Damage – Flat 07, Wang Yan House



Photo 8-3 (e): Unaffected Unit – Flat 04, Wang Yan House



Photo 8-4 (a): South Re-Entrant of Wang Tao House Fully Alight



Photo 8-4 (b): Visible Flames in Flats 1202, 1203 and 2202 of Wang Tao House¹¹²

¹¹² Once the fire spread into a unit, it intensified and could ignite previously unaffected façades through openings and windows of the affected unit, further advancing the fire's spread.

8.3.2 Simultaneous Transition From Façade Fire to Multi-Level Unit Fires Near the Re-Entrant

8.3.2.1 Our hypothesis posits that the fire predominantly spread into units through openings, such as broken or open windows. However, the test results from Sichuan revealed additional factors contributing to this fire spread. Apart from convective fire spread via broken windows, the radiant heat flux was sufficient to ignite combustibles inside the units. Notably, the time taken for the windows of the re-entrant to be broken by fire coincided with that for the combustibles inside units to be ignited by radiant heat. Even when windows were covered with polystyrene panels, these covers could potentially detach under intense heat, allowing radiation to penetrate and ignite materials within. Additionally, the investigation revealed that heat and smoke could also spread through other openings in kitchens and toilets, such as exhaust fans. These findings do not contradict our hypothesis but rather supplement it, revealing additional mechanisms of fire spread that need to be considered.

8.3.3 Further Observations

8.3.3.1 The development and spread of fire within a unit, as well as the extent of interior damage, were significantly influenced by the availability and distribution of fire loads, as well as the presence of openings within each unit. Although the fire may have started small, it eventually consumed the entire unit. Further analysis, however, was limited due to the extent of the damage, which had destroyed crucial evidence of the fire's spread and behaviour. Despite these challenges, the IFITF conducted a thorough investigation and made the following observations.

8.3.4 Asymmetrical Fire Damage in Adjacent Units Linked to the Same Re-Entrant

8.3.4.1 The investigation revealed that units immediately adjacent to the same re-entrant with rapid fire spread sustained asymmetrical fire damage. Using Wang Yan House as an example, rapid vertical fire spread was observed in the re-entrant between Flats 02 and 03. Despite being equidistant from the re-entrant, Flat 02 suffered significantly more damage, with 26 units sustaining extremely severe damage compared to only 7 units in Flat 03. This disparity, along with other influencing factors such as wind, is likely due to differences in their layouts and prompted the following study into the characteristics of both unit types.

8.3.4.2 To investigate the relationship between layout design and its impact on fire damage, Flat ■02 and Flat ■03 of Wang Yan House were selected for analysis. According to the fire damage assessment, Flat ■02 sustained extremely severe damage, while Flat ■03 suffered only severe damage.

- 8.3.4.3 Upon further examination, the living room (**Photo 8-5 (a)**), bedrooms (**Photos 8-5 (b) & (c)**), toilet (**Photo 8-5 (d)**) and kitchen (**Photo 8-5 (e)**) of Flat ■02 were found to have sustained extremely severe fire damage. However, despite the extreme damage to the bedrooms and toilet, their windows remained intact, indicating that the fire did not spread into these rooms from the building exterior. Instead, the fire likely first spread to the living room and kitchen, which are connected to the re-entrant and then internally spread to the bedrooms and toilet.
- 8.3.4.4 Conversely, Flat ■03 sustained less severe damage. While the kitchen (**Photo 8-6 (e)**) and toilet (**Photo 8-6 (d)**), which are connected to the re-entrant, suffered extremely severe damage, the fire was largely confined to these areas, leaving the rest of the flat relatively unaffected (**Photos 8-6 (a) to (c)**).
- 8.3.4.5 An examination of the layout plan (**Figure 8-1**) revealed that both units are situated equally close to the re-entrant, with both kitchens positioned identically. The key difference noted was that the living room of Flat 02 is immediately adjacent to the re-entrant, while the toilet of Flat 03 is adjacent to the same re-entrant. This asymmetry appears to be unrelated to the kitchens; instead, it is likely attributable to the larger window openings in the living room and the higher fire load present within that space.
- 8.3.4.6 Similar asymmetry was also observed in 11 other re-entrants by comparing the number of units that sustained extremely severe damage, as shown in **Figure 8-2**. In the case of Wang Cheong House and Wang Sun House, the figures are comparable but still show a trend of asymmetry. This may be because, in these buildings, three out of four re-entrants experienced rapid fire spread. Beyond the spread of fire from the building façade into the units, other modes of severe fire spread, such as internal fire spread, may also contribute and will be discussed later.



Photo 8-5 (a): Flat ■02 Living Room



Photo 8-6 (a): Flat ■03 Living Room



Photo 8-5 (b): Flat 02 Bedroom




Photo 8-6 (b): Flat 03 Bedroom



Photo 8-5 (c): Flat 02 Bedroom



Photo 8-6 (c): Flat 03 Bedroom



Photo 8-5 (d): Flat 02 Toilet



Photo 8-6 (d): Flat 03 Toilet



Photo 8-5 (e): Flat 02 Kitchen



Photo 8-6 (e): Flat 03 Kitchen



Photo 8-6 (f): External View of the Living Room Window of Flat 03




Figure 8-1: Extract of Floor Plan of Wang Yan House




Figure 8-2: Comparison of Fire Damage to Units Immediately Adjacent to the Re-Entrant that Showed Rapid Vertical Fire Spread

8.3.5 Fire Spread From the Façade to Units Beyond the Re-Entrant Area

- 8.3.5.1 In addition to fire spread originating from the re-entrant area, cases of exterior fire spread directly into units in other parts of the building were observed. A notable example is the fire damage in Wang Kin House, where Flats ■02 and ■08 were affected by the ignited combustible building envelope. However, unlike in other buildings, no rapid fire spread was observed along the re-entrant of Wang Kin House.
- 8.3.5.2 The case of Flat ■08 offers valuable insight into potential modes of fire spread from the exterior into a unit, despite the damage not being very significant. In this instance, the fire entered the flat through the air-conditioner rather than the windows. Consequently, the air-conditioner cover was damaged by the fire, while the windows and polystyrene window covers remained intact, as shown in **Photos 8-7 (a) & (b)**. Fortunately, no readily ignitable combustibles were located near the air-conditioner; otherwise, the consequences could have been far more severe. The observation matched the video footage, which showed the combustible building envelope outside Flat ■08 alight at about 1605 hours, as shown in **Photo 8-7 (c)**. The burn marks on the external wall outside Flat ■08, as shown in **Photo 8-7 (d)**, also matched this account.
- 8.3.5.3 Flat ■02 of Wang Kin House sustained extremely severe damage, as shown in **Figure 8-3** and **Photos 8-8 (a) to (g)**. Upon inspection, the toilet and kitchen windows were found to be intact. However, most of the windows in the bedrooms and living room were broken, with these areas experiencing extensive fire damage, as shown in **Photos 8-8 (d) to (f)**. This damage is believed to have resulted from the fire spreading into the unit from the exterior.



Photos 8-7 (a) & (b): Fire Spread Into Flat 08 via the Air-conditioner



Photo 8-7 (c): Combustible Building Envelope Outside Flat 2308 of Wang Kin House on Fire at 1605 Hours




Photo 8-7 (d): External Post-Fire Condition of Flat 2308




Figure 8-3: Layout Plan of Flat 02, Wang Kin House



Photo 8-8 (a): External View of Flat 02, Wang Kin House at 1619 Hours



Photo 8-8 (b): Toilet of Flat 02



Photo 8-8 (c): Kitchen of Flat 02



Photo 8-8 (d): Bedroom of Flat 02



Photo 8-8 (e): Bedroom of Flat 02



Photo 8-8 (f): Living room of Flat 02



Photo 8-8 (g): External Post-Fire Condition of Flat ■ 02

8.3.6 Possibility of Internal Fire Spread

- 8.3.6.1 During the fire investigation, a specific pattern of damage was identified in several cases: significant fire damage to the interiors of flats, while their exteriors remained unaffected. This prompted consideration of the possibility that the entrance doors of these heavily burnt domestic flats had been destroyed by the fire from adjacent flats, allowing smoke and heat to penetrate into originally unaffected flats.
- 8.3.6.2 In the case of Wang Yan House, rapid fire spread was observed only at the re-entrant between Flats 02 and 03, as shown in **Photo 8-9** and **Figure 8-4**. Consequently, Flats 02 and 03 sustained varying degrees of damage, as illustrated in **Photos 8-10 (a) & (b)** and **8-11 (a) & (b)**.
- 8.3.6.3 No obvious damage was observed on the exterior of Flat ■ 01 (**Photo 8-12 (a)**). Therefore, the damage within the unit (**Photos 8-12 (c) to (e)**) is highly likely to have resulted from internal fire spread from Flat ■ 02.

8.3.6.4 Similarly, Flat 04 showed no severe damage on the external wall (**Photo 8-13 (a)**). The internal damage within the unit (**Photos 8-13 (b) & (c)**) is also believed to have been caused by internal fire spread from Flat 03.

8.3.6.5 Like Flats 01 and 02, the entrance doors of Flats 03 and 04 were completely consumed by the fire. Notably, extremely severe damage was also observed at the nearby smoke stop door (**Photos 8-13 (e) & (f)**). The evidence suggests that the fire in Flats 02 and 03 was so severe that it destroyed their entrance doors and spread to the adjoining units, Flats 01 and 04. Once the entrances of Flats 01 and 04 were compromised, the fire extended further into these units.




Figure 8-4: Floor Plan of Wang Yan House



Photo 8-9: Rapid Fire Spread Observed at the Re-Entrant Between
Flats 02 and 03 of Wang Yan House



Photo 8-10 (a): Entrance of Flat 02



Photo 8-11 (a): Entrance of Flat 03



Photo 8-10 (b): Living Room of Flat 02




Photo 8-11 (b): Living Room of Flat 03



Photo 8-12 (a): External Wall Outside Flat 01, Wang Yan House




Photo 8-12 (b): Post-Fire Condition in the Common Corridor¹¹³ Connecting Flats 01 and 02, Wang Yan House

¹¹³ The common corridor connecting Flats 01 and 02 sustained extremely severe damage, with the unit entrance door completely consumed by fire.



Photos 8-12 (c) & (d): Unit Entrance of Flat 01



Photo 8-12 (e): Living Room of Flat 01, Wang Yan House¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ The living room window of Flat 01 remained intact with polystyrene window covers still in place. This further supports the conclusion that external fire spread can be ruled out.



Photo 8-13 (a): External Wall Outside Flat ■ 04, Wang Yan House



Photo 8-13 (b):
Unit Entrance of Flat ■ 04



Photo 8-13 (c): Living Room of Flat ■ 04




Photo 8-13 (d): Post-Fire Condition in the Common Corridor Connecting
Flats 03 and 04, Wang Yan House



Photos 8-13 (e) & (f): Damaged Smoke Stop Door on [REDACTED]/F of Wang Yan House

8.4 Secondary Ignitions

- 8.4.1 As demonstrated in the full-scale fire tests, the FR properties of safety nets significantly reduce the risks of secondary ignitions and therefore prevent fire propagation. Small fires involving FR safety nets typically self-extinguish once the external heat source is removed. However, the tests revealed that uncertified safety nets, non-FR safety nets and samples collected from Wang Chi House sustained small fire propagation, along with the generation of flaming droplets from the safety nets, which in turn ignite readily ignitable scaffolding components, such as nylon strips, toe-boards and wooden planks.
- 8.4.2 In addition to the combustible building envelopes, statements from occupants¹¹⁵ revealed that large quantities of construction materials and miscellaneous articles were stored on the ground floors around the buildings. These materials could be ignited by a secondary ignition source from the façade fire and their accumulations intensified the severity and spread of the fire.

¹¹⁵ Witness statements at Appendices A-52, A-58 to A-62, A-84 to A-86 and A-96 to A-108 refer.

8.4.3 The fire at Wang Fuk Court was a catastrophic event affecting seven residential blocks, marked by extensive damage and rapid fire spread. Wind-carried embers, falling debris and flaming droplets ignited surrounding combustible materials, significantly contributing to the fire's propagation. This section will provide a detailed analysis of the ignition sources and fuels involved.

8.4.4 Wind-Carried Embers

8.4.4.1 Wind-carried embers are pieces of burning debris light enough to be carried by strong winds over considerable distances. The rapid fire spread along the re-entrant played an important role in dispersing embers. During this process, flames from the re-entrant were observed rising higher than the building itself, as shown in **Photos 8-14 & 8-15**. These intense flames lifted embers to great heights, allowing them to follow the wind flow and travel considerable distances before falling, as shown in **Figure 8-5**.

8.4.4.2 The hypothesis is supported by the CCTV footage from the roof of Wang Tai House. At about 1458 hours¹¹⁶, embers were observed falling from a high level onto the roof of Wang Tai House, as shown in **Photos 8-16 (a) & (b)**, coinciding with the rapid fire spread recorded in the **east & south re-entrant** of Wang Cheong House at about the same time. It is believed that the vigorous fire activity in the re-entrant lifted embers high above the building, allowing them to travel with wind and fall onto the roof of Wang Tai House.



Photo 8-14: Flames From the Re-Entrant Observed
Rising Higher Than the Building at Wang Tao House

¹¹⁶ Although the times shown on CCTV were 1457 and 1504 hours, the system was approximately 44 secs behind the HKO reference time, making the actual times about 1458 and 1505 hours.



Photo 8-15: Flames From the Re-Entrant Observed
Rising Higher Than the Building at Wang Cheong House



Photos 8-16 (a) & (b): Embers Falling From a High Level
Observed on the Roof of Wang Tai House




Figure 8-5: Wind Vector Contour (120m – Above Building) With
Rapid Fire Spread Along Re-Entrants of Wang Cheong House Marked

8.4.5 Falling Debris

- 8.4.5.1 In the context of this fire investigation, falling debris refers to flaming, heavy objects that fell during the fire. This incident involved bamboo scaffolding, in which bamboo poles were secured with nylon strips and numerous combustible materials were placed on or attached to the building envelope. The fire spread severely damaged the bamboo scaffolding and nylon strips, compromising its structural stability and causing burning components and attached combustibles to fall to lower levels or the ground, as shown in **Photo 8-17**, further intensifying the fire spread.
- 8.4.5.2 Additionally, it was observed that the rapid and vigorous fire spread along the re-entrant propelled debris into the surrounding areas. If this debris had fallen into the re-entrants of nearby buildings, it could potentially have triggered another rapid fire spread within those re-entrants, as shown in **Photos 8-18 (a) to (d)**.



Photo 8-17: Collapsed Burning Debris From the Damaged Bamboo Scaffolding



Photo 8-18 (a): Debris Falling From Wang Sun House at 1602 Hours



Photos 8-18 (b) & (c): Flaming Fire Observed in the Lower Portion of Wang Tao House at 1611 Hours



Photo 8-18(d): Fire Spread Vertically Throughout the Re-Entrant of Wang Tao House

8.4.6 Flaming Droplets

- 8.4.6.1 The dripping of flaming droplets from burning plastic materials is a widely observed phenomenon in building fires, particularly in cable and façade fires. These hot molten droplets, carrying a flame, can fall onto other combustibles, igniting new fires and posing a significant fire hazard.
- 8.4.6.2 This phenomenon was observed during the Wang Fuk Court fire incident, with one instance well-documented by the informant during the initial stage of the fire, as shown in **Photos 8-19 (a) & (b)**.
- 8.4.6.3 According to the test results from GL, the burning of canvas, safety nets, foam boards and toe-boards demonstrated the formation of fire droplets.
- 8.4.6.4 In addition to ignition sources, the availability of combustible materials played a significant role in the fire's progression. The buildings in Wang Fuk Court were surrounded by combustible envelopes, which provided an abundant fuel source, sustaining and intensifying the fire.
- 8.4.6.5 Various combustibles were identified on the external scaffolding, including bamboo, toe-boards, wooden planks, safety nets, canvas, nylon strips and miscellaneous waste from the works, as shown in **Photo 8-19 (c)**, all of which contributed significant fuel to the façades of all eight buildings in Wang Fuk Court, **Photos 8-19 (d) to (f)**.



Photos 8-19 (a) & (b): Flaming Droplets Dripping From Burning Materials
Observed During the Initial Stage of Fire



Photo 8-19 (c): Combustible Waste on the External Scaffolding



Photos 8-19 (d) to (f): Burning of Combustible Envelope Observed During the Fire

8.4.7 TTI Considerations

8.4.7.1 TTI provides an account of the ignitability of combustible materials.

<i>Procured Materials for Fire Tests</i>	<i>TTI (s)</i>
<i>Uncertified Safety Nets (4 Layers)</i>	46
<i>Uncertified Safety Nets (2 Layers)</i>	50
<i>FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)</i>	76
<i>FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)</i>	86
<i>Non-FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)</i>	48
<i>Non-FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)</i>	52
Toe-boards	42
Polystyrene Window Covers	31
Carton Boxes	11

<i>Sample from Wang Chi House</i>	<i>TTI (Range)</i>
Toe-boards	19s (18s – 20s)
Safety Nets (4 Layers)	48s (30s – 60s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers)	49s (27s – 72s)
Polystyrene Window Covers	67s
Bamboo	116s

8.4.7.2 In addition to Wang Chi House, samples were collected from Wang Yan House to provide a more comprehensive perspective of the TTI data, which showed consistent results.

<i>Sample from Wang Yan House</i>	<i>TTI (Range)</i>
Toe-boards	19s (16s – 21s)
Nylon Strips	36s
Safety Nets (4 Layers)	44s (24s – 96s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers)	49s (27s – 78s)
Polystyrene Window Covers	60s
Wooden Planks	65s (58s – 79s)
Bamboo	112s (89s – 143s)

- 8.4.7.3 The above findings align with observations made during full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan. During the tests, it was observed that even as the fire in the re-entrant began to decay, secondary ignition occurred during tests with safety nets lacking FR properties, uncertified safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House.
- 8.4.7.4 The fire propagated along the safety nets until it encountered suitable combustibles, such as nylon strips. The ignited strips subsequently set fire to other materials, including toe-boards and wooden planks, further developing and sustaining the fire, as shown in **Photos 8-20 (a) to (d)**.
- 8.4.7.5 During the post-fire investigation, it was further observed that wind-carried embers, falling debris and fire droplets not only spread to the combustible envelope but also ignited combustibles and construction materials scattered on the ground floor level. This contributed to the fire's further spread and even the blockage of exits, as shown in **Photos 8-21 (a) to (h)**.



Photo 8-20 (a):
Small Fire Propagated Along the
Safety Net



Photo 8-20 (b):
Nylon Strips Alight



Photos 8-20 (c) & (d): Other Combustibles
(Toe-Boards and Wooden Boards) Alight



Photo 8-21 (a): Post-Fire Condition Outside the East Re-Entrant of Wang Cheong House



Photo 8-21 (b): Post-Fire Condition Outside the East Re-Entrant of Wang Cheong House



Photos 8-21 (c) & (d): Observed Fire Spread at the Open Ground Between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House



Photo 8-21 (e):
Post-Fire Condition Outside the West Re-Entrant of Wang Cheong House



Photo 8-21 (f):
Observed Fire Spread



Photo 8-21 (g): Post-Fire Condition Outside the West Re-Entrant of
Wang Tai House Facing Wang Kin House



Photo 8-21 (h): Post-Fire Condition Outside the North Re-Entrant of
Wang Cheong House

8.4.8 Effect of Canvas in Promoting Secondary Fire Spread

8.4.8.1 As discussed in Section 8.2, the use of non-FR canvas demonstrated its potential to escalate small fires in the re-entrant area into widespread and intense blazes. Non-FR canvas also played a significant role in fire spread through secondary ignition.

8.4.8.2 Catch-fans were installed on the scaffolding to intercept and contain falling objects on the building exterior. According to information provided by the HKPF, most of the catch-fans in Wang Fuk Court were covered with canvases.

8.4.8.3 Since catch-fans extend outward from the building, flying embers, flaming droplets and burning debris could easily fall onto them. The use of non-FR canvas, with its relatively large surface area, increased the likelihood of these ignited materials landing and causing ignition. Once ignited, the fire could spread to other combustibles, facilitating horizontal fire spread along the catch-fans and to other parts of the scaffolding.

8.4.9 Weather Conditions

8.4.9.1 When discussing secondary ignition, weather conditions significantly influence fire behaviour and the rate of spread. **Dry weather** and **windy conditions** are particularly impactful factors that intensify the risk and severity of secondary ignitions.

8.4.9.2 Dry Weather

Dry weather significantly reduces the moisture content in materials, making them more vulnerable to ignition. Combustible items dry out quickly in such conditions, lowering their ignition threshold. As a result, even small embers or flaming droplets can easily ignite these materials, enabling fire to spread rapidly. Additionally, dry conditions favor smouldering fires, as reduced moisture allows embers to persist and smoulder in materials for longer periods, potentially reigniting and sustaining the fire over time.

8.4.9.3 Windy Conditions

Wind drives the spread of embers over greater distances. In cases of secondary ignition, wind carries these burning materials to areas far from the original fire source, where they can ignite other combustibles, such as scaffolding materials or construction debris. Furthermore, strong winds supply additional oxygen to the fire, intensifying its heat and accelerating its spread.

8.4.9.4 The combination of dry and windy weather exacerbates conditions favorable for secondary ignition. Wind-carried embers and falling debris can travel long distances, igniting combustibles and enabling fires to develop quickly in new areas. Such weather conditions amplify the probability of uncontrollable fire spread, particularly in areas where abundant fuel sources are present.

8.5 Conclusion on the Mode of Fire Spread

8.5.1 After an extensive review of evidence and full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan, the hypotheses, including the **three dominant modes** of fire spread outlined in paragraph 8.1.1, were confirmed, with additional key observations included to ensure completeness.

8.6 Key Additional Observations:

8.6.1 FR Properties of Safety Nets

8.6.1.1 The full-scale fire tests and simulations highlighted the critical role of FR safety nets in mitigating fire risks. FR safety nets significantly reduced the likelihood of fire propagation by preventing secondary ignitions and self-extinguishing small fires once the external heat source was removed. In contrast, uncertified, non-FR safety nets and samples collected from Wang Chi House sustained small fire propagation and generated flaming droplets that ignited other combustible scaffolding components, such as nylon strips, toe-boards and wooden planks.

8.6.2 FR Properties of Canvas

8.6.2.1 Samples collected from Wang Chi House, combined with the use of non-FR canvas, allowed small fires in the re-entrant area to escalate into widespread, intense blazes capable of consuming nearly all combustibles and spreading rapidly across multiple levels.

8.6.2.2 Although the catch-fans were designed to intercept falling debris, they trapped flying embers, flaming droplets and burning debris instead during the fire, especially with non-FR canvas used on the catch-fans, which increased the risk of ignition and enabled fires to spread horizontally along the catch-fans and onto the scaffolding. This risk was further compounded at Wang Fuk Court by the previously identified observation. For instance, if the fire spread along the non-FR canvas covering the catch-fans and entered the re-entrant zone, consequences could be severe.

8.6.3 Fire Spread Into Units

8.6.3.1 Evidence indicated that openings such as broken or open windows, exhaust fans and air conditioners significantly contributed to the spread of fire into the building's interior. Fire tests conducted in Sichuan further demonstrated the possibility of fire spread via radiation ignition.

8.6.4 Ground-Level Ignition

8.6.4.1 In addition to the building's combustible envelope, wind-carried embers, flaming droplets and falling debris also ignited scattered construction materials at ground level, further intensifying the fire and its damage.

8.6.5 Extensive Fire Spread and Multi-Unit Involvement

8.6.5.1 Within a two-hour period, 11 instances of rapid fire spread were observed at various re-entrants across multiple buildings.¹¹⁷ The fire spread through these re-entrants, igniting adjacent units and escalating the initial building fire into multiple simultaneous outbreaks across numerous indoor units. It is conservatively estimated that more than 470 units were affected by the fire within the two-hour timeframe. The extensive spread severely impeded firefighting operations and rescue efforts, presenting extreme challenges in containment and suppression.

8.7 **Interconnected Modes Promoting Fire Progression:**

8.7.1 The three modes of fire spread amplified and promoted the fire's development through interconnected mechanisms:

1. **Rapid Vertical Fire Spread along the Re-entrant:**

This allowed the fire to spread simultaneously across 31 levels. The intense flames and heat generated in the re-entrant drove the rapid vertical progression of the fire.

2. **Façade Fire Transforming into Interior Fires:**

The rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant transitioned the façade fires into interior fires through broken or open windows, exhaust fans and other openings, or in some cases, through radiation ignition. Once inside a unit, the fire grew in intensity and could ignite previously unaffected façades through openings and windows of affected unit, further spreading the fire.

3. **Secondary Ignitions via Embers, Flaming Droplets and Falling Debris:**

As the fire intensified, burning fragments ignited combustibles on façades, at ground level and in nearby areas. Notably, the rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant was intense enough to lift relatively lightweight burning fragments over the top of the building, allowing them to drift considerable distances with the wind. Additionally, such spread propelled burning debris into surrounding areas, sparking new fires. When these secondary ignitions occurred within nearby re-entrants, they had the potential to initiate a new cycle of fire development. This, in turn, led to the rapid vertical fire spread along another re-entrant, perpetuating the fire's growth and destruction.

8.7.2 These interconnected mechanisms collectively accounted for 12 instances of rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant across 6 buildings in Wang Fuk Court. The interconnection between rapid vertical fire spread, internal fire propagation and secondary ignitions demonstrated how the fire evolved rapidly, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that made containment significantly more difficult.

¹¹⁷ The rapid fire spread along the re-entrant of Wang Yan House was noted at about 1830 hours.

Chapter 9 – Fatalities and Injuries Caused by the Fire

9.1 Background

- 9.1.1 The incident resulted in 79 injuries¹¹⁸ and 168 fatalities¹¹⁹, including one FS member, Senior Fireman (SFn) (Posthumous)¹²⁰ 18469 HO Wai-ho (as at the time of incident he was performing the duties of a Fireman (Fn), hereafter referred to as “Fn HO”).

9.2 Circumstances Leading to the Fatality of Senior Fireman 18469 HO Wai-ho

- 9.2.1 Fn HO is a 37-year-old firefighter, who tragically sustained serious injuries and lost his life in the line of duty during the fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26.11.2025. This chapter outlines a detailed account of the circumstances that led to his fatality.

9.2.2 Sequence of Occurrences

- 9.2.2.1 On 26.11.2025, Fn HO was a crew member of Sha Tin (ST)/LRU. At about 1451 hours, ST/LRU was dispatched to attend the incident and arrived at scene at 1501 hours. Upon arrival, ST/LRU was initially assigned to assist ST/MP with laying hoses.

- 9.2.2.2 At about 1503 hours, SStnO HUI Kin-on received a radio message from FSCC about an assistance call at Flat 2701 of Wang Cheong House. He then instructed PStnO LIAO Kong-lap (PStnO LIAO), who then instructed Principal Fireman (PFn) [REDACTED] CHAN Chun-man (PFn CHAN), the Oic of ST/LRU, to form a team to respond to the aforesaid assistance call. PFn CHAN then instructed Fn HO and two other ST/LRU crew members, namely Fn [REDACTED] YEUNG Ching (Fn YEUNG) and Fn [REDACTED] SIU Tsz-ho (Fn SIU) to respond to the aforesaid assistance call.

- 9.2.2.3 While heading from ST/LRU to Wang Cheong House and passing through the bicycle parking area (as indicated “1” in **Figure 9-1**) on the G/F of Wang Tai House, the aforesaid crew members¹²¹ of ST/LRU encountered a large crowd evacuating from the building, as shown in **Photo 9-1 (a)**. Fn HO stopped to assist an elderly female in a wheelchair at Wang Tai House, while Fn YEUNG and Fn SIU did not notice that Fn HO was providing assistance to an evacuee and they continued proceeding towards Wang Cheong House, as shown in **Photo 9-1 (b)**.

¹¹⁸ Source of Reference: <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202601/22/P2026012100605.htm>

¹¹⁹ Source of Reference: <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202601/15/P2026011500612.htm>

¹²⁰ The late Mr. HO Wai-ho was posthumously awarded the honorary title of Senior Fireman in recognition of his outstanding service and selfless dedication to duty by FSD on 11.12.2025.

¹²¹ According to CCTV footage, Fn HO’s team was equipped with BA, a Rescuer Breathing Aid (RBA), a hammer and a crowbar when passing through the bicycle parking area on the G/F of Wang Tai House.



Photo 9-1 (a): CCTV Screenshot of Fn HO & Two Crew Members Entering the Bicycle Parking Area of Wang Tai House at 1512 Hours¹²²



Photo 9-1 (b): CCTV Screenshot of Fn HO Assisting an Elderly Female in a Wheelchair During her Evacuation

- 9.2.2.4 Afterwards, Fn YEUNG and Fn SIU arrived at the open ground outside Wang Cheong House and noted numerous firefighters were scattered around the entrance of Wang Cheong House which was blocked by burning objects. In order to maintain safe entrance and egress at Wang Cheong House for the search and rescue operation to Flat 2701, Fn YEUNG and Fn SIU had to first engage themselves in the firefighting operation at ground level near the front entrance of Wang Cheong House before proceeding further. The location is indicated “2” in **Figure 9-1**.

¹²² Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1513 hours, it was approximately 61 secs ahead the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1512 hours.



Figure 9-1: Location Map Showing Fn HO and his Team Members of ST/LRU

- 9.2.2.5 Meanwhile, CCTV footage showed that Fn HO entered the lift lobby of Wang Tai House at about 1517 hours¹²³, as shown in **Photo 9-2**, and took lift L14 to the 25/F with BA donned, as shown in **Photos 9-3 (a) & (b)**.
- 9.2.2.6 Given the large number of residents evacuating and firefighters conducting firefighting operations in the vicinity, compounded by the fact that all firefighters were wearing full protective gear with their faces concealed by masks and helmets, it was extremely difficult for Fn YEUNG and Fn SIU to promptly notice the absence of Fn HO.
- 9.2.2.7 Furthermore, the team's original assignment was to proceed to Flat 2701 of Wang Cheong House. However, the ground-level entrance of Wang Cheong House was obstructed by burning scaffolding and debris at the time, majority of firefighters were engaged in firefighting operations at that location. Under normal circumstances, it would have been reasonable to assume that Fn HO was among those firefighters, making it unlikely for Fn YEUNG and Fn SIU to suspect that he had mistakenly entered Wang Tai House.

¹²³ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1515 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1517 hours.



Photo 9-2: CCTV Screenshot Showing Fn HO Entering the
Lift Lobby of Wang Tai House



Photo 9-3 (a): CCTV Screenshot Showing Fn HO Entering
Lift L14 on G/F of Wang Tai House



Photo 9-3 (b): CCTV Screenshot Showing Fn HO Exiting
Lift L14 on 25/F of Wang Tai House

- 9.2.2.8 At about 1522 hours, Fn HO dispatched a Mayday message through channel 85 by means of his radio telephone (R/T). According to SStnO HUI, he heard a Mayday message through R/T. The message stated: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, , 而家被困係 30 樓。”. SStnO HUI was only able to recognize the words “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” and “而家被困係 30 樓”. SStnO HUI responded via R/T: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, 你喺咩位置。” However, SStnO HUI did not hear any response. At that time, based on the available information, SStnO HUI did not know the number or identity of the distressed member(s) nor the exact building he/they was/were in.
- 9.2.2.9 PStnO LIAO and Fn YEUNG both heard the message. The message they received was: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, 我係沙田細搶救隊員 18469 何偉豪, 而家被困係 30 樓。” In the message, Fn HO identified himself as being trapped on the 30/F. However, he did not specify the building he was in.
- 9.2.2.10 SStnO HUI initiated rescue operations, which will be explained in detail in Section 9.2.4.
- 9.2.2.11 To understand the adverse conditions Fn HO encountered when he dispatched the Mayday message, the fire development at Wang Tai House, both externally and internally, will be evaluated in detail in the ensuing paragraphs.

9.2.3 Fire Development in Wang Tai House

9.2.3.1 Overview of the External Fire Spread

Details of the fire development of Wang Tai House can be referenced in Section 5.2.3. Briefly, the fire spread to Wang Tai House via flying embers, though not on a large scale initially, was observed around 1500 hours. The situation deteriorated quickly and at about 1516 hours, video footage captured the vertical fire spread along the re-entrant on the east side of Wang Tai House, as stated in paragraph 5.2.3.5 and shown in **Photo 9-4**.



Photo 9-4: Rapid Vertical Fire Spread Along
the East Re-Entrant of Wang Tai House at 1516 Hours

Rapid Deterioration of Internal Conditions in Wang Tai House

9.2.3.2 CCTV footage and online video sources were thoroughly reviewed to analyze the internal conditions of Wang Tai House during the fire, which provided insights into the sequence of events and the rapid deterioration of conditions inside the building.

- 9.2.3.3 CCTV footage showed [REDACTED] entering lift L14 of Wang Tai House on the 31/F at about 1520 hours¹²⁴, as shown in **Photo 9-5**. Another video from an online source showed [REDACTED] encountered heavy and dense smoke entering through the upper openable part of the window in the lift lobby, as shown in **Photos 9-6 (a) & (b)**.
- 9.2.3.4 CCTV footage captured [REDACTED] inside lift L15 of Wang Tai House at about 1521 hours¹²⁵. When the lift doors opened on the 23/F, heavy and dense black smoke entered the lift, as shown in **Photos 9-7 (a) to (c)**.
- 9.2.3.5 Another CCTV footage showed [REDACTED] inside lift L13 of Wang Tai House at about 1521 hours¹²⁶. When the lift doors opened on the 24/F, heavy and dense black smoke poured intensely into the lift, as shown in **Photos 9-8 (a) to (c)**. This coincided with Fn HO's dispatch of the Mayday message, highlighting the severely deteriorating conditions at Wang Tai House.

¹²⁴ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1518 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1520 hours.

¹²⁵ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1519 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1521 hours.

¹²⁶ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1519 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1521 hours.






Photo 9-5: CCTV Screenshot Showing [REDACTED]
Entering Lift L14 on 31/F of Wang Tai House



Photos 9-6 (a) & (b): Video From Online Source Showing Internal Condition
of Lift Lobby on 31/F of Wang Tai House



Photos 9-7 (a) to (c): CCTV Screenshots
Showing Internal Condition of Lift L15 on 23/F



Photos 9-8 (a) to (c): CCTV Screenshots
Showing Internal Condition of Lift L13 on 24/F

9.2.3.6 A surviving witness, Ms. HON [REDACTED]¹²⁷, a friend of the resident of Flat 30[REDACTED], Wang Tai House, was interviewed after the fire. Ms. HON stated that she was escaping with three people, but only Ms. HON and one of her friends successfully evacuated to the roof floor, while the other two went missing during the evacuation.

9.2.3.7 Ms. HON observed that one of the staircases of Wang Tai House was filled with smoke on the 30/F. Upon entering the staircase, she noticed smoke rising from the lower levels, which prompted her to escape to the roof via another staircase. Once there, she found a large portion of the roof engulfed in flames and sought temporary shelter on the unaffected scaffolding at a lower level.¹²⁸

9.2.3.8 Based on the above, it is believed that the internal situation of Wang Tai House deteriorated rapidly shortly after Fn HO entered. CCTV footage and witness accounts indicated that conditions on the 30/F were already very severe at the time when Fn HO dispatched the Mayday message.

9.2.4 The Rescue Operation

9.2.4.1 At about 1522 hours, upon receiving Fn HO's Mayday message, SStnO HUI immediately responded via R/T: "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, 你喺咩位置。" The call-back message made by SStnO HUI was heard by other personnel at scene. However, there was no response from Fn HO. Under such circumstances, SStnO HUI decided to keep all personnel at scene in the same talk group at that moment and repeatedly attempted to establish contact with Fn HO, but to no avail.

9.2.4.2 At that time, SStnO HUI did not know the number or identity of the distressed member(s) nor his/their exact location. However, the fire at Wang Cheong House was extremely severe with heavy smoke. Since the fire originated at Wang Cheong House, SStnO HUI assessed that the distressed member(s) was/were most likely trapped on the 30/F of Wang Cheong House. SStnO HUI formed 5 Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) to conduct a search for Fn HO on the 30/F, Wang Cheong House. However, the entrance to Wang Cheong House was obstructed by burning bamboo and miscellaneous articles. Subsequently, PStnO LIAO confirmed with SStnO HUI that the distressed member was Fn HO and requested to be one of the members of the 5th ERT to conduct a search for Fn HO on the 30/F of Wang Cheong House.

9.2.4.3 SStnO HUI instructed TP/MP and TP/HP to extinguish the fire outside Wang Cheong House and to clear access to the interior. This action was intended to enable the ERTs and other FS members to enter Wang Cheong House and carry out the rescue operation for Fn HO.

¹²⁷ Witness Statement of HON [REDACTED] at Appendix A-12 refers.

¹²⁸ According to Mr. CHENG [REDACTED], a friend of Ms HON, they left the unit together at about 1510 hours and arrived the roof at around 1519 hours. Details are available in his witness statement, referenced in Appendix A-56.

- 9.2.4.4 At about 1534 hours, DO LAM Ho-chun upgraded the fire incident to No.4 Alarm and tasked ADO CHEUNG Lok-hang to continue firefighting operations at Wang Kin House and Wang Sun House; ADO CHOW Tsz-ho to assist DO LAM in handling Mayday rescue operation; and SStnO HUI to tackle fire at Wang Shing House, Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, as well as to clear access for the ERTs into Wang Cheong House.
- 9.2.4.5 Since Wang Cheong House was well alight with a lot of burning bamboo and miscellaneous articles obstructing the building entrance at that instance, the ERTs could not enter the building.
- 9.2.4.6 At approximately 1555 hours, Fn HO was found by PStnO WONG Man-hin and SFn [REDACTED] CHEUK Kam-wing of TP/MP. At the material time, Fn HO was found unconscious and lying on top of the burning scaffolding outside Wang Tai House, as shown in **Photo 9-9**.
- 9.2.4.7 Nearby crew members immediately removed Fn HO to a place of safety, rendered ambulance aid and handed him over to Amb A195 at 1605 hours at scene.




Photo 9-9: Photo Showing the Location Where Fn HO was Discovered

9.2.5 Medical Cause of Death

9.2.5.1 Heat Related Injuries

The autopsy¹²⁹ revealed that Fn HO had sustained extensive skin burns on various body parts and inflammation of the air passage, indicating thermal injuries and inhalation of smoke and hot gas produced during the fire. The toxicological analysis detected 26% saturation of carboxyhaemoglobin in Fn HO's blood. In addition, soot deposits were found in Fn HO's airways and lungs. These findings indicated that Fn HO had been exposed to the fire and smoke without wearing his BA for a period of time before his death.

9.2.5.2 Bruises and Lacerations

The autopsy also revealed that Fn HO had sustained head injuries and fractures localised to the left side of his body (left-sided ribs, left pelvis, left shoulder, left arm bone and left forearm bones). These findings suggest that Fn HO might have fallen from a height, which resulted in impact on the left side of his body against a wide, hard, unyielding surface.

9.2.5.3 Given the location and severity of these injuries, it was unlikely for these injuries to be rapidly fatal by themselves. However, the associated injuries to brain and cervical spinal cord might have caused reduced conscious level and limb weakness or paralysis, leading to the physical incapacitation that rendered Fn HO incapable of removing himself from dangerous environment, such as the fire.

9.2.6 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) & Other Equipment

9.2.6.1 When Fn HO was rescued outside Wang Tai House, he was observed wearing the following uniform and PPE¹³⁰:

- i) Station T-shirt (Short Sleeves) and No.3 Trousers;
- ii) PBI Matrix Tunic and Trousers;
- iii) Anti-flash Hood;
- iv) Fire Retardant Glove¹³¹ on his right hand, while the left-hand glove was missing; and
- v) R/T.

¹²⁹ The Autopsy Report of Fn HO at Appendix A-55 refers.

¹³⁰ All equipment worn by Fn HO during the time of incident was delivered to GL on 1.12.2025 & 3.12.2025. No ignitable liquid residues were recovered therefrom. The relevant examination report at Appendix A-3-10 refers.

¹³¹ In accordance with EN 659:2003, fire retardant glove shall withstand contact heat at 250°C for 10 secs and radiant heat flux of 40 kW/m² for 20 secs.

9.2.6.2 The helmet, Mine Safety Appliances, or MSA Safety Incorporated (MSA) BA Set and full-face mask belonging to Fn HO were found in the lift lobby on the 31/F by the crew of FL/HP. Considering that the set could be used as an alternative Rescuee Breathing Aid (RBA), they took the BA set and the full face mask to the roof floor. However, the BA cylinder was found empty, so they subsequently left the BA set and the face mask on the ground of the roof floor.

9.2.6.3 Additionally, Fn HO's left hand glove and a hammer were found on the window sill of the lift lobby on the 31/F, near the broken window, as shown in **Photo 9-10**. The boots belonging to Fn HO were recovered separately on the G/F outside Wang Tai House, as shown in **Figure 9-2**, by Acting ADO TSE Kwong-for and PFn [REDACTED] TANG Cheuk-yin respectively.




Photo 9-10: Photo Showing the Window Sill on the 31/F




Figure 9-2: Map Indicating the Locations of the Fire Boots of Fn HO

- 9.2.6.4 The post-fire visual inspection revealed that Fn HO might have been in prolonged contact with hot or burning objects, resulting in severe fire damage to his Station T-shirt, No. 3 trousers, PBI Matrix tunic & trousers, anti-flash hood and his helmet, as shown in **Photos 9-11 to 9-16**.



Photo 9-11 (a):
Station T-shirt (Front)



Photo 9-11 (b):
Station T-shirt (Back)



Photo 9-12 (a):
No. 3 Trousers (Front)



Photo 9-12 (b):
No. 3 Trousers (Back)



Photo 9-13 (a):
PBI Matrix Tunic (Front)¹³²



Photo 9-13 (b):
PBI Matrix Tunic (Back)

¹³² In accordance with EN 469:2020, PBI Matrix tunic and trousers shall withstand 1,093°C for up to 8 secs.



Photo 9-14 (a):
PBI Matrix Trousers (Front)



Photo 9-14 (b):
PBI Matrix Trousers (Back)



Photo 9-15 (a):
Anti-flash Hood (Front) ¹³³



Photo 9-15 (b):
Anti-flash Hood (Back)



Photo 9-16 (a): The Helmet ¹³⁴



Photo 9-16 (b): Crack on Visor

¹³³ In accordance with EN 13911:2017, anti-flash hood shall be non-flammable and capable of withstanding 260°C for 5 mins without melting or dripping.

¹³⁴ In accordance with EN 443:2008, helmets shall be resistant to flame combustion at 900 – 1,000°C for up to 10 secs and to radiant heat for up to 480 secs, and shall have impact resistance against 5 kg weight and penetration resistance against 1 kg sharp object impact.

- 9.2.6.5 No unusual damage was observed on Fn HO's anti-flash hood and helmet, apart from a crack in the visor, which might have been caused by contact with a sharp or hard object, either prior to or during the fire.
- 9.2.6.6 The post-fire visual inspection revealed that Fn HO's rubber boots might also have been in prolonged contact with hot or burning objects, resulting in severe fire damage. As the boots are designed to provide protection against fire in accordance with European Standard (EN) 15090:2012¹³⁵, it is believed that the intense heat or flames exceeded the boots' protective capacity over an extended period, as shown in **Photos 9-17 (a) & (b)**.



Photo 9-17 (a):
The Rubber Boot (Right-Foot)



Photo 9-17 (b):
The Sole of the Boot (Left-Foot)

9.2.7 BA Equipment and Operation

9.2.7.1 BA Equipment Examination

The concerned BA set passed the BA half-yearly test on 9.10.2025, which was about 1 month prior to the incident. Additionally, a daily test was conducted by Fn HO on 26.11.2025 with satisfactory results. It is therefore reasonably believed that the BA set, including the face mask, was in efficient working order.

- 9.2.7.2 The firefighter shown in **Photos 9-3 (a) & (b)** was Fn HO. Fn HO entered Wang Tai House and took the lift to the 25/F with BA donned and no abnormalities were noted during the process.

¹³⁵ In accordance with EN 15090:2012, firefighting boots shall withstand 250°C for up to 10 mins.

9.2.7.3 BA Procedures

Regarding BA-wearing experience, Fn HO was qualified as an MSA BA wearer on 13.2.2017 and subsequently wore BA in numerous incidents throughout his service. Records also indicate that Fn HO attended his last monthly practice on 3.10.2025, demonstrating that he was a competent and experienced BA wearer.

9.2.7.4 Regarding the incident, Fn HO, along with two other ST/LRU members forming a team of three, was instructed by PFn CHAN, Oic of ST/LRU, to respond to an assistance call at Flat 2701, Wang Cheong House. No negligence or non-observance of procedures was identified on the part of any of the team members involved.

9.2.8 Observation and Analysis

9.2.8.1 Fn HO, along with two other ST/LRU members forming a team of three was separated from his team because he was providing assistance to evacuees at the bicycle parking area on the G/F of Wang Tai House.

9.2.8.2 At around 1517 hours¹³⁶, Fn HO was captured on CCTV accessing the 25/F of Wang Tai House via the lift with his BA donned, as shown in **Photos 9-3 (a) & (b)**. According to the circumstances above, it is inferred that Fn HO had mistakenly believed that he was at Wang Cheong House when he was, in fact, at Wang Tai House.

9.2.8.3 Fn HO likely believed that the rest of the team had already reached the 27/F. In an attempt to rejoin his crew, Fn HO took the lift to the 25/F, two floors below the reported location. Since stopping the lift car at least two floors below the affected/reported floor is a standard safety precautionary measure when using Fireman's Lift¹³⁷, it is believed that Fn HO was executing his assigned order and approaching Flat 2701 of Wang Cheong House at that moment.

9.2.8.4 Based on the post-fire investigation, it is believed that conditions deteriorated rapidly shortly after Fn HO arrived on the 25/F. It was also revealed that multiple fatalities were located on the 31/F and R/F, further highlighting the severe conditions in those areas. The witness statement of HON [REDACTED]¹³⁸ also confirmed that both staircases were heavily smoke-logged.

9.2.8.5 Equipped with proper PPE and BA, Fn HO was fully capable of escaping from Wang Tai House upon noting the deteriorating situation. However, it is believed that he stayed in Wang Tai House in an attempt to assist the evacuation of others.

¹³⁶ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1515 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1517 hours.

¹³⁷ Paragraph 5.1.1 of FS Manual (Operation), Part I, Section IV(B), Chapter 12 – Operational Procedures on the Use of Fireman's Lift refers.

¹³⁸ Witness Statement of HON [REDACTED] at Appendix A-12 refers.

- 9.2.8.6 Based on the recovery of Fn HO's BA set, full-face mask, helmet and hammer on the 31/F, together with the broken window at the lift lobby, it is reasonably believed that Fn HO had placed down his equipment before attempting to climb out of the building to the external scaffolding via the window as shown in **Photo 9-10**, as this might have been the only option available for him at the moment – to seek assistance or to identify an alternative escape route. The autopsy report indicated that his injury pattern was consistent with a fall (see paragraph 9.2.5.2), supporting the inference that he exited the building structure through the scaffolding.
- 9.2.8.7 Plausible reconstructions are (i) that Fn HO was overcome by smoke inhalation, lost consciousness and subsequently fell from height; or (ii) that he fell while climbing the scaffolding, sustained incapacitating injuries and later became unconscious. In the latter scenario, he may have remained on or near the scaffolding until it collapsed, resulting in a combined fall with the structure. Both interpretations are consistent with the autopsy findings of blunt force trauma, fractures and smoke inhalation.
- 9.2.8.8 In either case, the evidence indicates that Fn HO was engaged in a valiant effort to escape or obtain help under extreme conditions. His incapacitation — whether primarily due to smoke inhalation or traumatic injuries sustained during a fall — ultimately rendered him unable to remove himself from danger, leading to his tragic passing.
- 9.2.8.9 The confirmed cause of death of Fn HO was determined to be the adverse effects of fire and the inhalation of fire fumes and smoke. Although the PPE was severely damaged due to prolonged contact with hot or burning objects, it continued to serve its intended purpose.
- 9.2.9 Conclusion
- 9.2.9.1 According to the Autopsy Report, Fn HO died from inhalation of fire fumes and extensive burns, with head and neck injuries as other significant conditions contributing to the death.
- 9.2.9.2 Fn HO demonstrated exceptional bravery and a deep sense of duty while responding to the incident. Despite the challenging and life-threatening conditions, he prioritized the safety of others over his own, exemplifying the highest standards of selflessness and dedication.

9.3 Analysis on Circumstances Leading to Other Fatalities

9.3.1 Overview

9.3.1.1 A total of 168¹³⁹ fatalities were confirmed in the No. 5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court. The summary of the fatalities was provided in **Appendix A-22(A)**.

9.3.1.2 The deceased included 58 males and 110 females, whose ages ranged from 6 months to 98 years. Notably, 114 of the fatalities were individuals aged 65 or older.

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
0-14	0	6	6
15-24	0	2	2
25-44	8	17	25
45-64	7	14	21
65 or above	43	71	114
Total	58	110	168

9.3.1.3 According to the autopsy reports and Pol.75 findings, the causes of death were attributed to the following:

Cause of Death	Number of Fatalities
<i>Adverse effects of fire</i>	65
<i>Inhalation of fire fumes</i>	91
<i>Inhalation of fire fumes and burns</i>	4
<i>Inhalation of fire fumes and extensive burns</i>	4
<i>Multiple causes</i> ¹⁴⁰	4

¹³⁹ Of the total fatalities, 4 individuals were pronounced dead after being transported to the hospital, while the remaining 164 were found deceased at the scene.

¹⁴⁰ 3 of the deceased sustained inhalation of fire fumes as the direct cause of death with other significant contributing conditions, including ischaemic heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and obstructive sleep apnea respectively; one of the deceased sustained inhalation of fire fumes and extensive burns as direct cause of death and was subject to head and neck injuries as other significant contributing conditions.

- 9.3.1.4 Of the deceased, 103 were found inside residential units, 64 were discovered in common areas or on the roof of the affected buildings and 1 was located on the open ground outside the building.

Identity	Wang Tao	Wang Kin	Wang Sun	Wang Tai	Wang Cheong	Wang Shing	Total
<i>Resident</i>	2	-	2	72	72	1	149
<i>Worker</i>	-	-	-	4	3	-	7
<i>Domestic Helper</i>	-	-	-	4	6	-	10
<i>Visitor</i>	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
<i>FS Member</i>	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Total	2	-	2	82	81	1	168

9.3.2 Observations on Fatalities Distribution at Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House

Fatalities in Common Areas of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House

- 9.3.2.1 Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House experienced the highest number of fatalities, with 81 and 82 lives lost respectively. The breakdown of fatalities is as follows:

Location	Wang Cheong	Wang Tai
<i>Within unit</i>	57	41
<i>Staircase</i>	5	28
<i>Common corridor</i>	19	10
<i>Roof</i>	-	2
<i>Open ground outside the building</i>	-	1
Total	81	82

- 9.3.2.2 Fatalities in the staircases and common areas of Wang Tai House (38)¹⁴¹ exceeded those in Wang Cheong House (24). Proportionally, Wang Cheong House recorded a higher number of fatalities inside residential units compared to Wang Tai House.

¹⁴¹ Out of the 38 fatalities, 28 were found inside the staircase of Wang Tai House. The cause of death for all 28 individuals was inhalation of fire fumes, with one of them also sustaining extensive burns.

- 9.3.2.3 At Wang Cheong House, the fire rapidly spread along the east re-entrant around 1458 hours, which connected directly to both staircases through openings. This rapid progression quickly compromised the staircases as smoke and heat penetrated during the early stages of the fire. The failure of the FAS, combined with polystyrene-covered unit windows installed during renovation, delayed fire detection. By the time the fire was identified, the staircases were overwhelmed with smoke, leaving occupants without viable escape routes and forcing them to seek refuge in their units.
- 9.3.2.4 At Wang Tai House, rapid fire spread was observed in three re-entrants at 1516 hours, 1517 hours and 1530 hours. The last re-entrant to experience rapid fire spread was connected to the staircases, initially enabling occupants to attempt evacuation. However, by 1520 hours and 1530 hours, both ground-level exits were blocked by flaming, collapsed debris, trapping occupants and leading to fatalities in the staircases and common areas.
- 9.3.2.5 14 fatalities were located at the staircases and common corridors between the G/F and 4/F, with 6 at Wang Cheong House and 8 at Wang Tai House. Of these, 12 fatalities were later identified as occupants residing at a floor level higher than their discovered locations. It is reasonably believed that, as they approached the G/F during their attempts to evacuate, they likely encountered blocked exits caused by fallen, burning debris. Trapped with no viable escape routes, they were forced to remain in the common areas, contributing to the fatalities in these locations.

Observations at Wang Sun House

- 9.3.2.6 Post-fire investigations revealed that Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House and Wang Sun House all sustained significant fire damage. However, the comparatively low number of fatalities in Wang Sun House prompted the IFITF to conduct a detailed investigation.

Location sustaining Extremely Severe Damage or Severe Damage	Wang Cheong (81 fatalities)	Wang Tai (82 fatalities)	Wang Sun (2 fatalities)
<i>Unit</i>	63%	58%	58%
<i>Common corridor</i>	87%	94%	100%
<i>Staircase</i>	55%	55%	81%

Note: The number of fatalities is shown in parentheses ().

- 9.3.2.7 During the fire development at Wang Fuk Court, a distinctive fire progression pattern was observed, characterized by rapid fire spread along the re-entrant. This spread occurred simultaneously across 31 levels, severely affecting units and common areas. It penetrated units, degraded conditions in corridors and staircases via openings and caused bamboo scaffolding to collapse, with flaming debris obstructing ground-floor exits and complicating evacuation.
- 9.3.2.8 In Wang Cheong and Wang Tai Houses, fire spread early on, leaving little time for evacuation. In response to the unprecedented rate of fire spread, the FSD concentrated the majority of its available manpower on fire suppression. This strategy was intended not only to combat the heavily involved blocks but also to slow the fire progression towards the as-yet-unaffected Wang Kin House, Wang Sun House, Wang Tao House and Wang Yan House. By prioritizing immediate fire suppression over other tasks, firefighters bought critical time for residents and maintained viable escape conditions that would have otherwise been compromised by flames spreading from the external scaffolding into the building interiors. This tactical prioritization likely delayed the fire spread, providing residents at Wang Sun House more time to evacuate.
- 9.3.2.9 Witness statements and questionnaires from the occupants of Wang Sun House revealed various ways in which they became aware of the fire, as summarized in the table below:

Means of Acknowledgement	Occupants (From Statement)	Occupants (From Questionnaire)
<i>Witnessed fire or smoke</i>	3	8
<i>Smelled smoke</i>	4	9
<i>Heard sound of burning</i>	1	1
<i>Heard sirens/seen of emergency appliances</i>	1	7
<i>Heard fire alarm</i>	1	7
<i>Informed by others</i>	13	49
Total	23	81

9.3.2.10 Compared to residents of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, residents of Wang Sun House had more time to gather information about the fire or to become aware of various noise and sounds at the scene. This time gap also enabled residents of Wang Sun House to receive calls from relatives or friends alerting them that a fire had broken out at Wang Fuk Court and was spreading toward Wang Sun House.

9.4 Circumstances Leading to the Injuries

9.4.1 Summary of Injuries

79 individuals sustained injuries of varying severity, comprising 45 males and 34 females, aged between 3 months and 87 years. 72 injured individuals received ambulance aid at the scene and were conveyed to hospital by ambulance, while 7 arrived at the hospital via private means. A summary of the injuries is provided in **Appendix A-22(B)**.

Age Group	Male	Female	Total
0-14	0	1	1
15-24	1	1	2
25-44	15	5	20
45-64	9	11	20
65 or above	20	16	36
Total	45	34	79

<i>Injured Persons</i>	Wang Cheong	Wang Tai	Wang Tao	Wang Shing	Wang Yan	Others	Total
<i>Resident</i>	30 ^[142]	11	9	2	1	3 ^[143]	56
<i>Construction Workers</i>	2	1	-	-	-	-	3
<i>Domestic Helper</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Visitors</i>	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
<i>FS Members</i>	-	-	-	-	-	13 ^[144]	13
<i>News Reporter</i>	-	-	-	-	-	1 ^[145]	1
<i>Resident of Kwong Fuk Estate</i>	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
Total	33	14	9	2	1	20	79

<i>Place of Rescue</i>	Wang Cheong	Wang Tai	Wang Tao	Wang Shing	Wang Yan	Others	Total
<i>Within unit</i>	26 ^[146]	10	6	2	1	-	45
<i>Staircase</i>	3	-	1	-	-	-	4
<i>Common corridor</i>	1	-	2	-	-	-	3
<i>Rooftop</i>	2	2	-	-	-	-	4
<i>Outside building</i>	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
<i>Kwong Fuk Estate</i>	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
<i>FS Members</i>	-	-	-	-	-	13 ^[147]	13
<i>Arrived at hospital by private means</i>	-	-	-	-	-	4	4
Total	33	14	9	2	1	20	79

¹⁴² Among the 30 residents rescued by FS, two reached the hospital by private means.

¹⁴³ Three residents who were not at Wang Fuk Court during the fire also arrived at hospital by private means.

¹⁴⁴ Among the 13 FS members, one arrived at hospital by private means.

¹⁴⁵ The news reporter arrived at hospital by private means.

¹⁴⁶ Two residents rescued by FSD arrived at hospital by private means.

¹⁴⁷ Among the 13 FS members, one arrived at hospital by private means.

9.4.2 In accordance with the FSD's record, the injuries were attributed to the followings:

Nature of Injuries	Number of Injuries
<i>Inhalation Injury</i>	25
<i>Shortness of Breath</i>	22
<i>Burn</i>	3
<i>Heat Exhaustion</i>	2
<i>Hyperventilation</i>	2
<i>Hypothermia</i>	1
<i>Limbs Injuries or Pain</i>	3
<i>Organ Related Issues</i> ¹⁴⁸	7
<i>Dizziness, Weakness or Irregular Pulse</i>	3
<i>For Examination</i>	1
<i>Multiple Injuries</i> ¹⁴⁹	3
<i>Arrived Hospital by Private Means</i>	7
Total	79

9.4.3 Dynamic Assessment by Surviving Injuries

9.4.3.1 In rapidly changing circumstances, the adoption of dynamic assessment in the fire incident drastically increased the chance of survival for evacuees / rescues. The adoption of dynamic assessment was particularly important in both Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House since the means of escape therein were compromised at the very early stage of fire. In certain cases, occupants evacuated from their units and successfully exited the building. However, some occupants who attempted to leave encountered intense heat and smoke, forcing them to retreat to their own units or seek refuge in neighbouring units while awaiting rescue. Others remained inside their homes from the outset and were ultimately rescued. The following examples illustrate the dynamic assessment of occupants' reactions and highlight the varying outcomes observed during the incident.

¹⁴⁸ 'Organ Related Issues' include throat pain, throat discomfort, eye pain, eye problem, stomachache.
¹⁴⁹ Three persons sustained multiple injuries, including "inhalation injury" & "Glasgow Coma Scale dropped", "shortness of breath, eye injury" and "loss of consciousness, neck pain, dizziness".

- 9.4.3.2 Mr. LI [REDACTED]¹⁵⁰, the occupant of Flat 2[REDACTED], Wang Cheong House, attempted to leave the unit at around 1510 hours but was unsuccessful due to the common corridor being filled with dense smoke. Meanwhile, Mr. LI sheltered two neighbours into his flat for refuge. All three of them remained inside Mr. LI's unit until eventually being rescued by FS at 1800 hours on 26.11.2025.
- 9.4.3.3 Ms. HUANG [REDACTED]¹⁵¹ and Mr. YIU [REDACTED]¹⁵², construction workers of Wang Cheong House, were at the scaffolding outside the 27/F during the time of fire. Upon being informed of the fire, they first climbed back up to the R/F of Wang Cheong House via the scaffolding. Subsequently, they tried to escape using the only staircase from the R/F but to no avail due to heavy dense smoke pouring out therefrom. Ms. HUANG and Mr. YIU remained at the R/F of Wang Cheong House until they were eventually rescued by FS.
- 9.4.3.4 A similar case was also noted in Wang Tai House. Ms. HON [REDACTED]¹⁵³ and her colleague Mr. CHENG [REDACTED] were inside Flat 30[REDACTED] when they were alerted to the fire. They first tried to escape using the staircase immediately outside Flat 30[REDACTED] but were unsuccessful due to dense smoke issuing from underneath. They then escaped to R/F using another staircase. After successfully arriving at the R/F and taking refuge there for some time, the fire spread to the nearby area. They then took shelter on the scaffolding below and remained there. Two hours later, they climbed back to the R/F via the scaffolding, where they stayed until eventually being rescued by FS at 0200 hours on 27.11.2025.
- 9.4.3.5 In other shelter-in-place cases, 38 occupants remained in their units as the fire and heavy smoke were contained outside.¹⁵⁴ These individuals chose to stay because conditions within their units were relatively safe. Their flats sustained either "Minor Damage" or remained "Unaffected".¹⁵⁵
- 9.4.3.6 While the evacuation process was complex and challenging, it in fact reflected the necessity of adopting an ongoing dynamic assessment when evacuating during a fire due to the rapidly changing circumstances.

¹⁵⁰ Witness statement of LI [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-40](#) refers.

¹⁵¹ Witness statement of HUANG [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-111](#) refers.

¹⁵² Witness statement of YIU [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-112](#) refers.

¹⁵³ Witness Statement of HON [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-12](#) refers.

¹⁵⁴ As reported, occupants utilized various smoke management measures that effectively prevented smoke and heat from entering their units.

¹⁵⁵ Units classified as having "Severe Damage" or "Extremely Severe Damage" likely became untenable for occupants due to rapidly deteriorating conditions, making it impossible to remain inside and await fire services assistance. As a result, evacuation became their only viable option. Notably, among the fatalities found in common areas, 17 individuals were residents of flats classified as having "Minor Damage" or being "Unaffected". Additionally, successful rescues were observed in adjacent units with similar classifications.

Chapter 10 – Circumstances Leading to Heavy Casualties

10.1 Overview of Preliminary Findings

10.1.1 The fire at Wang Fuk Court resulted in an unprecedented number of fatalities and injuries. This chapter examines the circumstances that contributed to the high number of casualties based on observations and analysis conducted by the IFITF. The IFITF identified several critical factors that led to heavy casualties, including:

- Increased risk of entrapment due to rapid and extensive fire spread
- Fire-damaged combustible envelope blocking exits
- Failure of fire alarms
- Polystyrene window covers
- Compromised tenability in means of escape

10.2 Increased Risk of Entrapment due to Rapid and Extensive Fire Spread

10.2.1 Video recordings evidenced that flames quickly spread from the lower levels to the rooftop¹⁵⁶. This extreme rate of vertical fire spread left residents with limited time to react, significantly reducing opportunities for safe evacuation and increasing the likelihood of entrapment¹⁵⁷.

10.2.2 In other words, from a very early stage, the fire behaviour had already set a critical time pressure on both evacuees and first responders.

10.2.3 The rapid and extensive spread of the fire was driven by a combination of factors, as detailed in Section 6.2, including:

- Rapid vertical fire spread through the chimney-like re-entrant filled with combustible materials (as shown in **Photo 10-1 (a)**);
- Secondary ignitions caused by wind-driven embers, falling debris and flaming droplets (as shown in **Photo 10-1 (b)**);
- Unfavourable weather conditions accelerating fire spread;
- Combustible envelope, such as safety nets, polystyrene window covers, wooden planks, toe-boards, nylon strips and canvas, contributing to fire propagation (as shown in **Photo 10-1 (c)**);
- Fire load inside units prolonging fire duration; and
- The presence of potentially non-FR safety nets and canvas, as detailed in Section 8.2.

¹⁵⁶ Such spread was documented at 12 re-entrants across different buildings. Video footage, subsequently validated by the Sichuan fire tests, confirmed that fire spread at the re-entrant typically progresses steadily in the beginning. Following this initial phase, the fire growth accelerates exponentially.

¹⁵⁷ At Wang Fuk Court, certain re-entrants were connected to staircases and common corridors through openable windows or openings. The condition of the means of escape components deteriorated rapidly, significantly compromising their effectiveness. Under these circumstances, occupants had virtually no time to evacuate safely. Further details are provided in Section 10.6.

- 10.2.4 The aforementioned factors interacted and amplified one another, creating conditions highly conducive to fire development, particularly when rapid fire spread occurred at the re-entrants of the buildings.
- 10.2.5 The consequences of the rapid fire spread and deteriorating conditions were evident in the experiences of multiple occupants and workers within the affected buildings. The following accounts illustrate how the sudden onset of dense smoke obstructed evacuation efforts.
- 10.2.5.1 Ms. SUEN [REDACTED]¹⁵⁸, the occupant of Flat 21 [REDACTED] in Wang Cheong House, stated that at around 1430 hours, the common corridor outside her unit was free of smoke when she initially opened her entrance door. However, upon reopening the door a couple seconds later, she observed that the corridor was filled with dense black smoke. The sudden deterioration of conditions rendered evacuation impossible, compelling her to retreat back into her unit.
- 10.2.5.2 Mr. CHEUNG [REDACTED], the occupant of Flat [REDACTED]06 in Wang Tai House, stated that at about 1516 hours, he left the unit with his wife and attempted to use the staircase to escape.¹⁵⁹ However, both staircases were heavily smoke-logged. Within one minute, the common corridor became filled with dense smoke, making it extremely difficult to breathe, as shown in **Photos 10-2 (a) & (b)**. Consequently, they returned to their unit.
- 10.2.5.3 Based on observations from witness statements, at least 23 workers¹⁶⁰ returned to the rooftop to retrieve personal belongings. While some were ultimately able to escape, the rapid deteriorating condition may have prevented others from escaping. One such case involved Mr. CHAN [REDACTED], a construction worker at Wang Tai House. According to CCTV records, he entered the lift at approximately 1509 hours on the [REDACTED]/F and proceeded to the 31/F, likely to retrieve personal belongings, alert others as well as attempt to extinguish the fire on the R/F¹⁶¹. He then returned to the lift at about 1520 hours, as shown in **Photos 10-2 (c) & (d)**. Tragically, he was later found deceased at the staircase landing on the 10/F of Wang Tai House.

¹⁵⁸ Witness statement of SUEN [REDACTED] at Appendix A-10 refers.

¹⁵⁹ Witness statement of CHEUNG [REDACTED] at Appendix A-49 refers.

¹⁶⁰ Witness statements at Appendices A-13, A-14, A-16, A-63 to A-82 refer.

¹⁶¹ Witness statements at Appendix A-14 and A-79 refer.



Photo 10-1 (a): Rapid Vertical Fire Spread Along Re-Entrant of Wang Tao House



Photo 10-1 (b): Secondary Ignitions Caused by Falling Debris



Photo 10-1 (c): Combustible Envelope Fueling Fire Spread



Photo 10-2 (a): Security Camera Footage of Flat 06 at 1516 Hours



Photo 10-2 (b): Security Camera Footage of Flat 06 at 1517 Hours




Photo 10-2 (c): CCTV Footage of Wang Tai House at 1509 Hours¹⁶²




Photo 10-2 (d): CCTV Footage of Wang Tai House at 1520 Hours¹⁶³

¹⁶² Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1507 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1509 hours.

¹⁶³ Although the CCTV footage was time-stamped at 1518 hours, it was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1520 hours.

10.3 Fire-Damaged Combustible Envelope Blocking Exits

- 10.3.1 Flaming bamboo scaffolding and other construction materials detached from the upper levels during the fire led to the collapse and accumulation of a large amount of burning debris, which piled up on the ground level, resulting in flaming blockages at building entrances, as shown in **Photos 10-3 (a) & (b)**. As a result, both escape for evacuees and access for firefighting personnel were obstructed and in turn delaying escape, rescue efforts and fire suppression.
- 10.3.2 As shown in **Photo 10-3 (c)**, which was taken at about 1611 hours, the bamboo scaffolding on the southeast façade of Wang Cheong House had collapsed, likely blocking the rear exit of Wang Cheong House.
- 10.3.3 According to the initial Incident Commander, SStnO HUI Kin-on, the front entrance and rear exit of Wang Cheong House were blocked by collapsed burning scaffolding at about 1505 hours and 1457 hours respectively. For Wang Tai House, the front entrance and rear exit were similarly obstructed at about 1520 hours and 1530 hours respectively¹⁶⁴. His observation at Wang Tai House was supported by the following evidence from the building's CCTV footage, as shown in **Photos 10-3 (d) & (e)**, and the following observations.
- 10.3.3.1 Mr. AU YEUNG [REDACTED] is the occupant of Flat 10[REDACTED] of Wang Cheong House. After leaving his unit, he attempted to exit Wang Cheong House via the staircase but discovered the G/F rear exit was blocked by fire. He then returned to the 1/F and used the front staircase to successfully leave the building through the lift lobby¹⁶⁵.
- 10.3.3.2 In **Photo 10-4 (a)**, the [REDACTED], believed to be [REDACTED] arrived at the G/F via lift L13 of Wang Tai House at about 1518 hours for the first time. [REDACTED] hesitated at the lift entrance, briefly peeking out before retreating back into the lift out of fear of the fire. [REDACTED] then shuttled between the 24/F and G/F¹⁶⁶, arriving at the G/F again at 1520 hours. Tragically, as described in paragraph 9.2.3.5, the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the lift lobbies ultimately led to [REDACTED] deaths.

¹⁶⁴ Witness statement of HUI Kin-on to IC at **Appendix A-29(C)** refers.

¹⁶⁵ Witness statement of AU YEUNG [REDACTED] at **Appendix A-95** refers.

¹⁶⁶ Although the time shown on both CCTV footage was 1518 hours, the system was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1520 hours.

10.3.3.3 In **Photo 10-4 (b)**, the [REDACTED], believed to be [REDACTED], entered lift L15 on the G/F at approximately 1518 hours and travelled to the 11/F, 23/F and 29/F. [REDACTED] then remained in the same lift and returned to the G/F at approximately 1520 hours¹⁶⁷. The photo captured the flare, highlighting the hazardous conditions at the entrance. [REDACTED] remained in the lift and ascended to the 11/F & 23/F. When [REDACTED] eventually arrived at the 23/F at about 1521 hours, the lift was engulfed by smoke and heat pouring in. Tragically, as detailed in paragraph 9.2.3.4, the worsening conditions in the lift lobbies ultimately led to [REDACTED] death.

10.3.3.4 As shown in **Photo 10-4 (c)**, sparks were visible at the entrance of Wang Tai House; at about 1521 hours¹⁶⁸, flames were captured at the same location in **Photo 10-4 (d)**. Under these hazardous conditions, even evacuees who managed to reach the ground floor were unable to escape safely. At the same time, firefighters faced serious challenges in approaching the entrances safely and quickly, as they had to contend with falling, burning materials and intense heat at the base of the buildings. Hence, the blockage of exits was undoubtedly one of the critical contributing factors that led to heavy casualties.



Photo 10-3 (a): The Burning Debris and Bamboo Scaffolding Blocking Exits

¹⁶⁷ Although the time shown on both CCTV footage was 1518 hours, the system was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1520 hours.

¹⁶⁸ Although the time shown on the CCTV was 1519 hours, the system was approximately 2 mins behind the HKO reference time, making the actual time approximately 1521 hours.



Photo 10-3 (b): Flaming Bamboo Scaffolding and Other Construction Materials
Detached From the Upper Levels



Photo 10-3 (c): The Bamboo of the Scaffolding on Southeast Façade of Wang Cheong House Fell and Possibly Blocked the Rear Exit



Photo 10-3 (d): CCTV Footage G/F, Wang Tai House at 1516 Hours



Photo 10-3 (e): CCTV Footage G/F, Wang Tai House at 1518 Hours



Photo 10-4 (a): CCTV Footage of Lift L13 on the G/F at 1520 Hours



Photo 10-4 (b): CCTV Footage of Lift L15 on the G/F at 1520 Hours



Photo 10-4 (c): CCTV Footage of at the Entrance of Wang Tai House at 1520 Hours



Photo 10-4 (d): Flame was Observed at the Entrance of Wang Tai House at About 1521 Hours

10.4 Shutdown of Fire Alarms

- 10.4.1 Post-fire investigation revealed that the FAS of the eight blocks were shut down before the fire. As such, residents did not receive timely warnings, leading to delayed evacuation. Once they became aware of the outbreak of fire, the means of escape might have already been exposed to smoke and heat, which contributed to the heavy casualties.
- 10.4.2 Information indicates that Mr. LAM [REDACTED]⁶⁹, the Technical Officer of ISS EastPoint Properties Ltd, successfully restarted the FAS in two blocks. Despite this effort, the non-functioning FAS prevented early warnings to residents, thereby reducing the time available for safe evacuation.
- 10.4.3 According to Ms. CHUNG [REDACTED]⁷⁰, the security guard of Wang Cheong House, she attempted to manually activate the FAS to alert residents to evacuate at about 1448 hours. This attempt was made while the fire was still in its incipient stage, three minutes before it was officially reported to the FSD at 1451 hours. However, her efforts were unsuccessful. As a result, residents of Wang Cheong House only became aware of the fire at a point when smoke and heat had already worsened in common areas, making safe evacuation more difficult.
- 10.4.4 Had the FAS been operational, Ms. CHUNG's activation attempt at 1448 hours could have provided residents with a critical evacuation alert during the key escape window between 1448 hours and 1458 hours¹⁷¹, when escape routes were still tenable. For example, Ms. TSE [REDACTED]¹⁷², the occupant of Flat 2 [REDACTED] of Wang Cheong House, was informed by the security guard and left her flat at approximately 1455 hours, enabling her to evacuate successfully at an early stage.
- 10.4.5 However, as the FAS was not functional, residents remained unaware of the immediate danger until evacuation was no longer viable.

¹⁶⁹ Witness statement of LAM [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-87](#) refers.

¹⁷⁰ Witness statement of CHUNG [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-11](#) refers.

¹⁷¹ Generally speaking, escape conditions in the building quickly deteriorated after the rapid fire spread along the re-entrant, engulfing multiple floors. Such fire spread at the re-entrant of Wang Cheong House was first observed at 1458 hours. Moreover, at about 1457 and 1505 hours, the two ground-floor exits of Wang Cheong House were already blocked by the fallen burning debris, rendering escape impossible.

¹⁷² Witness statement of TSE [REDACTED] at [Appendix A-83](#) refers.

- 10.4.6 One such case occurred at Flat 2█ of Wang Cheong House. Mr. LI █ was informed of the fire by his wife at approximately 1502 hours.¹⁷³ He attempted to leave the unit at around 1510 hours, but by then the common corridor was already filled with dense smoke, preventing escape. Meanwhile, Mr. CHAU █ and his wife¹⁷⁴, attempted to evacuate via the common corridor and staircases on the same floor. Due to heavy smoke and poor visibility, they had to seek refuge in Mr. LI's unit.
- 10.4.7 It is reasonably believed that, had Mr. CHAU and his wife remained in the corridor, they would have been exposed to severe smoke and heat, likely resulting in serious injuries or even death. Fortunately, they all remained inside the unit until about 1800 hours, when firefighters successfully rescued them.
- 10.4.8 The cases illustrated the dynamic nature of decision-making during evacuation, requiring occupants to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and evaluate the tenability of escape routes in real time. Other similar cases can be found in Appendices A-31 to A-54, A-56 and A-110.
- 10.4.9 During the fire, immediate efforts were made to restore the operation of the FAS on site. These efforts successfully restored the FAS of Wang Yan House and Wang Sun House¹⁷⁵. A post-fire investigation conducted by the Fire Protection Facilities Supervision (FPFS) of the FSD, as detailed in the Inspection Report Appendix A-93, revealed that, with the exception of Wang Cheong House, the fuses in the control circuit of the FAS of all seven blocks were blown. Furthermore, as the fire booster pumps of a block share the same control circuit with the FAS, they could not be actuated either. The fuses in Wang Chi House were sent to a laboratory for examination and

¹⁷³ Witness statement of LI █ at Appendix A-40 refers.

¹⁷⁴ Witness statement of CHAU █ at Appendix A-52 refers.

¹⁷⁵ The investigation found that escape conditions in the building quickly deteriorated after the rapid fire spread along the re-entrant engulfing multiple floors. Such spread to the re-entrant of Wang Sun House was first observed at about 1601 hours.

Ms. HUANG █, an occupant of Flat 5█, Wang Sun House (Appendix A-88), stated that the fire alarm began ringing at approximately 1530 hours, well before interior conditions worsened due to the fire.


Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House and Wang Sun House all suffered severe fire damage; however, fatalities in Wang Sun House were significantly lower compared to the other buildings. This difference could be attributed to the timing of the fire spread. When the rapid fire spread occurred at the re-entrant connecting to the staircase, the staircase became untenable. For Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, the point was reached at 1458 hours and 1530 hours respectively; whereas for Wang Sun House, it occurred at 1641 hours.

The considerable time gap meant that residents of Wang Sun House had a longer window to evacuation after becoming aware of the fire at Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House. They had more time to gather information of the fire, whether through social media, television news reports or to be aware of the various noise and sounds at the scene. This additional time allowed residents of Wang Sun House to receive alerts from relatives or friends (Appendices A-88 to A-90). Furthermore, numerous occupants reported hearing the fire alarm at Wang Sun House (Appendices A-88 to A-92). Hence, the potential positive impact of a functioning FAS in alerting residents to evacuate earlier cannot be discounted.


the findings indicated that the fuses had operated normally but were damaged due to an overcurrent.

- 10.4.10 It is recognized that from time to time, FSIs may occasionally develop defects or require temporary shutdowns for carrying out maintenance / inspection / modification / repair by RFSICs¹⁷⁶. To ensure that such occasions are managed in a consistent, safe and compliant manner, the FSD has established procedural frameworks.¹⁷⁷

10.4.11



10.4.12



10.5 Polystyrene Window Covers

- 10.5.1 Polystyrene window covers, installed as a protective measure from debris on unit and common corridors windows, obstructed residents' view of the external environment.¹⁷⁸ This potentially hindered occupants from realizing the severity of the fire in neighbouring buildings as well as their own buildings, lowering their awareness and in turn delaying their response.
- 10.5.2 Based on information obtained from occupant of Wang Fuk Court, the means by which residents became aware of the fire are summarized in the table below:

¹⁷⁶ Under the existing legislative framework, it is the owner's responsibility to ensure that the FSIs are kept in efficient working order. The RFSIC, as the competent person engaged by the owner, is responsible for inspecting the FSIs and reporting any identified deficiencies to the FSD.

¹⁷⁷ In case the work is expected to be carried out overnight or persist for more than 24 hours and if the defect in the FSI may, in the event of fire, put the entire building in jeopardy, in accordance with FSD CL No. 1/2021 - Shutdown of FSIs for Maintenance, Inspection, Modification or Repair, a set of procedures for handling shutdown of FSIs must be observed by the RFSIC when any of major FSIs need to be shut down for maintenance, inspection, modification or repair.

Once the shutdown details including the location(s) / part(s) requiring works and the duration of the shutdown have been confirmed, the RFSIC shall submit a FSI Shutdown Notice to the FSD within 24 hours. Upon receiving the notification, personnel from the local fire station will visit the premises within 24 hours to conduct a risk assessment. The objectives are twofold: (i) to assess the risk from an operational perspective; and (ii) to assess the scale and type of additional fire safety measures to be taken by FSI owner(s) during the shutdown period.

Based on the risk assessment results, the FSD will issue an Advisory Letter to the FSI owner(s), urging them to **complete repairs as early as possible** and requiring them to **notify the occupants of the FSI failures**.

¹⁷⁸ According to the HKPF, almost all windows of flats and lift lobbies in all eight buildings were installed with polystyrene covers.

<i>Means of Acknowledgement</i>	<i>Number of Occupants (Statement)</i>	<i>Number of Occupants (Questionnaire)</i>
<i>Witnessed fire or smoke</i>	43	48
<i>Smelled smoke</i>	48	110
<i>Heard sound of burning</i>	10	12
<i>Heard sirens / seen of fire appliances</i>	32	30
<i>Heard fire alarm</i>	1	39
<i>Informed by others</i>	157	340
Total	291	579

10.5.3 Among the **291 witness statements**, only **43 individuals (14.7%)** reported seeing fire or smoke. Similarly, among the **579 questionnaires**, only **48 respondents (8.3%)** indicated that they had witnessed the fire. These surprisingly low numbers for such a large fire suggest that the installation of polystyrene window covers may have significantly hindered occupants' ability to perceive the situation outside their units, thereby delaying their escape until they became aware of subsequent signs of fire, such as smelling smoke, hearing sounds of burning or being informed by friends or relatives.

10.5.4 In addition, the combustible polystyrene panels contributed to the vertical spread of the fire. Once windows were breached, flames and smoke entered units easily and directly exposing residents to dangerous conditions, not to mention the combustion of such polystyrene materials generated toxic gases such as carbon monoxide¹⁷⁹.

10.5.5 According to Mr. CHAU [REDACTED]¹⁸⁰, the occupant of Flat 2 [REDACTED] in Wang Cheong House, he witnessed the fire spreading to the polystyrene panel affixed to his toilet window during the early stages of the fire. He observed that the window was compromised and the polystyrene panel caught fire. The post-fire conditions of Flat 2 [REDACTED] are shown in **Photos 10-5 (a) to (f)**.

10.5.6 The investigation identified four key ways in which polystyrene panels contributed to the spread of fire:

- **Fueling the external fire spread:** Polystyrene panels affixed to windows, as shown in **Photo 10-6 (a)**, burned readily, accelerating fire propagation along the building façade.
- **Falling debris fueling additional fires:** Full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan demonstrated that ignited polystyrene panels could detach from the building exterior and fall. Once fallen, they acted as a new source of fire and could spark fires beneath the windows, as shown in **Photo 10-6 (b)**.

¹⁷⁹ Among the 168 fatalities, toxicological reports indicated that 102 individuals had blood carbon monoxide saturation levels ranging from 15% to 80%.


¹⁸⁰ Witness statement and IC hearing transcript of CHAU [REDACTED] at **Appendix A-52 and A-113** refer.

- **Ignited fragments causing secondary fires:** Burning fragments of polystyrene panels were light enough to travel significant distances, potentially igniting secondary fires in adjacent buildings or nearby combustibles. This was particularly relevant given the weather conditions on the day of the incident.
- **Burning droplets causing fire spread:** As observed during full-scale fire tests and GL testing, ignited polystyrene panels generated burning droplets. These droplets dripped onto nearby combustibles, igniting them and causing additional fire spread, as shown in **Photo 10-6 (c)**.

10.5.7 The BD, as the authority under the BO, is of the view that the installation of Polystyrene window covers is a potential violation of several fire safety requirements as stipulated in the PNAP, FS Code and building regulations.

- 10.5.8 All in all, the extensive use of the combustible polystyrene window covers, believed to have been applied to protect windows from debris, on the majority part of the building façade may introduce additional hazards in case of fire.

<i>Code / Regulation</i>	<i>Requirement</i>	
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.3	All materials used in building works or street works must be (amongst others): (a) of a nature and quality suitable for their intended use or purpose; and (b) adequately tested by recognized tests.
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.16(1)	In carrying out building works, appropriate construction methods and procedures must be adopted; and appropriate precautionary measures must be taken.
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.35(a)	A building must be designed and constructed so as to, in case of fire, inhibit the spread of fire within the building and to the buildings nearby. (See also performance requirement C6 of the FS Code listed below for the application to alteration, repair or maintenance).
<i>PNAP APP-70</i>	Paragraphs 4(a) & (c)	Flame-retardant sheeting should be used and obstruction to natural ventilation and lighting of occupied buildings under renovation by sheeting should be avoided as far as practicable.
<i>FS Code</i>	Performance requirement C6	Fire safety provisions should be provided to a building or parts of a building undergoing construction, demolition, alteration, repair or maintenance with due consideration to the hazard imposed by the works and the fire safety precautionary available
<i>FS Code</i>	F5.6(f)	When carrying out alteration, additions, renovation and repair works, accumulating inflammable and combustible materials in excessive quantity is to be avoided. (Paragraph 1.4(e) Part C of the Guidelines on the Design and Construction of Bamboo Scaffolds published by the BD also requires no loose materials should be placed on/near any scaffolds.)







Photos 10-5 (a) to (f): Post-Fire Condition of Flat 2█, Wang Cheong House



Photo 10-6 (a): Polystyrene Panels Fueling Fire Spread on the Building Façade



Photo 10-6 (b): Polystyrene Panel Detached From Building Exterior



Photo 10-6 (c):
Burning Droplets From Polystyrene
Panels Igniting Nearby Combustibles

10.6 Compromised Tenability in Means of Escape

10.6.1 Lift Lobby Windows

- 10.6.1.1 During the fire, the upper ventilation¹⁸¹ parts of the windows in the lift lobbies on some floors were left open. This allowed smoke from the burning scaffolding to enter the lift lobbies and corridors, which in turn hindered evacuation, as shown in **Photos 10-7 (a) & (b)**, and further shortened the time for evacuation.
- 10.6.1.2 Security camera footage from Flat ■06 of Wang Tai House shows that the common corridor on the 10/F was clear of smoke at 1516 hours. However, due to the rapid fire spread at the re-entrant adjacent to the lift lobby window of the building, as shown in **Photo 10-7 (e)**, the same corridor was engulfed in dense smoke within the span of one minute, as shown in **Photos 10-7 (c) & (d)**.
- 10.6.1.3 A similar event took place in Wang Cheong House at about 1509 hours, as shown in **Photo 10-7 (f)**. At that time, there was a rapid fire spread along the re-entrant adjacent to the lift lobby window of the building. The CCTV footage at Flat ■03¹⁸² of Wang Cheong House showed that smoke infiltrated rapidly from the common corridor into the unit between 1500 hours and 1510 hours, as shown in **Photo 10-7 (g) & (h)**.



Photos 10-7 (a) & (b): Video From Online Source Showing Smoke Entering Lift Lobby Through the Upper Openable Part of Window of Wang Tai House

¹⁸¹ As explained in paragraph 4.3.2, the upper part of the windows in the lift lobbies as well as in the staircases of the eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court were openable, while the lower part of the windows was fixed light. Such design was compliant with the prevailing standard at the time of construction of Wang Fuk Court (i.e. Clause 23 of CoP on MOE 1976).

¹⁸² The occupants of Flat ■03 evacuated but were later found dead in Flat ■08.



*Photo 10-7 (c): Security Camera Footage of Flat 06 of
Wang Tai House at 1516 Hours*



*Photo 10-7 (d): Security Camera Footage of Flat 06 of
Wang Tai House at 1517 Hours*



Photo 10-7 (e): Rapid Fire Spread at the East Re-Entrant of
Wang Tai House at 1516 Hours




Photo 10-7 (f): Rapid Fire Spread at the West Re-Entrant of Wang Cheong House at 1509 Hours



Photo 10-7 (g): Showing the Smoke Entering Flat 03 of Wang Cheong House at 1500 Hours



Photo 10-7 (h): Showing the Smoke Condition at Flat 03 of Wang Cheong House at 1510 Hours

10.6.2 Staircase Windows Replaced With Movable Boards

- 10.6.2.1 Some windows in staircases (details in paragraph 4.5.5.4) were replaced with movable boards as access openings to the exterior scaffolding. During the fire, these movable boards permitted smoke and heat to infiltrate the staircases. Severe blackening of ceilings above the opening indicated heavy smoke penetration. As a result, staircases intended to serve as protected escape routes were compromised, leaving residents without safe pathways for evacuation. This also restricted firefighter access, delayed firefighting and rescue operations and reduced the effectiveness of firefighting efforts, as shown in **Photo 10-8 (a)**.
- 10.6.2.2 It is noteworthy that out of the 38 fatalities in the staircases and common areas of Wang Tai House, 26 were found inside the staircase of Wang Tai House. The cause of death for all 26 individuals was inhalation of fire fumes, with one of them also sustaining extensive burns. This tragic outcome can likely be attributed to the compromised openings in the staircase, such as those fitted with movable boards, which allowed smoke and heat to infiltrate. These openings rendered the staircase, intended as a protected escape route and temporary place of safety, incapable of providing a safe environment for evacuation.
- 10.6.2.3 Full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan replicated the conditions within the re-entrant, where staircase windows had been replaced with wooden boards and aluminium composite panels, as detailed in paragraphs 7.2.3.20 to 7.2.3.25. Wooden board, aluminium composite panel and fire-rated glass window were installed at the openings on the 3/F, 2/F and 1/F levels respectively. During the test, the wooden board ignited at 4 min 40 sec and the aluminium composite panel ignited at 7 min 49 sec, as shown in **Photos 10-8 (b) & (c)**.

Location	Material	Max Temp (Re-entrant Side)	Max Temp (Opened Side)
1/F	Fire Rated Glass Window	1061 °C	56 °C
2/F	Aluminium Composite Panel	937 °C	605°C

- 10.6.2.4 The test results indicate that both the wooden board and aluminium composite panel are unsuitable for protecting the staircase openings. These materials fail to provide adequate protection, unlike the fire-rated glass window¹⁸³, which remained intact and maintained a lower interior temperature, therefore ensuring a safer environment for evacuation.¹⁸⁴
- 10.6.2.5 This observation is further supported by a witness account. According to Ms. TSE [REDACTED]¹⁸⁵, the occupant of Flat 2 [REDACTED], Wang Cheong House, during her evacuation at about 1455 hours, she observed a reflection of fire immediately outside the fire-rated windows along the staircase. Her experience provides direct confirmation of the effectiveness of the fire-rated glass window installed along the escape staircase, which successfully served a fire separation component and prevented smoke infiltration into the staircase under fire conditions.



Photo 10-8 (a): Windows Replaced by Movable Boards (Damaged by Fire) at
Escape Staircase of 10-11/F of Wang Tai House

¹⁸³ In the fire incident at Wang Fuk Court, rapid fire spread was observed at the re-entrant connected to the staircases of Wang Cheong House. Nevertheless, all of the broken windows were found to have been intentionally broken by the FSD during the later stage of firefighting, rather than being damaged by the fire itself.

¹⁸⁴ Taking Wang Cheong House as an example, both staircases were connected to the east re-entrant through these openings. The rapid fire spread along the re-entrant at 1458 hours would have compromised both staircases, as intense heat and dense smoke infiltrated them. Unfavourable conditions may have developed even earlier than 1458 hours, influenced by fire products generated during the fire's development. This occurred well before the blockage of the last exits at the front entrance at approximately 1505 hours. Supported by the test results, the use of fire-rated windows could provide occupants with at least an additional 7-min escape window, potentially allowing more time for evacuation.

¹⁸⁵ Witness statement of TSE [REDACTED] at Appendix A-83 refers.



Photo 10-8 (b):
Ignition of Wooden Board
(4 Mins 40 Secs)



Photo 10-8 (c):
Ignition of Aluminium Composite Panel
(7 Mins 49 Secs)

- 10.6.2.6 In effect, the aforesaid alterations made for renovation purposes directly compromised the performance of the escape routes at the very moment they were most needed. This failure created significant difficulties for both evacuees and firefighters, as the staircases and corridors no longer provided the level of protection intended in the original design.
- 10.6.2.7 According to Mr. LI [REDACTED]¹⁸⁶, a construction worker in Wang Cheong House, he became aware of the fire at about 1450 hours and successfully evacuated to the Ground level of Wang Cheong House at about 1500 hours.
- 10.6.2.8 During his escape from the R/F using the staircase, he encountered smoke and heat. By the time he reached the 14/F, he paused at the lift lobby to catch his breath and recover for about 30 secs. However, upon returning to the staircase, he found it filled with dense smoke, rendering it unusable for escape. With no other alternatives, he returned to the lift lobby and ultimately used the lift to evacuate.
- 10.6.2.9 During the IC hearing on 1.4.2026, Ms. CHUNG [REDACTED], the security guard, testified that while she was at the 3/F staircase, she observed smoke penetrating from the upper floors down to the 3/F level.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Witness statement of LI [REDACTED] at Appendix A-24 refers.

¹⁸⁷ Transcript of IC hearing on 1.4.2026 at Appendix A-94 refers.

- 10.6.2.10 The observations of Mr. LI and Ms. CHUNG aligned with our findings regarding the rapid fire spread at about 1458 hours at the east re-entrant of Wang Cheong House, which connects to the staircases. This confirmed that the replacement of staircase windows with movable boards, lacking proper fire resistance and smoke control properties, enabled smoke to infiltrate the staircases through cracks, holes and openings in the boards at the earliest stage, thereby compromising the tenability of the staircases.
- 10.6.2.11 Statements from injured persons (at Appendices A-10, A-12, A-31 to A-54) also confirmed that heavy, dense black smoke poured intensely into the common corridors and staircases, with some accounts indicating that smoke had even infiltrated individual domestic units. This situation created severe difficulties for evacuees attempting to escape, forcing some to retreat back into their domestic units or seek temporary places of safety to avoid the smoke and await FS assistance.
- 10.6.2.12 The unprotected staircase also significantly hindered firefighting and rescue operations. Firefighters were compelled to carry out extinguishing efforts floor by floor, even while the fire remained uncontrolled. Despite these conditions, the SAR teams advanced to the upper levels, knowingly placing themselves at considerable risk, for carrying out their rescue operations.¹⁸⁸
- 10.6.2.13 The BD, as the authority under the BO, is of the view that, to maintain the functionality of the exit staircases during repair works, the staircases must remain unobstructed and free from any additional hazards. Furthermore, the integrity of the fire separation for protected escape routes must be properly maintained. As such, the installation of combustible wooden movable boards providing access to the scaffolding, which introduced additional hazards to the exit route, indicates that the construction methods and precautionary measures in place may be inappropriate.
- 10.6.2.14 To maintain the functionality of the exit staircases during repair works, the staircases must remain unobstructed and free from any additional hazards. Furthermore, the integrity of the fire separation for protected escape routes must be properly maintained. As such, the installation of combustible wooden movable boards providing access to the scaffolding, which introduced additional hazards to the exit route, indicates that the construction methods and precautionary measures in place may be inappropriate. The installation of combustible wooden doors and the misuse of staircase openings is a potential violation of several fire safety requirements as stipulated in the Fire Safety Code (FS Code) as well as building regulations, including the Building (Construction) Regulations (B(C)R) (Cap.123Q) and the Building (Planning) Regulations (B(P)R) (Cap.123F).

¹⁸⁸ In addition, as noted in paragraph 4.5.6.3, there was no floor-level signage during the renovation period. This consumed valuable time in clarifying the correct floor level and further hampered the operational efficiency. As a result, the aforementioned challenges imposed on the rescue operations contributed to the heavy fatalities and casualties associated with this fire incident.

<i>Code / Regulation</i>	<i>Requirement</i>	
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.16(1)	In carrying out building works, appropriate construction methods and procedures must be adopted; and appropriate precautionary measures must be taken.
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.35(a)	A building must be designed and constructed so as to, in case of fire, inhibit the spread of fire within the building and to the buildings nearby. (See also performance requirement C6 of the FS Code listed below for the application to alteration, repair or maintenance)
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.37(1)	A protective barrier must be provided at the edge of (amongst others) a floor or staircase to restrict or control the movement of persons and objects.
<i>B(C)R</i>	s.38	A protective barrier required under section 37 must be designed and constructed so as to prevent a person or object from (amongst others) falling or slipping through the gap of the barrier.
<i>B(P)R</i>	s.40	The staircase intended for common use shall (amongst others) be provided with adequate natural lighting at each storey.
<i>FS Code</i>	Performance requirement C6	Fire safety provisions should be provided to a building or parts of a building undergoing construction, demolition, alteration, repair or maintenance with due consideration to the hazard imposed by the works and the fire safety precautionary available.
<i>FS Code</i>	F5.6(a) & (b)	When carrying out alteration, additions, renovation and repair works, all means of escape should be maintained at all times free from obstruction and adequately signed and lit, and all fire rated doors along exit routes to be maintained and kept closed at all times.

Code	Regulation	Requirement
<i>FS Code</i>	E13.1(a)	Linings of internal walls, ceiling and decorative finishes within protected exits should have limited combustibility as per Table E1 of the FS Code.
<i>PNAP APP-65</i>		This requires clear glass to be used for staircases and staircase window for each storey to have an aggregate glass area of not less than one-tenth of the plan area.
<i>PNAP APP-110</i>		Protective barrier should have a height of not less than 1.1m from the adjoining floor level and be designed to resist the imposed loads as prescribed in section 9 of the B(C)R. The lowest 150 mm of the barrier should be built solid.

10.7 Qualitative Evacuation Time Line Analysis

10.7.1 In fire engineering, timeline analysis is a critical process used to evaluate evacuation safety by comparing:

- ASET (Available Safe Egress Time): The time available for occupants to safely evacuate before conditions become life-threatening due to factors such as heat, smoke and toxic gases.
- RSET (Required Safe Egress Time): The time needed for all occupants to safely evacuate from the affected premises under the given conditions.

10.7.2 In the absence of accurate and detailed data, it is not possible to carry out a precise quantitative analysis. However, a qualitative analysis can still offer valuable insights by focusing on key observations, enabling a better understanding of the situation despite the lack of exact numerical data.

10.7.3 Referring to Clause G6.4 of the FS Code issued by the BD, RSET comprises the following elements:

- Detection Time: The time it takes for the fire to be detected.
- Pre-movement Time: The time between fire detection and the initiation of evacuation by occupants.
- Movement Time: The time it takes for occupants to physically evacuate to a place of safety.

10.7.4 Factors Impacting RSET

- Detection and Pre-movement Time:
 - The failure of fire alarms and the presence of polystyrene window covers obscured visibility and delayed residents' awareness of the fire. These factors increased both the detection and pre-movement times, as occupants were less able to notice the fire at an early stage and were less likely to respond promptly.
- Movement Time:
 - Under normal circumstances, the protected means of escape, such as staircases, are considered places of safety. However, due to openings connected to the re-entrant, staircases were no longer qualified as safe zones because of the rapid infiltration of smoke and heat.
 - In such a situation, evacuation could only be considered safe if evacuees reached an open area away from the building. This significantly lengthened the evacuation path, forcing occupants to travel farther to a safe location, thereby increasing the movement time.
 - Additionally, the means of escape may become compromised or completely unusable if exits are blocked by collapsed and burning scaffolding, particularly after the rapid fire spread that occurred at the relevant re-entrants.

10.7.5 Impact of Rapid Fire Development on ASET

- As observed in the full-scale fire test conducted in Sichuan, the fire initially exhibited a slow initial growth and rapidly escalated within minutes. Similarly, video footage from informants and news recordings showed that the entire re-entrant was fully engulfed by fire in a short timeframe. This rapid fire development, combined with the re-entrant's connection to staircases via openings, made escape routes unsafe. As a result, the time available for occupants to safely evacuate (i.e. ASET) was drastically reduced, as the rapid fire spread along the re-entrant quickly compromised the means of escape.

10.7.6 As discussed above, the rapid fire spread that occurred at the re-entrants critically affected both the ASET and RSET, contributing to heavy casualties in two key aspects:

- The rapid fire spread developed at the re-entrants at an exceptionally fast rate, simultaneously compromising the means of escape and causing blockages at building exits, as detailed in Sections 10.2, 10.3 and 10.6. This rapid progression drastically shortened the time available for safe evacuation.
- The failure of the fire alarm systems, combined with the presence of polystyrene window covers, further delayed occupant response and evacuation, as detailed in Sections 10.4 and 10.5.

- 10.7.7 The combination of a reduced ASET and an increased RSET resulted in an extremely limited escape window for evacuees, particularly for those occupants at Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House. Occupants were confronted with a dire situation during evacuation, as the means of escape had already been compromised at the very early stage of the fire.
- 10.7.8 In certain cases, occupants evacuated from their units and successfully exited the building. However, others who attempted to leave encountered intense heat and smoke, forcing them to retreat to their own units or seek refuge in neighboring units while awaiting rescue. Some occupants remained inside their homes from the outset and were ultimately rescued, as detailed in Section 9.4.3. Unfortunately, a number of occupants were unable to escape or seek refuge in time, resulting in fatalities.

Chapter 11 – Conclusion

- 11.1 The fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26.11.2025 was one of the most devastating incidents in recent history, resulting in 168 fatalities, including one FS member and 79 injuries. The scale and severity of the incident highlighted critical issues related to fire safety, building management and renovation practices, requiring attention to prevent similar incidents.
- 11.2 Notwithstanding the rapid fire spread, over 100 individuals were rescued. Special arrangements were implemented, including early activation of the DCP, strengthening of the command structure and deployment of substantial rescue resources to manage the situation as effectively as possible.
- 11.3 The IFITF investigation concluded the fire originated accidentally on the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House, likely from a glowing source (such as a cigarette end) igniting combustible materials (such as carton paper boxes).
- 11.4 The fire spread from the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House to the R/F along the re-entrant within minutes, consuming the entirety of the re-entrant. This was driven by the presence of large quantities of accumulated combustibles, such as safety nets and canvas (potentially lacking FR properties), bamboo, wooden planks, nylon strips, toe-boards and polystyrene window covers.
- 11.5 The fire subsequently extended to other re-entrants, nearby open grounds and multiple façades of adjacent buildings. By the conclusion of the incident, rapid fire spread was observed not only in one re-entrant, but also from block to block, involving 12 re-entrants across 6 buildings. In general, three dominant modes of fire spread were identified:
- Rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant;
 - Fire spread into units via openings / windows at the re-entrant; and
 - Secondary ignitions to building combustible envelopes.

Full-scale fire tests and CFD simulations were conducted to validate the dynamics and contributing factors.

11.6 Key factors likely contributed to heavy casualties include:

- Rapid fire spread, which left residents with limited time to evacuate and increased the risk of entrapment;
- Exits were blocked by burning debris that had fallen from combustible envelope;
- The response and evacuation of the residents were delayed due to the failure of the fire alarms;
- The polystyrene window covers obstructed residents' view of the external environment, lowered their awareness and delayed their responses; and
- Compromised tenability in the means of escape hindered evacuation as well as firefighting and rescue operations.

- End -

Terms of Reference

The Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force, led by the Fire Services Department, brings together representatives from the Police Force, the Buildings Department, the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department, the Independent Checking Unit under the Housing Bureau, the Labour Department, the Government Laboratory, and fire engineering professionals. Its objectives are:


- to investigate the cause of the fire and how it spread;
- to determine the factors that led to heavy casualties.

<u>Department</u>	<u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Deliverables</u>
FSD	- Conduct fire scene examinations and perform fire dynamics analyses. - Engage fire engineering and material science specialists as needed. - Provide technical expertise on fire behavior and suppression methods. - Compile and submit a comprehensive, consolidated investigation report.	- Fire Severity Analysis - Cause of Fire Analysis
BD	- Provide support and advice to the ICU in conducting investigation in relation to the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) (BO). - Identify any contraventions of the BO based on the ICU's findings and recommendations.	
EMSD	- Identify whether the root cause of the fire is electrically related. - Investigate whether the cause and rapid spread of the fire at the suspected fire origin in Wang Cheong House's lightwell are gas-related.	- Report on Investigation of Electrical Faults - Impact Analysis of LPG


<u>Department</u>	<u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Deliverables</u>
GL	- Conduct on-site forensic investigation of the incident for establishing the origin, cause and the development of the fire. - Serve as an expert witness to explain the findings and methodologies.	- Cause of Fire Analysis
HKPF	- Provide updates on the progress of the Police's actions and investigation. - Coordinate with Task Force members on the preservation of evidence and the interviewing of witnesses or suspects in accordance with the Department of Justice's (DoJ) advice. - Assist experts in conducting their experimental studies.	
ICU	- Conduct investigation of the fire incident in relation to BO and report the findings and recommendations to BD for consideration of any actions warranted under BO.	
LD	- Investigate the fatal occupational accidents in the fire and provide recommendations to the stakeholders to avoid recurrence of similar accidents in the scope of occupational safety and health. - Examine the compliance of Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance (Cap. 59) and Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance (Cap. 509) and their subsidiary regulations by the duty holders.	
Fire Engineering Professionals	- Conduct numerical and experimental studies to gain a detailed understanding of the initiation and development of the fire, with a focus on the material characteristics of safety nets, polystyrene window	- Report of Findings from Computer Modelling and Full Scale Burning Tests *

covers, bamboo sticks, and other combustible materials.


Remark (): The comprehensive findings of the tests will be provided in the final report, while the preliminary findings are presented in this interim report.*




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 1樓
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
BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 2樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 3樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 4樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 5樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 6樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 7樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 8樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 9樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 10樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 11樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 12樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 13樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 14樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 15樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 16樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 17樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 18樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 19樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 22樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 23樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 24樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 25樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 26樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 27樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 28樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 29樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 30樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-B(宏道閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 31樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 1樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 2樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 3樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 4樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 5樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 6樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 7樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 8樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 9樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 10樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 11樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 12樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 13樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 14樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 15樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 16樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 17樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 18樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 19樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 21樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 22樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 23樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 24樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 25樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 26樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 27樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 28樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 29樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 30樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-C (宏新閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 31樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 1樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 2樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 3樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 4樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 5樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 6樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 7樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 8樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 9樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 10樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 11樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 12樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 13樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 14樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 15樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 16樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 17樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 18樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 19樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 21樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 22樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 23樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 24樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 25樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 26樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 27樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 28樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 29樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 30樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-D (宏建閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 31樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 1樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 2樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 3樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 4樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 5樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 6樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 7樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 8樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 9樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 10樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 11樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 12樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 13樓
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
BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 14樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 15樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 16樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 17樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 18樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 19樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 21樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 22樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 23樓
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
BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 24樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 25樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 26樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 27樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 28樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 29樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 30樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-E (宏泰閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 31樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 1樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 2樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 3樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 4樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 5樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 6樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 7樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 8樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 9樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 10樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 11樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 12樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 13樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 14樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 15樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 16樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 17樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 18樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 19樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 20樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 21樓
SCALE 1:100




BLOCK-F(宏昌閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 22樓
SCALE 1:100




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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BLOCK-G(宏盛閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 30樓
SCALE 1:100



BLOCK-G(宏盛閣) LAYOUT PLAN - 31樓
SCALE 1:100

Appendix A-17

Fire Development and Spread Report

1. Background

Following the No. 5 Alarm Fire incident at Wang Fuk Court between 26 and 28 November 2025, The Fire Investigation Team (FIT) conducted an on-site fire investigation from 29 November to 9 December 2025 to assess and record the fire severity on both exterior and interior of the affected buildings. The FIT conducted thorough and systematic investigation to determine the progression and spread of the fire throughout the impacted buildings.

2. Methodology

- Develop a standardized fire damage assessment system to provide data-driven quantification of contents losses;
- Conduct a comprehensive survey to determine the extent of fire damage across all impacted buildings and individual occupancies;
- Undertake examinations of the exemplar building, in order to evaluate building conditions, fire loads, site activities, housekeeping standards, and other critical factors relevant to the fire investigation;
- Acquire and analyze various footage sources to assess fire development and spread;
- Evaluate the impact of meteorological conditions on the progression and distribution of the fire;
- Document the performance and integrity of passive fire safety provisions, including smoke-stop doors, windows and staircases after fire;
- Collect statements from eyewitnesses, casualties, and occupants involved in the incident within affected buildings;
- Obtain statements from attending Fire Services (FS) personnel;
- Examine computer-generated FS incident occurrence records;
- Validate by the results of computational fluid dynamics and real fire tests; (based on future inputs)
- Retrieve building design details from general building plans (GBP) from the record of Fire Services Department (FSD); and
- Carry out a literature review referencing NFPA 921 (Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations) and other pertinent publications.


3. Building design

Wang Fuk Court is a residential development under the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), and it comprises eight domestic blocks¹, each with thirty two storeys. According to the GBP of Wang Fuk Court, each block is equipped with two staircases (front and rear) and three elevators. From the GBP, there are wired glass windows provided on the external walls of the staircases. The ground floor is used as building entrance, management office, caretakers flat, refuse chamber, plant rooms, bicycle parking space etc. and the remaining floors (from 1/F to 31/F) are for domestic use.

On each typical floor (i.e. 1/F to 31/F), there are eight residential units, one refuse room and one electric room on each floor, common corridors and a lift lobby. Wired glass windows are also provided at the lift lobby. There are four wings in each block, with each wing comprising two domestic flats which connectings to the lift lobby. There is a re-entrant between two wings, and there are in total four re-entrants at the outside of each block extending from the 1/F to the roof. Each residential unit, ranging from saleable area of 40 sq. ft to 44 sq. ft, has a living room, two bedrooms, a bathroom, and a kitchen with window facing to the re-entrant.



¹ Wang Fuk Court comprises eight domestic blocks and one standalone carpark building.



4. Exemplar building examinations

Wang Chi House, the only block undamaged during the fire, serves as the exemplar building for this fire investigation. At the time of fire, the building's external is fortified with double-layered bamboo scaffolding fitted with safety nets, while catch-fans are strategically positioned at the first floor and at four additional higher levels. These catch-fans, working platforms, and safety nets are integral for preventing falling objects around the exterior. Most windows within the scaffolding are covered with foam boards. Every two metre in height is equipped with a bamboo work platform and the bamboo work platform near the first and fifth floors are fully covered with wooden planks. These work platforms were found littered with cigarette butts, unused foam boards, plastic sheets, discarded food utensils, and other debris.

For Wang Chi House, access openings covered with movable boards are found at staircase windows on the 4-5/F, 14-15/F and 24-25/F of the front staircase and at staircase windows on the 9-10/F and 19-20/F of the rear staircase. As such windows

replaced with movable boards were believed to serve as access for construction workers to the working platforms of scaffolding, it has been observed that housekeeping in the associated re-entrant with the aforesaid workers' access is considerably poorer than in the other three re-entrants. The upper part of the windows at the lift lobbies is smaller and openable, while the lower part of the windows is larger and fixed. It is observed that the majority of the windows at the lift lobbies of different floors are typically left open, promoting ventilation across residential areas. Some of the windows in the lift lobbies are covered by foam board.




Diagram: Typical floor plan of Wang Chi House




Photo: The distance between bamboo scaffolding and residential units is about 134 cm.



Photo: One large, fixed window and aThe upper part of the windows at the lift lobbies is smaller and openable, while the lower part of the windows is larger and fixed. The majority of the windows at the lift lobbies of different floors are typically left open, promoting ventilation across residential areas. Some of such windows were covered with foam boards.



Photo: External windows at the staircase on twenty-fifth floor removed and replaced with wooden boards and locks.



Photo: Other situations on fifth, tenth, fifteenth, and twentieth floors of Wang Chi House



Photo: Bathroom windows of Unit 102 were covered externally by foam board



Photo: Cigarette box, cigarette end, bamboo scaffoldings, safety net, plastic sheets, plastic toe board and wooden planks located outside Units 101 and 102



Photo: Re-entrant between Units 101 and 108 and common corridor




Photo: Re-entrant between Unit 106 and 107 and refuse room




Photo: Re-entrant between Units 104 and 105 and staircases. Poorer housekeeping than other three.



Photo: A view from below at the re-entrant between Units 104, 105 and staircases



Photo: Re-entrant between Units 102, 103 and meter room

5. Observations on Ground Level around the External of the Domestic Blocks after the Fire

Externally, a large quantity of combustible materials, including safety nets, wooden planks, bamboo, and plastic sheets used for covering construction materials, were scattered on the ground level around Wang Fuk Court. When burning objects fell onto these materials, they would be ignited, starting a fire. The fire subsequently grew and spread to the adjacent building, resulting in widespread fire damage.



Photo: combustible materials outside Wang Chi House



Photo: Safety net and bamboo outside Wang Kin House



Photo: Ground floor fire plume² at building entrance and resulting damage following the incident at Wang Cheong House

The large amount of combustible materials, including safety nets, scaffoldings and foam boards, etc. discovered on site, is expected to be a critical factor for sustaining fire spread both from outside to inside of the building; and building to building. In addition, the windows at staircases (for example at Wang Chi House, three windows at the front staircase from 4/F to 5/F, 14/F to 15/F and 24/F to 25/F as well as two windows at rear staircase from 9/F to 10/F and 19/F to 20/F) had been converted to openable access covered with movable boards for construction convenience. Such alterations may have impaired the building's fire-resisting features and facilitated additional smoke movement, particularly into the staircases, which served both as means of escape as well as means of access³ of the building. This likely intensified smoke spread during the incident and resulting in untenable conditions⁴ within the staircases for occupant evacuation and hindering fire-fighting and rescue operations



Photo: Most of staircases' windows of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House were damaged by fire.

² Fire plume is the flame and gases emanating from a burning object. (Source of Reference: Page 130, "Principles of Fire Behavior" by James G. Quinterie)

³ In Hong Kong, "means of access" refers broadly to allow safe and unobstructed access to the buildings for firefighting, which including roads, staircases and fireman's lifts (i.e. a safe and unobstructed access for emergency vehicles and firemen for fire fighting), all governed by Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123) and Building (Planning) Regulation.


⁴ "untenable conditions" refers to the point at which a building, or part of a building, is no longer safe for occupants to remain in or pass through due to the effects of a fire, primarily high temperature, smoke, and toxic gases.

5. Weather conditions

On the day of the incident, the Hong Kong Observatory (HKO) had issued a Red Fire Danger Warning, which means the weather condition conducive to the occurrence and spread of fire, such as low humidity and high wind speed. Pursuant to information provided by the HKO, the meteorological conditions at Tai Po during the initial phase of fire spread and development on 26 November 2025 were as follows:

Time	Humidity	Wind Direction	Wind Speed
1500 hours	40%	112 degree (east-southeast wind)	14 km/hr
1600 hours	46%	130 degree (southeast wind)	9 km/hr

The low humidity and high wind speed facilitated the rapid ignition and sustained combustion of materials. Strong winds dispersed burning debris across multiple blocks, accelerating the fire's spread, while the dry atmosphere reduced moisture in combustibles, increasing both fire intensity and the rate of flame propagation. Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, located southeast of Wang Fuk Court, were significantly affected by wind influence during fire incidents, whereas other buildings, such as Wang Tao House, did not experience similar effects.



6. Rapid flame spread

Wind speed, wind direction, and the proximity of buildings influenced the propagation of fire from Wang Cheong House to six additional residential blocks⁵. However, the extent of damage sustained by each building did not correspond with the timeline of the fire's spread. Based on analysis of available video footage and frontline personnel and

⁵ Wang Chi House (宏志閣) did not sustain fire damage in the Wang Fuk Court Fire.

witnesses observations, the times at which visible flames appeared on the seven residential blocks are as follows:


	Time of first appearance of visible flame
Wang Cheong House (宏昌閣)	14:43
Wang Tai House (宏泰閣)	15:00
Wang Shing House (宏盛閣)	15:20
Wang Kin House (宏建閣)	15:25
Wang Sun House (宏新閣)	15:25
Wang Tao House (宏道閣)	15:39
Wang Yan House (宏仁閣)	16:04

Flame spread is the process of advancing the fire front in air, along surfaces, or through porous solids, which the gravitational and wind effects are important.⁶ In the fire of Wang Fuk Court, flame spread was further assisted by the semi-open, chimney like re-entrant, where the chimney effect⁷ (or stack effect) — driven by fire-induced buoyancy and prevailing atmospheric winds — played a critical role. At the outbreak of fire at Wang Cheong House, the chimney effect accelerated the swift upward movement of flames, hot gases, and smoke through the re-entrant and drew cooler external air inward, intensifying both fire severity and flame spread. Consequently, a jet flame⁸ was observed throughout the entire re-entrant, indicating rapid flame progression and full fire involvement in this space. The investigation found several locations within the impacted buildings where clear indicators of these phenomena were present. Units, staircases and common corridors, bamboo scaffoldings adjacent to the jet flames experienced highest level of fire, heat and smoke exposure, resulting in most significant damage. The presence of this jet flame offered a coherent rationale for the multi-level impact and the varying severity observed across Wang Fuk Court.

⁶ Source of Reference: Page 82, “Principles of Fire Behavior” by James G. Quinterie

⁷ The chimney effect (also known as the stack effect) describes the vertical airflow within buildings caused by the temperature-created density differences between the building interior and exterior or between two interior spaces. (Source of Reference: “Chimney Effect | NIST,” NIST, June 12, 2023, <https://www.nist.gov/glossary-term/20231>.)

⁸ The jet flame is the flame due to a high velocity fuel supply. (Source of Reference: Page 27, “Principles of Fire Behavior” by James G. Quinterie)



7. Severity damage analysis

To enable a systematic evaluation of fire damage, the following classification criteria for severity have been established:

- Extremely Severe Damage (ESD)
- Severe Damage (SD)
- Minor Damage (MD)
- Unaffected (U)

Exterior damage

The extent of exterior fire damage was categorized into three levels of severity. ESD refers to instances where over 50% of the bamboo scaffolding was damaged and had collapsed onto the ground. Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House, and Wang Sun House fell under this classification. SD denotes cases in which less than 50% of the bamboo scaffolding was damaged and collapsed, as observed at Wang Shing House, Wang Tao House, and Wang Yan House. MD indicates that the bamboo scaffolding sustained only slight damage, as observed at Wang Kin House.



Photo: Wang Fuk Court external view



Photo: Wang Fuk Court external view



Photo: Wang Fuk Court external view



Photo: Wang Fuk Court external view




Photo: Wang Fuk Court external view

Interior Fire Damage

The interior fire damage assessment covered seven domestic buildings, each comprising 8 residential units, common corridor and 2 staircases per floor across the 31 domestic floors. In total, 1,736 residential units, 217 common corridors and 14 staircases were inspected. The extent of damage in terms of the extent of the contents being damaged has been categorised into four principal levels:

Extremely Severe Damage	A complete burnout condition. All combustible materials, including finishes and contents inside the unit, have been fully consumed or converted to ash, leaving only non-combustible remnants. There is extensive charring and deformation.
Severe Damage	Significant burnout condition and heavy content inside the unit were damaged. The majority of combustible materials have been destroyed, with only a small fraction (e.g. deeply embedded or protected items) possibly remaining. There is extensive charring and deformation are present.
Minor Damage	Superficial damage to finishes inside the unit. Damage is primarily limited to surface finishes, such as paint blistering, light smoke staining, or minor charring on exposed surfaces. Majority of contents remain intact and functional.
Unaffected	No discernible fire damage inside the unit. The interior of unit shows no signs of heat, flame, or smoke impact.

The extent of damage in six locations of each unit, namely the kitchen, entryway, living room, master bedroom, guest bedroom, and bathroom, was assessed independently.



Based on these evaluations, the overall damage level of a unit is assigned according to the predominant damage category (i.e., at least 50% of the six locations).

In cases where two damage levels are equally represented or no single damage level accounts for 50% or more of the locations, the most severe level present will determine the overall rating. "Unaffected" indicates that the entire unit was not impacted by fire; alternatively, if three or more locations within the unit remain unaffected, "Minor Damage" is assigned as the overall rating.

A color-coded diagram is applied to visually illustrate fire damage pattern across all units within each building: red indicates ESD, orange signifies SD, yellow denotes MD, and green represents U. The six locations within each unit—kitchen, entryway, living room, master bedroom, guest bedroom, and bathroom—are arranged sequentially from left to right.


							Overall		
	1						Red	Yellow	Green
	Kitchen	Entryway	Living room	Master Bedroom	Guest Bedroom	Bathroom			
31/F	esd	esd	esd	esd	esd	esd	1		
30/F	sd	sd	esd	sd	sd	sd		1	
29/F	sd	sd	sd	md	md	md		1	
28/F	sd	sd	md	u	md	u		1	
27/F	u	md	u	u	u	u			1
26/F	u	u	u	u	u	u			1

Diagram: Illustration of interior fire damage assessment system


Unit analysis

Building Damage analysis⁹

Wang
Cheong
House
(宏昌閣)



Unit damage summary



Wang Cheong House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	113	45	60	30
Common Corridor ¹⁰	6	21	4	0
Staircase 1 ¹¹	14	3	14	0
Staircase 2 ¹²	13	4	14	0

Approximately 63% of units (158 out of 248), 87% of common corridors (27 out of 31) and 55% of staircases (34 out of 62) experienced ESD or SD. According to footage, the jet flames developed in a clockwise direction, moving from east to west. Most units adjacent to jet flames experienced ESD or SD. Since units 2 and 3 were less affected, it was believed there was no well-developed fire inside their shared re-entrant.


⁹ Damage analysis for the common corridor and staircases has been included in this revised version.

¹⁰ Common corridor includes lift lobby and 2 corridors outside 8 residential units.

¹¹ Staircase 1 has access to the roof.

¹² Staircase 2 has no access to the roof.

Wang Tai House (宏泰閣)




Unit damage summary



Wang Tai House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	125	20	78	25
Common Corridor	8	21	2	0
Staircase 1	12	4	15	0
Staircase 2	11	7	13	0


Approximately 58% of units (145 out of 248), 94% of common corridors (29 out of 31) and 55% of staircases (34 out of 62) experienced either ESD or SD. According to footage, the fire at Wang Tai House was believed to have spread from Wang Cheong House in the incipient stage of Wang Fuk Court fire. Thereafter, the jet flames developed in clock-wise direction, moving from east to south. Most units adjacent to the jet flame sustained ESD or SD. Given that most of Units 4 and 5 also sustained ESD or SD, this suggests the presence of a well-developed fire within their shared re-entrant. In contrast, since Units 6 and 7 were less impacted, it is likely that no well-developed fire occurred inside their shared re-entrant.

Wang Kin House (宏建閣)



13

Unit damage summary



Wang Kin House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	1	0	7	240
Common Corridor	0	1	0	30
Staircase 1	0	0	0	31
Staircase 2	0	0	0	31

Approximately 97% of units (240 out of 248), 97% of common corridors (30 out of 31) and 100% of staircases (62 out of 62) were found to be undamaged. Analysis of footage revealed multiple ignition points at the external bamboo scaffolding of Wang Kin House. The fire subsequently propagated into the living room, guest bedroom, and master bedroom of Unit 2 on the 16th floor, eventually resulting in ESD for that unit. The fire then extended along the common corridor, affecting Units 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of same floor, with damage limited to the areas around their entryways. Furthermore, Unit 8 on the 23rd Floor and Unit 3 on the 20th Floor exhibited fire spread pattern similar to that observed in Unit 2 on the 16th Floor, as previous detailed.

¹³ The mislabeled diagram heading was replaced by “Wang Kin House (宏建閣)” on 27.2.2026.





Photo: Capture from UAS's video

Wang
Sun
House
(宏新閣)

Wang Sun House (宏新閣)													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Common Corridor	Staircase	1	2	3
12F													
11F													
10F													
9F													
8F													
7F													
6F													
5F													
4F													
3F													
2F													
1F													
Basement													

Unit damage summary



Wang Sun House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	122	24	102	0
Common Corridor	8	23	0	0
Staircase 1	15	9	7	0
Staircase 2	16	10	5	0

All units sustained some degree of damage, with approximately 58% of units (146 out of 248), 100% of common corridors (31 out of 31) and 81% of staircases (50 out of 62) as having experienced ESD or SD.


Units	ESD	SD	MD	U
1 & 8	25	9	28	0
6 & 7	20	7	35	0
4 & 5	31	5	26	0
2 & 3	46	3	13	0

According to footage, the first jet flame occurred at west re-entrant and spread to south re-entrant. Simultaneously, another ground fire plume was observed outside units 1 and 8. The majority of units of the above-mentioned re-entrant sustained ESD or SD. Given that more than half of Units 6 and 7 sustained MD only, this suggests that no well-developed fire occurred within their shared re-entrant.

Wang
Shing
House
(宏盛閣)

14

Unit damage summary




Wang Shing House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	16	5	38	189
Common Corridor	0	10	7	14
Staircase 1	1	1	0	29
Staircase 2	0	0	0	31

Approximately 76% of the units (189 out of 248), 45% of common corridors (14 out of 31) and 97% of staircases (60 out of 62) were undamaged. A jet

¹⁴ The mislabeled diagram heading was replaced by “Wang Shing House (宏盛閣)” on 27.2.2026.


flame occurred at the south re-entrant and Units 6 and 7 sustained the most significant impact. Similar to Wang Sun House, internal fire spread patterns were observed on 10/F, 22/F and 29/F, while the external to internal fire spread pattern occurred on 7/F.

Wang Tao House (宏道閣)



15

Unit damage summary



Wang Tao House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	23	17	35	173
Common Corridor	4	10	2	15
Staircase 1	1	0	15	15
Staircase 2	0	0	16	15


Approximately 69% of the units (173 out of 248), 48% of common corridors (15 out of 31) and 48% of staircases (30 out of 62) were undamaged. A jet flame occurred at the south re-entrant and Units 2 and 3 sustained the greatest impact. Similar to Wang Sun House, internal fire spread patterns were observed on 2/F, 3/F, 6/F, 9/F, 11/F, 12/F, 13/F, 17/F, 22/F, 26/F and 29/F.

¹⁵ On 27.2.2026, the diagram was replaced with that of Wang Tao House.

Wang Yan House (宏仁閣)



Unit damage summary



Wang Yan House	ESD	SD	MD	U
Unit	35	17	41	155
Common Corridor	7	14	3	7
Staircase 1	0	0	1	30
Staircase 2	2	0	1	28

Approximately 62% of the units (155 out of 248), 23% of common corridors (7 out of 31) and 97% of staircases (58 out of 62) did not sustain any damage. A jet flame occurred at the south re-entrant and Units 2 and 3 sustained the greatest impact. Similar to Wang Sun House, internal fire spread patterns were observed on 1/F, 6/F, 7/F, 9/F, 11/F, 19-23/F and 28/F while the external to internal fire spread pattern occurred on 15/F and 18/F.

Block analysis

A total of 1,736 residential units were assessed. Among them, 924 units sustained varying levels of fire damage, whereas 812 units remain unaffected. Wang Tai House, Wang Sun House, and Wang Cheong House each recorded that over 50% of their units were classified as ESD or SD. In contrast, much less units in the other buildings were impacted by ESD or SD. The block-level unit damage indication is as follows:

Block	ESD	SD	MD	U
Wang Tai House (宏泰閣)	50.40%	8.06%	31.45%	10.08%
Wang Sun House (宏新閣)	49.19%	9.68%	41.13%	0.00%
Wang Cheong House (宏昌閣)	45.56%	18.15%	24.19%	12.10%
Wang Yan House (宏仁閣)	14.11%	6.85%	16.53%	62.50%
Wang Tao House (宏道閣)	9.27%	6.85%	14.11%	69.76%

Wang Shing House (宏盛閣)	6.45%	2.02%	15.32%	76.21%
Wang Kin House(宏建閣)	0.40%	0.00%	2.82%	96.77%

Locations analysis

To analyze the 924 damaged units across the 7 blocks, it was observed that the kitchens and entryways sustained more severe damage than the living rooms, master bedrooms, guest bedrooms, and bathrooms. Windows in kitchens and entryways face the shared re-entrant. The jet flames at the re-entrant caused a multi-level impact, resulting in more severity to these areas. Their locations damage indication based on data collected are as follows:

Locations	ESD	SD	MD	U
Kitchen	61.04%	18.72%	14.61%	5.63%
Entryway	50.65%	25.00%	19.81%	4.55%
Living room	46.86%	16.02%	27.49%	9.63%
Master Bedroom	45.67%	9.31%	27.71%	17.32%
Guest Bedroom	45.45%	10.71%	27.49%	16.34%
Bathroom	45.78%	12.12%	31.39%	10.71%

Unit orientation analysis

The units are oriented exclusively in either the northeast (NE) or southwest (SW) direction. Over 50% of the units in the NE direction are classified as U, while approximately 45% of the units in the SW direction experienced ESD or SD. The corresponding unit damage is classified as follows:

Unit orientation	ESD	SD	MD	U
NE	14.05%	5.65%	21.66%	58.64%
SW	36.06%	9.10%	19.93%	34.91%

Re-entrant orientation analysis

Each block contains re-entrants oriented to the north (N), east (E), south (S) and west (W). More than half of the units with S-facing re-entrants experienced ESD and SD, whereas units with re-entrants facing other directions were predominantly categorized as U. The damage to units sharing the same re-entrant orientation is summarized as follows:

Locations	ESD	SD	MD	U
N	7.60%	2.30%	23.50%	66.59%
E	20.51%	8.99%	19.82%	50.69%
S	41.47%	11.75%	30.65%	16.13%
W	30.65%	6.45%	9.22%	53.69%

Living room analysis

In assessing the correlation between the living room and the re-entrants in relation to level of unit damage, two distinct unit configurations were identified. In one configuration, the living room is located adjacent to the re-entrants, whereas in the other it is positioned further away. It is observed that the damages are different in relation to the different configurations of living rooms. The below findings indicate that units with living rooms situated closer to the re-entrant sustained a higher degree of ESD and SD compared with units where the living room is located farther from the re-entrants.



Living room position	ESD	SD	MD	U
N: situated near the re-entrant	31.11%	6.11%	17.40%	45.39%
A: situated further away from the re-entrant	19.01%	8.64%	24.19%	48.16%

Conclusion on damage analysis

- A significant amount of combustible materials, such as safety nets, scaffolding, and foam boards, was found on site. This is likely a key factor contributing to the occurrence of jet flames at re-entrant locations and sustaining fire spread

both from outside to inside the building, as well as between different buildings.

- The windows of the kitchens and entryway face direct to their shared diamond-shaped re-entrant. During the occurrence of the jet flame at the re-entrants, the re-entrants functioned like a long semi-open chimney to attack the windows of the residential units simultaneously.
- The combination of low humidity and elevated wind speeds significantly contributed to the swift ignition and persistent combustion of materials. Strong winds transported burning debris over several blocks, thereby expediting the fire's advancement, while the dry atmosphere decreased the moisture content in combustible materials, resulting in heightened fire intensity and accelerated flame propagation. Notably, Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, situated southeast of Wang Fuk Court, were substantially impacted by wind conditions during fire incidents. In contrast, other buildings such as Wang Tao House did not encounter comparable effects.
- Over 50% of NE units were classified as U, whereas approximately 45% of SW units exhibited ESD or SD. These findings indicate that unit orientation, together with the wind direction and existence of combustibles, played a significant role in influencing the extent of fire damage observed.
- Units sharing S re-entrants generally sustained considerable damage, with the exception of Wang Kin House. Conversely, the associated units of N re-entrants consistently exhibited less damage than other units across all buildings. These results demonstrate that the orientation of the re-entrant has a significant influence on the severity of fire damage experienced by adjacent units.
- Units with living rooms located nearer to the re-entrant exhibited higher levels of ESD and SD compared with those positioned farther away, indicating that the re-entrant was a significant factor contributing to fire damage within the unit.
- Analysis of 924 damaged units revealed that the kitchens and entryways experienced greater levels of damage than living rooms, master bedrooms, guest bedrooms, and bathrooms. As windows in kitchens and entryways typically face the shared re-entrant, while half of living room windows are positioned near this re-entrant. These findings suggest that fire primarily propagated from the exterior to the interior via the kitchen, entryway, or living room.
- During the incident, both the safety nets and bamboo scaffolding ignited at multiple locations of the affected buildings. Although there is a possibility of fire spreading to residential units, this risk remains relatively low. For example, at Wang Kin House, multiple seats of fire were identified on the bamboo scaffolding, yet only three residential units sustained damage due to external fire spread.
- In several cases, the most severe damage was concentrated at the entryway of

the affected unit, particularly around the entrance door, compared with other areas within the unit. Furthermore, the common corridor and at least one other residential unit on the same floor were significantly impacted. This situation may arise when a fire becomes fully developed within a unit for a certain period, subsequently spreading through the common corridor to other unaffected units. Nevertheless, such pattern of fire spread was typically observed at the post-fire stage, as numerous units experienced ESD.

- Accordingly, the configuration and orientation of the re-entrants with existence of combustibles, together with the low humidity were key factors facilitating fire transmission from the exterior to the interior, and playing a decisive role in determining the extent of damage sustained by residential units.

8. Hypothesis on fire development and spread

Based on the findings from paragraph 3 to 7, four stages of fire development and spread at the incipient stage of Wang Fuk Court fire are suggested.

Stage 1: Ignition and Initial Vertical Spread

The fire originated in the flat roof re-entrant on the first floor Wang Cheong House. It progressed rapidly upward via combustible materials including bamboo, wooden planks, safety nets, plastic sheets, and foam boards. The stack effect facilitated swift vertical movement of flames and heat.

Stage 2: Fully Developed Fire in the Re-entrant

Ample fuel and oxygen led to a significant increase in temperature within the re-entrant, resulting in a fully developed fire that extended from the first to the thirty-first floor. The presence of a jet flame was indicative of extreme fire intensity.

Stage 3: Lateral Spread and Internal Involvement

The fire spread to near bamboo scaffoldings. Elevated temperatures caused adjacent windows such as those in kitchens, living rooms, and staircases to fracture. Subsequently, fire and smoke penetrated Units 4 and 5 across all floors, as well as the stairwells. Although the jet flame subsided once the fuel in the re-entrant was depleted, the fire had already spread into all units 4 and 5 at the same time, with continued heat and smoke impinging on the staircases. Burning bamboos falling to the catch-fans at lower level or ground level, further ignited scattered combustible construction material and obstructed access routes, complicating fire suppression efforts.

Stage 4: Secondary Fire Spread


Adjacent Re-entrants

The fire extended into nearby re-entrants, primarily due to wind effects, the presence of catch-fans and working platforms, scattered combustible materials on the ground, and ignition caused by radiant heat¹⁶ or burning debris falling through the air. Stages 2 and 3 subsequently occurred in these new re-entrants as fire propagation persisted. In some cases, burning bamboo scaffolding and safety nets may lead to fire spreading directly into individual units.

Other buildings

Wind-driven updrafts carried burning debris above the building roofs, where the debris then descended onto the rooftops, scaffolding of nearby blocks and ground floor combustible construction materials, causing them to catch fire. Downward spread was also observed, with scaffold nets melting and dripping flaming material onto catch-fans at lower levels. Stages 2 and 3 subsequently occurred in the re-entrants of the new buildings as fire propagation persisted. In some cases, burning bamboo scaffolding and safety net may lead to fire spreading directly into the individual units.

¹⁶ Radiant Heat is an electromagnetic transmission of heat energy; increases the sensible temperature of any substance capable of absorbing the radiation, especially solid and opaque objects. (Source of Reference: Page 18, NFPA 921 : 2021 edition)



9. Wang Kin House and Wang Tao House fires as hypothesis validation


Fire spread and development of Wang Kin House



Stage 4.2 of Wang Kin House, i.e. fire spread from other buildings to Wang Kin House



Diagram showing situation on ground floor of Wang Kin House



Unit damage diagram of Wang Kin House

Analysis from Wang Kin House Fire

Fire spread and development

During the initial phase of the incident, external fire spread was observed, with multiple seats of fire identified on the bamboo scaffolding of Wang Kin House. The fire likely spread from Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House, since the blaze at Wang Sun House was still in its early stages. Notably, some portions of the bamboo scaffolding outside Unit 2 sustained damage from the fire and subsequently collapsed onto the ground. Throughout this period, there was no indication of fire activity within the re-entrant, nor was any jet flame observed.

Damage analysis

Externally, portions of the safety net sustained fire damage, while most of the bamboo scaffolding remained intact except for some sections outside Unit 2 that had collapsed to the ground. Internally, assessments indicate that 240 out of 248 units were undamaged. Footage analysis revealed multiple points of ignition on the bamboo scaffolding at Wang Kin House. The fire subsequently spread to the living room, guest bedroom, and master bedroom of Unit 2 on the 16th floor, ultimately resulting in the total involvement of this unit. The fire then extended along the common corridor, impacting Units 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8, where damage was confined to areas adjacent to their entryways. Additionally, Unit 8 on the 23rd floor and Unit 3 on the 20th floor demonstrated damage patterns consistent with those identified in Unit 2 on the 16th floor; however, the severity of damage in these units is less pronounced than that observed in Unit 2. Overall, the findings suggest that the likelihood of fire spreading from bamboo scaffolding to residential units remains relatively low provided that the re-entrant is not involved in the fire.

Fire spread and development of Wang Tao House



Stage 4 of Wang Sun House (right), i.e. secondary fire spread from Wang Sun House to Wang Tao House (left)

Stage 1 of Wang Tao House, fire developed at the re-entrant of Units 2 and 3

Stage 2 of Wang Tao House, a jet flame occurred at the re-entrant of Units 2 and 3

Stage 3 of Wang Tao House, the jet flame subsided; however, fire had already rapidly spread to all units 2 and 3 emerging dense black smoke.



Photos: External view of Wang Tao House




Diagram showing external damage of Wang Tao House

[illegible]

Unit damage diagram of Wang Tao House

Analysis from Wang Tao Fire

Fire spread and development

The Wang Tao House fire was characterized by early external fire spread, though the major escalation occurred only after ignition within the re-entrant. The fire's progression was primarily attributed to influence from Wang Sun House. Notably, only one single jet flame was observed at the re-entrant between Units 2 and 3. Throughout most of the event, flames and smoke rose vertically with limited wind influence, and no direct fire extension into adjacent re-entrants was reported.

Damage analysis

Externally, most of the safety nets were consumed by flames, while the majority of the bamboo scaffolding remained intact except for the section outside Unit 2. The external walls of both the re-entrant and Unit 2 exhibited significant blackening due to heat and smoke exposure. Internally, Units 2 and 3 sustained severe fire damage, whereas most other units were minimally affected or remained undamaged. Only a section of bamboo scaffolding outside Unit 2 collapsed and the staircase was not affected, thus occupant evacuation and fire-fighting access to all floors were not impeded. Internal fire spread patterns were observed on 2/F, 3/F, 6/F, 9/F, 11/F, 12/F, 13/F, 17/F, 22/F, 26/F and 29/F. However, this pattern of fire spread was typical at the post-fire stage, as numerous units experienced ESD. In gist, the damage at Wang Tao House was primarily caused by the jet flame in the south re-entrant, but was less severe than at Wang Cheong House, Wang Tai House, and Wang Sun House.

10. Validation from CFD

Please find the input in Chapter 7 of the Final Report.

11. Validation from real fire test

Please find the input in Chapter 7 of the Final Report.

Appendix A-18

Investigation Report on the Origin and Cause of the Fire

1. Origin of the Fire

- 1.1 At 1451 hours on 26.11.2025, FSD received a report of scaffolding on the external wall of Wang Cheong House being on fire. However, CCTV footage later revealed that at 1443 hours, burning debris had already fallen from the podium area between Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House. **All available evidence indicates that the fire originated at the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House** as shown in the *Figure A18-1*.



Figure A18-1 – Showing the Fire Origin at Flat Roof outside Flat 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House

2. Cause of Fire

2.1 On-Site Examination

A comprehensive on-site excavation and examination was conducted at the suspected area of origin within the affected building. The debris excavation was completed, and subsequent assessments by Government Chemists and the FSD's Fire Investigation Team identified several items, including melted scaffold nets, two cigarette ends, multiple drink cans, meal utensils, a portable angle grinder, and cutting discs. The post-fire investigation indicated that mosaic tiles were being installed on the external walls in the suspected area of fire origin during the incident.

2.2 **Prevailing Conditions During Building Renovation**

Wang Chi House, which remained undamaged, served as a reference for the fire investigation. Work platforms, particularly on the flat roof of the first floor, were found littered with cigarette ends, carton boxes, unused foam boards, plastic sheets, discarded food utensils, and other debris, suggesting that these areas may have been used as rest areas by construction workers.

2.3 **Establishing the Probable¹ Cause of the Fire**

Based on the evidence collected, deliberations were conducted to ascertain the probable cause of fire.

2.3.1 First Fuel Ignited²

Observations at Wang Chi House revealed large quantities of cigarette ends, carton boxes, unused foam boards, plastic sheets, discarded food utensils, wooden planks, bamboo, and safety nets, all of which are considered potential sources of combustible material. The EMSD ruled out liquefied petroleum gas leakage as the initial fuel source.

2.3.2 Competent ignition source³

2.3.2.1 Electrical Fault:

The EMSD excluded electrical faults from the building's electricity supply. In addition, the portable angle grinder was located at the upper layer of burning debris, which was far from the fire origin. Therefore, the cause by electrical fault of the grinder is considered unlikely.

2.3.2.2 Spontaneous Combustion⁴:

No materials liable to spontaneous combustion were identified in the vicinity; therefore, this cause is considered unlikely.

2.3.2.3 Deliberate Act:

No traces of accelerants were found at the scene, and CCTV footage revealed no suspicious activity. The Hong Kong Police Force ruled out arson, making deliberate action improbable.

2.3.2.4 Flying Embers or External Factors:

Investigation confirmed that mosaic tile installation was underway at the suspected origin area. However, the angle grinder used to cut mosaic tiles would not produce flying embers. In addition, hot works such as welding were also ruled out.

¹ Probable is the level of certainty corresponds to being more likely true than not. At this level of certainty, the likelihood of the hypothesis being true is greater than 50 percent. (Source of Reference: Page 22, NFPA 921 : 2021 edition)

² The first fuel ignited is that which first sustains combustion beyond the ignition source. (Source of Reference: Page 16, NFPA 921 : 2021 edition)

³ A competent ignition source will have sufficient energy and be capable of transferring that energy to the fuel long enough to raise the fuel to ignition. (Source of Reference: Page 15, NFPA 921 : 2021 edition)

⁴ Spontaneous combustion is the incubation of a chemical reaction that leads to smoldering or (diffusion) flaming. It can occur in oily cotton rags (e.g. linseed oil), a haystack, or a pile of wood chips. (Source of Reference: Page 25, "Principles of Fire Behavior" by James G. Quinterie)

2.3.2.5 Disposal of Lighted Smoking Material:

Two cigarette ends remained at the re-entrant⁵ following the fire at Wang Cheong House. CCTV footage captured construction workers smoking on the roof floor of Wang Cheong House. The witness statement, LIU [REDACTED],⁶ also confirmed that workers regularly smoked and disposed of lighted cigarettes in staircases. Additionally, numerous cigarette ends were found at the Wang Chi House bamboo scaffolding work site. Collectively, the evidence indicated workers frequently smoked and improperly discarded cigarettes in these work areas.

3. **Conclusion**

3.1.1 Based on the investigation to date, the probable competent ignition source is discarded lighted cigarette ends. Ignition by discarded lighted cigarette ends would result in smoldering—a relatively slow combustion process occurring between oxygen in the air and solid fuel. This reaction takes place on the solid surface, with oxygen diffusing to it, causing glowing and charring. Smoldering can transition to flaming combustion, especially with increased airflow⁷. Therefore, the presence of combustibles such as carton boxes, unused foam boards, plastic sheets, discarded food utensils, wooden planks, bamboo, and safety nets at the suspected area of fire origin cannot be excluded as the initial fuel ignited.

3.1.2 Based on the available evidence, the probable cause of the fire is assessed to be “discarding lighted cigarette ends smolder combustible materials placed at the Flat Roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House, in turn set fire to the same and spread to nearby combustibles.

⁵ The re-entrant mentioned as the origin of fire at Paragraph 1 refers.

⁶ Witness Statement of LIU [REDACTED] at Appendix A-53 refers.

⁷ Source of Reference: Page 38, “Principles of Fire Behavior” by James G. Quinterie

Investigation Report of
Fire Incident
at
Wang Fuk Court,
Tai Po, New Territories
on 26 November 2025

Electricity Legislation Division
Electrical and Mechanical Services Department
December 2025

Preamble

1. The Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) was requested on 28 November 2025 to assist the Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force led by the Fire Services Department (FSD) to investigate a fire incident occurred at Wang Fuk Court, Tai Po, New Territories causing multiple fatalities and injuries. Electricity Legislation Division (ELD) of the EMSD was requested to identify whether the root cause of the fire incident was electrically related.

Investigation

2. Joint site investigation under Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force comprising FSD, Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and Government Laboratory (GL), etc was carried out by ELD's investigation team of the following officers on 29 November 2025 and 3 December 2025.

- (i) Mr. CHAN Chi-kin (Senior Electrical and Mechanical Engineer)
- (ii) Mr. WONG Pui-leung (Electrical and Mechanical Engineer)
- (iii) Mr. MA Chun-man (Senior Electrical Inspector)
- (iv) Mr. CHOI Kin-chung (Assistant Electrical Inspector)

Information Collected

3. The following information was collected from FSD at the scene:
- (i) The fire occurred at around 14:51 on 26 November 2025.
 - (ii) Multiple fatalities and injuries were reported.
 - (iii) The suspected fire origin was at the Lightwell Platform at Wang Cheong House between Flat 104 and 105 on the first floor.

Observations / Findings

4. The scene was a residential estate consisting eight blocks. The floor plans for Wang Cheong House of the first floor and ground floor are shown in the Figure A and B respectively.



Figure A : Floor Plan of the First Floor for Wang Cheong House




Figure B : Floor Plan of the Ground Floor for Wang Cheong House

5. On the ground floor, there was a bicycle parking space consisting of two compartments. There were two ceiling mounted lighting and a CCTV near the compartment closer the Lightwell Platform (Photo G1 to G2). The lighting and the CCTV were seriously burnt by fire externally (Photo G3 to G4). Besides, there were an electrical distribution board with cables, two ceiling mounted lighting and an outdoor unit of air conditioner in the compartment further away from the Lightwell Platform (Photo G5 to G6). These electrical installations were relatively intact but affected by external fire slightly. There was no sign of electrical fault identified from these fixed electrical installations. No electrical product was found in bicycle parking space near the Lightwell Platform. There was no evidence to show the fire was initiated from fixed electrical installation in bicycle parking space and the fire is not electrically related.




Bicycle Parking Space Overview
(Photo G1)




Bicycle Parking Space Overview
(Photo G2)



Lighting in Bicycle Parking Space
(Photo G3)



CCTV in Bicycle Parking Space
(Photo G4)



Distribution Board and Lighting in Bicycle
Parking Space
(Photo G5)



Air Conditioner in Bicycle Parking Space
(Photo G6)

6. On the first floor, Flat 104, 105 and meter room were inspected. The two kitchens of Flat 104 and 105 were nearest to the Lightwell Platform.

7. In the kitchen of Flat 104, the fixed electrical installations and electrical products were found seriously burnt by fire externally. The fixed electrical installations and electrical products included a ceiling lighting, a range hood, a washing machine, a refrigerator, a microwave oven, a conventional oven, toaster, a distribution board and socket outlet. There was no sign of electrical fault identified from these fixed electrical installations and electrical products (Photo A1 to A8). Other areas of Flat 104 (i.e. Living and Dining Rooms, Bedrooms, Bathroom) were also affected by fire externally (Photo A9 to A12). There was no evidence to show the fire was initiated from fixed electrical installation nor electrical product in Flat 104 and the fire is not electrically related.



Kitchen of Flat 104 Overview
(Photo A1)



Washing Machine, Refrigerator and
Microwave Oven in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A2)



Distribution Board in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A3)



Interior of Distribution Board in Kitchen of
Flat 104
(Photo A4)



Socket Outlet in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A5)



Conventional Oven, Toaster, Microwave
Oven in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A6)



Ceiling Lighting in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A7)



Range Hood in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo A8)



Living & Dining Room of Flat 104
Overview
(Photo A9)



Bedroom 1 of Flat 104 Overview
(Photo A10)



Bedroom 2 of Flat 104 Overview
(Photo A11)



Bathroom of Flat 104 Overview
(Photo A12)

8. In the kitchen of Flat 105, the fixed electrical installations and electrical products were found seriously burnt by fire externally. The fixed electrical installations and electrical products included a ceiling lighting, a range hood, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a distribution board and socket outlets (Photo B1-B9). Other areas of Flat 105 (i.e. Living and Dining Rooms, Bedrooms, CPD, Bathroom) were also affected by fire externally (Photo B10-B14). There was no evidence to show the fire was initiated from fixed electrical installation nor electrical product in Flat 105 and the fire is not electrically related.



Kitchen of Flat 105 Overview
(Photo B1)



Range Hood in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B2)




Distribution Board in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B3)



Interior of Distribution Board in Kitchen of Flat 105

(Photo B4)



Ceiling Lighting in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B5)



Socket Outlet in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B6)



Washing Machine in Kitchen of Flat 104
(Photo B7)



Socket Outlet in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B8)



Microwave Oven in Kitchen of Flat 105
(Photo B9)



Living & Dining Room of Flat 105
Overview (Photo B10)



Bedroom 1 of Flat 105 Overview
(Photo B11)



Bedroom 2 of Flat 105 Overview
(Photo B12)



"CPD" of Flat 105 Overview
(Photo B13)



Bathroom of Flat 105 Overview
(Photo B14)

9. In the meter room, all the fixed electrical installations were intact (Photo M1-M4). The MCB for Flat 104 and 105 was at ON position indicating no electric fault occurred at both flats.



Meter Room Overview
(Photo M1)



Isolator of Meter Room
(Photo M2)



Electric Meters in Meter Room
(Photo M3)




Distribution Board for Different Flats in
Meter Room (Photo M4)

10. At the Lightwell Platform, which was the suspected fire origin, there was no fixed electrical installation nor electrical product found that require ELD to inspect. (Photo R1 to R2).



Lightwell Platform
(Photo R1)




Lightwell Platform
(Photo R2)

Analysis


11. According to the above observations / findings, there was no fixed electrical installation nor electrical product found at the Lightwell Platform that require ELD to inspect. In the vicinity of the Lightwell Platform, Flat 104 and 105 on the first floor and bicycle parking space on the ground floor were inspected. There was no sign of electrical fault identified and there was no evidence to show the fire was initiated from these areas.

Cause of the incident

12. Based on our above collected information, observations / findings and analysis, there was no evidence to show that the root cause of the fire incident was electrically related.



(CHAN Chi Kin)
Senior Electrical and Mechanical Engineer



(WONG Pui Leung)
Electrical and Mechanical Engineer

Electrical and Mechanical Services Department
31 Dec 2025

<FINAL>

**Investigation Report of
Fire Incident
at
Wang Fuk Court,
Tai Po, New Territories
on 26 November 2025**

Gas Standards Office
Electrical and Mechanical Services Department
February 2026

Table of Contents

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3. Action taken during the Incident	6
4. Investigation and Analysis	7
5. Conclusion.....	13

Appendix

Appendix A: LPG Underground Piping Layout for Wang Fuk Court

Appendix B: Schematic Diagram of LPG Distribution System of Wang Fuk Court

Appendix C: Fire Test for LPG Pipe Joints

1. Background

- 1.1 A No. 5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court, Tai Po, occurred on 26 November 2025. Following the fire incident, an Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force (IFITF) led by the Fire Services Department (FSD) was set up to investigate into the cause of fire, how it spread and the factors leading to heavy casualties of the fire incident.
- 1.2 The Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) was invited by FSD to assist in the investigation.
- 1.3 The Gas Standards Office (GasSO) of EMSD is responsible for regulating fuel gas safety in Hong Kong. Its duties include enforcing the Gas Safety Ordinance (Cap. 51) to regulate gas safety matters, including the safety of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and town gas pipeline supply systems in buildings.
- 1.4 The objective of GasSO's investigation is to assist the IFITF to identify whether the cause and the rapid spread of fire at the suspected fire origin in Wang Cheong House's lightwell are LPG related. This report presents the findings of the investigation by GasSO.

2. Introduction

2.1 Description of LPG Supply System

- 2.1.1 Wang Fuk Court is supplied with LPG piped from a central LPG supply compound located at Kwong Chun Street, adjacent to Kwong Fuk Park. This LPG compound also serves the neighbouring Kwong Fuk Estate.
- 2.1.2 The LPG compound consists of three underground LPG storage tanks, each at 23 kilolitres water capacity. LPG is supplied to the buildings in Wang Fuk Court via an underground gas supply network with operating pressure at around 69 kPa.
- 2.1.3 The underground pipework extends vertically from the ground level and connects to the LPG riser of each building to supply LPG to individual households. The riser is the aboveground section of the LPG pipework that transports LPG to pressure regulators installed at the roof of the building (“2nd Stage Pressure Regulators”). The LPG pressure is stepped down from 69 kPa to 6.9 kPa by the pressure regulators before LPG is distributed into individual flats through LPG downers and the associated lateral pipes. The pressure regulators are equipped with a low-pressure protection function such that LPG supply to the downers would be cut off automatically if low pressure in the downers is detected.
- 2.1.4 The downers are the vertical pipes installed from the roof to the lower levels of the building to supply LPG to individual households through a lateral pipe (15 mm dia.) in the premises. There are typically two downers installed in each re-entrant to supply LPG to the same two flats in different floors. The downers extend downward only up to the pipe entry point near the ceiling level of the first floor flats, but no farther down to the re-entrant flat roof level.
- 2.1.5 The LPG risers and downers are constructed of heavy grade steel pipes to BS1387 with nominal diameter of 50 mm and 25 mm, respectively.
- 2.1.6 A main gas supply valve is fitted to the upstream position of each LPG riser to effect isolation of LPG supply to the riser from the underground LPG supply network.
- 2.1.7 Detailed piping layout and schematic diagram of the LPG distribution system of Wang Fuk Court are in Appendices A and B, respectively.
- 2.1.8 The responsible Registered Gas Supply Company (“RGSC”) for operation and maintenance of the LPG compound and the supply of LPG to Wang Fuk Estate is Sinopec (Hong Kong) Petroleum Holding Company Limited (“Sinopec”).

2.2 LPG Installations near Suspected Fire Origin

2.2.1 According to the FSD's investigation results, the suspected fire origin is located at the flat roof outside Rooms 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House ("Flat Roof").

2.2.2 There is an LPG riser laid horizontally on the Flat Roof along the external wall outside the bathroom of Room 104. This pipe section extends upwards in the re-entrant to the roof of the building and is mounted on the re-entrant external wall (see [Photo 1](#)).

2.2.3 All joints along the LPG riser are welded, except three elbow threaded joints connecting the vertical and horizontal pipe sections at the Flat Roof.

2.2.4 The floor plan of the first floor of Wang Cheong House illustrating the riser and downers alignment and the Flat Roof position is in [Figure 1](#).




Figure 1 – Floor plan of the first floor of Wang Cheong House




Photo 1 - The arrangement of LPG riser at the re-entrant of Wang Cheong House

3. Action Taken During The Incident

- 3.1 The Sinopec's site operators were on duty in their site office at Kwong Fuk Estate when the fire broke out on 26 November 2025. When the operators noticed the severe fire in Wang Fuk Court, they shut off the two LPG isolation valves, i.e. valve nos. 6 and 10, in the underground supply network, and the main gas supply valve to the riser of Wang Yan House, to cut off LPG supply to all buildings in Wang Fuk Court at around 16:00 on 26 November 2025 (**See Appendix A**) as safety precautions.
- 3.2 The Sinopec also reported the fire incident to GasSO at around 15:55. GasSO's inspector arrived at the LPG compound at 18:00 to monitor the LPG compound operation and the fire situation.
- 3.3 The Sinopec was requested to closely monitor the LPG compound to see if any abnormality occurred. The Sinopec reported that no abnormal LPG consumption was observed since then.

4. Investigation and Analysis

4.1 Investigation Methodology

- (i) Video Evidence Review: A review of the flame development at the suspected fire origin during the initiation of the fire.
- (ii) Operational Records Review: A review of Sinopec's maintenance logs, and operation records to identify any LPG leakage before the fire incident at Wang Fuk Court.
- (iii) On-site inspection: A technical, on-site assessment of the LPG pipework installations in Wang Fuk Court after the fire incident.
- (iv) Fire test: A fire test to examine the airtightness of LPG pipe joints after exposure to fire.

4.2 Assessment of LPG Involvement in Fire Cause

4.2.1 Analysis of Flame Appearance

- (i) As observed from video footage¹ taken by a member of the public during the initiation of the fire, **the flames at the Flat Roof were not originated from the LPG riser or downers (Photo 2).**
- (ii) The flames captured in the video footage did not exhibit the form or behavior characteristics of an ignited vapour LPG leak from a pressurized source. If the fire was caused by an LPG leakage from the LPG pipe, the flame would have been jet-like, which would be more intense, highly directional and elongated in a conical shape with its flame base close to the leak point of the LPG pipe. However, the observed flames in the video footage lacked these defining features.

¹ According to the FSD, the video was provided by Mr. YIP [REDACTED], who was at the cycling path near Wang Cheong House, witnessed the occurrence of fire and immediately reported it to the Fire Services Communications Centre.



Photo 2 – Flame appearance during fire initiation captured from video footage

4.2.2 Review of Leakage Records

- (i) According to the operation records from the Sinopec, **no reports on suspected LPG leakage** in Wang Fuk Court have been received in the past three months before the fire incident.
- (ii) LPG supplied in Hong Kong is odorized with a distinctive smell, making leaks easily detectable. If there had been a leak in the LPG riser near the fire origin prior to the fire, residents nearby or pedestrians passing the public area under the Flat Roof should have noticed the smell or signs of leakage.

4.2.3 Assessment of Post-fire Conditions of LPG Riser

- (i) The EMSD conducted a visual inspection of the LPG riser on the Flat Roof on 4 December 2025, focusing on the horizontal pipe section and the lower section of the vertical pipe near the suspected fire origin. The inspection revealed burn marks on the LPG riser sections with its surface coatings damaged and peeled off from the pipe after subjected to high heat in the fire. A slight bend was also observed in the horizontal pipe section (Photos 3 and 4), likely resulting from external impact by falling objects during the fire.
- (ii) The structural integrity of the above-mentioned pipe sections remained intact. **No signs of perforations, cracks or severe localised corrosion** were observed on the pipe surfaces, which could have contributed to a pre-fire leak.

4.2.4 Based on the findings above, there is **no evidence to suggest that the cause of fire is LPG related**.



Photo 3 - LPG riser at the Flat Roof



Photo 4 - Horizontal section of LPG riser at the Flat Roof

4.3 Assessment of LPG Involvement in Rapid Fire Spread

4.3.1 LPG Riser

- (i) During our inspection at the Flat Roof on 4 December 2025, it was found that the LPG riser installed on the external wall of the building was severely deformed in the fire with some sections of pipe detached from the building wall (Photo 5).
- (ii) **The whole riser was inspected and NO complete circumferential fracture (i.e. no pipe rupture) was observed along the entire LPG riser.** Therefore, the possibility that a large amount of LPG released from a ruptured pipe accelerated the vertical fire spread can be ruled out.

4.3.2 Pipe Joint Leaks

- (i) The horizontal pipe section of the LPG riser at the Flat Roof consists of threaded joints, which are inherently more prone to leakage than welded joints when subjected to external fire. While the findings in para. 4.2.3(ii) and 4.3.1(ii) concluded that no large release of LPG from the LPG riser has occurred accelerating the fire spread, a further study has been conducted to examine whether the fire at its initiation stage could have caused minor LPG leakage at the riser's pipe joints, and if so the degree to which the leak would contribute to the fire spread.
- (ii) A fire test was therefore conducted by EMSD at the FSD's Fire and Ambulance Services Academy at Tseung Kwan O on 14 January 2026. In the fire test, a number of LPG pipe sections, with each consisting of a threaded or welded joint, were subjected to fire for different periods of time to replicate the initial fire scenario at the Flat Roof. The pipe specimens were then tested for leakage with the leak rates measured. Details of the fire tests and the results are provided in Appendix C.
- (iii) The test results showed that the threaded joints in all the specimens exhibited various degree of leakage after exposure to fire for 3 minutes to 15 minutes. Based on the leak rates measured in the tests, the calculated heat power generated by burning of LPG leakage under similar circumstances was very small (i.e. around 3.4 kW), which was only comparable to that of a common portable LPG cassette cooker. On the other hand, the welded joint in the specimen remained intact and airtight even after 15 minutes of fire.

- (iv) From the above test results, although it cannot be ruled out that very minor LPG leakage might have occurred at the riser threaded joints when subjected to the initial fire, the scale and intensity of the LPG fire so caused would be minimal as compared to that observed at the re-entrant. Its contribution to the rapid spread of fire is considered negligible.

4.3.3 LPG Downers

- (i) Similarly, **the whole two LPG downers at the re-entrant were also inspected and NO pipe rupture was observed** although some sections of the pipes at high level were deformed in the fire (Photo 5).
- (ii) While some lateral pipes connecting the downers to the gas fittings inside the flats were found severely damaged and disconnected due to prolonged fire exposure, their contribution to the rapid spread is considered negligible since **any leak from lateral pipes is momentary and of insignificant quantity to accelerate the fire spread**.
- (iii) The reasons for the above are that the lateral pipes are of small size (15 mm dia.) and at low operating pressure (6.9 kPa); and protected from occurrence of continuous large leaks by the low-pressure protection function of the 2nd Stage Pressure Regulators. That is, once any leak occurred causing a significant drop in the line pressure, the safety protection function would be triggered automatically to immediate cut off the LPG supply to the concerned downer and all the associated lateral pipes until it is manually reset. Thus, any leak caused by such damages should be of short duration and one-off. The same protection also applies to LPG downers.
- (iv) Our post-fire inspection of the 2nd Stage Pressure Regulators on the roof of Wang Cheong House on 13 January 2026 revealed that the low-pressure protection function had been triggered confirming that the LPG supply to the downers had been cut off during the fire.


- 4.3.4 Based on the findings above, there is **no evidence to suggest that the rapid spread of fire is LPG related**.




Photo 5 - Deformed LPG riser and downer at Wang Cheong House with no sign of rupture

5. Conclusion

- 5.1 With the findings and analysis above, there is **no evidence to indicate that the cause and rapid spread of fire are LPG related.**





Appendix C: Fire Test for LPG Pipe Joints

Objective

To assess the air tightness of the threaded/welded joints of the LPG riser during fire initiation

Methodology

- 1. A fire is set up to simulate the fire scenario of the suspected fire origin during fire initiation. Six steel pipes with threaded joints are exposed to fire for various durations (i.e. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 15 minutes¹) (Photo 6). One steel pipe with a welded joint is exposed to fire for 15 minutes.
- 2. The diameter and specifications of the tested steel pipes and fittings are equivalent to those of the LPG risers installed in Wang Fuk Court.
- 3. After fire attack and cooling down of the steel pipes, soapy leakage tests are conducted on the steel pipes at a pressure of 15 psig with compressed air (Photo 7). Pressure readings for each pipe are recorded.
- 4. If leakage at the joints is detected, the leakage volume flow rate would be estimated based on the recorded pressure drop and duration.

Participants

The fire was set up by the FSD’s colleagues. The soapy leakage test was conducted by a Registered Gas Installer, and witnessed by a competent person and staff of GasSO. The test result was certified by the competent person.

Venue of Test

Fire and Ambulance Services Academy, Tseung Kwan O

Date of Test

14 January 2026

Summary of Test Result

- 1. Minor leakage was observed at the threaded joints of all tested pipes after fire attack. According to the test reports provided by the competent person, the estimated leakage rates ranged from 0.015 to 1.736 litres/minute at atmosphere pressure.
- 2. Based on the above estimated leakage rate, the estimated heat power due to LPG leakage at the threaded joints ranged from 0.03 kW to 3.36 kW, which is comparable to the power of a portable cassette cooker, which typically ranges from 2.6 kW to 3.5 kW.
- 3. No leakage was found at the welded joint of the tested pipe.

Photos

	
Photo 6 – Steel pipes under fire attack	Photo 7 – Leakage test after fire attack

¹ According to FSD’s information, the fire was officially reported at 14:51 but evidence from witness statements and CCTV footage indicates that it started earlier. FSD’s investigation revealed that the fire spread to the 8/F of Wang Cheong House at 14:57. The test duration of 15 minutes fire exposure is sufficient to cover the fire initiation period at the Flat Roof.

Post Fire Exterior Photos Wang Fuk Court











Wang Cheong House

Wang Shing House

Wang Chi House








Wang Yan House

Wang Tao House

Wang Sun House

720



Wang Yan House

Wang Tao House

Wang Sun House






Wang Yan House



Wang Tao House



723

Wang Sun House



Wang Kin House





**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

Final Expert Report

By

Ir Prof Richard Yuen

***BSc HK, MSc HK, PhD UNSW,
FHKEng, RPE, FHKIE, MSFPE, MIFE***

8th May 2026

1 Background

- 1.1 I am the appointed fire engineering expert to perform studies on the fire engineering aspect in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po between 26 and 28 November 2025 as detailed in para. 2.2 of the Preliminary Fire Engineering Expert Report dated 10th February 2026 (“**PER**” as per Appendix A with its Annex A-C). A copy of the PER was submitted to Independent Committee on 25th February 2026 as per Appendix A-27 to the Interim Investigation Report of No. 5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025 (“**Interim Report**”) dated February 2026 by the Inter-Departmental Fire Investigation Task Force (“**IFITF**”). This report will provide further and more comprehensive analysis to the scope of study as detailed in para. 2.2.1 to 2.2.4 of the PER.
- 1.2 The fire engineering professionals contributing to the works of the PER and this Final Fire Engineering Expert Report (“**FER**”) consists of the team of experts led by **Prof Richard Kwok Kit YUEN¹ with his team members including Prof Eric Wai Ming LEE¹, Prof Lin PENG², Prof Anthony Chun Yin YUEN³, Prof Timothy Bo Yuen CHEN¹, and Prof Bin FEI⁴.**
- 1.3 In this FER, some essential information for the bench-scale tests, full-scale fire tests which had been previously presented and discussed in the PER, together with the newly performed tests will be adopted to further enhance the understanding of contribution of materials to the fire development for drawing of final conclusions, while the presented information and discussions as well as summaries in the PER remain valid.
- 1.4 In relation to the scope of the studies in para. 2.2.4 of the PER, the computational fluid dynamics (“**CFD**”) simulations of the full-scale fire spread and development over the building where the fire originally started will be presented in this FER. The CFD simulations will give further understandings to depict how fire spread and escalated extremely rapidly over the full height of the building façade, as well as how heat and

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smoke penetrated in the building staircases via its windows either installed with glass or in some cases with wooden hinged doors or aluminium composite panels as found on the site, and how prevailing wind may have contributed to the spread of fire to other buildings.

- 1.5** The CFD simulations results and newly performed bench-scale tests and full-scale fire tests are attached as *Appendices B-D* in this FER.

2 Full-Scale Fire Tests

2.1 Overview of Fire Tests

- 2.1.1** Full-scale fire tests were conducted in Sichuan between late January and early February 2026 at the Sichuan University of Science and Engineering (四川輕化工大學), where a three-storey model replicating the flat roof outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House was constructed. This model was used to conduct a series of full-scale fire tests, including experiments within a cone calorimeter setup to measure the heat release rate, observe glass behaviour under fire, assess fire development, and study the impact of locally sourced materials such as bamboo scaffolding, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, wooden planks, canvas and toe-boards on fire spread⁵. In addition to providing visual observations of fire development under different scenarios, the data collected from the tests will be used to echo the CFD simulation results and serve as a foundation for further CFD simulations of different fire scenarios.
- 2.1.2** Based on the preliminary observations from the initial fire tests described in paragraph 2.1.1, further fire tests were conducted in April 2026 to enhance the understanding of the contribution of materials to fire development. For ease of reference, all fire tests, together with the corresponding studies and analyses, are summarised in the table below to provide an overview.

⁵ According to the Cone Calorimeter Analysis, the fire behaviour of the bamboo, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, wooden planks, and toe-boards used in the full-scale fire tests was broadly comparable to that of the materials recovered from the scene at Wang Fuk Court. Details are provided in *Annex B of Appendix A*.

Fire Test	Details of the Test
Initial Fire Tests (Tests 1 to 6)	Section 2.2 to 2.3
Heat Release Rate (HRR) Study of Re-entrant Configuration	Section 2.5
Fire Severity Analysis	Section 2.6
Further Fire Tests (Tests 7 to 13)	Section 2.7
Fire Test for comparison of fire behavior of safety nets and canvas samples	Section 2.8
Fire Test to study fire spread risk associated with polystyrene window covers	Section 2.11

2.2 Initial Test Arrangement

2.2.1 A series of fire tests were conducted using locally sourced materials to preliminarily assess the effects of fire size, safety nets, and polystyrene window covers on fire behaviour.

2.2.2 Initially, six fire test scenarios (“**Tests**”) were conducted to establish a foundation for further discussion. The details are as follows:

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Polystyrene Covers
1	Below 1.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified) ⁶	No
2	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No
3	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	No
4	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No
5	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	Yes
6	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes

⁶ Sample 1 was procured from the supplier without any certification. As a result, it was initially believed that the safety nets lacked flame-retardant (“**FR**”) properties. However, subsequent testing by Government Laboratory confirmed that, despite the safety nets being uncertified, the samples exhibited a certain degree of FR properties (see [Appendix A-3-7](#) to the Final Investigation Report of No. 5 Alarm Fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025 (“**Final Investigation Report**”) dated May 2026 by the IFITF). Of the four samples tested, three passed the GB 5725-2009 standard, while one sample failed. These mixed results suggest a possible inconsistency in FR properties. Therefore, the original terms “non-FR” and “non-FR safety nets” used in the PER were revised to “uncertified” and “uncertified safety nets” respectively for greater accuracy. For further details, refer to Section 2.4.

2.2.3 Visual observations and temperature data were recorded using cameras and thermocouples respectively, while the total heat release rate was measured by the mega-scale cone calorimeter.

2.2.4 As of the compilation of the Interim Report, the results of the Tests were still undergoing analysis. However, preliminary observations from Tests 1 to 4 were included in the Interim Report to provide an initial understanding of the fire spread mechanism. The raw test results are set out in the PER, provided in *Appendix A*, and are subject to further analysis to be discussed below.

2.3 Preliminary Observations reported in the Interim Report

Comparison of Fire Spreading Behaviour for FR and Uncertified Safety Nets under Small Fire Conditions⁷ (Heat Release Rate < 1.5 MW)

2.3.1 In Test 1, the fire spread to other materials on the scaffolding, including nylon strips, wooden planks and toe-boards, via the ignited uncertified safety nets (as shown in Photos 2-1 (a) & (b)). Although the fire source had burnt out, localized ignition of the uncertified safety nets persisted for over an hour, with slow fire propagation continuing to ignite other combustible materials on the scaffolding. In Test 2, the FR safety nets either did not ignite or self-extinguished upon ignition (as shown in Photos 2-1 (c) & (d)).

2.3.2 Key Observation (1):

The results indicate that FR safety nets significantly reduce the risk of ignition and fire propagation compared to uncertified safety nets under small fire conditions.



Photo 2-1 (a): Fire Spread to Wooden Plank in Test 1



Photo 2-1 (b): Fire Spread along Uncertified Safety Nets

⁷ The HRR from the small fire source was measured to be 0.6 MW in the re-entrant configuration and 0.4 MW in the open configuration.




Photo 2-1 (c) & (d): No Spread of Fire along FR Safety Nets Observed
Comparison of Fire Spreading Behaviour for FR and Uncertified Safety Nets under Relatively Large Fire Conditions (Heat Release Rate of about 2.5 MW)

2.3.3 In both Tests 3 and 4, relatively large fire source⁸ was used and most of the combustible materials within the re-entrant, including bamboo scaffolding, safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks, were burnt by the end of the tests (as shown in Photos 2-2 (a) & (b)).

2.3.4 Key Observation (2):

The results indicate that when the fire size is sufficiently large⁸, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed by the fire, irrespective of whether FR or uncertified safety nets are used.

2.3.5 It is noteworthy that in Test 3, after the fire in the re-entrant area entered the decay stage,

⁸ Comparing the small fire condition with an HRR of 0.6 MW at the re-entrant, the HRR of the relatively large fire source was approximately 2.5 MW.

localized ignition of the uncertified safety nets persisted. Slow propagation of small fire continued, eventually resulting in secondary ignitions at various locations on the scaffolding, occurring between 50 and 120 minutes after the re-entrant fire entered the decay stage (as shown in Photo 2-2 (c)). Further details can be found in the timeline analysis in *Annex C of Appendix A*.

- 2.3.6 The observation as mentioned in paragraph 2.3.5 was not noted in Test 4. Even though the FR safety nets were ignited by embers or flaming construction materials, the fire self-extinguished once the external fire source diminished (as shown in Photo 2-2 (d)).
- 2.3.7 Key Observation (3):

Secondary ignition can occur at a distance from the initial fire origin, even after the initial fire has burnt out, as uncertified safety nets sustained ignition and allowed fire to spread. However, such spread was not observed in tests conducted with FR safety nets, as the fire would generally self-extinguish once the external heat source was removed.



Photo 2-2 (a): Fully Developed Fire in Test 3 (Uncertified Safety Nets)



Photo 2-2 (b): Fully Developed Fire in Test 4 (FR Safety Nets)



Photo 2-2 (c): Secondary Ignition Occurred in Test 3



Photo 2-2 (d): No Secondary Ignition Occurred in Test 4

2.4 Further Analysis of Safety Nets used in the Initial Fire Tests

- 2.4.1 Given the tight schedule, fire tests and safety net testing by Government Laboratory (“GL”) were carried out in parallel. However, GL’s test results were not available during the compilation of the PER.⁹
- 2.4.2 GL examined the FR properties of the safety nets used in the initial fire tests, with the testing report included in GL, Statement of Witness, Reference 26C0048.¹⁰ According to GL’s findings, despite lacking certification, some of the uncertified safety net samples demonstrated FR properties while others failed. These mixed results indicate potential inconsistencies in the FR properties¹¹ of the safety nets.
- 2.4.3 The uneven FR properties likely explain (i) the limited exterior damage to the safety nets after the fire tests, and (ii) the continued fire spread observed in Test 3, even after the re-entrant fire was extinguished.
- 2.4.4 The full-scale fire test aimed to examine the effect of FR properties on fire spread. As mentioned in paragraph 2.4.2, while uncertified safety nets samples provided some indicative insights, the findings were inconclusive. Therefore, additional full-scale fire tests were conducted in April 2026 using artificially deteriorated non-FR safety net samples that failed to meet the requirements of GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008.¹²

2.5 Heat Release Rate (“HRR”) Study of Re-Entrant Configuration

- 2.5.1 An HRR study¹³ was conducted to establish a fundamental understanding of fire

⁹ Since the testing of safety nets was still ongoing during the compilation of the Interim Report, and additional tests using materials collected from Wang Fuk Court were still required, only verified qualitative observations from the fire tests were included in the PER. These observations provided an initial understanding of the impact of FR properties on fire spread. Quantitative analysis of different fire tests is included in this FER.

¹⁰ Examination report from GL at Appendix A-3-7 of the Final Investigation Report refers.

¹¹ The uneven distribution of FR properties may stem from a quality issue with the uncertified safety nets or localized degradation of FR properties in the uncertified safety nets due to heat exposure during the fire test. However, in properly certified safety nets, FR properties remained intact even after the fire tests. Since this was not the primary focus of the study, it was not explored in detail.

¹² No testing laboratory was found capable of conducting fire tests in accordance with NFPA 701:2019 when this report was prepared.

¹³ These fire tests used wooden cribs with a total mass of 184 kg as the fire source to examine the impact of the re-entrant configuration on fire size, comparative tests were performed with and without the test model.

behaviour under both open and re-entrant configurations.

2.5.2 Key Observation (4):

The results indicated that the re-entrant configuration increased the peak HRR to slightly over 3 MW, compared to about 1 MW in the open configuration. Furthermore, the HRR growth rate was significantly faster in the re-entrant configuration (see Fig. 2-1).




Fig. 2-1: Comparison of HRR for Wooden Cribs

2.6 Fire Severity Analysis

2.6.1 A fire severity analysis was initially conducted in the form of a trial test (as per para. 4.6 of the PER) to evaluate fire development and severity (“**Fire Severity Analysis**”). Scaffolding with four layers of horizontal working platforms, replicating the exact design at Wang Fuk Court, was constructed outside the three-storey model. FR safety nets enclosed the scaffolding, with wooden planks and toe-boards installed. Polystyrene window covers were not used. The setup is shown in Photos 2-3 (a) & (b).



(a)



(b)

Photos 2-3 (a) & (b): Scaffolding Setup Used in the Fire Severity Analysis

Visual Observation of Fire Development

- 2.6.2 The fire development during the analysis is shown in Photos 2-4 (a) to (i). Initially, the fire spread slowly for the first 30 minutes, but then grew significantly and spread upward at a rapid rate.
- 2.6.3 The HRR increased from **1 MW at 30 min** to **24 MW at 34 min**, peaking at **29 MW** shortly after. This mirrors the rapid vertical fire spread observed at Wang Fuk Court, where multiple floors were engulfed within minutes.
- 2.6.4 Recorded footage showed heavy smoke penetrating the wooden board on the 2/F, which ignited at 32 minutes. By the end of the test, the 2/F wooden board was completely burned, as shown in Photo 2-5 (a).
- 2.6.5 At Wang Fuk Court, similar openings were connected to escape staircases, likely exacerbating evacuation conditions.

Photos 2-4 (a) to (i): Fire Development in the Fire Severity Analysis

Front View: Re-entrant



(a) $t = 5 \text{ min}$

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 0 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	11.2 °C	9.5 °C	1/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	12.0 °C	10.7 °C	2/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	12.2 °C	10.8 °C	3/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant



(b) $t = 25 \text{ min}$

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 0.326 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	40.2 °C	10.3 °C	1/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	45.1 °C	20.8 °C	2/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	28.2 °C	24.9 °C	3/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant

(c) $t = 30$ min

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 1.102 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	164.4 °C	23.4 °C	1/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	119.3 °C	187.8 °C	2/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	51.2 °C	142.9 °C	3/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant

(d) $t = 31$ min

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 1.744 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	353.7 °C	210.8 °C	1/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	317.6 °C	676.6 °C	2/F	14.52 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	537.4 °C	609.5 °C	3/F	76.3 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant

(e) $t = 32$ min

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 4.235 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	236.9 °C	444.9 °C	1/F	19.77 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	440.6 °C	1064.4 °C	2/F ¹⁴	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	321.9 °C	1053.3 °C	3/F	19.08 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant

(f) $t = 33$ min

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: 8.338 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	306.9 °C	463.2 °C	1/F	19.77 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	489.6 °C	1066.4 °C	2/F ¹⁵	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	496.7 °C	1018.9 °C	3/F	76.3 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

¹⁴ Though the heat flux sensor recorded an unusual drop to “zero” at the kitchen on the 2/F due to instrumental errors, the data set has been retained for reference purpose (see also Fig. 2-4 (a)).

Front View: Re-entrant

(g) $t = 34$ min

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR:23.72 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	451.7 °C	504.1 °C	1/F	59.31 kW/m ²	17.99 kW/m ²
2/F	612.0 °C	1075.3 °C	2/F	14.52 kW/m ²	37.45 kW/m ²
3/F	667.3 °C	991.7 °C	3/F	38.15 kW/m ²	94.17 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant

(h) $t = 34$ min 21 s (FS Intervention)

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR:19.91 MW

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	581.1 °C	563.1 °C	1/F	79.08 kW/m ²	17.99 kW/m ²
2/F	651.1 °C	874.8 °C	2/F	29.04 kW/m ²	56.18 kW/m ²
3/F	708.4 °C	915.1 °C	3/F	76.30 kW/m ²	94.17 kW/m ²

Front View: Re-entrant



(i) $t = 40$ min (Post-fire Stage)

Back View: Staircase Window / Boards



HRR: (Measurement Ceased)

Temperature	Centerline	S/C Window	Heat Flux	Kitchen	Foyer
1/F	276.5 °C	249.9 °C	1/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
2/F	89.8 °C	148.6 °C	2/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²
3/F	34.4 °C	161.0 °C	3/F	0.00 kW/m ²	0.00 kW/m ²

Photo 2-5 (a):
Fully Burnt Wooden Board on the 2/FPhoto 2- 5 (b):
Broken Glass Window on the 1/F

Smoke and Flame Infiltration through the Opening

2.6.6 During the Fire Severity Analysis, the wooden movable boards (as shown in Photo 2-5 (a)) located between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were completely burnt away. As shown in Photos 2-6 (a) to (c), smoke and flame infiltrated the staircase region through the gaps and holes in the wooden movable boards before they were burnt out.

2.6.7 Key Observation (5):

Fire and smoke could infiltrate the escape staircase through the gaps and holes in the movable boards, even before they were completely burned out. Such infiltration would make the use of staircase for evacuation impractical in the actual fire scene.



(a)



(b)



(c)

Photos 2-6 (a) to (c):
Smoke and Flame Infiltration into the
Simulated Staircase Region

HRR Measurement and Fire Load Analysis

2.6.8 The HRR peaked at 29 MW¹⁵ at 34 min, comparable to the burning of a bus or heavy goods truck.

2.6.9 Key Observation (6):

The HRR provided a quantified measurement of fire severity. During the test, the HRR growth was initially gradual, with relatively slow fire development observed during the first 30 min. However, after this period, the HRR increased dramatically in a few minutes and peaked at 29 MW (see Fig. 2-2).




Fig. 2-2: HRR against Time Graph for the Fire Severity Analysis¹⁶

Temperature and Heat Flux Measurements

2.6.10 Temperature versus time graphs for thermocouple tree number 2 (located near the centre of the re-entrant) and number 4 (positioned at the staircase window / wooden boards) are shown in Figs. 2-3 (a) & (b) respectively. Both thermocouple trees recorded maximum temperatures exceeding 1,000°C in the re-entrant.

2.6.11 Key Observation (7):

The dramatic increase in HRR within a few minutes was accompanied by a significant rise in temperatures, from around 200°C to more than 1,000 °C.

¹⁵ Per NFPA 502: “Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and other Limited Access Highways”, 2026 ed., National Fire Protection Association, 2026.

¹⁶ Due to the fire's severity exceeding the cone calorimeter's measurement limits, the test was terminated at 34 minutes and 21 seconds by suppression of the fire.

2.6.12 The heat flux (i.e. heat energy transfer per unit area per unit time) against time graphs for foyer windows at different floors and that for kitchen windows at different floors are provided at Figs. 2-4 (a) & (b). The maximum heat flux of both groups of windows exceeds 100kW/m^2 . The foyer window group and the kitchen window group reached the threshold of flashover¹⁷ at about 31 min and 32 min respectively.

2.6.13 Key Observation (8):

Both the foyer and kitchen window groups were exposed to extreme external heat fluxes, peaking at over 100 kW/m^2 and reaching the radiative ignition thresholds of 20 kW/m^2 ¹⁸, the kitchen at approximately 31 min and the foyer at about 33 min. At these levels, the piloted or spontaneous¹⁹ ignition of combustibles is likely to occur.




Fig. 2-3 (a): Temperature against Time Graph for Thermocouple Tree No.2 (at the Centerline of Re-entrant) in the Fire Severity Analysis

¹⁷ Flashover is defined as the sudden transition from a developing fire to a fully developed fire. It represents a rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement of all combustible material within a compartment.

¹⁸ A value of 20 kW/m^2 represents the ignition flux at an ignition time of approximately 180s for box cardboard. (Source of Reference: R.D. Peacock et al. (1999), Defining flashover for fire hazard calculations, Fire Safety Journal 32, 331-345.)

¹⁹ Piloted ignition is defined as the initiation of flaming combustion when a mixture of fuel vapor and air, heated to a certain point, encounters a local energy source (such as a spark, flame, or glowing wire), while spontaneous ignition (or spontaneous combustion) is a phenomenon where a material self-heats due to internal exothermic reactions—such as oxidation or biological processes—until its temperature rises high enough for ignition to occur without an external spark or flame.




Fig. 2-3 (b): Temperature against Time Graph for Thermocouple Tree No.4 (at the Staircase Window / Wooden Boards) in the Fire Severity Analysis




Fig. 2-4 (a): Heat Flux against Time Graph for Kitchen Windows in the Fire Severity Analysis




Fig. 2-4 (b): Heat Flux against Time Graph for Foyer Windows in the Fire Severity Analysis

- 2.6.14 During the Fire Severity Analysis, approximately 5 kg of cardboard and 5 kg of clothing were placed on the unexposed sides of the kitchen and foyer windows. After the test, all windows near the re-entrant broke, and all combustible materials placed near the windows were completely burned.

Fire Severity Analysis	Time
3/F Kitchen and Foyer Windows Breaking Time	33 min 48 sec
2/F Kitchen and Foyer Windows Breaking Time	30 min 35 sec
1/F Kitchen and Foyer Windows Breaking Time	31 min 19 sec
Reaching Radiative Ignition Threshold at Kitchen Window	31 – 34 min
Reaching Radiative Ignition Threshold at Foyer Window	32 – 34 min

2.6.15 Key Observation (9):

The breaking of the foyer and kitchen windows allowed fire and hot smoke to enter the premises from the building exterior. This enabled naked flames and hot smoke from the re-entrant to ignite combustible materials inside the premises. Notably, the time taken for the windows of the re-entrant to be broken by fire coincided with that for the combustibles inside units to be ignited by radiant heat. As such, the possibility of piloted or spontaneous ignitions are both highly plausible.

Fire Load Analysis

2.6.16 All safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks were consumed completely. Fire load estimations of re-entrant in the Fire Severity Analysis was summarised in the following table.

Material	Weight before Test	Weight after Test	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	1,296.20 kg	153.56 kg	1,142.64 kg	17,391.03 MJ	77.89%
Safety Nets	24.57 kg	0 kg	24.57 kg	265.00 MJ	1.19%
Toe-Boards	11.66 kg	0 kg	11.664 kg	270.25 MJ	1.21%
Wooden Planks	262.08 kg	0 kg	262.08 kg	3,050.61 MJ	13.66%
Wooden Cribs	184.00 kg	101.20 kg	82.80 kg	1,350.00 MJ	6.05%
			Total Energy	22,326.89 MJ	100.00%

2.6.17 Bamboo was the dominant fuel source, contributing nearly 78% of the total energy released, followed by wooden planks (14%). Despite bamboo's dominance as a fuel, the test revealed that other materials, such as safety nets, toe-boards, and wooden planks, ignited first due to their lower thermal resistance. However, once the fire intensified, bamboo—despite its relatively good resistance to ignition (i.e. longer time to ignition)—was still ignited, as it is not a non-combustible material.

2.7 Fine-tuning of Fire Test Configuration

2.7.1 The fire tests were designed to: (i) evaluate the severity and development of fires, and (ii) analyze the influence of various components—such as bamboo, wooden planks, toe-boards, safety nets, and polystyrene window covers—on fire spread.

2.7.2 In the initial Fire Severity Analysis, the intense fire consumed most combustibles in the re-entrant, making it difficult to isolate the individual effects of each component. To address this, subsequent tests used the same scaffolding model but reduced the number of horizontal platforms from four to two, as illustrated in Photos 2-7 (a) and (b)). This adjustment decreased the fire size, enabling a clearer evaluation of each component's fire behaviour in the thirteen tests described below.

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Polystyrene Covers	Canvas
1	Below 1.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	No	No
2	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No	No
3	2.5 ²⁰	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	No	No
4	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No	No
5	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	Yes	No
6	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	No
7	Below 1.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR) ²¹	No	No
8	2.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No	No
9	2.5	Sample 4 ²² (Wang Chi House)	Yes	Non-FR
10	2.5	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	FR
11	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	No	FR
12	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	FR
13	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	Non-FR

2.7.3 As shown in the above table, thirteen tests were conducted to explore the fire dynamics in the incident. In essence, these tests were arranged to examine the following:

- Influence of FR properties on fire development under small fire conditions (HRR < 1.5 MW)
- Influence of FR properties on fire development under relatively large fire conditions (HRR of about 2.5 MW)
- Fire hazards, spread risks, and smoke toxicity of polystyrene window covers
- Assessment of effectiveness of opening protection materials in staircase
- Secondary ignition behaviour and Time-to-Ignition analysis
- Influence of FR properties (safety nets and canvas) on fire development

²⁰ Slow fire growth was observed in the wooden cribs. To accelerate fire development, accelerants were used in accordance with the test arrangement outlined in NIST Technical Note 2102, “Heat Release Rates of Multiple Transient Combustibles.” For the scenario involving a fire size of 2.5 MW, four wooden cribs were soaked in approximately 1 liter of n-heptane to sustain ignition until steady burning was achieved.

²¹ Following the fire, we faced challenges in procuring safety nets that did not meet the standards of GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008. As a result, we resorted to producing such safety nets through induced thermal deterioration. Uncertified safety net samples were thermally deteriorated for at least 4 hours in an electric thermostatic forced-air drying oven (4 kW) at 120°C to become non-FR. The non-FR safety nets used in the tests were non-compliant with both GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008 standards. Test reports are included in [Appendix B](#).

²² The samples were collected by the HKPF from Wang Chi House building façade and some unused samples on ground level and were subsequently sent to Sichuan for fire testing.

2.7.4 Details of Tests 1 to 6 are available in the PER, as per Appendix A, while details of the remaining tests are provided in Appendix C.



Photo 2-7 (a):
Setup of the Fire Severity Analysis



Photo 2-7 (b):
Setup of Tests 1-13

2.8 Comparison of Fire Behaviour of Safety Nets and Canvas Samples

2.8.1 In addition to the above tests, a mobile platform was set up in the re-entrant area to evaluate the fire behaviour of Sample 2 (FR) safety nets, Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets, and the used and unused safety net samples collected from Wang Chi House²³ as well as FR canvas and non-FR canvas. As shown in Photo 2-8 and Fig. 2-5, either Sample 2 (FR) or Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets enclosed one side of the platform, while Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets enclosed the other. The safety nets were tested using a fire source with an HRR below 1.5 MW placed in between.

²³ The unused Wang Chi House safety nets are each attached with a label showing that the manufacturer is 滨州市源进化纤绳网有限公司. According to information from the HKPF, the renovation contractor of Wang Fuk Court ordered a delivery of 2,500 nets to Wang Fuk Court which was marked as “綠不阻燃網” from the same manufacturer on 28.9.2025. The unused nets of Wang Chi House used in the tests were sampled from a total of 170 unused nets manufactured by the said 滨州市源进化纤绳网有限公司, which were placed on the ground floor outside Wang Chi House.



Photo 2-8: The Mobile Platform Setup
(Fire Behaviour of Safety Nets)




Fig. 2-5: Schematic of the Test Setup
(Fire Behaviour of Safety Nets)

Fire Development Observation: Sample 2 (FR) vs Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)

- 2.8.2 The fire development of both safety nets is visually shown in Photos 2-9 (a) to (d). Fire spread was observed in the Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets (as shown in Photo 2-9 (b)), where the fire spread along the safety nets until the entire safety nets were consumed (as shown in Photo 2-9 (d)).
- 2.8.3 In contrast, the Sample 2 (FR) safety nets experienced fire consumption only in the lower portion, without spreading along the rest of the safety nets. A significant portion of the Sample 2 (FR) safety nets remained intact, as shown in Photos 2-9 (a) & (b).




Photo 2-9 (a): Limited Fire Damage on Sample 2 (FR)



Photo 2-9 (b): Extensive Fire Spread on Sample 4 (Wang Chi)




Photo 2-9 (c): Post-Fire Condition of Sample 2 (FR) (Partially Intact)



Photo 2-9 (d): Post-Fire Condition of Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (Fully Consumed)

Fire Development Observation: Sample 3 (Non-FR) vs Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)²⁴

- 2.8.4 The fire development of both safety nets, captured at 2-minute intervals, are shown in Photos 2-10 (a) to (ab). It was noted that safety nets collected from Wang Chi House exhibited a faster rate of spread compared to Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets. The fire continued to propagate until the entire safety nets were consumed, as illustrated in Photos 2-10(ab).

²⁴ An additional comparison between Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets and the unused Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets was conducted on 28.4.2026 and showed the same observation.



Photo 2-10 (a): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (2 min)



Photo 2-10 (b): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (2 min)




Photo 2-10 (c): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (4 min)




Photo 2-10 (d): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (4 min)




Photo 2-10 (e): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (6 min)



Photo 2-10 (f): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (6 min)




Photo 2-10 (g): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (8 min)




Photo 2-10 (h): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (8 min)



Photo 2-10 (i): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (10 min)



Photo 2-10 (j): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (10 min)




Photo 2-10 (k): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (12 min)




Photo 2-10 (l): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (12 min)



Photo 2-10 (m): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (14 min)




Photo 2-10 (n): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (14 min)




Photo 2-10 (o): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (16 min)




Photo 2-10 (p): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (16 min)




Photo 2-10 (q): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (18 min)




Photo 2-10 (r): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (18 min)



Photo 2-10 (s): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (20 min)




Photo 2-10 (t): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (20 min)



Photo 2-10 (u): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (22 min)




Photo 2-10 (v): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (22 min)




Photo 2-10 (w): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (24 min)




Photo 2-10 (x): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (24 min)




Photo 2-10 (y): Fire Spread
on Sample 3 (Non-FR) (26 min)



Photo 2-10 (z): Fire Spread
on Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (26 min)



Photo 2-10 (aa): Post-Fire Condition
of Sample 3 (Non-FR) (53 min)




Photo 2-10 (ab): Post-Fire Condition of
Sample 4 (Wang Chi) (53 min)

Fire Development Observation: FR Canvas vs Non-FR Canvas

- 2.8.5 The fire development of both FR or non-FR canvas is visually shown in Photos 2-10 (ac) to (af). Fire spread was observed in the non-FR canvas (as shown in Photo 2-10 (ad)), where the fire spread along the canvas until majority of the canvas was consumed (as shown in Photo 2-10 (af)).
- 2.8.6 In contrast, the FR canvas experienced fire consumption only in the lower portion, without spreading along the rest of the canvas. A significant portion of the FR canvas remained intact (as shown in Photos 2-10 (ac) & (ae)).



Photo 2-10 (ac): Limited Fire Damage on FR Canvas (White Color)



Photo 2-10 (ad): Extensive Fire Spread on Non-FR Canvas (White & Blue Striped)



Photo 2-10 (ae): Post-Fire Condition of FR Canvas (Partially Intact)



Photo 2-10 (af): Post-Fire Condition of Non-FR Canvas (Mostly Consumed)

2.8.7 Key Observation (14)(a):

In the two comparisons among safety nets, safety nets collected from Wang Chi House showed a faster spread than the Sample 2 (FR) and Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets. In both cases, safety nets collected from Wang Chi House were all consumed. The results indicate that the Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets are very likely lacking fire-retardant properties.

2.8.8 Key Observation (14)(b):

In the comparison among canvas, non-FR canvas showed a faster fire spread than FR canvas. In the case of non-FR canvas, most of the non-FR canvas was consumed. It indicated that the risk of fire spread along any location with the presence of non-FR canvas is increased.

2.9 Influence of FR Properties on Fire Development Under Small Fire Conditions (HRR < 1.5 MW)

- 2.9.1 To assess the influence of FR properties without interference from the fire source or combustibles, HRR was compared under small fire conditions²⁵ (<1.5 MW) using artificially deteriorated non-FR safety nets to avoid uncertainties from uncertified safety nets.
- 2.9.2 Secondary fire spread was observed in Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets, as shown in Photo 2-11 (b). The behaviour was similar to that of Sample 1 (Uncertified) safety nets and supports the validity of Key Observation (1) for non-FR safety nets.



Photo 2-11 (a): Fire Spread in Test 1 Using Uncertified Safety Nets



Photo 2-11 (b): Fire Spread in Test 7 Using Non-FR Safety Nets

²⁵ The HRR from the fire source in Tests 1, 2, 7, 11, and 12 and 13 was measured to be 0.6 MW in the re-entrant configuration and 0.4 MW in the open configuration.

HRR Measurement

2.9.3 The use of non-FR safety nets exhibited a slightly higher peak HRR and slightly faster growth compared to the FR safety nets, as shown in Fig. 2-5.

Test	Material	Peak HRR	Time to Peak
2	Sample 2 (FR)	1.3 MW	7 min 37 sec
7	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	1.4 MW	6 min 52 sec






Fig. 2-5: HRR Comparison between Test 2 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 7 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

Temperature Measurement

2.9.4 The temperature measured during the tests was found generally higher in Test 7 than in Test 2, as shown in Figs. 2-6 (a) to (d). For example, in Test 7, Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets recorded centerline temperatures exceeding 600°C on the 1/F and 300°C on the 2/F. In contrast, Sample 2 (FR) safety nets in Test 2 recorded significantly lower centerline temperatures of 100°C on the 1/F and 50°C on the 2/F.



Figs. 2-6 (a) & (b): Temperature against Time Graphs for Thermocouple at the Centerline of the Re-entrant in Test 2 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 7 (Non-FR) Safety Nets



Figs. 2-6 (c) & (d): Temperature against Time Graphs for Thermocouple at the Staircase Window / Wooden Boards in Test 2 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 7 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

2.9.5 Refined Key Observation (1):

The results indicate that FR safety nets significantly reduce the risk of ignition and fire propagation compared to uncertified and **non-FR** safety nets under small fire conditions.

2.9.6 Key Observation (10):

Regardless of whether uncertified safety nets, FR safety nets or non-FR safety nets were used, most of the bamboo remained unaffected throughout the tests (using small fire size). While the fire spread along uncertified safety nets and non-FR safety nets, it was observed that small fires propagating on the safety nets and flaming droplets from the safety nets first ignited the nylon strips used for knotting. The fire then spread to the toe-boards and wooden planks, but the bamboo remained unaffected.

2.10 Influence of FR Properties on Fire Development Under Relatively Large Fire Conditions (HRR of about 2.5 MW)

2.10.1 Artificially deteriorated non-FR safety nets were used to examine the impact of FR properties on fire development for a fire source with an HRR of approximately 2.5 MW.

HRR Measurement

2.10.2 The use of non-FR safety nets exhibited a higher peak HRR and faster growth compared to the FR safety nets, as shown in Fig. 2-7.

Test	Material	Peak HRR	Time to Peak
4	Sample 2 (FR)	17.1 MW	17 min
8	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	20.9 MW	13 min 40 sec






Fig. 2-7: HRR Comparison between Test 4 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 8 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

Temperature Measurement

2.10.3 The temperature measured during the tests was found generally higher in Test 8 than in Test 4, as shown in Figs. 2-8 (a) to (d). For example, in Test 8, Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets recorded centerline temperatures near 700°C on the 1/F and 500°C on the 2/F. In contrast, Sample 2 (FR) safety nets in Test 4 recorded significantly lower centerline temperatures of about 500°C on the 1/F and below 100°C on the 2/F.



Figs. 2-8 (a) & (b): Temperature against Time Graph of Thermocouple at the Centerline of the Re-entrant in Test 4 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 8 (Non-FR) Safety Nets



Figs. 2-8 (c) & (d): Temperature against Time Graph of Thermocouple at the Staircase Window / Wooden Boards in Test 4 (FR) Safety Nets and Test 8 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

Fire Load Analysis

2.10.4 The fire load analysis for Test 4 and Test 8 is summarized in the tables below. The estimated energy released for Test 8 is only marginally larger than that of Test 4.

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	556.11 kg	8464 MJ	67.75%
Safety Nets	20.52 kg	221.445 MJ	1.77%
Toe Boards	6.75 kg	156.4 MJ	1.25%
Wooden Planks	55.98 kg	651.61 MJ	5.22%
Wooden Cribs	184 kg	2999.2 MJ	24.01%
Total Energy		12492.66 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 4 using Sample 2 (FR) Safety Nets

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	554.2575 kg	8435.86 MJ	67.38%
Safety Nets	13.42 kg	259.2 MJ	2.07%
Toe Boards	7.309 kg	169.35 MJ	1.35%
Wooden Planks	56.433 kg	656.88 MJ	5.25%
Wooden Cribs	184 kg	2999.2 MJ	23.95%
Total Energy		12520.49 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 8 using Sample 3 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

2.10.5 Consistent with Key Observation (2), when the fire size becomes sufficiently large, most combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed, regardless of whether FR, non-FR, or uncertified safety nets are used.

2.10.6 Based on the fire load analysis, the total heat released were comparable at approximately 12,500 MJ in both Test 4 and Test 8. However, the non-FR safety nets caused a faster peak HRR through accelerating ignition and consuming combustibles more rapidly.

2.10.7 Refined Key Observation (2):

The results indicate that when the fire size is sufficiently large, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed by the fire, irrespective of whether FR, non-FR or uncertified safety nets are used.

2.10.8 Key Observation (11):

The non-FR safety nets demonstrated a higher peak HRR and reached its peak more quickly compared to the FR safety nets. Additionally, temperatures were considerably higher in the test with non-FR safety nets than in the test with the FR safety nets.

2.10.9 Like Test 3 with Sample 1 (Uncertified) safety nets, secondary ignition was also observed in Test 8 with Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets.

2.10.10 Refined Key Observation (3):

Secondary ignition can occur at a distance from the initial fire origin, even after the initial fire has burnt out, as uncertified and non-FR safety nets sustained ignition and allowed fire to spread. However, such spread was not observed in tests conducted with FR safety nets, as the fire would generally self-extinguish once the external heat source was removed.



Photo 2-12 (a): Full Developed Fire in Test 4 using FR Safety Nets



Photo 2-12 (b): Full Developed Fire in Test 8 using non-FR Safety Nets



Photo 2-12 (c): Post-Fire Condition in Test 4 using FR Safety Nets



Photo 2-12 (d): Post-Fire Condition in Test 8 using non-FR Safety Nets



Photo 2-12 (e): Secondary Ignition Occurred in Test 8



Photo 2-12 (f): Fire Spread to Other Construction Materials in Test 8



Photo 2-12 (g): Seriously Damaged Safety Nets in Test 8

2.11 Fire Hazards, Spread Risks, and Smoke Toxicity of Polystyrene Window Covers

2.11.1 The influence of polystyrene window covers on fire development was investigated by comparing Test 4 and Test 6. Both tests used Sample 2 (FR) safety nets, but in Test 6, polystyrene window covers were installed over the windows.

2.11.2 The peak HRR recorded in Test 4 and Test 6 were 17.1 MW and 12.97 MW respectively. The reduction in HRR observed in Test 6 was attributed to the decreased contribution of bamboo sticks, as indicated by the fire load analysis.

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	556.11 kg	8464 MJ	67.75%
Safety Nets	20.52 kg	221.445 MJ	1.77%
Toe Boards	6.75 kg	156.4 MJ	1.25%
Wooden Planks	55.98 kg	651.61 MJ	5.22%
Wooden Cribs	184 kg	2999.2 MJ	24.01%
Total Energy		12492.66 MJ	100.00%

Fire Analysis of Test 4

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	433.62 kg	6599.78 MJ	62.62%
Safety Nets	5.65 kg	61.02 MJ	0.58%
Toe Boards	6.99 kg	162.05 MJ	1.54%
Wooden Planks	56.433 kg	656.88 MJ	5.25%
Wooden Cribs	433.62 kg	6599.78 MJ	62.62%
Foam Boards	3.17 kg	79.58 MJ	0.76%
Total Energy		10539.28 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 6

2.11.3 Although polystyrene window covers contributed less than 1% of the total heat release due to their small mass, they significantly promoted fire spread to other combustibles and subsequential fire development, influencing the overall fire behaviour despite their minimal impact on the HRR.

Fire Spread Risks Associated with Polystyrene Window Covers

- 2.11.4 According to GL's observations, as reported in GL, Statement of Witness, Reference 25C2825, polystyrene window covers are readily ignitable when exposed to a naked flame²⁶. During testing, burning droplets were observed, which could act as a source of secondary ignition. These findings were further confirmed through testing conducted in Sichuan²⁷, as shown in Photos 2-13 (a) & (b).
- 2.11.5 Additionally, fire tests revealed that ignited polystyrene panels could detach from the building exterior and fall, as shown in Photo 2-13 (c). Once fallen, these panels acted as a new source of fire, potentially igniting materials beneath the windows. This highlights the significant fire hazards associated with polystyrene materials and their potential to contribute to rapid fire spread.

²⁶ Examination reports from GL at Appendices A-3-2 & A-3-3 of the Final Investigation Report refer.

²⁷ In addition to the tests mentioned in paragraph 2.7.2, this supplementary test was conducted in Sichuan to learn more about the fire behaviour of polystyrene window covers.



Photo 2-13 (a): Formation of Burning Droplets from the Ignited Polystyrene Window Covers




Photo 2-13 (b): Ignition of Nearby Combustibles



Photo 2-13 (c): Fallen Polystyrene Window Covers Potentially Sparking Secondary Fires

Smoke Hazards of Polystyrene Window Covers

- 2.11.6 As well-recognized by FE professionals, polystyrene is considered a more hazardous material than timber in terms of smoke generation and inhalation toxicity due to high carbon monoxide (CO) production during a fire as demonstrated in the bench-scale cone calorimeter test. Comparative testing suggests that wood and other natural-fibre-based materials, although combustible, produce significantly less smoke and heat compared to polystyrene.
- 2.11.7 When polystyrene is involved in a fire, it generates dense black smoke and releases toxic combustion byproducts (i.e. CO). The primary acute hazards arise from carbon monoxide, and heavy smoke or soot. Additionally, the aromatic decomposition products present in polystyrene smoke (such as benzene)—further contribute to its toxicity.
- 2.11.8 A study referenced by FE professionals demonstrates that polystyrene’s total smoke release is 32 times higher than that of wood batt insulation of a similar density²⁸. This supports the conclusion that polystyrene generally presents a far more severe smoke hazard under combustion compared to timber or wood-based materials. In cases where flame-retarded or brominated polystyrene is involved, the toxic effluent may also include hydrogen bromide, adding to the risk.
- 2.11.9 Key Observation (12):
Although the total heat release from polystyrene window covers was minimal due to their small mass, they significantly promoted fire spread to other combustibles and subsequent fire development due to their ease of ignition and production of burning droplets. Additionally, these covers released toxic smoke, further increasing fire hazards.

²⁸ Cassandra Lafond and Pierre Blanchet, “Technical Performance Overview of Bio-Based Insulation Materials Compared to Expanded Polystyrene,” which was published in the journal *Buildings*,” *Buildings* **2020**, 10(5), 81; <https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings10050081>.

2.12 Assessment of Effectiveness of Opening Protection Materials in Staircases

- 2.12.1 In Wang Cheong House, escape staircases were positioned next to the east re-entrant, as shown in Fig. 2-9. Post-fire investigations revealed that while fire-rated glass windows had replaced the original ones, some were substituted with movable wooden or aluminium composite boards. These boards had holes and gaps, allowing direct exposure between the staircase and the re-entrant.
- 2.12.2 Rapid fire spread along the re-entrant was observed early in the fire. A test was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of fire-rated glass windows, aluminium composite panels, and wooden boards in covering window openings and their impact on evacuation. A piece of wooden board, aluminium composite panel, and fire-rated glass window²⁹ were installed at the openings on the 3/F, 2/F, and 1/F level respectively in Test 9 and Test 10, as shown in Photo 2-14.
- 2.12.3 The materials used in these tests were construction materials collected from Wang Fuk Court, including bamboo sticks, safety nets, polystyrene window covers, toe-boards and aluminium composite panels. While the canvas used in the test was not collected from the scene, it had similar FR properties and chemical composition to the canvas of Wang Fuk Court.³⁰ Therefore, the test materials closely resembled those involved at Wang Fuk Court, except for a reduction in the number of horizontal platforms from four to two.
- 2.12.4 In Test 9, the wooden board on 3/F (Photo 2-15 (a)) ignited at 4 min 40 sec, followed by the aluminum composite panel on 2/F (Photo 2-15 (b)) at 7 min 49 sec. Both were completely consumed by fire, while the fire-rated glass window remained intact throughout the test, as shown in Photo 2-15 (c).
- 2.12.5 Although the aluminium composite panel showed delayed ignition, it still allowed smoke and heat to penetrate the staircase and ultimately ignited.

²⁹ The wooden boards and fire-rated glass windows covering the staircase openings in the tests were procured by FE professionals. The fire-rated glass windows procured were Class B fire-rated glass windows with 60 min fire resistance.

³⁰ Examination reports from GL at Appendices A-3-5 & A-3-6 of the Final Investigation Report refer.




Fig. 2-9: Floor Plan of Wang Cheong House




Photo 2-14: Installation of Wooden Board, Aluminium Composite Panel and Fire-rated Glass Window in both Test 9 and Test 10



(a)

Photo 2-15 (a): Test 9
Ignition of Wooden Board
(4 min 40 sec)



(b)

Photo 2-15 (b): Test 9
Ignition of Aluminium Composite Panel
(7 min 49 sec)



(c)



(d)

Photos 2-15 (c) & (d): Test 9 – Post-Fire Condition

HRR Measurement

2.12.6 The peak HRR of 25.97 MW was reached at about 8 minutes in the test, as shown in Fig. 2-10.




Fig. 2-10: HRR against Time Graph for Test 9


Temperature Measurement

2.12.7 In Test 9, temperatures were measured at the centerline of the re-entrant and on both sides of the openings, as shown in Figs. 2-11 (a) to (c).

2.12.8 The maximum temperature record at the aluminium composite panel and fire-rated glass window in Test 9 are tabulated as below:


Location	Material	Max Temp (Re-entrant Side)	Max Temp (Opened Side)
1/F	Fire-Rated Glass Window	1061 °C	56 °C
2/F	Aluminium Composite Panel	937 °C	605 °C

2.12.9 The test demonstrated that the fire-rated glass window maintained significantly lower temperatures, ensuring that evacuation remained a viable option.




(a)

Fig. 2-11 (a): Test 9- Centerline Temperature against Time Graph



(b)

Fig. 2-11 (b): Test 9 - Temperature against Time Graph at the Openings (Re-entrant Side)



(c)

Fig. 2-11 (c): Test 9 - Temperature against Time Graph at the Openings (Opened Side)

Fire Load Analysis

2.12.10 The fire load analysis for Test 9 is summarized in the tables below.

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	617.28 kg	9395.00 MJ	68.14%
Safety Nets	19.41 kg	374.94 MJ	2.72%
Toe-Boards	8.76 kg	202.97 MJ	1.47%
Wooden Planks	57.24 kg	666.27 MJ	4.83%
Foam Board	3.04 kg	76.24 MJ	0.55%
Canvas	4.04 kg	72.72 MJ	0.53%
Wooden Cribs	184 kg	2999.2 MJ	21.75%
Total Energy		13787.34 MJ	100%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 9

2.12.11 Key Observation (13):

The test results indicate that both the wooden board and aluminium composite panel are unsuitable for protecting the staircase openings. These materials fail to provide adequate protection, unlike the fire-rated glass window, which remained intact and maintained lower temperatures, ensuring a safer environment for evacuation.

2.12.12 As demonstrated in previous tests (i.e. Tests 1 to 8), the FR properties of safety nets played a crucial role in fire development, with particular impact on secondary ignition risk and flame propagation behavior. In Tests 9 to 13, further assessment was conducted on fire development incorporating canvas, whether non-FR or FR.

2.12.13 Tests 9 and 10 revealed that with a large fire source, all combustibles within the re-entrant area were consumed, resulting in high fire severity that obscured the details and impact of FR properties. This outcome is consistent with **Refined Key Observation (2)**, which indicates that when the fire size is sufficiently large, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed by the fire, irrespective of whether FR, non-FR or uncertified safety nets are used. The peak HRR and the time to peak data recorded in both tests were similar, as shown in Fig. 2-12(a).

Test	Material	Peak HRR	Time to Peak
9	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) + Non-FR Canvas	25.97 MW	8 min 5 sec
10	Sample 2 (FR) + FR Canvas	27.72 MW	8 min






Fig. 2-12(a): HRR Comparison between Test 9 (Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) + Non-FR Canvas) and Test 10 (Sample 2 (FR) + FR Canvas)

2.12.14 The temperature measured during the tests was found generally similar in Tests 9 and 10 except for 2/F, as shown in Figs. 2-12 (b) to (e). For example, Test 9, Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets + non-FR canvas in Test 10 recorded significantly lower centerline temperatures of about 1000°C on the 1/F and about 900°C on the 2/F. In contrast, in Test 10, Sample 2 (FR) safety nets + FR canvas recorded centerline temperatures near 1000°C on the 1/F and 550°C on the 2/F.



Figs. 2-12 (b) & (c): Centerline Temperature against Time Graph in Test 9 (Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) + Non-FR canvas) and Test 10 (Sample 2 (FR) + FR canvas)



Figs. 2-12 (d) & (e): Temperature against Time Graph at the Openings in Test 9 (Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) + Non-FR canvas) and Test 10 (Sample 2 (FR) + FR canvas)

Secondary Ignition Behaviour and Time-to-Ignition Analysis

2.12.15 The observation of secondary ignition among the tests were summarized in the table below. Across the net types assessed, no secondary ignition was observed in the Sample 2 (FR) safety nets, whereas Sample 1 (Uncertified) safety nets, Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets and Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets exhibited persistent secondary ignition lasting over a considerable time, as shown in Photos 2-16 (a) to (p).

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Secondary Ignition Persisting Time
1	Below 1.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	2 hrs 13 min 10 sec
3	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified)	2 hrs 47 min 28 sec
5	2.5	Sample 1 (Uncertified) ³¹	2 hrs 02 min 52 sec
7	Below 1.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	0 hrs 35 min 19 sec
8	2.5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	1 hr 07 min 46 sec
9	2.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	1 hrs 05 min 16 sec
12	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) ³²	1 hr 53 min 50 sec
13	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) ³³	1 hr 38 min 37 sec

³¹ Polystyrene window covers were included in Test 5 and Test 9.

³² FR canvas was included in Test 12.

³³ Non-FR canvas was included in Test 13.



Photo 2-16 (a): Secondary Ignition in Test 1 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]



Photo 2-16 (b): Post-Fire Condition in Test 1 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]



Photo 2-16 (c): Secondary Ignition in Test 3 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]



Photo 2-16 (d): Post-Fire Condition in Test 3 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]



Photo 2-16 (e): Secondary Ignition in Test 5 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]³⁴



Photo 2-16 (f): Post-Fire Condition in Test 5 [Sample 1 (Uncertified)]



Photo 2-16 (g): Secondary Ignition in Test 7 [Sample 3 (Non-FR)]



Photo 2-16 (h): Post-Fire Condition in Test 7 [Sample 3 (Non-FR)]

³⁴ Polystyrene window covers were included in Test 5.



Photo 2-16 (i): Secondary Ignition in Test 8 [Sample 3 (Non-FR)]



Photo 2-16 (j): Post-Fire Condition in Test 8 [Sample 3 (Non-FR)]



Photo 2-16 (k): Secondary Ignition in Test 9 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]



Photo 2-16 (l): Post-Fire Condition in Test 9 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]^[35]

³⁵ Polystyrene window covers were included in Test 9.



Photo 2-16 (m): Secondary Ignition in Test 12 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]³⁶



Photo 2-16 (n): Post-Fire Condition in Test 12 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]




Photo 2-16 (o): Secondary Ignition in Test 13 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]³⁷



Photo 2-16 (p): Post-Fire Condition in Test 13 [Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)]

³⁶ FR canvas was included in Test 12.

³⁷ Non-FR canvas was included in Test 13.

2.12.16 Secondary ignition spread to safety nets located outside the re-entrant area, far from the original fire source. Additionally, small fires propagating along the safety nets and flaming droplets were observed to ignite new fires. For illustration, secondary ignition observed in Test 3, as shown in Photos 2-17 (a) to (d), will be studied in detail.

2.12.17 The following key stages were observed during the secondary ignition process:

- Small fires spreading along the safety nets led to the formation of flaming droplets, as shown in Photo 2-17 (a).
- Flaming droplets dripped, causing additional fire spread, as shown in Photo 2-17 (b).
- As the fire propagate, fires on the safety nets or flaming droplets ignited easily ignitable materials, such as nylon strips, as shown in Photos 2-17 (c) & (d).
- The fire spread to nearby combustibles, such as wooden planks and toe-boards, as shown in Photo 2-17 (e).
- The fire continued to generate flaming droplets, resulting in further fire propagation, as shown in Photos 2-17 (f) to (h).

2.12.18 Key Observation (15):


Small fires consistently propagated along the surface of non-FR safety nets, uncertified safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, leading to the formation of flaming droplets. As the small fires advanced and the flaming droplets dripped onto adjacent areas, igniting readily flammable materials such as nylon strips. The ignition of these materials caused the fire to spread further to nearby combustibles, such as wooden planks and toe-boards, significantly escalating its intensity and propagation.



Photo 2-17 (a):
Small Fires Spreading Along Safety
Nets, Forming Flaming Droplets



Photo 2-17 (b):
Flaming Droplets Dripping and
Spreading Fire



Photos 2-17 (c) & (d): Flaming Droplets Igniting Nylon Strips



Photo 2-17 (e):
Fire Spreading to Wooden Planks and
Toe-Boards




Photo 2-17 (f):
Flaming Droplets Causing Further Fire
Propagation.



(g)



(h)

Photos 2-17 (g) & (h): Flaming Droplets Causing Further Fire Propagation.

Time-to-ignition Analysis

2.12.19 The time-to-ignition (“TTI”)³⁸ data obtained from the cone calorimeter tests performed for various construction materials provides valuable insights into their ignitability and helps in understanding the mechanism of fire spread through secondary ignition. The TTI data for the procured materials and samples collected from Wang Chi House used in the tests are summarized in the following table.

Procured Materials for Fire Tests	TTI (s)
Uncertified Safety Nets (4 Layers)	46
Uncertified Safety Nets (2 Layers)	50
FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)	76
FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)	86
Non-FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)	48
Non-FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)	52
Toe-Board	42
Polystyrene Window Cover	31
Carton Box	11

Sample Collected from Wang Chi House	TTI (Range)
Toe-Board	19s (18s -20s)
Safety Nets (4 Layers) ³⁹	48s (30s -60s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers) ⁴⁰	49s (27s - 72s)
Polystyrene Window Cover	67s
Bamboo	116s

2.12.20 In addition to Wang Chi House, samples were collected from Wang Yan House to provide a more holistic view of the TTI data, which showed consistent results.

³⁸ TTI is the elapsed time from the start of radiant exposure to the first sustained flaming per ISO 5660, measured in a cone calorimeter. Specimens (100 × 100 mm) were wrapped in aluminium foil with the upper face exposed and tested 25 cm below the cone at a constant 35 kW/m² heat flux.

³⁹ Two samples were collected from high level and low level of Wang Chi House with TTI ranging from 30s to 60s giving an average of 47.75s.

⁴⁰ Two samples were collected from high level and low level of Wang Chi House with TTI ranging from 27s to 72s giving an average of 49.4s.

Sample from Wang Yan House	TTI (Range)
Toe-Board	19s (16s - 21s)
Nylon Strips	36s
Safety Nets (4 Layers) ⁴¹	44s (24s – 96s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers) ⁴²	49s (27s – 78s)
Polystyrene Window Cover	60s
Wooden Plank ⁴³	65s (58s – 79s)
Bamboo ⁴⁴	112s (89s – 143s)

⁴¹ Six samples were collected from the Roof, outside Flat 303, Flat 1201, and Flat 1203 of Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 24s to 96s giving an average of 44s.

⁴² Six samples were collected from the Roof, outside Flat 303, Flat 1201, and Flat 1203 of Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 27s to 78s giving an average of 49s.

⁴³ Two different thickness of wooden plank (from 1st floor and scaffolding, with thickness of 15mm and 8mm, respectively) from Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 58s to 79s giving an average of 65s.

⁴⁴ Three sections of bamboo with different diameters (from unit 303 and roof, with thickness of 6mm to 16mm) from Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 89s to 143s giving an average of 112s.

- 2.12.21 A comparison of the TTI for these materials reveals that toe-boards (16s and 42s) and nylon strips (36s) have relatively low TTI values, making them more readily ignitable. In contrast, wooden planks and polystyrene window covers ignite at approximately 60 seconds, while bamboo demonstrates a significantly higher TTI of over 110 seconds.
- 2.12.22 This TTI evaluation aligns with our **Key Observation (14)**: as small fires progressed and flaming droplets dripped onto adjacent areas, igniting readily flammable materials such as nylon strips. The ignition of these materials facilitated the fire's spread to nearby combustibles, including wooden planks and toe-boards, significantly escalating its intensity and rate of propagation.

Influence of FR Properties on Fire Development

- 2.12.23 As demonstrated in previous tests, the FR properties of construction materials played a crucial role in fire development. However, Tests 9 and 10 revealed that with a large fire source, all combustibles within the re-entrant area were consumed, resulting in high fire severity that obscured the details and impact of FR properties. To address this, Tests 11 to 13 were conducted with a small fire source and in the absence of polystyrene covers to explore the relationship between fire severity and the FR properties of safety nets and canvas.

Test	Fire Size (MW)	Safety Net	Canvas
11	Below 1.5	Sample 2 (FR)	FR
12	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	FR
13	Below 1.5	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Non-FR



Photo 2-18 (a): No Fire Spread along Safety Nets in Test 11




Photo 2-18 (b): Post-Fire Condition in Test 11 using FR Safety Nets and FR Canvas



Photo 2-18 (c): Fire Spread along Safety Nets in Test 12



Photo 2-18 (d): Post-Fire Condition in Test 12 using Safety Nets collected Wang Chi House and FR Canvas



(e)



(f)

Photos 2-18 (e) & (f): Fire Spread along Safety Nets in Test 13



Photo 2-18 (g): Post-Fire Condition in Test 13 using Safety Nets collected Wang Chi House and non-FR Canvas

Fire Load Analysis of Tests 11, 12 and 13

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	2.31 kg	35.16 MJ	9.6%
Safety Nets	5.64 kg	108.95 MJ	29.6 %
Toe-Boards	0 kg	0 MJ	0%
Wooden Planks	0 kg	0 MJ	0%
FR Canvas⁴⁵	4.92 kg	88.58 MJ	24.1%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	36.7%
Total Energy		367.65 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 11

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	19.15 kg	291.37 MJ	20.1%
Safety Nets	18.32 kg	353.83 MJ	24.5%
Toe-Boards	3.34 kg	77.41 MJ	5.4%
Wooden Planks	39 kg	453.96 MJ	31.4%
FR Canvas⁴⁶	7.51 kg	135.20 MJ	9.3%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	9.3%
Total Energy		1446.73 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 12

Material	Mass Loss	Energy Released	Energy Released (%)
Bamboo	572.95 kg	8720.2 MJ	85.9%
Safety Nets	18.57 kg	353.7 MJ	3.5%
Toe-Boards	8.65 kg	200.42 MJ	2.0%
Wooden Planks	57.24 kg	666.27 MJ	6.6%
Non-FR Canvas⁴⁷	4.19 kg	75.37 MJ	0.7%
Wooden Cribs	8.28 kg	134.96 MJ	1.3%
Total Energy		10155.92 MJ	100.00%

Fire Load Analysis of Test 13

⁴⁵ Only about 32% of the FR canvas (by mass) was damaged by fire in **Test 11**.

⁴⁶ About 48% of the FR canvas and 68% of the wooden planks were damaged by fire in **Test 12**.

⁴⁷ All non-FR canvas and wooden planks were completely consumed by fire in **Test 13**.

HRR Measurement

2.12.24 The HRRs measured in Tests 11 to 13 are presented in the following table and illustrated in Fig. 2-13.

Test	Safety Net	Canvas	Peak HRR	Total Heat
11	Sample 2 (FR)	FR	1.01 MW	281.57 MJ
12	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	FR	0.62 MW	1453.57 MJ
13	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Non-FR	11.58 MW	6885.78 MJ

2.12.25 Key Observation (16)

Tests demonstrated that FR materials effectively reduce fire severity and limit fire spread to adjacent areas.

In contrast, suspected non-FR materials, such as safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, promote fire spread through secondary ignition, involving more combustibles and increasing total heat release. However, the damage remains limited.

The fire spread along the safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, causing the canvases on 3/F of the scaffolding setup to catch fire and subsequently spreading the fire along the floor horizontally. The flaming droplets from 3/F caused the combustible materials on 2/F to catch fire. Eventually, the fire made the whole bamboo scaffolding collapse.

The non-FR canvas accelerated the fire growth, transforming limited and localized fires into a widespread and intense blaze. The resulting excessive heat release was sufficient to ignite bamboo sticks, significantly increasing the HRR.




Fig. 2-13: HRR Comparison between Tests 11, Test 12 & Test 13

Temperature Measurement

2.12.26 In Tests 11-13, all three openings were sealed with fire-rated glass windows, as shown in Photo 2-18 (h). Temperatures were measured on both sides of the windows, as shown in Figs. 2-14 (a) to (f). The maximum recorded temperatures at the fire-rated glass windows are tabulated below:


Location	Material	Max Temp (Re-entrant Side)	Max Temp (Opened Side)
1/F	Fire-Rated Glass Window	1023 °C	30.8 °C
2/F	Fire-Rated Glass Window	709 °C	45.8 °C

2.12.26.1 Key Observation (17)


The tests further reinforce that fire-rated glass windows effectively maintained significant temperature reductions and would have prevented the entry of smoke into staircases in the actual fire scene, ensuring safe evacuation remained a viable option.



Photo 2-18 (h):
Condition of Fire-rated
Glass during Test 13




(a)




(b)

Figs. 2-14 (a) & (b):
Centerline Temperature against Time Graph




(c)




(d)

Figs. 2-14 (c) & (d):
Temperature against Time Graph at the Openings (Re-entrant Side)



(e)



(f)

Figs. 2-14 (e) & (f):
Temperature against Time Graph at the Openings (Opened Side)

2.13 Correlation of Fire Test Findings with Fire Scene Conditions

- 2.13.1 After completion of the 13 fire tests, various combinations of materials were tested to examine the fundamentals of the rapid vertical fire spread. Rapid vertical fire spread was observed only in fire tests with large fire size and Test 13 (where a small fire size was used).
- 2.13.2 Based on the test parameters, the combination adopted in Test 13 – involving safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and non-FR canvas with composition verified to be similar to those present at scene ⁴⁸ – was considered the most comparable to the actual fire scene. Accordingly, a qualitative comparison between the visual image of Test 13 and that of the actual fire scene was presented in Photos 2-19.

Photos 2-19: Fire Development Comparison between Test 13 and Wang Cheong House

Front View:
Re-entrant of Test 13




Time: 61 min

Front View:
Re-entrant of Wang Cheong House



Time: about 1450 hours

⁴⁸ Examination reports from GL at Appendices A-3-5 & A-3-6 of the Final Investigation Report refer.




Time: 62 min (1 min afterwards)



Time: about 1450 hours




Time: 66 min (5 min afterwards)



Time: about 1455 hours (5 min afterwards)



Time: 68 min (7 min afterwards)



Time: about 1457 hours (7 min afterwards)




Time: 69 min (8 min afterwards)



Time: about 1458 hours (8 min afterwards)



Time: 70 min (9 min afterwards)



Time: about 1459 hours (9 min afterwards)

2.13.3 The results of Tests 11 and 13 suggested that the risk of ignition and fire propagation can be significantly reduced under small fire conditions when FR safety nets and FR canvases are used. Therefore, the rapid development of the fire (which could even be presumably small) at the origin of the actual fire is likely due to the use of non-FR safety nets and non-FR canvases. If FR materials had been used, the fire would have self-extinguished and not caused the combustible materials inside the re-entrant to catch fire so the fire might not develop.

2.13.4 In the comparison tests, the use of safety nets collected from Wang Chi House with non-FR canvas in Test 13 showed a faster fire spread than the use of FR safety nets with FR canvases in Test 11. The fire spread among Wang Fuk Court is likely due to

the use of non-FR safety nets and non-FR canvases, both of which were ignited by the flying embers and did not self-extinguish. Multiple online videos and witnesses also confirmed that significant number of flaming droplets were observed from the safety nets at Wang Fuk Court. This secondary source of ignition not only spread the fire along the bamboo scaffolding but also caused the construction materials on the ground of Wang Fuk Court to catch fire. If the safety nets and canvases of Wang Fuk Court provided similar protective function as the FR safety nets and FR canvases used in the tests, the fire spread would have been much more minimal in Wang Fuk Court and less buildings would have been on fire.

- 2.13.5 In the full-scale fire tests, the fire-rated glass windows along the staircase remained intact in the end. Moreover, the fire-rated glass windows can keep the temperature at a suitable level for escape. The use of fire-rated glass windows in Wang Fuk Court could have provided occupants with additional time for evacuation before conditions became fatal.
- 2.13.6 Overall, the tests demonstrated that FR safety nets, FR canvases and fire-rated glass windows can provide sufficient protection for prevention of fire spread and safe escape staircase. On the other hand, if non-FR safety nets, non-FR canvases and polystyrene boards are used, the simulation of fire spread would be similar to the real situation of Wang Fuk Court. The window openings also allowed smoke and fire to enter the staircase.

3 Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulation

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Fire engineering professionals utilized CFD simulations⁴⁹ to demonstrate rapid vertical fire spread and wind-driven ember propagation. Due to the limitations of full-scale fire testing, CFD simulations were conducted with the following objectives:

- Assess wind effects on fire spread at Wang Fuk Court.
- Analyze the rapid vertical fire spread observed along external scaffolding and the fire dynamics within the re-entrant space during the fire incident.
- Compare fire development across scenarios with variations in initial fire size, safety net FR properties, and different configurations.

3.2 Wind Effects on Fire Spread at Wang Fuk Court

3.2.1 The CFD model was developed using ANSYS Fluent software for study of wind effects on fire spread at Wang Fuk Court. A full-scale model of all eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court was created, incorporating the configuration, building height, and separation based on building plan records.⁵⁰ According to the Hong Kong Observatory (“HKO”), the average wind speed and direction recorded at the Tai Po Kau Anemometer at 1500 hours on 26.11.2025 were approximately 14 km/hr (i.e. 3.89 m/s) and East to Southeast respectively. These wind conditions were applied in the simulation to represent the wind profile at Wang Fuk Court during that time.

3.2.2 Wind vector contours at heights of 10m (bottom level), 40m (middle level), 80m (top level), 97m (rooftop level), and 120m (above the buildings) were plotted based on the simulation results for the scenario, as illustrated in Figs. 3-1(a) to (e).

⁴⁹ CFD is the engineering practice of using computers to simulate how fluids (liquids and gases) flow, based on the fundamental equations of fluid mechanics. It combines mathematical modelling, numerical methods, and high-performance computing to predict fluid behaviour in complex systems. In fire engineering, CFD model how fire, smoke, heat, and toxic gases move through buildings and structures.

⁵⁰ **Simulation Limitations:**

- **Buoyancy Effects:** The simulation does not account for buoyancy effects. As a result, the influence of the large fire plume driven by thermal buoyancy on the wind profile could not be analyzed.
- **Model Scope:** The model is limited to the eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court and does not account for nearby low-rise structures, landscape features, or geographical variations. Nonetheless, the simulation provides a reasonable representation of wind behaviour at higher levels under the specified wind speed and direction.

3.2.3 Significant smoke drifting was observed during the incipient stage of the fire, as shown in Photos 3-1 (a) to (c). This drifting was effectively replicated and demonstrated by the CFD simulation, as illustrated in Fig. 3-2.




Fig. 3-1 (a): Wind Vector Contour (10m – bottom level)




Fig. 3-1 (b): Wind Vector Contour (40m – middle level)




Fig. 3-1 (c): Wind Vector Contour (80m – top level)




Fig. 3-1 (d): Wind Vector Contour (97m – rooftop level)




Fig. 3-1 (e): Wind Vector Contour (120m – above building)⁵¹

⁵¹ The wind profile showed an increase in velocity as it flowed over the buildings as well as between the gap of adjacent buildings (shown in vector plots above) in Wang Fuk Court.




Photo 3-1 (a):
Heavy Smoke on the South-east Façade
of Wang Cheong House at 1508 hours




Fig. 3-2:
Extract of Wind vector contour at 80m
height



Photo 3-1 (b):
Heavy Smoke on the South Re-entrant of
Wang Cheong House at 1537 hours




Photo 3-1 (c): Heavy Smoke from Wang Cheong House & Wang Tai House

- 3.2.4 The wind vector provided valuable insights into the trajectory of flying embers that could ignite new fires. Wang Chi House was the only unaffected building in Wang Fuk

Court, a fact that can be explained by the wind profile. As shown in Fig. 3-3 (a) and Photo 3-2, buildings experiencing rapid fire spread along re-entrants are marked with red circles. However, as illustrated by the wind vectors, the wind did not carry embers towards Wang Chi House, which may account for its minimal damage.

- 3.2.5 For example, a Senior Station Officer of FSD⁵² observed the fire spreading to the safety nets at the middle to bottom level of the east façade of Wang Tai House at approximately 1500 hours, marked by a black circle in Fig. 3-3 (b). This observation also aligned with the wind profile at 40 m (middle level), which suggested that embers were likely carried by the wind towards that façade following the rapid fire spread along the south re-entrant of Wang Cheong House at nearly the same time.
- 3.2.6 Wang Kin House, despite being in the path of flying embers, sustained only minor damage. This may be attributed to the recirculation zone⁵³ formed around the building which likely extended the embers' travel distance, allowing them to cool before reaching the structure and reducing the risk of ignition, as illustrated in Fig. 3-3 (c).




Fig. 3-3 (a): Wind Vector Contour (120m – above building) with Rapid Fire Spread along Re-entrants Marked

⁵² As detailed in paragraph 5.2.3.2 of the Final Investigation Report.

⁵³ A recirculation zone is a region where the fluid velocity locally reverses direction and forms a circulating loop. Instead of moving downstream, the flow rolls back upstream and creates a vortex-like structure. Source of reference: Duong, N. H., & Nguyen, T. D. (2002). Numerical study of the recirculation zone behind a building in the neutral and stable atmospheric boundary layer. *Vietnam Journal of Mechanics*, 24(2), 84–100.



Photo 3-2: Smoke Clear Zone Above Wang Chi House




Fig. 3-3 (b): Wind Vector Contour at 40m Height




Fig. 3-3 (c): Wind Vector Contour at 80m Height showing recirculation zone formed around Wang Kin House⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Similar phenomenon is also observed in the wind vector contour at 10m and 40m as shown in Figs. 3-1(a) and (b).

3.3 Fire Dynamics Simulation: Model Setup and Scenarios

The CFD Model Setup for study of fire development

- 3.3.1 To examine the impact of materials on rapid fire spread, a model was developed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (“FDS”) ⁵⁵ software. The full-scale model replicated the geometry of Wang Cheong House, including its external façade, re-entrant spaces, staircase enclosure, and bamboo scaffolding from the incident.⁵⁶ Fig. 3-4 (a) illustrates the computational domain and building model with the vertical scaffolding grid.⁵⁷
- 3.3.2 The ignition source in the model was located at the flat roof on the 1/F re-entrant outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House, as shown in Fig. 3-4 (b). The fire was designed to reach full size within 10 seconds, skipping the smoldering phase.
- 3.3.3 A staircase enclosure was constructed inside the building near the re-entrant where the ignition source was placed, as shown in Fig. 3-4 (c). Fire-rated glass windows were modeled along the staircase enclosure. To simulate the effect of the replacement of wooden boards (i.e. wooden hinge doors “生口”) at the window openings, another set up was modeled with opening on the 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F, and 25/F replaced by wooden boards.

⁵⁵ FDS is a CFD software developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology to simulate fire-driven fluid flow, especially smoke movement, heat transfer, and combustion behaviour in buildings and outdoor environments.

⁵⁶ Bench-scale tests, including Thermogravimetric Analysis and Cone Calorimeter Tests, were conducted to obtain material properties of combustibles for the model. The test samples consisted of materials collected from Wang Fuk Court or testing materials procured for the fire tests in Sichuan to ensure accurate representation. The test results, serving as simulation parameters, are detailed in the *Annex B of Appendix A*.

⁵⁷ The computational domain extended 15m beyond the building footprint on each side and 10m above the roof, resulting in domain dimensions of approximately 65m (width) × 54m (depth) × 90m (height).




Fig. 3-4 (a): Full-scale Model of Wang Cheong House in FDS




Fig. 3-4 (b): Location of Fire Origin




Fig. 3-4 (c): Configuration of the Staircase Enclosure near the Re-entrant

Simulation Scenarios

- 3.3.4 Six core simulation scenarios (“**Cases**”) were defined to observe the fire behaviour of the materials and evaluate the variables affecting fire spread, each categorized by the magnitude of the initial ignition source⁵⁸ as follows:

Large Fire Size (Ignition Source of 1 MW)		
Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers
1	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Yes
2	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes
3	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Yes
Small Fire Size (Ignition Source of 0.7 MW)		
Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers
4	Sample 2 (FR)	No
5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No
6	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No

⁵⁸ The ignition source is fire with the t^2 -growing development with constant growth time of reaching 1 MW or 0.7 MW at 10 seconds.

Results for Large Fire Size Cases

- 3.3.5 As observed in the full-scale fire tests, when the fire size is sufficiently large, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed, regardless of whether FR or non-FR safety nets are used. Therefore, only minor differences were expected across the three large fire size cases.
- 3.3.6 The simulation of the three large fire cases demonstrated rapid fire spread along the re-entrant. The HRR profiles for the three cases over time are plotted in Fig. 3-5. Additionally, the times taken for rapid vertical fire spread to reach the 10/F, 20/F, and R/F ⁵⁹ from the simulations are summarized in the table below:

Case	Safety Nets Used	Polystyrene Window Covers	Peak HRR (Time)	Time Fire Spread to		
				10/F	20/F	R/F
1	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Yes	834 MW (203 s)	120 s	130 s	137 s
2	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes	755 MW (216 s)	129 s	137 s	146 s
3	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Yes	800 MW (201 s)	118 s	128 s	135 s

- 3.3.7 The simulation results revealed a slight delay in fire spread when FR safety nets were used compared to non-FR safety nets. For instance, the fire spread in Case 3 using Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets reached the 10/F, 20/F, and R/F faster than in Case 2 using Sample 2 (FR) safety nets. The delay is likely due to the FR properties of the FR safety nets, which temporarily slows the combustion process.
- 3.3.8 The HRR in all simulations was tremendous, as expected. As demonstrated in the full-scale fire tests, all combustible materials within the re-entrant were involved in the fire, leading to significant fire development and intense heat release.
- 3.3.9 The simulation results indicate that Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets exhibited faster fire development, reaching a peak HRR of 800 MW in 201 seconds. Although Sample 4

⁵⁹ The time of fire spread to reach 10/F, 20/F, and R/F was determined using 3D visualization of the visible flaming zone based on the heat release rate per unit volume (HRRPUV) cut-off value of 80kW/m³, which is a well-established empirical value related to the amount of energy released per unit area of flame sheet adjusted for grid sizing.

safety nets collected from Wang Chi House were 2 seconds slower in reaching its peak, they recorded the highest HRR of 834 MW among the three samples.

3.3.10 The results suggest that the samples from Wang Chi House exhibited fire characteristics more similar to non-FR safety nets than FR safety nets, particularly in terms of fire spread rate and HRR. The differences became even more pronounced when exposed to a smaller fire source of 0.7 MW and in the absence of polystyrene window covers.




Fig. 3-5: The HRR profile for Case 1 to Case 3 (1.0 MW ignition source)

Case 1:**Safety Nets collected from Wang Chi House with Polystyrene Window Covers**

Legend:  zone with an HRRPUV > 80kW/m³




**Case 2:****FR Safety Nets with Polystyrene Window Covers****Case 3:****Non-FR Safety Nets with Polystyrene Window Covers**

Fig. 3-6: Visualization Snapshots of the Fire Spread Simulation

Results for Small Fire Size Cases

3.3.11 In Cases 4–6, different safety nets were used to envelop the building as outlined below, with the HRR profiles shown in Fig. 3-7.

Case	Safety Net Used	Polystyrene Window Covers	Peak HRR (Time)	Time Fire Spread to		
				10/F	20/F	R/F
4	Sample 2 (FR)	No	30 MW (268 s)	-	-	-
5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No	747 MW (271 s)	158s	168s	178s
6	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No	795 MW (272 s)	160s	166s	171s

3.3.12 Key Observation (18)

The simulation results demonstrated significant differences in fire development across the three cases. The use of Sample 2 (FR) safety nets showed that the fire could not sustain itself, with no rapid fire spread having occurred. In contrast, the use of Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets and Sample 4 safety nets collected from Wang Chi House resulted in significant fire spread and more severe fire development.

3.3.13 The results further prove that the samples collected from Wang Chi House exhibited fire characteristics more similar to non-FR safety nets than FR safety nets, particularly in terms of fire spread rate and peak HRR.






Fig. 3-7: The Heat Release Rate (HRR) Profile for Case 4, Case 5 and Case 6

Case 4: FR Safety Nets without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire

Legend:  zone with a HRRPUV > 80kW/m³



Case 5: Non-FR Safety Nets without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire



Case 6: Safety Nets collected from Wang Chi House without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire




Fig. 3-8: Visualization Snapshots of the Fire Spread Simulation for Case 4 - 6

3.4 Summary of Key Observations

3.4.1 The key observations were categorized into:

- Safety nets & canvas related;
- Staircase openings related;
- Polystyrene window covers related; and
- Fire development related.

Safety Nets and Canvas Related Key Observations

(1)	The results indicate that FR safety nets significantly reduce the risk of ignition and fire propagation compared to uncertified and non-FR safety nets under small fire conditions.
(3)	Secondary ignition can occur at a distance from the initial fire origin, even after the initial fire has burnt out, as uncertified and non-FR safety nets sustained ignition and allowed fire to spread. However, such spread was not observed in tests conducted with FR safety nets, as the fire would generally self-extinguish once the external heat source was removed.
(10)	Regardless of whether uncertified safety nets, FR safety nets or non-FR safety nets were used, most of the bamboo remained unaffected throughout the tests (using small fire size) . While the fire spread along uncertified safety nets and non-FR safety nets, it was observed that small fires propagating on the safety nets and flaming droplets from the safety nets first ignited the nylon strips used for knotting. The fire then spread to the toe-boards and wooden planks, but the bamboo remained largely unaffected.
(11)	The non-FR safety nets demonstrated a higher peak HRR and reached its peak more quickly compared to the FR safety nets . Additionally, temperatures were considerably higher in the test with non-FR safety nets than in the test with the FR safety nets.
(14a, b)	In the two comparisons among safety nets, safety nets collected from Wang Chi House showed a faster spread than the Sample 2 (FR) and Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets. In both cases, safety nets collected from Wang Chi House were all consumed. The results suggest that the Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets are very likely lacking fire-retardant properties. In the comparison among canvas, non-FR canvas showed a faster fire spread than FR canvas . In the case of non-FR canvas, most of the non-FR canvas was consumed. It indicated that the risk of fire spread along any location with the presence of non-FR canvas is increased.
(15)	Small fires consistently propagated along the surface of non-FR safety nets, uncertified safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House , leading to the formation of flaming droplets . These flaming droplets dripped onto adjacent areas, igniting readily ignitable materials such as nylon strips.

- The ignition of these materials caused the fire to spread further to nearby combustibles, such as wooden planks and toe-boards, significantly escalating its intensity and propagation.
- (16) Tests demonstrated that FR materials effectively reduce fire severity and limit fire spread to adjacent areas.
- In contrast, suspected non-FR materials, such as non-FR canvases and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, promote fire spread through secondary ignition, involving more combustibles and increasing total heat release. However, the damage remains limited.
- The fire spread along the safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, causing the canvases on 3/F of the scaffolding setup to catch fire and subsequently spreading the fire along the floor horizontally. The flaming droplets from 3/F caused the combustible materials on 2/F to catch fire. Eventually, the fire made the whole bamboo scaffolding collapse.
- The non-FR canvas accelerated the fire growth, transforming limited and localized fires into a widespread and intense blaze. The resulting excessive heat release was sufficient to ignite bamboo sticks, significantly increasing the HRR.
- (18) The simulation results demonstrated significant differences in fire development across the three cases. The use of FR safety nets showed that the fire could not sustain itself, with no rapid fire spread having occurred. In contrast, the use of non-FR safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House resulted in significant fire spread and more severe fire development.

Staircase Openings Related Key Observations

- (5) Fire and smoke could infiltrate the escape staircase through the gaps and holes in the movable boards, even before they were completely burned out. Such infiltration would make the use of staircase for evacuation impractical in the actual fire scene.
- (13) The test results indicate that both the wooden board and aluminium composite panel are unsuitable for protecting the staircase openings. These materials fail to provide adequate protection, unlike the fire-rated glass window, which remained intact and maintained lower temperatures, ensuring a safer environment for evacuation.
- (17) The tests further reinforce that fire-rated glass windows effectively maintained significant temperature reductions and prevented the entry of smoke into staircases in the actual fire scene, ensuring safe evacuation remained a viable option.

Polystyrene Window Covers Related Key Observations

(12)	Although the total heat release from polystyrene window covers was minimal due to their small mass, they significantly promoted fire spread to other combustibles and subsequent fire development due to their ease of ignition and production of burning droplets. Additionally, these covers released toxic smoke, further increasing fire hazards.
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Fire Development Related Key Observations

(2)	The results indicate that when the fire size is sufficiently large, all combustible materials within the re-entrant are likely to be consumed by the fire, irrespective of whether FR, non-FR or uncertified safety net are used.
(4)	The results indicated that the re-entrant configuration increased the peak HRR to slightly over 3 MW, compared to about 1 MW in the open configuration. Furthermore, the HRR growth rate was significantly faster in the re-entrant configuration.
(6)	The HRR provided a quantified measurement of fire severity. During the test, the HRR growth was initially gradual, with relatively slow fire development observed during the first 30 min. However, after this period, the HRR increased dramatically in a few minutes and peaked at 29 MW.
(7)	The dramatic increase in HRR within a few minutes was accompanied by a significant rise in temperatures, from around 200°C to more than 1,000 °C.
(8)	Both the foyer and kitchen window groups were exposed to extreme external heat fluxes, peaking at over 100 kW/m ² and reached the radiative ignition thresholds of 20 kW/m ² between approximately 31 and 34 min. At these levels, the piloted or spontaneous ignition of combustibles is likely to occur.
(9)	The breaking of the foyer and kitchen windows allowed fire and hot smoke to enter the premises from the building exterior. This enabled naked flames and hot smoke from the re-entrant to ignite combustible materials inside the premises. Notably, the time taken for the windows of the re-entrant to be broken by fire coincided with that for the combustibles inside units to be ignited by radiant heat. As such, the possibility of piloted or spontaneous ignitions are both highly plausible.

4 Fire Development Fundamentals and Mechanisms

4.1 Purpose

- 4.1.1 This section summarizes how the experimental results correspond with the observed conditions as the fire scene in Wang Fuk Court, for the purpose of evaluating the fundamentals and understanding of the fire development with observations from the full-scale fire tests.
- 4.1.2 To achieve a comprehensive understanding of the fire phenomenon, including (i) rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant, (ii) secondary ignition of the building's combustible envelop, and (iii) fire spread into the flats, a series of full-scale fire test was conducted to replicate the various conditions assumed to have occurred during the actual incident. The tests provided not only qualitative, visual insight into the fire development, but also quantitative data for scientific analysis. Based on these results, a reasonable qualitative comparison between the fire tests and the fire scene could be made. The key findings are presented in the following paragraphs.

4.2 Rapid Vertical Fire Spread

- 4.2.1 From available source of information, a rapid vertical fire spread was firstly observed in the east re-entrant of Wang Cheong House, where the blaze consumed the entire re-entrant and spread across 31 levels in a few minutes.
- 4.2.2 With reference to the investigation result in the PER, it was considered that the high density of materials, such as bamboo, toe-boards, wooden planks, safety nets, and nylon strips, provided a continuous fuel source at the re-entrant that sustained the fire.
- 4.2.3 The confined geometry of the re-entrants intensified the situation by restricting heat dissipation. This confinement led to the accumulation of heat, creating conditions favorable for the uncontrollable vertical fire spread observed in multiple re-entrants in Wang Fuk Court.
- 4.2.4 To provide detail understanding of the fire development, a series of full-scale fire tests was conducted. These tests were designed to evaluate the role of the re-entrant's confined geometry and assess whether the combination of combustibles within the re-

entrants was sufficient to induce such rapid and widespread fire behaviour.

Impact of the Confined Geometry of Re-Entrants

- 4.2.5 As discussed in Section 2.5, a HRR Study of Re-Entrant Configuration was conducted, and as illustrated in Fig. 4-1, the re-entrant configuration was found to significantly increase the fire size. Tests utilizing wooden cribs within the re-entrant configuration demonstrated a notably higher peak HRR compared to tests conducted without the re-entrant configuration.




Fig. 4-1: HRR Comparison for Tests with and without the Re-entrant Configuration

Fire Severity from Identified Combustible Materials

- 4.2.6 To evaluate the impact of the significant accumulation of combustibles identified in the re-entrant area (i.e. bamboo, safety nets, toe-boards and wooden planks), a Fire Severity Analysis, as detailed in Section 2.6, was conducted.
- 4.2.7 Results showed that even with only the identified materials included, the fire exhibited extreme severity, as shown in Photo 4-1. The peak HRR reached 29 MW for a 3-storey setup, equivalent to the peak fire HRR of a bus or heavy goods vehicle in a tunnel fire. In a realistic scenario, with re-entrants spanning 31 storeys and containing additional combustibles (i.e. canvas, polystyrene window covers and backing papers of mosaic tiles), the fire severity could escalate dramatically.



Photo 4-1: Fire Severity Analysis Showing Extreme Fire Severity

Comparison of fire developments from Wang Cheong House footage and experiment Test 13

- 4.2.8 The fire spread occurrence observed in Test 13 (with safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and non-FR canvas) and that observed in the Wang Cheong House fire scene are compared in Photo 4-2 and Photo 4-3. The figures in Photo 4-2 show the fire

development from the incipient stage to the rapid vertical spread stage. The stages in the Wang Cheong House fire scene and the Test 13 experiment were compared side-by-side in Photos 4-3. The comparison shows that the two fire developments are visually comparable to each other. **Such observations from fire experiments confirm the fundamentals and detailed understandings of the actual fire development on site to be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.**




Photo 4-2: Comparison of fire developments from Wang Cheong House footage and experiment Test 13 at different time snapshots.

Re-entrant of Test 13



Time: 61 min



Time: 66 min (5 min afterwards)



Time: 69 min (8 min afterwards)

Re-entrant of Wang Cheong House



Time: about 1450 hours




Time: about 1455 hours (5 min afterwards)



Time: about 1458 hours (8 min afterwards)



Time: 70 min (9 min afterwards)



Time: about 1459 hours (9 min afterwards)

Photo 4-3: Comparison of fire developments from Wang Cheong House footage and Test 13 in different fire development stages.

- 4.2.9 In the full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan, the materials within the re-entrant area were carefully documented before and after the tests. Results showed that nearly all combustibles in the re-entrant were fully consumed by the fire, except for some bamboo and wooden cribs (the fire source), if the fire size was large enough in the fire incident.
- 4.2.10 When using small fire sizes, no bamboo was ignited, regardless of whether uncertified safety nets, FR safety nets, or non-FR safety nets were used. It was observed that small fires on FR safety nets would self-extinguish and fail to propagate significantly. Fire spread primarily occurred along uncertified, non-FR safety nets and nets collected from Wang Chi House, where propagating small fires and flaming droplets first ignited the nylon strips, then in turn, led to the ignition of the toe-boards and wooden planks, while the bamboo remained unaffected.
- 4.2.11 Tests 12 and 13, which used canvas (with and without FR properties) together with safety net samples collected from Wang Chi House, further demonstrated bamboo's resistance under small fire conditions. In Test 12, the presence of suspected non-FR materials, such as safety nets collected from Wang Chi House, worsened the situation by promoting secondary ignition. This increased the involvement of combustibles and the total heat release, though the bamboo itself did not ignite in the test.

- 4.2.12 In Test 13, when safety nets collected from Wang Chi House was combined with non-FR canvas, the fire grew rapidly, producing excessive heat sufficient to ignite bamboo sticks and causing a significant spike in HRR, as shown in Photo 4-2.
- 4.2.13 The above tests also highlighted the critical role of non-FR canvas in accelerating fire growth, transforming limited and localized fires into a widespread and intense blaze across 31 levels.
- 4.2.14 According to the IFITF, the fire is believed to have been caused by a glowing source, such as a lit cigarette end, which ignited combustible materials, such as carton paper boxes, at the point of origin. Initially, the fire would have been small. However, due to the accumulation of ignitable waste and other combustibles in the area, the fire grew steadily and eventually became large enough to develop into a fully developed fire as observed in the Fire Severity Analysis and ultimately engulfing the entire re-entrant.
- 4.2.15 However, Test 13 of the full-scale fire test in Sichuan also demonstrated that the combined effect of the safety nets collected from Wang Chi House and non-FR canvas transformed a relatively small fire into a rapid fire spread along the re-entrant. Both scenarios remain possible as contributors to the rapid spread and development of the fire in the re-entrant.

4.3 Secondary Ignitions

- 4.3.1 The secondary ignition of the building's combustible envelop could be attributable to factors such as the use of uncertified or non-FR safety nets, wind-carried embers, falling debris, fire droplets and unfavorable weather conditions.
- 4.3.2 The fire tests indicated that Sample 1 (Uncertified) safety nets, Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets, and Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets sustained small fire propagation, which together with the generation of flaming droplets from these materials, in turn ignite readily flammable scaffolding components, such as nylon strips, toe-boards, and wooden planks.
- 4.3.3 This secondary ignition phenomenon was not the case in fire tests involving FR safety nets, as the fires typically self-extinguish once the external heat source was removed.

It demonstrated that the FR properties of safety nets significantly reduce the risks of secondary ignition and therefore prevent fire propagation in small fires.


- 4.3.4 It was observed that large quantities of construction materials and miscellaneous articles were stored on the ground floors around buildings. These accumulations increased significantly the risk of secondary ignitions, intensifying the severity and spread of the fire.

Wind-carried embers

- 4.3.5 The fire spread at Wang Fuk Court was extensive involving seven residential blocks and causing serious damage. Wind-carried embers, falling debris, and fire droplets ignited surrounding combustible materials, significantly contributing to the fire's propagation. During this process, flames from the re-entrant were observed rising higher than the building itself, as shown in Photos 4-4 (a) & (b). These intense flames carried embers to great heights, allowing them to follow the wind flow and travel considerable distances before falling, as shown in Fig. 4-2.



(a)



(b)

Photos 4-4 (a) & (b): Flames from the Re-entrant Observed Rising Higher than the Building at Wang Cheong House & Wang Tao House




Fig. 4-2: Wind Vector Contour (120m – above building) with Rapid Fire Spread along Re-entrants Marked

Falling debris

- 4.3.6 The test setup involved bamboo scaffolding, where bamboo poles were secured with nylon strips and numerous combustible materials were placed on or attached to the building envelope. From the fire tests, it was observed that fire damage to the bamboo and nylon strips resulted in a loss of stability of the scaffolding structure, as shown in Photo 4-6. When the fire spread caused severe damage to the bamboo scaffolding and nylon strips, burning components and other combustibles fell to the lower or ground level (as shown in Photo 4-7), further intensifying the fire spread.



Photo 4-6: Collapsed Burning Bamboo from the Damaged Bamboo Scaffolding in Fire Test




Photo 4-7: Collapsed Burning Debris from the Damaged Bamboo Scaffolding

Flaming droplets

- 4.3.7 The phenomenon of flaming droplets dripping from burning plastic materials is widely observed in building fires, particularly in cable and façade fires. These hot, molten, flame-bearing droplets can fall onto other combustible materials, initiating secondary fires and posing a significant fire hazard.
- 4.3.8 This phenomenon could be observed at the initial stages of the Wang Fuk Court fire incident as shown in Photos 4-7 (a) & (b).
- 4.3.9 According to the test results from GL⁶⁰, the burning of safety nets, foam boards and toe-boards demonstrated the formation of fire droplets. In the fire test in paragraph 2.11.5, the significant fire hazard associated with foam board materials (polystyrene window covers) was demonstrated and their potential risk contributing to rapid fire spread was also validated.
- 4.3.10 In addition to ignition sources, the presence of combustible materials significantly influenced the fire development. Surrounded by combustible envelopes, including bamboo, toe-boards, wooden planks, safety nets, canvas, nylon strips, and even miscellaneous waste from the works, the buildings in Wang Fuk Court possessed an abundant fuel source, sustaining and intensifying the fire, as shown in Photos 4-7 (c) to (f).

⁶⁰ Examination reports from GL at Appendices A-3-2 to A-3-4 & A-3-6 to A-3-9 of the Final Investigation Report refer.



Photos 4-7 (a) & (b): Fire droplets Dripping from Burning Materials
Observed During the Initial Stage of Fire



Photos 4-7 (c): Combustible materials on the External Scaffolding



(d)



(e)



(f)

Photos 4-7 (d) to (f): Combustible Envelope Burning in Fire Development

TTI Considerations

4.3.11 The concept of TTI was preliminarily discussed in Section 2.12.19, providing a quantitative indicator for assessing the ignitability of combustible materials.

Procured Materials for Fire Tests	TTI (s)
Uncertified Safety Nets (4 Layers)	46
Uncertified Safety Nets (2 Layers)	50
FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)	76
FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)	86
Non-FR Safety Nets (4 Layers)	48
Non-FR Safety Nets (2 Layers)	52
Toe-Board	42
Polystyrene Window Cover	31
Carton Box	11

Sample Collected from Wang Chi House	TTI (Range)
Toe-Board	19s (18s -20s)
Safety Nets (4 Layers) ⁶¹	48s (30s - 60s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers) ⁶²	49s (27s - 72s)
Polystyrene Window Cover	67s
Bamboo	116s

4.3.12 In addition to Wang Chi House, samples were collected from Wang Yan House to provide a more holistic view of the TTI data, which showed consistent results.

⁶¹ Two samples were collected from high level and low level of Wang Chi House with TTI ranging from 30s to 60s giving an average of 47.75s.

⁶² Two samples were collected from high level and low level of Wang Chi House with TTI ranging from 27s to 72s giving an average of 49.4s.

Sample collected from Wang Yan House	TTI (Range)
Toe-Board	19s (16s – 21s)
Nylon Strips	36s
Safety Nets (4 Layers) ⁶³	44s (24s – 96s)
Safety Nets (2 Layers) ⁶⁴	49s (27s – 78s)
Polystyrene Window Cover	60s
Wooden Plank ⁶⁵	65s (58s – 79s)
Bamboo ⁶⁶	112s (89s – 143s)

4.3.13 The materials listed above are generally categorized into three classes based on their TTI values:

(a) **Easily Ignitable Materials (TTI < 40 seconds):**

- Carton box: fastest to ignite, with a TTI as low as 11 seconds.
- Toe-boards from Wang Chi House and Wang Yan House: with the averaged TTI value as low as 19s.
- Nylon strips: with a TTI of 36s.
- Polystyrene window covers procured for the fire tests: with a TTI of 31s.

(b) **Moderately Ignitable Materials (40 seconds ≤ TTI ≤ 75 seconds):**

- Polystyrene window covers collected from Wang Chi House and Wang Yan House: with TTI of 67s and 60s, respectively.
- Uncertified safety nets and non-FR safety nets: with TTI ranging from 46s to 52s.
- Safety nets from Wang Fuk Court: with averaged TTI ranging from 44s to 49s.

(c) **Delayed Ignitable Materials (TTI > 75 seconds):**

- These materials, such as safety nets with FR properties and bamboo stick, exhibit greater resistance to ignition, requiring prolonged exposure to high heat.

4.3.14 The above findings align with observations made during full-scale fire tests conducted in Sichuan. During the tests, it was observed that even as the fire in the re-entrant began

⁶³ Six samples were collected from the Roof, outside Flat 303, Flat 1201, and Flat 1203 of Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 24s to 96s giving an average of 44s.

⁶⁴ Six samples are collected from the Roof, outside Flat 303, Flat 1201, and Flat 1203 of Wang Yan House with TTI ranged from 27s to 78s giving an average of 49s.

⁶⁵ Two different thickness of wooden plank (from 1st floor and scaffolding, with thickness of 15mm and 8mm, respectively) from Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 58s to 79s giving an average of 65s.

⁶⁶ Three sections of bamboo with different diameters (from unit 303 and roof, with thickness of 6mm to 16mm) from Wang Yan House with TTI ranging from 89s to 143s giving an average of 112s.


to decay, wind-carried embers, falling debris, and fire droplets continued to ignite safety nets without FR properties, uncertified safety nets and safety nets collected from Wang Chi House.

- 4.3.15 The fire propagated along the safety nets until it encountered suitable combustibles, such as nylon strips. The ignited strips subsequently set fire to other materials, including toe-boards and wooden planks, further developing and sustaining the fire, as shown in Photos 4-8 (a) to (d).
- 4.3.16 During the post-fire visit, it was further observed that wind-carried embers, falling debris, and fire droplets not only spread to the combustible envelope but also ignited combustibles and construction materials scattered on the ground floor level. This contributed to the fire's further spread and exacerbated the damage, as shown in Photos 4-9 (a) to (h).



(a)

Photo 4-8 (a): Small Fire Propagated along the Safety Net



(b)

Photo 4-8 (b): Nylon Strips Alight



(c)



(d)

Photos 4-8 (c) & (d): Other Combustibles (Toe-Boards and Wooden Planks) Alight



Photo 4-9 (a):
Post-Fire Condition outside the East Re-entrant of Wang
Cheong House



Photo 4-9 (b):
Observed Fire Spread



Photo 4-9 (c): Post-Fire Condition outside the
East Re-entrant of Wang Cheong House




Photo 4-9 (d):
Post-Fire Condition outside the West Re-entrant of
Wang Cheong House



Photo 4-9 (e):
Observed Fire Spread




Photo 4-9 (f):
Post-Fire Condition outside the East Re-entrant of Wang
Tai House Facing Wang Cheong House



Photo 4-9 (g):
Observed Fire Spread



Photo 4-9 (h): Post-Fire Condition outside the North Re-entrant of Wang Cheong House

Unfavourable Weather Condition

4.3.17 When discussing secondary ignition, weather conditions significantly influence fire behaviour and the rate of spread. Dry weather and windy conditions are particularly impactful factors that intensify the risk and severity of secondary ignitions.

4.3.18 **Dry weather** significantly reduces the moisture content in materials, making them vulnerable to ignition. Combustible items dry out quickly in such conditions, lowering their ignition threshold. As a result, even small embers or flaming droplets can easily ignite these materials, enabling fire to spread rapidly. Additionally, dry conditions favor smouldering fires, as reduced moisture allows embers to persist and smoulder in materials for longer periods, potentially reigniting and sustaining the fire over time.

4.3.19 **Windy conditions** can drive the spread embers over greater distances. In cases of secondary ignition, wind carries these burning materials to areas far from the original fire source, where they can ignite other combustibles, such as scaffolding materials or construction debris. Furthermore, strong winds supply additional oxygen to the fire, intensifying its heat and accelerating its spread.

4.3.20 The combination of dry and windy weather exacerbates conditions favorable for secondary ignition. Winds-carried embers and falling debris can travel long distances, igniting combustibles and enabling fires to develop quickly in new areas. Such weather conditions amplify the potential for fires to spread uncontrollably, particularly in area where abundant fuel sources were present.

4.4 Conclusion on the Mode of Fire Spread

4.4.1 There had been three **dominant** modes of fire spread in the Wang Fuk Court fire identified:

- Rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant,
- Fire spread into units through broken or open Windows, and
- Secondary ignition of the building's combustible envelope by embers, flaming droplets, and falling debris.

4.4.2 After an extensive review of evidence and performance of full-scale fire tests in Sichuan, these dominant modes of fire spread were confirmed, with minor refinements added to ensure completeness.

4.5 Key Additional Observations:

Fire Spread into Units

- 4.5.1 Evidence indicated that openings such as broken or open windows, exhaust fans, and air conditioners significantly contributed to the spread of fire into the building's interior. Fire tests in Sichuan further demonstrated the possibility of fire spreading via radiation ignition.

Ground-Level Ignition

- 4.5.2 In addition to the building's combustible envelope, wind-carried embers, flaming droplets and falling debris also ignited scattered construction materials at the ground level, further intensifying the fire and its damage.

Extensive Fire Spread and Multi-unit Involvement

- 4.5.3 Within a two-hour period, 11 instances of rapid vertical fire spread were observed at various re-entrants across multiple buildings.⁶⁷ The fire spread through these re-entrants, igniting adjacent units and escalating the initial building fire into multiple simultaneous outbreaks across numerous indoor units. It is conservatively estimated that more than 470 units were affected by fire within the two-hour timeframe. The extensive spread severely impeded firefighting operations and rescue efforts, presenting extreme challenges in containment and suppression.

4.6 Interconnected Modes Promoting Fire Progression:

- 4.6.1 The three modes of fire spread amplified and promoted the fire's development through interconnected mechanisms:

1. Rapid Vertical Fire Spread along the Re-entrant:

This allowed the fire to spread simultaneously across 31 levels. The intense flames and heat generated in the re-entrant drove the rapid vertical progression of the fire.

2. Façade Fire Transforming into Interior Fires:

⁶⁷ The rapid fire spread along the re-entrant of Wang Yan House was noted at about 1830 hours.

Façade fires transitioned into interior fires through broken or open windows, exhaust fans and other openings, or in some cases, through radiation ignition. Once inside a unit, the fire grew in intensity and could ignite previously unaffected façade through openings and windows of affected unit, further spreading the fire.

3. **Secondary Ignition via Embers, Flaming Droplets, and Falling Debris:**

As the fire intensified, burning fragments ignited combustibles on façade, at the ground level, or in nearby areas. Notably, the rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant was intense enough to lift relatively lightweight burning fragments over the top of the building, allowing them to drift considerable distances with the wind. Additionally, such spread propelled burning debris into surrounding areas, sparking new fires. When these secondary ignitions occurred within nearby re-entrants, they had the potential to initiate a new cycle of fire development. This, in turn, led to the rapid vertical fire spread along another re-entrant, perpetuating the fire's growth and destruction.

- 4.6.2 These interconnected mechanisms collectively accounted for 12 instances of rapid vertical fire spread along the re-entrant across 6 buildings in Wang Fuk Court. The interconnection between vertical fire spread, internal fire propagation, and secondary ignitions demonstrated how the fire evolved rapidly, creating a self-reinforcing cycle that made containment significantly more difficult.

5 Declarations

- 5.1 I understand that my duty in providing written reports and giving evidence is to help the Committee, impartially and independently on matters relevant to my area of expertise, and that this paramount duty to the Committee overrides any obligation to the party by whom I am engaged or the person who has paid or is liable to pay me. I confirm that I have complied and will continue to comply with my duty.
- 5.2 I confirm that I have not entered into any arrangement where the amount or payment of my fees is in any way dependent on the outcome of the case.
- 5.3 I know of no conflict of interest of any kind, other than any which I have disclosed in this report. I will advise the party by whom I am instructed if, between the date hereof and the trial, there is any change in circumstances which affect my declaration herein.
- 5.4 I am not an advocate for a party.
- 5.5 I have exercised reasonable care and skill in order to be accurate and complete in giving my opinion in this report. I have shown the sources of all information I have considered and relied on. I have endeavored to include all those matters, of which I have knowledge or have been made aware, that might adversely affect the validity of my opinion. I have clearly stated my qualifications to my opinion.
- 5.6 I have not, without forming an independent view, included or excluded anything which has been suggested to me by others, including my instructing lawyers.
- 5.7 I will notify those instructing me immediately and confirm in writing if, for any reason, my existing report requires any correction or qualification.
- 5.8 I understand that:-
 - 5.8.1 This report will form the evidence to be given under oath or affirmation;
 - 5.8.2 Questions may be put to me in writing for the purposes of clarifying my opinion in this report and that my answers shall be treated as part of my report and covered by my statement of truth;
 - 5.8.3 The Committee may at any stage direct a discussion to take place between experts for the purpose of identifying and discussing the expert issues in the inquiry, where possible reaching an agreed opinion on those issues and identifying what action, if any, may be taken to resolve any of the outstanding issues between the parties;
 - 5.8.4 The Committee may direct that following a discussion between the experts that a statement should be prepared showing those issues which are agreed, and those


issues which are not agreed, together with a summary of the reasons for disagreeing;

- 5.8.5 I may be required to attend the inquiry to be cross-examined on this report by a cross-examiner assisted by an expert;
- 5.8.6 I am likely to be the subject of public adverse criticism if the Committee concludes that I have not taken reasonable care in trying to meet the standards set out above;
- 5.8.7 I have been read the Code of Conduct for expert witnesses set out in **Appendix D** to the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) and agree to be bound by it.

6 Statement of Truth

6.1 I confirm that the contents of this Final Expert Report are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 8th day of May 2026.



Ir Prof Richard Kwok Kit YUEN

Appendix A – Expert Report of Ir Prof Richard Yuen dated 10th February 2026

Appendix B – Report on Large-Scale Fire Experiment Base of Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, (Tests On 2026.4.11-2026.4.27)

Appendix C – Bench-Scale Fire Performance Testing of Materials from the Wang Fuk Court Fire Incident, Hong Kong (7.5.2026)

Appendix D – Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulation of the Wang Fuk Court Fire Incident (7.5.2026)

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

Expert Report of Ir Prof Richard Yuen

***BSc HK, MSc HK, PhD UNSW,
FHKEng, RPE, FHKIE, MSFPE, MIFE***

10 February 2026

1. Expert qualifications

- 1.1. I am currently the Chair Professor of Architectural Engineering of the Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong. I obtained my first degree in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Hong Kong in 1981 and PhD from the School of Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, University of New South Wales, Australia in 1998. I joined City Polytechnic of Hong Kong in 1988 as a Laboratory Officer and became Senior Lecturer in the Department of Building and Construction in 1990. I was the Head, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering in 2018-2019 and the Acting Director of Communications and Public Relations Office in 2019, City University of Hong Kong. I was also the Chief of Staff (Vice-President), from December 2019 till May 2023.
- 1.2. I am a Registered Professional Engineer and members of the Institution of Fire Engineers (UK), Society of Fire Protection Engineers (USA) and Hong Kong Institution of Engineers (HK). My research expertise includes fire safety and engineering, pyrolysis and combustion, applications of computational fluid dynamics (“**CFD**”), fire retardant materials, neural network modelling applications in fire engineering, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (“**HVAC**”) and control engineering. I have been extremely active in research and have over 300 publications including international journal articles, conference papers and book chapters and have been listed among the top 2% of the most cited scientists in the world (career-long), according to Stanford University consecutively in 2022, 2023 and 2024. I have been engaged in research consultancies with industries and served actively in professional institutions. I am also the Founding Member of the Disciplinary Advisory Panel of Fire Discipline of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers and I have been the Technical Advisor of

Institution of Fire Engineers (HK Branch) since 2021. I have been appointed as a member of the Working Group on Fire Engineering Approach in Buildings Department of the Government of Hong Kong, in 1996; Member on the Examination Committee and Examination Board for Registration of Lift and Escalator Engineers, under the Lifts and Escalators (Safety) Ordinance (Cap. 327), since 1999; Board Member of the Gas Safety Appeal Board; Member of Fire Safety Standards Advisory Group of the Government of the Hong Kong SAR (“**HKSAR Government**”), since 2003; and Member of the Appeal Board Panel under Builders’ Lifts and Tower Working Platforms (Safety) Ordinance (Cap. 470), since 2006. I have provided expert opinions including as an expert witness in court in the areas of fire services systems, fire safety engineering, lift systems, HVAC equipment, building services systems and components. Since 2021, I have been serving as a Member of Fire Services Training Advisory Committee, Fire and Ambulance Services Academy (“**FASA**”) of Fire Services Department of the HKSAR Government. In September 2025, I have been conferred the Fellow of Hong Kong Academy of Engineering in recognition of my contributions in engineering and academic research and my achievements in engineering. A Curriculum Vitae which summarizes my relevant academic record and experience is attached in **Annex A**.

- 1.3. I have taken part in the post-fire investigations for the No. 4 Alarm Fire at the Amoycan Industrial Centre in 2016 as a university specialist member and later as an expert witness in the Coroner’s Court for this fire incident.

2. Appointment as Expert

- 2.1. I was approached by the Fire Services Department (“**FSD**”) of the

HKSAR Government on 28 November 2025.

2.2. I was appointed as an expert in fire engineering aspect in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po between 26 and 28 November 2025 to perform studies for providing an understanding of the following aspects of the said fire incident and to give expert opinion on a number of technical issues arising from the studies:-

2.2.1. Pyrolysis characteristics of key combustibles involved in the fire incident;

2.2.2. Mechanism of the rapid development of the fire at the possible origin of fire (i.e. platform outside units 104 and 105 at Wang Cheong House);

2.2.3. Comparison of various scenarios with different combinations of flame retardant safety net or non-flame retardant safety net; presence or absence of foam board, etc; and

2.2.4. Numerical simulations of rapid vertical spread of fire at Wang Cheong House (in progress and to be submitted at a later stage).

2.3. The need for expert opinion arose from the rapid fire development within the re-entrants of various blocks of Wang Fuk Court during the fire incident.

2.4. Following the fire at Wang Fuk Court, FSD was tasked to lead the Inter-departmental Fire Investigation Task Force (“**IFITF**”) with the following investigative objectives: (i) to investigate the cause of the fire and how it spread; and (ii) to determine the factors that led to heavy casualties. I was approached to take part in the fire tests in Sichuan and to perform numerical simulation by Computational Fluid Dynamics (“**CFD**”) fire simulation for the purpose of preparing test reports for IFITF’s consideration. For these purposes, I conducted a visit on the site

first time on 28 November 2025 to study the fire scene at Wang Fuk Court. I conducted another site visit at Wang Fuk Court on 10 December 2025 to collect onsite materials samples with the assistance and supervision of the FSD and Hong Kong Police Force and to study the configuration of the re-entrant and the burnt out units in Wang Fuk Court.

- 2.5. In parallel, I understand that an Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court was also established by the HKSAR Government, and that FSD has been requested to address specific questions (“**Questions**”) set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the FSD dated 23 December 2025 (“**23 December Letter**”), including Question 5.1 of the 23 December Letter in relation to the rapid fire spread.
- 2.6. I prepare this Expert Report to adduce the test report from the Sichuan fire tests at **Annex B** and to summarise my findings and conclusions therein. The Expert Report will also set out my comments on the fire behaviour contributing to the rapid fire spread and the mechanisms by which the fire penetrated domestic units which will also assist FSD in addressing Question 5.1 of the 23 December Letter as shown below.

- B. Cause of the fire, its rapid spread and reasons for the significant number of casualties
4. The fire has caused unprecedented number of losses of life and injuries. At the time of writing, there are 161 confirmed deaths and 79 injuries, 6 persons remain unaccounted for or missing.
5. According to your experience and expertise, describe and explain:
- 5.1. the cause of the fire, and the reasons why the fire had spread extensively, at such a rapid speed and lasted for so long; and
- 5.2. the cause of the heavy casualties at Wang Fuk Court, including the cause of deaths and injuries.

Question 5.1 as extracted from the 23 December Letter

2.7. For the purpose of preparing this Expert Report, I have been provided with information and discussions at meetings of IFITF namely the IFITF's Terms of Reference, building plans of Wang Fuk Court, and evidence of the fire incident including photos and video footages of the fire and sample materials collected onsite.

3. Summary of Bench-scale test in Hong Kong

3.1. The bench-scale fire test is a laboratory test which aims to quantify the fire performance of commonly found/on-site materials (e.g. their thermal stability, ignition, burn duration, heat release and smoke production) to provide scientific evidence for their behaviour and contribution towards the rapid fire spread during a fire incident. Samples were collected from Wang Fuk Court. Thermogravimetric Analysis (“TGA”) and Cone Calorimeter Test were adopted to conduct the bench-scale test.

3.2. All the onsite material samples were collected from different floor locations in Wang Yan House (Block A) of Wang Fuk Court. The collected materials consist of (i) six different texture and colour safety net samples collected from various floors of Wang Yan House, (ii) white coloured foamboard, (iii) orange coloured toe board, (iv) two different thickness of plywood, and (v) three sections of bamboo with different diameter.

3.3. TGA is a technique that measures the change in mass of a sample under incremental temperature increases to evaluate the thermal decomposition rate and stability of the material. TGA tests were performed on a PerkinElmer STA 6000 thermogravimetry instrument, with sample masses of approximately $5\text{ mg} \pm 1\text{ mg}$ and for three heating rates (5, 10 and $20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C/min}$) from $20\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ to $800\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ under a nitrogen

environment. Apart from the white foamboard, all the other material samples were prepared by grinding into powder form before the TGA testing. It is the requirement of the TGA machine that the material sample to be tested should be prepared in powder form.

3.4. The cone calorimeter is a fire-testing instrument used to evaluate the flammability and fire performance of materials by measuring key parameters such as heat release rate (“**HRR**”), time to ignition, burn duration and smoke production under controlled radiant heat exposure. Cone calorimeter tests were carried out with the cone calorimeter apparatus (FTT, UK) according to ISO 5660 standards, which is the standard governing the determination of heat release rate by cone calorimeter method. For fitting into a standard sample holder, all samples were cut to 100 mm × 100 mm, then wrapped in aluminium foil with the upper surface exposed. It is a standard sample preparation for the cone test. For the safety net sample tests, due to the significant material shrinkage undergone by the net samples when they are placed under a radiant heat flux, the test results will vary significantly depending on how and at which direction the net samples shrink and deform. Therefore, wired mesh was placed on top of the samples to control the material shrinkage. These measures enhanced the consistency of the test results. For the bamboo, the circular sections were sliced into 4 approximately equal pieces and placed horizontally onto the sample holder.

3.5. TGA test results show that the bamboo and plywood samples (i.e. cellulosic materials) exhibit lower thermal stability than the other polymeric materials (i.e. foamboard, toe board, safety net). While cellulosic materials begin losing significant mass at lower temperatures, their slower mass loss rate and charring behaviour may better limit the release of combustible volatiles than the polymers; in principle,

cellulosic materials may therefore play a less critical role in ignition and fire spread than polymeric materials. Also, it was found that the samples of safety net collected from different levels of Wang Yan House showed minor variations in fire performance.

3.6. Cone calorimeter test results show that the white foamboard indicated intense burning and high smoke hazard once ignited. The toe board showed very rapid ignition and strong contribution to early fire growth. Both foamboard and toe board also showed extremely rapid melting and deformation during testing, further increasing their flammability concern under real fire conditions. A comparison was conducted to assess the comparability of fire behaviour between the replicated experiment and the actual fire incident. The fire behaviour of bamboo recovered from the scene was closely comparable to that of the Sichuan material samples. The foamboard recovered from the scene demonstrated substantially more severe fire behaviour than the Sichuan reference material. The toe board from the scene ignited much more rapidly but exhibited lower total heat release, shorter burn duration and substantially reduced smoke production compared with the Sichuan toe board. The plywood recovered from the scene exhibited a lower peak heat release rate than the Sichuan reference material. On the other hand, the effective heat of combustion values for most materials showed good consistency between the scene and Sichuan samples.

3.7. In the cone calorimeter test, the safety nets collected from the scene showed combustion performance that aligned closely with the non-flame-retardant (“**non-FR**”) safety nets evaluated in Sichuan. The safety nets recovered from the scene exhibited fire performance characteristics that were broadly similar to the non-FR safety nets tested in Sichuan and nearly identical effective heat of combustion values. In contrast, the flame-retardant (“**FR**”) safety nets from Sichuan exhibited distinctly

improved ignition resistance, as anticipated from materials designed with fire-retardant treatments.

- 3.8. The Sichuan experiment included safety nets explicitly specified as FR and non-FR. In the cone calorimeter test, FR nets showed significantly longer time to ignite compared to non-FR nets. FR nets generally released more total heat and burned longer.¹ FR nets produced more smoke than non-FR nets. The scene-collected safety nets exhibited ignition and heat release behaviour more similar to the non-FR Sichuan nets than the FR ones.

4. Full-scale Fire Tests

- 4.1. Full-scale fire tests were carried out with the aims of comparing the burning performances of different combinations of building materials (i.e. FR safety net, non-FR safety net, glass with foamboard, glass without foamboard). The tests were performed at the large-scale fire experiment located in Huangling Campus of Sichuan University of Science and Engineering (“SUSE”) covering an area of 406 acres with a construction area of approximately 130,000 square meters as shown in Fig 2.1 & 2.2 in para. 2.1.1 of Annex B. The laboratory has been accredited to CSA/ANSI C800:25 large-scale fire test by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and is authorised by the CSA Group as shown in Fig 2.3 in para. 2.1.1 of Annex B.

- 4.2. The complete test apparatus was equipped with a 5MW cone

¹ This was expected because under the cone calorimeter test, the sample is exposed to a constant heat flux that forces the material to burn until fully consumed. So, the longer burn duration of the FR safety nets can be attributed to the FR additives slowing down the burn rate but extending the burn duration. In addition, the extended burn duration and the higher total heat release are attributed to the higher density of the FR safety net (i.e. the FR safety net is significantly heavier thus has a more combustible mass).

calorimeter (5 meters long, 5 meters wide, and 10 meters high), a 20MW large-scale cone calorimeter (15 meters long, 13 meters wide, and 15.5 meters high), an infrared spectrometer and a large-scale exhaust gas treatment device as shown in Fig 2.4 and Fig 2.5 respectively in para. 2.1.2 of Annex B.

4.3. The full-scale model used in the tests was constructed based on the portion of the building with the origin of the fire ignition. Cameras were installed at different locations to monitor the fire development. Thermocouple trees each with six measurement points were arranged. In this experiment, a wood crib fire was used as the ignition source to ignite bamboo scaffolding and other combustible materials.

4.4. By measuring the rate of oxygen consumption and using the relevant HRR calculation method, the HRR curve of the wood crib fire over time was monitored in real-time.² This allows for the determination of the average and maximum power during the stable combustion phase, thereby verifying whether the ignition source can effectively ignite bamboo scaffolding and other combustible materials. This provides data support for controlling the ignition timing in the formal experiment.

4.5. The main materials for fire tests included bamboo, FR safety nets, and non-FR safety nets, wood panel, toe board and foam boards, etc. The construction of the bamboo scaffolding strictly adhered to the relevant practices in Hong Kong.

4.6. There were totally seven tests, including one trial test and six fire test scenarios, with quantity and arrangement of the bamboo scaffolding in the full-scale model closely matching those onsite of Wang Fuk Court

² HRR indicates the heat release per unit time from the burning test.

(see Table 2.1 in para. 2.2.2 of Annex B). The quantity and distribution of bamboo were consistent in each scenario. Four layers of scaffolding were considered for the Trial Test on 11 January 2026 and two layers of scaffolding were studied for the Test No. 1 – 6 as shown in the Table 2.1 in para. 2.2.2 of Annex B³. The results are presented in detail in Section 2.3 of Annex B.

4.7. For the Trial Test with FR safety nets, windows-without-foam and 4 layers of horizontal bamboo, the HRR peaked at an enormously high value of 28.97 MW indicating the intense combustion phase of bamboo scaffolding and wood boards with an ever rapid escalating trend in fire intensity (see para. 2.3.1 of Annex B). To avoid damage to the testing equipment, firefighters had to spray water to extinguish the fire. Since the fire was put out by firefighters, the HRR and total heat release measurements were ceased. It should be noted that in this experiment, approximately 5kg of cardboard was placed at the unexposed sides of the kitchen windows on the first and third floors. Also, approximately 5kg of clothing was placed at the unexposed side of the window of foyers. All combustible materials were placed close to the windows and they were burned completely (see para. 2.3.1 of Annex B).

4.8. For Test No. 1 and No.2, two separate fire tests were conducted to study the flame spread behaviour of scaffolding fitted with FR safety nets or non-FR safety nets under a small fire size i.e. a lower HRR of not more than 0.5MW at the incipient stage. In contrast, for Test No. 3 and No. 4, the same parameters were set except under a fire with around 1 MW at its incipient stage. The difference in fire size was intentional and

³ As shown in para. 4.7, the heat energy created in the Trial Test was almost 30 MW which was much higher than the allowable maximum HRR of the cone calorimeter (i.e. 20 MW). In order not to damage the testing equipment, the amount of bamboo was reduced from 4 layers to 2 layers in the Test No. 1 to 6 to reduce the HRR to lower than 20 MW.

aimed at seeing the burning performances under different fire sizes.

4.9. In Test No. 1 with non-FR safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, it was noted that the fire caused ignition of the non-FR safety nets but did not ignite the bamboo scaffolding. When the fire source began to decay, localised ignition of the non-FR safety net persisted, and the material continued to support slow flame propagation (see para. 2.3.2 of Annex B).

4.10. In Test No. 2 with FR safety net, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, it was observed that, following the decay of the fire source, no persistent flaming, surface ignition, or lateral flame propagation occurred on the FR safety nets (see para. 2.3.3 of Annex B).

4.11. For Test No. 3 with non-FR safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, the HRR reached its peak at 16.10 MW and the total heat release was around 12,705 MJ (see para. 2.3.4 of Annex B).

4.12. For Test No. 4 with FR safety net, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, it was noted that the heat release rate curve as shown in Fig. 2.40 in para. 2.3.5.2 of Annex B depicted after the growth phase reached 2 peaks at around 20 minutes (approximately 10 MW) and at around 30 minutes (approximately 17 MW), respectively, with the latter peak reflecting the accelerated spread of the fire and the extensive combustion of combustible materials. The total heat release was 11,043 MJ as shown in Fig. 2.41 as shown in para. 2.3.5.2 of Annex B.

4.13. For Test No. 5 and No. 6, two separate fire tests were conducted to

study the flame spread behaviour of scaffolding fitted with FR safety nets or non-FR safety nets in the presence of foam, under a fire size of around 1 MW similar to Test No. 3 and No. 4.

4.14. For Test No. 5 with non-FR safety nets, windows-with-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, as shown in Fig. 2.50 in para. 2.3.6.2 of Annex B, the HRR exhibited a rapid increase overall with a number of peaks of approximately 8 MW, approximately 12.5 MW, approximately 14.5 MW, respectively spanning over a period of around 11 minutes. The total heat release was around 11,585 MJ.

4.15. For Test No. 6 with FR safety nets, windows-with-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo, as shown in Fig. 2.60 of para. 2.3.7.2 of Annex B, the HRR exhibited a rapid upward trend overall. There was a significant growth phase around 10 minutes and there were 3 peaks of approximately 6 MW, 13 MW and 14.5 MW at around 13, 20 and 22 minutes, respectively. The total heat release was around 11,443 MJ.

4.16. The experimental results of the 7 tests are summarised in Table 2.9 in Section 2.4 of Annex B. The Trial Test conducted on 11 January 2026 involving a four-layer bamboo scaffold resulted in a HRR that peaked at an enormously high value of 28.97 MW indicating the intense combustion phase of bamboo scaffolding and wood boards with an ever rapid escalating trend in fire intensity. Generally, the fire test with a non-FR safety net accelerated the burning process, but the peak heat release rate and the total heat energy released were almost the same as those of the FR safety net. Also, with foam boards pasted on the windows, the burning process was slightly accelerated, but the peak heat release rate and the total heat released were almost the same as those of the windows without foam.

4.17. Through the comparisons of the four tests (Test No. 3 to No. 6), it can be observed that whether using FR safety nets or non-FR safety nets, and whether windows are covered with foam or not, the peak value of HRR and the total amount of heat released are not significantly affected. **This suggests that neither the fire retardancy of the safety nets, nor the presence of foam, affect the speed of fire spread in a significant way from fire safety engineering point of view.** This is because in these tests, the major combustible materials contributing to the total fire loads (thus total heat release) were the bamboo scaffoldings, wooden planks and toe boards inside the re-entrant which were found to have been almost burnt out completely in all tests. On the other hand, the safety nets and foamboards with their relatively much lower mass as compared to the major combustible materials, contributed less to the total fire loads even though they were also burnt out inside the re-entrant.

4.18. While the fire retardancy of safety nets has an insignificant impact on the peak value of the HRR and development speed of fires, it can be clearly observed that for the fire scenarios with FR safety nets, the nets were found not easily ignitable but swollen and/or detached and hence dripped downward in pieces. Even in rare incidents that FR safety nets were ignited, once there was a discontinuation and/or lack of supply of adequate heat from the adjacent burning materials, the FR safety nets would quickly extinguish. However, for the fire scenarios with non-FR safety nets, the non-FR safety nets when ignited could continue to burn, and the fire could sustain to burn for more than an hour (see **Annex C**). It even ignites other unburnt foam, wood boards, and bamboo scaffolding. **It can be inferred that the non-FR safety nets do vastly increase the risk of fire spread given the presence of large amount of combustibles in the close vicinity in fire outbreak.**

4.19. With the exceptions of Test No. 1 and 2 where fire size was much smaller at its inception stage, in tests including the Trial Test, Test No. 3 to Test No. 6, due to the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment. **It can be inferred that the fire and smoke would enter into the escape staircase through the wired windows and plywood panel doors no matter the safety nets were FR or non-FR and no matter the windows were covered by foamboard or not.**

4.20. For fire scenarios involving the use of foam (i.e. Test No. 5 to 6), **it can be observed that the presence of foam has little impact on the speed and spread of the fire.** This is because as compared to the major combustible materials (i.e. bamboo scaffolding, wooden planks and toe boards inside the re-entrant), foamboards had relatively much lower mass and therefore contributed less to the total fire loads.

5. CFD fire simulations

5.1. In relation to the scope of the studies in para. 2.2.4 of this Expert Report, the numerical (i.e. CFD) simulations of the full-scale fire spread and development over the building where the fire originally started have been ongoing and are not yet completed at this stage when the statement is submitted.

5.2. It is aimed that CFD simulations will be completed and analysed by end of March 2026. An addendum to this Expert Report will then follow and be submitted as an integral part of this document where further

understandings shall be revealed to depict how fire spread and escalated extremely rapidly over the full height of the building facade as well as how heat and smoke penetrated in the building staircases via its windows either installed with glass or in some cases with the wooden hinged doors as found on the site.

6. Declarations

- 6.1. I understand that my duty in providing written reports and giving evidence is to help the Committee, impartially and independently on matters relevant to my area of expertise, and that this paramount duty to the Committee overrides any obligation to the party by whom I am engaged or the person who has paid or is liable to pay me. I confirm that I have complied and will continue to comply with my duty.
- 6.2. I confirm that I have not entered into any arrangement where the amount or payment of my fees is in any way dependent on the outcome of the case.
- 6.3. I know of no conflict of interest of any kind, other than any which I have disclosed in this report. I will advise the party by whom I am instructed if, between the date hereof and the trial, there is any change in circumstances which affect my declaration herein.
- 6.4. I am not an advocate for a party.
- 6.5. I have exercised reasonable care and skill in order to be accurate and complete in giving my opinion in this report. I have shown the sources of all information I have considered and relied on. I have endeavored to include all those matters, of which I have knowledge or have been made aware, that might adversely affect the validity of my opinion. I

have clearly stated my qualifications to my opinion.

6.6. I have not, without forming an independent view, included or excluded anything which has been suggested to me by others, including my instructing lawyers.

6.7. I will notify those instructing me immediately and confirm in writing if, for any reason, my existing report requires any correction or qualification.

6.8. I understand that:-

6.8.1. This report will form the evidence to be given under oath or affirmation;

6.8.2. Questions may be put to me in writing for the purposes of clarifying my opinion in this report and that my answers shall be treated as part of my report and covered by my statement of truth;

6.8.3. The Committee may at any stage direct a discussion to take place between experts for the purpose of identifying and discussing the expert issues in the inquiry, where possible reaching an agreed opinion on those issues and identifying what action, if any, may be taken to resolve any of the outstanding issues between the parties;

6.8.4. The Committee may direct that following a discussion between the experts that a statement should be prepared showing those issues which are agreed, and those issues which are not agreed, together with a summary of the reasons for disagreeing;

6.8.5. I may be required to attend the inquiry to be cross-examined on this report by a cross-examiner assisted by an expert;

6.8.6. I am likely to be the subject of public adverse criticism if the Committee concludes that I have not taken reasonable care in

trying to meet the standards set out above;

6.8.7. I have been read the Code of Conduct for expert witnesses set out in Appendix D to the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) and agree to be bound by it.

7. Statement of Truth

7.1. I confirm that the contents of this Expert Report are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 10th day of February 2026.



Ir Prof Richard Kwok Kit YUEN

Annex A – Curriculum Vitae of Ir Prof Richard Kwok Kit Yuen

Annex B – Bench-Scale Fire Test Report and Full-Scale Fire Test Report for Wang Fuk Court Fire Investigation

Annex C – Progression of Secondary Ignition

ANNEX A

CURRICULUM VITAE OF IR PROF RICHARD KWOK KIT YUEN

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME IR PROF RICHARD KWOK-KIT YUEN

NATIONALITY Hong Kong Citizen

PROFESSION Fire Researcher and Engineer

KEY QUALIFICATIONS

PhD., University of New South Wales, Australia, 1998

M.Sc.(Mech), University of Hong Kong, 1991

B.Sc.(Mech) Hons , University of Hong Kong, 1981

POSITION IN ORGANISATION

Chair Professor of Architectural Engineering, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS AND AWARD

-
- PhD (Mechanical Engineering), University of New South Wales, Australia (PhD thesis in Fire Science and Engineering), 1999
 - MSc (Mechanical Engineering), University of Hong Kong, 1991
 - BSc (Mechanical Engineering), University of Hong Kong, 1981
 - The President's Award (2016), City University of Hong Kong, 2016
 - **Fellow of the Hong Kong Academy of Engineering, 2025**
-

MEMBERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL BODIES

<i>Year</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Name of awarding institution</i>
2015	Fellow (Building Services)	The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, HK
2006	Founding Corporate Member (Fire)	The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, HK
2004	Member	The Institution of Fire Engineers, UK
2003	Member	Society of Fire Protection Engineers, USA
1990	Registered Professional Engineer	Registered under the Engineers Registration Ordinance Chapter 409, HK
1990	Corporate Member	The Hong Kong Institution of Engineers, HK
1988	Corporate Member, Chartered Professional Engineer	The Institution of Engineers, Australia
1986	Chartered Engineer	Engineering Council, UK
1986	Corporate Member	The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers, UK

BIOGRAPHY

Ir. Prof. Richard Kwok Kit YUEN, *BSc HK, MSc HK, PhD UNSW, FHKEng, RPE, FHKIE, MSFPE, MIFE*

Chair Professor of Architectural Engineering, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong

Prof Yuen obtained his first degree in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Hong Kong in 1981 and PhD from the School of Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, University of New South Wales, Australia in 1998. He joined City Polytechnic of Hong Kong in 1988 as a Laboratory Officer and became Senior Lecturer in Department of Building and Construction in 1990. He is currently Chair Professor of Architectural Engineering of the Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering. Prof Yuen was the Chief of Staff (Vice-President), from Dec 2019 till May 2023. He was also the Head, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering in 2018-2019 and the Acting Director of Communications and Public Relations Office in 2019, City University of Hong Kong. He is a Registered Professional Engineer and members of the IFE (UK), SFPE (USA) and HKIE (HK). His research interests include fire safety and engineering, pyrolysis and combustion, applications of computational fluid dynamics (CFD), fire retardant materials, neural network modelling applications in fire engineering, HVAC and control engineering. He was the Co-PI of the Theme-based Research Scheme project entitled “Safety, Reliability, and Disruption Management of High-Speed Rail and Metro Systems” with over HKD40 millions funded by the Research Grants Council of the HK. He is currently the Co-I of a CRF project entitled “Digital Twin Supported Rapid Deployable and Reconfigurable Healthcare Facility Module for Infectious Diseases Response and Treatment”. Prof Yuen has been extremely active in research and has over 300 publications including international journal articles, conference papers and book chapters with **H-index: 58 (ISI), 64 (Scopus) and 68 (Google)**, respectively. **Prof Yuen has been listed among the top 2% of the most cited scientists in the world (career-long), according to Stanford University consecutively in 2022, 2023 and 2024.** He had successfully supervised more than 40 PhD graduate students and is supervising 8 PhD graduate students currently at the main supervisor. He has also been the examiner of many PhD candidates both locally and internationally. He has also been the examiner of many PhD candidates both locally and internationally. He has been engaged in research consultancies with industries and served actively in professional institutions. He is also the Founding Member of the Disciplinary Advisory Panel of Fire Discipline of HKIE Prof Yuen has been the Technical Advisor of Institution of Fire Engineers (HK Branch) since 2021. He has served as members of Examination Board for Lift and Escalator Engineers of the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department, Fire Safety Committee, Inspector Registration Committee of the Buildings Department, the HKSAR Government and the Engineering Panel of the Research Grants Council of HKSAR respectively. He is also currently the **Council member and Chairman of Quality Assurance Committee (QAC) of the Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational Qualifications (HKCAAVQ)**. He also serves as Member of Fire Services Training Advisory Committee and Member of Innovation and **Technology Fund (ITF) Research Projects Assessment Panel (Environmental Technology Subgroup)**. Prof Yuen received The President’s Award of City University of Hong Kong in 2016. He was the member of the Review Team of Accreditation Board for Engineering Education in Korea (ABEEK) under the **Dublin and Sydney Accords** of the Accreditation Process in October 2012 and the Chairman of Review Team on the Periodic Review of Engineers Australia under the **Sydney Accord** in September 2014 to report to **International Engineering Alliance** at Istanbul, Turkey in 2015. On November 1, 2023, Prof Yuen has been appointed as the **Member of Committee on Self-financing Post-secondary Education (CSPE) by Education Bureau, HKSAR Government**. He is also the Chairman of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Accreditation Visit Team for the Accreditation Exercise of University of Macau, 21 – 22 November 2024. In 2024, Prof Yuen has been appointed as the Guest Professor of the School of Mechanical Engineering, Tianjin University. Prof Yuen has been recently appointed as the **Deputy Chairman of Accreditation Board and Accreditation Board Executive Committee (Session 2025/26) of HKIE**. **In September 2025, Prof Yuen is conferred the Fellow of Hong Kong Academy of Engineering in recognition of his contributions in engineering and academic research and his achievements in engineering.**

Working History and Experience

12/2024 - present	Tianjin University	Guest Professor of the School of Mechanical Engineering
8/2019 – present	City University of Hong Kong	Chair Professor of Architectural Engineering, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering Chief of Staff (Vice-President)
12/2019 – 5/2023	City University of Hong Kong	Acting Director, Communications and Public Relations Office (concurrent appointment with Head of Department)
12/2018 – 12/2019	City University of Hong Kong	Head, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering
1/2018 – 12/2019	City University of Hong Kong	Professor, Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering
7/2013 – 7/2019	City University of Hong Kong	Associate Professor (Scale A), Department of Civil and Architectural Engineering (formerly Department of Building and Construction)
9/2005 - 6/2013	City University of Hong Kong	Associate Professor (Scale B), Department of Building and Construction
1/2001 - 8/2005	City University of Hong Kong	Assistant Professor, Department of Building and Construction
3/1995 - 12/2000	City University of Hong Kong	University Lecturer, Department of Building and Construction
10/1992 - 3/1995 ⁴	City University of Hong Kong	Senior Lecturer, Department of Building and Construction
8/1990 - 9/1992	City Polytechnic of Hong Kong	Senior Laboratory Officer, Centralised Laboratory
8/1989 - 8/1990	City Polytechnic of Hong Kong	Laboratory Officer, Centralised Laboratory
4/1988 - 7/1989	City Polytechnic of Hong Kong	Lecturer, Department of Building Services Engineering
7/1984 - 4/1988	Hong Kong Polytechnic	Assistant Lecturer, Department of Building Services Engineering
11/1982 - 6/1984	Hong Kong Polytechnic	Assistant Engineer (Environmental)
9/1982 - 11/1988	Hongkong Electric Co. Ltd.	Junior Engineer, Large Projects Division
5/1981 - 9/1982	GEC (HK) Ltd.	

Services to Government Authorities and Local and International Communities

2025-present	Accreditation Board and Accreditation Board Executive Committee (Session 2025/26)	Deputy Chairman
2024-present	Appeal Board Panel under Builders, Lifts and Tower Working Platforms (Safety) ordinance (Cap.470)	Member
2023-present	Committee on Self-financing Post- secondary Education (CSPE), Education Bureau, HKSAR Government	Member
2023-present	Technology Fund (ITF) Research Projects Assessment Panel (Environmental Technology Subgroup), HKSAR Government	Panel Member
2020-present	Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational Qualifications (HKCAAVQ)	Council member
2024-present	Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational Qualifications (HKCAAVQ)	Chairman – Quality Assurance Committee (QAC)
2021- present	Fire Services Department (FSD), HKSAR Government	Member of Fire Services Training Advisory Committee on Fire and Ambulance Services Academy (FASA)
2020-2024	Hong Kong Council for Accreditation of Academic and Vocational Qualifications (HKCAAVQ)	Deputy Chairman – Quality Assurance Committee (QAC)
2021-2023	Fire Services Department (FSD), HKSAR Government	Member of Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) on Voluntary Recognition for FSI Technicians
2014–2020	Research Grants Council of HKSAR (RGC)	Member, Engineering Panel
2015-2016	Construction Industry Council (CIC)	Member, Construction Workers Registration Board (CWRB)
2014-2017	Buildings Department (BD), HKSAR Government	Member, Inspector Registration Committee, Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme

⁴ Prof Yuen had been granted an unpaid leave of 28 months (from February 1993 to June 1995) by CityU for pursue of PhD at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

2014	Sydney Accords, International Engineering Alliance	Chairman, Review Team on the Periodic Review of Engineers Australia under the Sydney Accord to report to International Engineering Alliance
2012	Dublin and Sydney Accords, International Engineering Alliance	Member, Review Team of Accreditation Board for Engineering Education in Korea (ABEEK) under the Dublin and Sydney Accords of the Accreditation Process
2010-2011	Buildings Department (BD), HKSAR Government	Member, Authorized Persons Registration Committee Panel and Authorized Persons Registration Committee, Section 3(5) of Building Ordinance (Cap.123)
2010-2013	Buildings Department (BD), HKSAR Government	Member, Fire Safety Committee Member, Advisory Committee for the Fire Safety (Buildings) Ordinance and the Fire Safety (Commercial Premises) Ordinance
2007-2013	Fire Services Department (FSD), HKSAR Government	Committee Member, Fire Safety Vetting Committee
2006-2012	Development Bureau (DEVB), HKSAR Government	Member, Appeal Tribunal Panel (Buildings)
2006-2012	Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), HKSAR Government	Member, Appeal Board Panel (Builders, Lifts and Tower Working Platforms (Safety))
2004-2009	Fire Services Department (FSD), HKSAR Government	Member, Fire Safety Standard Advisory Group (FSSAG), Fire Services Department, HKSAR Government
2004-2008	Fire Services Department, HKSAR Government	Partner, Fire Services Research and Development Working Group (FSRandDWG), Fire Services Department, HKSAR Government
2003-2009	Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), HKSAR Government	Member, Appeal Board Panel (Gas Safety)
1999-2016	Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD), HKSAR Government	Member, Examination Committee and Examiner, Examination Board for Registration of Lift and Escalator Engineers [under the Lifts and Escalator (Safety) Ordinance, Chapter 327, HKSAR Government]

Services to the Professional Bodies

2020 – present	Institution of Fire Engineers (HK Branch)	Technical Advisor
2020 - 2022	Construction Industry Council (CIC)	Committee Member, Appeal and Disciplinary Board of Construction Industry Council (CIC) - Certification of Building Information Modelling (BIM) Personnel and Accreditation of BIM Course Schemes (BIMAB)
2019 – present	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Member, Building Services Discipline Advisory Panel
2019 – 2023	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Member, Fire Discipline Advisory Panel
2011 – 2017	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Committee Member, Fire Engineering Divisional Committee
2016 – 2021	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Member, Accreditation Board
2010 – 2015	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Chairman, Accreditation Committee for Higher Diploma and Associate Degrees
2006 – 2012	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Founding Member, Discipline Advisory Panel of Fire Discipline
2003 – 2009	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Committee Member, Building Services Divisional Committee
1991 – 1993	Hong Kong Institution of Engineers	Committee Member, Gas and Energy Divisional Committee

Selected Research Projects

Competitive Earmarked Research Grants from Research Grant Council		HKD	
1.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Artificial Neural Network Based Dual-functional System for Thermal and Fire Safety Management for Lithium-ion Batteries (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) CityU11212922, PJ#9043346, on-going)	802,220	2023 onwards
2.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Experimental Study and Fire Field Model for Graphdiyne Flame Retarded Spray Polyurethane Foam in Enclosure Fires (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) CityU11214221, PJ#9043162, on-going)	911,317	2022 onwards
3.	Co-Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Digital Twin Supported Rapid Deployable and Reconfigurable Healthcare Facility Module for Infectious Diseases Response and Treatment (RGC - CRF - Collaborative Research Fund No. C7080-21G, PJ#8730072, on-going)	8,000,000	2022 onwards

4.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Digital Twin Supported Rapid Deployable and Reconfigurable Healthcare Facility Module for Infectious Diseases Response and Treatment (RGC - CRF - Collaborative Research Fund No. C7080-21G, PJ#8730072, on-going)	800,000	2022 onwards
5.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Study of Adaptive Neural Network Model-based Predictive Control for HVAC Systems (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) No. CityU11209518, PJ# 9042652, completed)	790,526	2019 – 2022
6.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Fire Field Model for Carbon Nanotubes Flame Retardant Expanded Polystyrene Foam in Enclosure Fires (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) No. CityU11208617, PJ#9042501, completed)	875,000	2018 – 2021
7.	Co-Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Safety, Reliability, and Disruption Management of High Speed Rail and Metro Systems (RGC Theme-based Research Scheme (TRB), completed)	43,000,000	2016 – 2021
8.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Safety, Reliability, and Disruption Management of High Speed Rail and Metro Systems (RGC Theme-based Research Scheme HKD1,678,576, [part of the TBRS project] (commenced on 1/1/2016, completed)	1,678,576	2016 – 2021
9.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: A Study of Critical Passenger Throughput Rate of Escalators and their Safety in Metro Stations (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) No. CityU11301015, PJ#9042227, Completed)	695,788	2016 – 2019
10.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Fire Risk Analysis Based on Artificial Neural Network Modelling Techniques (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) No. CityU122612, PJ#9042067, Completed)	525,000	2015 – 2018
11.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Fire Field Model Incorporating Pyrolysis for Burning of Flame-Retardant Polystyrene in Enclosures (RGC General Research Fund (GRF) No. CityU122612, PJ#9041792, Completed)	950,696	2012 – 2015
12.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Modeling of Heat and Smoke through Gaps of Fire Doors (RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant No. CityU 124309, PJ#9041447, Completed)	541,728	2009 – 2012
13.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Performance Optimisation of Water Mist Fire Suppression System Design (RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant No. CityU 12330, PJ#9041273, Completed)	500,214	2007 – 2009
14.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Spalling Prediction of Concrete Structures in Fire by Fractal Finite Element Mesh Method (RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant No. CityU 122405, PJ#9041042, Completed)	606,148	2005 – 2009
15.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: An Experimental Scale Study of the Smoke Control for Refuge Floors in Ultra high-rise Buildings (RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant No. CityU 1022/01E, PJ#9040580, Completed)	463,525	2001 – 2006
16.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: A Study of Spalling of Reinforced Concrete Structures under Fire Situations (RGC Competitive Earmarked Research Grant No. CityU 1026/00E, PJ#9040494, Completed)	528,899	2000 – 2005

Research Grants from City University

17.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: Investigation of Burning Mechanism of the Flame Retardant Battery Electrolyte for Development of Flame Retardant Lithium-ion Batteries (RGC General Research Fund (SRG-Fd) PJ#7005982, on-going)	100,000	2023 onwards
18.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: IT Development in Building and Architectural Engineering Design (CityU Applied RandD Fund#9640007, Completed)	2,030,000	2001 – 2004

Research Grant from Privately Donation

19.	Principal Investigator for the project entitled: A Fire Risk Based Translation of Fire Load Density for Various Buildings in Hong Kong (donated by Arup Fire, #9220037, Completed)	250,000	2006 – 2009
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Selected consultancy projects

Independent Fire Expert for Hot-Smoke Test for the Kai Tak Sports Park	2023 – present
Special Independent Advisor for Airport Authority on Fire Safety of Transit Mail Centre In-rack Sprinkle	2022 – 2023
Independent Fire Expert for fire engineering design for the Kai Tak Sports Park	2020 – 2022
Independent Fire Expert for AIRSIDE	2022 – 2023
Expert Witness of the Fire Services Department in a death inquest	2021 – 2022
Independent Check for Fire Safety Engineering Study on Integrated Waste Management Facilities, Phase I	2023 – 2024
Consultancy for the training for Buildings Department in fire safety engineering design	2010
Fire Safety Engineering Study: Improvement to Victoria Park Swimming Pool Complex, PandT	2008
A research study on the crowd flow in the proposed Sai Ying Pun Station of the new Island Line, Mass Transit Railway Corporation	2008
Expert Witness for Court Case on Fatal Accident to Chuk Kai Cheung at The Repulse Bay Apartments, Simmons and Simmons	2007
Fire Engineering Study for Fire Safety Improvement Works for Commercial Complex at Shun Lee Estate, The Link Management Limited	2006
Fire Engineering Study for new ICAC Headquarters Bldg at North Point, HK - C002518, On Joint Venture	2004 – 2007
Fire Engineering Study for steel truss frame structure above a indoor Swimming pool for Siu Yin Wai and Associates Ltd.	2004
Fire Risk Assessment on 17 numbers selected substations, China Light and Power Ltd.	2003
Expert Witness for High Court Action HCPI NO. 71 OF 2002 (assessing the cause of a fatal fire accident)	2003

Fire engineering study on GMS space frame for the proposed ESF English School at the Peak	2001
Fire Engineering Studies on Hung Hom Bay Services Apartments	1999
Fire Engineering Design for OMC Redevelopment, TYTL 128, 35-47 Tsing Yi Road, Tsing Yi, N.T. for Hsin Yieh Architects and Associates Ltd.	1996
Expert witness for High court action # 4261 of 1992 (assessing the behavioural reaction of victim in a fire incident)	1996

Student Supervision

Name	Award Year	Degree	Thesis Title
1. Fu Ruiwen	On-going	PhD	Tbc
2. Chen Qian	On-going	PhD	Tbc
3. Jiang Nan	On-going	PhD	Tbc
4. Wang Xin	On-going	PhD	Tbc
5. Zhang Shenghe	On-going	PhD	Tbc
6. Wang Keke	On-going	PhD	Tbc
7. Wang Wenjie	Dec 2023	PhD	Synthesis and Mechanism of Porphyrin-based Multifunctional Flame Retardant Reinforced Polymer Composites
8. Weng Jingwen	Jul 2023	PhD	Study on PCM-based Cylindrical Battery Thermal Management System Towards Improvement On Cooling Performance and Fire Safety
9. He Junjiang	Nov 2022	PhD	Studies on Fire Behavior and Smoke Movement in Stairwell of High-rise Buildings under Different Environmental Conditions
10. Fang Xu	Jul 2022	PhD	Studies on Fire Plumes and Flame Diffusion Combustion Characteristics under the Constraints Effects of Wall and Ceiling
11. Li Hongliu	Jul 2022	PhD	Evacuation Characteristics of High-motivated Preschool Children Passing through Bottlenecks
12. Peng Min	Jul 2021	PhD	Study on the Combustion Characteristics of Fires inside the Subway Train with Multiple Lateral Openings
13. Jiang Feifeng	Aug 2020	PhD	Crash Detection and Traffic Accident Analysis by Data Mining Methods
14. Zhang Zheng	Jul 2020	PhD	Experimental and Numerical Studies of Flame Propagation and Stability in Microchannels
15. Zhong Xinpeng	Jul 2020	PhD	Experimental Investigation on Burning Characteristics of Ice Cavity Pool Fires Under Cross Airflow
16. Li Pan	Mar 2020	PhD	Effects of High Altitude in Tibet on Pool Fire Behavior and Radiative Heat Feedback to Fuel Surface
17. Wang Lan	Aug 2019	PhD	Dynamic Optimisation of Chiller Plants Incorporating Cooling Load Forecasting Implemented with Data Analytics Approaches
18. Liu Jiajia	Aug 2019	PhD	Design of Graphene Hybrids and Investigation on Smoke Toxicity Suppression
19. Wei Ruichao	Aug 2019	PhD	Effect of the Plasticizer Dibutyl Phthalate on the Thermal Behaviours of Nitrocellulose
20. Qiu Shuilai	Aug 2019	PhD	Study on Flame Retardant Properties of Functionalized Two-Dimensional Black Phosphorus/Polymer Nanocomposites
21. Lian Liping	Aug 2018	PhD	Experimental Study on Pedestrian Merging Flow and Intersecting Flow
22. Wen Panyue	Aug 2017	PhD	Design of Novel Charring Agents and Investigation on Thermal Stability and Combustion Properties of Polymer
23. Liu Jiahao	Aug 2017	PhD	Effect of Low Ambient Pressure on Fire Plume and Ceiling Jet Driven by Liquid Pool Fires
24. Chen Mingyi	Aug 2017	PhD	Study on Fire Behaviors of Primary Lithium Batteries and Lithium-ion Batteries under Normal and Low Pressures
25. Hussain Syed Asad	Aug 2017	PhD	Multiplexed Real-Time Optimization of HVAC Systems
26. Ma Yi	Aug 2016	PhD	Effective Leadership for Crowd Evacuation in the Compartments of Building
27. Shi Yongqian	Jul 2016	PhD	Graphitic Carbon Nitride Based Hybrids/ Polystyrene Composites: Preparation, Combustion Properties and Flame-Retardant Mechanism Investigation
28. Yang Shenlin	Jul 2016	PhD	Soot Production and Its Scattering Properties of A N-heptane Pool Fire under Low Pressures
29. Yang Hongyu	Jul 2015	PhD	Investigation of Phosphorus-containing Flame-retardant Systems for Rigid Polyurethane Foam
30. Zhou Zhihui	Aug 2014	PhD	Effects of Low Ambient Pressure on Pool Fire Behavior and Plume Characteristics
31. Zhang Jiaqing	Aug 2015	PhD	Fire Dynamics in Ship Enclosures Considering the Effects of Ceiling Vent and Fire Locations
32. Wang Lei	Aug 2014	PhD	Preparation of Ethylene-Vinyl Acetate Copolymer/ Iron-Containing Oxide Composites and Study of Their Fire Safety
33. Liang Canjun	Aug 2014	PhD	Study on Effects of Ambient Pressure on Flame Spread over Solid Combustibles

Name	Award Year	Degree	Thesis Title
34. Bai Zhiman	Aug 2014	PhD	Synthesis of Novel Organophosphorus Compounds and Investigation on Flame Retardancy and Mechanism for Unsaturated Polyester Resin
35. Dai Kang	Feb 2014	PhD	Fire behavior and mechanisms of flame-retardant unsaturated polyester resins by incorporation of novel phosphorus-containing comonomers
36. Yang Hua	Oct 2013	PhD	Study on the monitoring of pedestrian flow in transportation hub complex based on digital image processing
37. Yang Wei	Oct 2012	PhD	Investigations on synergistic flame retardancy and mechanisms of halogen-free flame retardant polyester composites
38. Tai Qilong	Oct 2012	PhD	Synthesis and investigation of novel phosphorus and nitrogen-containing compounds and their flame retardancy polystyrene
39. Xiao Xiukun	Jul 2011	PhD	Study on the atomizing mechanisms and the fire extinguishing efficiency of pneumatic-atomizing water mist generated by the steam atomizing medium
40. Yuen Kit Yan	Feb 2011	PhD	Improved social force model for building evacuation simulation
41. Li Qiang	Feb 2011	PhD	Numerical and experimental studies of bluff bodies in tandem in presence of rotating cylinder flow control
42. Chan Ka Lung Raymond	Oct 2010	PhD	An optimal and life cycle model for design, operation and maintenance of air-cooled chiller plants for commercial buildings
43. He Xuechao	Oct 2010	PhD	Experimental and numerical study on characteristics of premixed propane-air flame in rectangular duct with a 90° bend
44. Se Mei King	Oct 2009	PhD	Investigation on tunnel fire phenomenon under different emergency ventilation systems
45. Liang Jing	Oct 2009	MPhil	On the use of lattice-gas model for studying pedestrian flow in built environment
46. Yang Dan	Jul 2009	MPhil	A CFD study of air leakage through door assemblies for smoke control
47. Cheung Lai Kuen	Jul 2007	PhD	A large eddy simulation model for buoyant plume fires
48. Kwok Wing Kwong	Oct 2006	PhD	Hygro-thermal behaviour of high performance reinforced concrete at elevated temperature during fires
49. Cheung Chi Pok	Feb 2006	PhD	Modelling of building fires coupled with turbulent, combustion, soot chemistry and radiation effects
50. Lee Wai Ming	Feb 2004	PhD	A novel artificial neural network model for compartment fires and evacuations

Selected publications

Book

1. Yeoh, GH and **Yuen, KK** (2009) Computational Fluid Dynamics in Fire Engineering - Theory, Modeling and Practice, Elsevier (ISBN: 978-0-7506-8589-4).

Selected International Refereed Journal Publications

2. Jiang, N, Yu, H, Lee, EWM; Yang, H, Yang, L, **Yuen, RKK** (2025) Machine learning methods in microscopic pedestrian and evacuation dynamics simulation: a comparative study, *Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory*, 103180.
3. Wang, JX, **Yuen, RKK**, Wang, L (2025) An innovative hybrid grid generation for urban ventilation simulation. *Frontiers in Built Environment*, 11, 1525361.
4. Zhang, S, Song, Z, Wang, B, **Yuen, RK** and Hu, Y (2025) Bio-based flame retardant macromolecules combined with nanoclay DK4 for fireproofing and toughening of polybutylene adipate/terephthalate (PBAT). *Composites Communications*, 55: 102317.
5. Wang, J, He, C, Jia, Y, Wang, Z, Bai, W, **Yuen, RKK**, and Lu, Y (2025) Fire-Proofing, Mechanic-Reinforcing, Electrostatic-Spinning Strategies Toward Fabricating Porous Separator for Superior and Safer Lithium-Ion Batteries. *ACS Applied Polymer Materials*.
6. Jiang, N, Lee, EWM, Yang, L, **Yuen, RKK**, and Zhai, C (2025) A deep-learning-based approach for simulating pedestrian turning flow. *Expert Systems with Applications*, 262: 125706.
7. Jiang, N, Lee, EWM, Li, X, Yu, H, Xie, W, Yang, L, **Yuen, RKK**, and Yeoh, G. H (2025) FAM-LSTM: Predicting Macroscopic Pedestrian Dynamics Through Data-Driven Method. *IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems*.
8. Chen, Q, Cordeiro, IDC, Yang, W, Yuen, ACY, Chen, TBY, Wang, W, Yeoh, G and **Yuen, R** (2025) Exploring graphdiyne-Dynamic characterisation of the surface oxidation mechanisms via ReaxFF-MD and experiments. *Carbon*, 232: 119793.
9. Li, H, Xia, L, Zhang, J, Song, W. and **Yuen, KKR** (2024) Influence of movement motivations on spatial and temporal features: a case study of preschool children passing through a right-angled corridor. *Transportmetrica A: transport science*, 20: 2181022.
10. Bai, W, Zhao, F, Wang, Z, Wang, J, **Yuen, RK** and Zheng, X (2024) Heterogeneous engineering strategy derived in situ carbon-encased nickel selenides enabling superior LIBs/SIBs with high thermal safety. *ACS Applied Materials & Interfaces*, 16 (44): 60732-60748.
11. Bai, W, Yang, J, Yu, K, Wang, Z, Wang, J, **Yuen RKK** and Wang, J (2024) Electrostatic assembly of metal organic frameworks nanocubes on electrochemically exfoliated graphene nanoflakes: Superior role in flame retardance, 1 Nov 2024, *Applied Surface Science*. 672, 160863.

12. He, C, Wei, Y, Wang, Z, Wang, J, and **Yuen RKK** (2024) Catalytic chemistry inspired hollow carbon nanofibers loaded with NiS/Ni as high-performance and safe Li+ reservoir, 15 Jun 2024, *Journal of Colloid and Interface Science*. 664, p. 156-167
13. Ho, ML, Yew, MC, Yew, MK, Saw, LH, **Yuen RKK**, Tan, WC, Yeo, WH. and Yit, JE. (2024) Numerical simulation of a pioneering cool roof system for Asia's roofing system reformation: The alternative cooling measure, Sept 2024, *Alexandria Engineering Journal*. 102, p. 211-222
14. Ho, ML, Yew, MC, Yew, MK, Saw, LH, Tan, WC, and **Yuen, RKK** (2024) Novel cool roofing technology system with sustainable design for attic temperature reduction, May 2024, *Ain Shams Engineering Journal*. 15, 5, 102706.
15. Yang, S, Yao, W, Zhu, LF, **Yuen, RKK** and Ke, LL, Prediction and optimization of global temperature field of composite materials under multiple heat sources, 15 Apr 2024, *Composite Structures*. 334, 15 p, 117974.
16. Wang, J, Li, K, Cheng, C, Nie, S, Cai, W, Zhang, Q, Zhao, F. and **Yuen, RKK** (2024) MXenes-based nanojunction with defective MoSe₂ nanocatalyst towards reducing the thermal runaway hazard of polymer, Apr 2024, *Composites Part A: Applied Science and Manufacturing*. 179, 108004.
17. Zhang, S, Chu, F, Hu, W, Wang, B, **Yuen RKK**. and Hu, Y. (2024) Investigation of nanocomposite system with long-chain phosphorus-containing intercalator-modified montmorillonite nanosheets, Jan 2024, *Composites Part A: Applied Science and Manufacturing*. 176, 107877.
18. Yang, W, Wu, Q, Zhou, Y, Zhu, S, Wei, C, Lu, H, Yang, W. and **Yuen RKK**. (2024) Multifunctional phosphorus-containing porphyrin dye for efficiently improving the thermal, toughness, flame retardant and dielectric properties of epoxy resins, Jan 2024, *Progress in Organic Coatings*. 186, 107967.
19. Wang, J, Yu, S, Cheng, C, Wang, Z, **Yuen, RKK**, Zhang, Q, Gong, J, Cai, W. and He, T (2024) Hydrogen bonding induced polyphosphazene/MXenes 2D/2D structure loaded with MOFs enabling fire-safe epoxy composite, 15 Dec 2023, *Applied Surface Science*. 640, 158309.
20. Yew, M. C, Yew, M. K. and **Yuen RKK** (2023) Experimental Analysis of Lightweight Fire-Rated Board on Fire Resistance, Mechanical, and Acoustic Properties, Jun 2023, *Fire*. 6, 6, 221.
21. Jiang, N, Yang, LZ, **Yuen, RKK** and Zhai, CJ (2023) Modeling the Pedestrian Flow Before Bottleneck Through Learning-Based Method. *IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems*, 20.03.2023.
22. Cao, RF, Lee, EWM, Xie, W, Gao, DL, Chen, Q, Yuen, AYC, Yeoh, GH and **Yuen, RKK** (2023) Development of an agent-based indoor evacuation model for local fire risks analysis. *Journal of Safety Science and Resilience*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 03.2023, p. 75-92.
23. Xie, W, Gao, DL, Cao, RF, Lee, EWM, **Yuen, RKK** and Weng, JW (2023) Study on single-group dynamics in evacuation considering pre-defined and undeclared leadership. *Journal of Safety Science and Resilience*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 03.2023, p. 52-60.
24. Gao, DL, Xie, W, Cao, RF, Lee, EWM, **Yuen, RKK** and Weng, JW (2023) The prediction of exit choice using cumulative prospect value. *Journal of Safety Science and Resilience*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 03.2023, p. 20-25.
25. Wei, CX, Gao, TY, Xu, Yang, WJ, Dai, GG, Li, RT, Zhu, SE, **Yuen, RKK**, Yang, W and Lu, HD (2023) Synthesis of Bio-based Epoxy Containing Phosphine Oxide as a Reactive Additive Toward Highly Toughened and Fire-retarded Epoxy Resins. *Chinese Journal of Polymer Science (English Edition)*, 21.02.2023.
26. Weng, J, Xiao, C, Yang, X, Ouyang, X, Chen, D, Zhang, GM, Lee WME., **Yuen, KKR** and Wang, J. (2022) An energy-saving battery thermal management strategy coupling tubular phase-change-material with dynamic liquid cooling under different ambient temperatures, Aug 2022, *Renewable Energy*. 195, p. 918-930
27. Xu, Y, Yang, WJ, Zhou, QK, Gao, TY, Xu, GM, Tai, QL, Zhu, SE, Lu, HD, **Yuen, RKK**, Yang, W and Wei, CX. (2022) Highly thermo-stable resveratrol-based flame retardant for enhancing mechanical and fire safety properties of epoxy resins. *Chemical Engineering Journal*, Vol. 450, No. Part 4, 138475, 15.12.2022.
28. Wan, H, Xu, XH, Xu, T, **Yuen, RKK** and Huang, GS. (2022) Development of a quasi-2D variable resistance–capacitance model for tube-encapsulated phase change material storage tanks. *Applied Thermal Engineering*, Vol. 214, 118868, 09.2022.
29. Fang, X, Sun, X, Zhang, X, **Yuen, RKK** and Hu, L (2022), Experimental study of impinging flame structures and thermal characteristics in ceiling flow generated by fuel jet diffusion combustion with air entrainment constraint in a corner, *Fuel*, vol. 323, 124361. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fuel.2022.124361>
30. He, J, Huang, X, Ning, X, Zhou, T, Wang, J and **Yuen, RKK** (2022), Modelling fire smoke dynamics in a stairwell of high-rise building: Effect of ambient pressure, *Case Studies in Thermal Engineering*, vol. 32, 101907. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csite.2022.101907>
31. Fang, X, Zhang, X, **Yuen, RKK** and Hu, L (2022), Diffusion flame side sag behavior in cross winds: Experimental investigation and scaling analysis, *Fuel*, vol. 310, 122252. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fuel.2021.122252>
32. Weng, J, Xiao, C, Ouyang, D, Yang, X, Chen, M, Zhang, G, **Yuen, RKK** and Wang, J (2022), Mitigation effects on thermal runaway propagation of structure-enhanced phase change material modules with flame retardant additives, *Energy*, vol. 239, no. C, 122087. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.122087>
33. Lian, L, Mai, X, Song, W, Zhang, J, **Yuen, KKR** and Lee, EWM (2022), Characteristics of merging behavior in large crowds, *Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment*, vol. 2022, no. 1, 013403. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/ac42cb>
34. Peng, Min, Cheng, Xudong, Cong, Wei, Yang, Hui, Shahid, Muhammad Usman, Yuen, Richard and Zhang, Heping (2021), Experimental study on temperature profile in long-narrow compartment fire with multiple lateral openings, *Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology*, vol. 117, pp. 104018
35. Hussain, SA, Lee, EWM, **Yuen, RKK**, Wang, W and Wang, L (2021), Dissimilarity-based boosting technique for the modelling of complex HVAC systems, *Energy and Buildings*, vol. 247, 111151. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2021.111151>
36. Weng, J, He, Y, Ouyang, D, Yang, X, Chen, M, Cui, S, Zhang, G, **Yuen, RKK** and Wang, J (2021), Honeycomb-inspired design of a thermal management module and its mitigation effect on thermal runaway propagation, *Applied Thermal Engineering*, vol. 195, 117147. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applthermaleng.2021.117147>
37. He, JJ, Zhang, J, Ning, XY, Wang, J, and **Yuen, RKK** (2021) Influence of Stairwell Ventilation State on Fire Behavior and Smoke Temperature Distribution in a Full-scale High-rise Building, *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science*, 813, 30 July 2021, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/813/1/012008>.
38. Zhou, Y, Lin, Y, Tawiah, B, Sun, J, **Yuen, RKK** and Fei, B (2021) DOPO-Decorated Two-Dimensional MXene Nanosheets for Flame-Retardant, Ultraviolet-Protective, and Reinforced Poly(lactide) Composites, *ACS Applied Materials and Interfaces*, vol. 13, no. 18, pp. 21876-21887. <https://doi.org/10.1021/acsami.1c05587>

39. Ma, Y, Lee, EWM, Shi, M and **Yuen, RKK** (2021) Spontaneous synchronization of motion in pedestrian crowds of different densities, *Nature Human Behaviour* vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 447-457. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00997-3>
40. Fang, X, Hu, L, Zhang, X and **Yuen, RKK** (2021) Diffusion flame morphology with or without near-wall in cross-winds: Experiments and a correlation based on momentum-buoyancy length scale, *Fuel*, vol. 289, 119842. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fuel.2020.119842>
41. Zhou, Y, Tawiah, B, Noor, N, Zhang, Z, Sun, J, **Yuen RKK** and Fei, B (2021) A facile and sustainable approach for simultaneously flame retarded, UV protective and reinforced poly(lactic acid) composites using fully bio-based complexing couples, *Composites Part B: Engineering*, vol. 215, 108833. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compositesb.2021.108833>
42. Li, H, Zhang, J, Song, W and **Yuen KKR** (2021) A comparative study on the bottleneck pedestrian flow under different movement motivations, *Fire Safety Journal*, vol. 120, 103014. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.firesaf.2020.103014>
43. Peng, M, Cheng, X, Cong, W and **Yuen, R** (2021) Experimental investigation on temperature profiles at ceiling and door of subway carriage fire, *Fire Technology*, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 439-459. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10694-020-01010-z>
44. Peng, M, Cheng, X, Cong, W, Yang, H, Shi, L, **Yuen, R** and Zhang, H (2021) Experimental investigation on the characteristics and propagation of fire inside subway train, *Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology*, vol. 107, 103632. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2020.103632>
45. Li, H, Zhang, J, Xia, L, Yang, L, Song, W and **Yuen, RKK** (2021) Characteristic time in highly motivated movements of children and adults through bottlenecks, *Scientific Reports*, vol. 11, 5096. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-84324-4>
46. Tawiah, B, Zhou, Y, **Yuen, RKK**, Sun, J and Fei, B (2020) Microporous boron based intumescent macrocycle flame retardant for poly(lactic acid) with excellent UV protection, *Chemical Engineering Journal*, vol. 402, 126209. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cej.2020.126209>
47. Jiang, F, **Yuen, KKR** and Lee, EWM (2020) Analysis of motorcycle accidents using association rule mining-based framework with parameter optimization and GIS technology, *Journal of Safety Research*, vol. 75, pp. 292-309. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2020.09.004>
48. Hussain, SA, Huang, G, **Yuen, RKK** and Wang, W (2020) Adaptive regression model-based real-time optimal control of central air-conditioning systems, *Applied Energy*, vol. 276, 115427. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.115427>
49. He, J, Huang, X, Ning, X, Zhou, T, Wang, J and **Yuen, R** (2020) Stairwell smoke transport in a full-scale high-rise building: Influence of opening location, *Fire Safety Journal*, vol. 117, 103151. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.firesaf.2020.103151>
50. Jiang, F, **Yuen, KKR**, Lee, EWM and Ma, J (2020) Analysis of Run-Off-Road Accidents by Association Rule Mining and Geographic Information System Techniques on Imbalanced Datasets, *Sustainability*, vol. 12, no. 12, 4882. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12124882>
51. Jiang, F, **Yuen, KKR** and Lee, EWM (2020) A long short-term memory-based framework for crash detection on freeways with traffic data of different temporal resolutions, *Accident Analysis and Prevention*, vol. 141, 105520. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2020.105520>
52. Peng, M, Zhang, S, Yang, H, He, K, Cong, W, Cheng, X, **Yuen, R** and Zhang, H (2020) Experimental study on confinement velocity in tunnel fires with longitudinal ventilation, *Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics*, vol. 201, 104157. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jweia.2020.104157>
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ANNEX B

BENCH-SCALE FIRE TEST REPORT AND FULL-SCALE FIRE TEST REPORT FOR WANG FUK COURT FIRE INVESTIGATION

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1. Bench Scale Fire Performance Testing of Material

1.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to quantify the fire performance (thermal stability, ignition, burn duration, heat release and smoke production) of commonly found/on-site materials to provide scientific evidence for their behaviour and contribution towards the rapid fire spread during the fire incident. Bench-scale fire tests were conducted on key materials recovered or representative of those used during the renovation of Wang Fuk Court: white foamboard, orange toe board, plywood, bamboo, and various scaffolding/construction safety net.

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Material sample collection

All the onsite material samples were collected with the assistance and supervision from the Fire Services Department and the Hong Kong Police Force on 10 December 2025. The majority of the samples were collected from different floor locations in Wang Yan House (Block A) of Wang Fuk Court. The collected materials consist of (i) six different texture and colour safety net samples collected from various floors of Wang Yan House, (ii) white coloured foamboard, (iii) orange coloured toe board, (iv) two different thickness of plywood, and (v) three sections of bamboo with different diameter.



Fig. 1.1 Image of the samples collected from Wang Fuk Court on 10 December 2025.

1.2.2 Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA)

The experiments were performed on a PerkinElmer STA 6000 thermogravimetry instrument, with sample masses of approximately $5 \text{ mg} \pm 1 \text{ mg}$ and for three heating rates (5, 10 and $20 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}/\text{min}$) from $20 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ to $800 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ under a nitrogen environment. Apart from the white foamboard, all the other material samples were prepared by grinding into powder form before testing.



Fig. 1.2 Image of sample preparation process for TGA which involve grinding the material to powder form.

1.2.3 Cone Calorimeter

Cone calorimeter tests were carried out with the cone calorimeter apparatus (FTT, UK) according to ISO 5660 standards. All samples were cut to $100 \text{ mm} \times 100 \text{ mm}$, then wrapped in aluminum foil with the upper surface exposed. The distance between the cone heater and test surface was set as 25 cm and the tests were conducted under a constant $35 \text{ kW}/\text{m}^2$ incident heat flux. For the safety net sample tests, due to the significant material shrinkage when placed under a radiant heat flux, it will cause the test results to vary significantly depending on how and at which direction the net samples shrink and deform. Therefore, a 1 mm fine wired grid with wire spacing of 10 mm was placed on top of the samples to control the material shrinkage and prevent the sample from coming into contact with the spark plug. These measures will enhance the consistency of the test results. For the bamboo, the circular sections were sliced into 4 approximately equal pieces and placed horizontally onto the sample holder as shown in

Fig. 1.3 below.




Figure 1.3. Image of samples prepared for the cone calorimeter test

1.3 Results

1.3.1 Thermogravimetric Analysis Results

The results from the bench-scale tests are presented below, including detailed TGA and cone calorimeter data. Key parameters for TGA include onset temperature (T_{onset}), temperature at 10% mass loss ($T_{10\%}$), main peak temperature (T_p), derivative thermogravimetry (DTG) peak rate, and residual weight. For cone calorimeter, parameters include time to ignition (TTI), peak heat release rate (pHRR), time to pHRR (t_{pHRR}), total heat release (THR), burn duration, peak smoke production rate (pSPR), total smoke production (TSP), and effective heat of combustion (EHC). Averages and standard deviations are provided where multiple replicates were tested to account for variability.

The results from TGA are summarised in Table 1.1 and 1.2. The critical parameters that are analysed include:

1. Onset temperature (T_{onset}) – the temperature the sample starts to degrade
2. Temperature at 10% mass loss ($T_{10\%}$) – indicator of initial thermal stability, less sensitive to minor early losses like moisture
3. Peak reaction rate temperature (T_p)
4. Peak reaction rate
5. Residual – mass remaining at 800°C, indicating char formation

The results for the 6 different samples of green safety net were separately compiled into Table 1.2 for comparison. The safety net samples were collected from different levels of Wang Yan House (Block A) and are labelled as 1. Wang Yan 303, 2. Wang Yan 1201, 3. Wang Yan 1203a, 4. Wang Yan 1203b, 5. Wang Yan roof A and 6. Wang Yan roof B as shown in Figure 1.4.

From the results, it can be seen that the bamboo and plywood samples exhibit the lowest onset temperature (average 84.7°C for bamboo and 72.2°C for plywood across heating rates), primarily due to initial moisture loss. After accounting for this early mass loss, comparing $T_{10\%}$ values provide further indication of thermal stability:

- Bamboo: 242–283 °C (average 263.6 °C)
- Plywood: 240–281 °C (average 260.4 °C)
- Foamboard: 331–386 °C (average 363.6 °C)
- Toe board: 349–385 °C (average 362.2 °C)
- Safety net: 367–433 °C (average ~400–410 °C across samples)

The polymeric materials (foamboard, toe board, safety net) thus demonstrate higher thermal stability before significant decomposition begins compared to the wooden materials (plywood, bamboo). Although the polymeric materials exhibit higher thermal stability based on temperature, it can be seen that the wooden samples (bamboo and plywood) displayed significantly lower peak reaction rates or peak mass loss rates (average DTG ~0.76%/°C) and higher residues (average ~3.3% for bamboo, ~2.6% for plywood) due to charring, whereas polymeric materials like foamboard and toe board had higher DTG peaks (~1.7%/°C and ~1.2%/°C, respectively) and lower residues (<3%). This suggests that while cellulosic materials begin losing significant mass at lower temperatures (after drying), their slower mass loss rate and charring behavior may limit the release of combustible volatiles compared to the more intense but higher-temperature decomposition of the polymers.

The six green safety net samples (collected from different levels of Wang Yan House) showed consistent TGA behaviours, with minor variations likely due to environmental exposure and weathering, temperature cycling, and different manufacturing batch or supplier. Average $T_{10\%}$ ranged from 387.6°C (roof B) to 409.3°C (1203a), suggesting uniform thermal stability across locations.




Figure 1.4. Image of the safety net samples collected for fire testing.

Table 1.1 Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) results of material samples collected from Wang Fuk Court

sample	heating rate	onset temperature	temperature at 10% mass loss	main peak temperature	DTG peak	residual weight at 800°C
	(C/min)	T _{onset} (C)	T _{10%} (C)	T _p (C)	(%/C)	(wt.%)
Bamboo	5	68.47	242.41	321.64	0.77	0.56
	10	84.07	265.15	342.22	0.77	0.93
	20	101.62	283.34	359.56	0.76	8.27
Toe board	5	303.92	348.97	403.55	1.28	6.2
	10	288.76	352.22	421.01	1.11	3.92
	20	316.05	385.36	455.12	1.19	2.77
Foamboard	5	279.66	331.21	377.54	1.56	1.82
	10	338.14	373.23	404.63	1.81	0.89
	20	357.42	386.45	421.09	1.71	0
Plywood	5	54.4	239.8	317.52	0.74	0.12
	10	70.21	260.17	338.1	0.74	0.46
	20	92.09	281.18	358.69	0.77	7.28

Table 1.2 Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) results of the safety net samples collected from Wang Fuk Court

sample	heating rate	onset temperature	temperature at 10% mass loss	main peak temperature	DTG peak	residual weight at 800°C
	(C/min)	T _{onset} (C)	T _{10%} (C)	T _p (C)	(%/C)	(wt.%)
green net at 303	5	298.39	373.45	444.94	1.6	1
	10	314.42	392.29	463.79	1.69	2
	20	340.71	416.98	479.39	1.42	2.8
green net at 1201	5	315.18	372.58	444.94	1.51	0.2
	10	334.03	394.89	464.66	1.61	1.7
	20	345.51	417.85	480.26	1.41	2.5
green net at 1203a	5	303.7	388.18	458.15	2.1	0.4
	10	314.32	406.37	471.16	1.82	1.1
	20	348.76	433.45	483.51	1.61	1.6
green net at 1203b	5	317.78	384.93	457.29	1.83	1.95
	10	330.99	400.09	467.04	1.71	0.32
	20	349.62	416.12	483.51	1.46	1.31
green net at roof A	5	334.89	390.34	457.29	2.28	0.66
	10	355.47	407.24	469.64	2.11	0.67
	20	377.56	429.55	483.51	1.66	0.66
green net at roof B	5	287.89	367.38	452.52	1.82	0.29
	10	316.27	393.16	471.16	1.7	1.1
	20	348.11	422.4	487.84	1.53	1.09

1.3.2 Cone Calorimeter Results

The results for the cone calorimeter test have been broken up into two main groups. The first group shows the results from the materials collected from Wang Fuk Court fire scene and the second group shows the results from the materials used in the Sichuan Full-Scale fire experiment (including specified FR and non-FR safety net). Each test was repeated at least 2 times to improve the consistency of the test results. For all the cone calorimeter tests, the key features of the test results are summarised in the tables below. The critical parameters that are analysed include:

1. Time to ignition (TTI)

2. Peak heat release rate (pHRR)
3. Time to peak heat release (t_pHRR)
4. Burn duration
5. Peak smoke production rate (pSPR)
6. Total smoke production (TSP)
7. Effective heat of combustion (EHC)

1.3.2.1 Comparison of Fire Performance Across Different Materials

Table 1.3 compiled the averaged results for each material type collected from the fire scene for testing. From the results summarised in Table 3, it shows that the white foamboard exhibited the highest pHRR (394.9 kW/m²) and substantial smoke production (TSP 7.7 m²), combined with moderate TTI (60 s), indicating intense burning and high smoke hazard once ignited. The toe board showed the shortest TTI (19 s) and a high pHRR (286.6 kW/m²), suggesting very rapid ignition and strong contribution to early fire growth. Furthermore, both the foamboard and toe board also showed extremely rapid melting, and deformation during testing, further increasing their flammability concern under real fire conditions.

The wooden materials plywood and bamboo displayed longer TTI (65 s and 112 s), a lower pHRR (154.1 and 301.8 kW/m²) but has significantly longer burn durations (352 s and 303 s), and a higher THR (34.2 and 46.4 MJ/m²), indicating slower but more sustained burning.

Focusing on the safety net, tests were conducted using 2 layers and 4 layers of materials. The results showed moderate to high pHRR (160.9–222.3 kW/m²) but low THR and short burn duration, consistent with quick but relatively limited total heat release. As mentioned previously, due to the massive shrinkages exhibited by the safety net under high temperature, there was a significantly higher variability in the test results for the net.

Table 1.3. Summary of the averaged cone calorimeter test results for different material types.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
Foamboard	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1
Toe board	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8
Plywood	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361

Bamboo	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211
Safety net 2 layer	60	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29
Safety net 4 layer	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5

1.3.2.2 Comparison of fire performance between fire scene and the Sichuan full-scale fire experiment

Table 1.4 compares averaged results between scene-collected materials and those tested from the Sichuan experiment and the calculated relative difference between the two groups of samples.

Table 1.4 compiled the averaged results for each material type collected for fire testing.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
Foamboard	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1
Foamboard (Sichuan)	31	233.7	71	7.3	59	0.175	4.43	13.4
Relative difference %	48%	41%	24%	48%	30%	25%	42%	26%
Toe board	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8
Toe board (Sichuan)	42	320.9	100	31.9	178	0.087	7.14	30
Relative difference %	-121%	-12%	-138%	-267%	-89%	-61%	-328%	3%
Plywood	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361
Plywood (Sichuan)	59	313	132	20.4	94	0.029	1.03	9.9
Relative difference %	9%	-103%	65%	40%	73%	-164%	-6%	15%
Bamboo	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211
Bamboo (Sichuan)	110	295.7	211	30.7	172	0.028	1.65	8.5
Relative difference %	2%	2%	-29%	34%	43%	-33%	-27%	44%
Safety net 2 layer	60	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29
Non-FR safety net 2 layer (Sichuan)	50	128.9	106	4	60	0.023	0.47	29.5
Relative difference %	17%	20%	-5%	18%	-13%	39%	56%	-2%
FR safety net 2 layer (Sichuan)	86	170.8	151	6.1	70	0.045	1.29	30.4
Relative difference %	-43%	-6%	-50%	-24%	-32%	-18%	-21%	-5%
Safety net 4 layer	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5
Non-FR safety net 4 layer (Sichuan)	46	203.8	124	8.2	84	0.039	1.01	31.2
Relative difference %	-5%	8%	-41%	23%	-4%	22%	56%	-6%

FR safety net 4 layer (Sichuan)	76	233	172	12.1	102	0.059	2.6	30.3
Relative difference %	-73%	-5%	-95%	-14%	-26%	-18%	-14%	-3%

In general, the fire behaviour of bamboo recovered from the scene was closely comparable to that of the Sichuan material samples, with negligible differences in time to ignition and peak heat release rate ($\leq +2\%$) and only moderate increases in total heat release and burn duration. The foamboard recovered from the scene demonstrated substantially more severe fire behaviour than the Sichuan reference material, with markedly higher peak heat release rate (+69%), total heat release (+92%), and smoke production (+74%). The toe board from the scene ignited much more rapidly (TTI -55%) but exhibited lower total heat release (-73%), shorter burn duration (-47%), and substantially reduced smoke production (-77%) compared with the Sichuan toe board. Despite differences in time-dependent parameters such as TTI and pHRR, the effective heat of combustion (EHC) values for most materials showed good consistency between the scene and Sichuan samples.

The plywood recovered from the scene exhibited a lower peak heat release rate than the Sichuan reference material, yet sustained burning for a considerably longer duration and released a greater total amount of heat. These characteristics are consistent with enhanced charring behaviour, which is commonly observed in aged or weathered wood-based products and does not fundamentally alter the representativeness of the reference data.

The safety net collected from the fire scene showed combustion performance that aligned closely with the non-FR safety net evaluated in Sichuan. Parameters such as time to ignition, peak heat release rate, total heat release, burn duration, and effective heat of combustion were sufficiently similar to indicate comparable fire behaviour under the test conditions. The safety net recovered from the scene exhibited fire performance characteristics that were broadly similar to the non-FR safety net tested in Sichuan, with small to moderate differences in TTI, pHRR, THR, and burn duration (range -12% to $+29\%$) and nearly identical effective heat of combustion values. In contrast, the FR safety net from Sichuan exhibited distinctly improved ignition resistance, as anticipated from materials designed with fire-retardant treatments.

1.3.2.3 Comparison between FR and non-FR safety net

The Sichuan experiment included safety net explicitly specified as FR and non-FR. FR safety

net showed significantly longer TTI (76–86 s) compared to non-FR safety net (46–50 s), representing a 40–86% delay in ignition. FR safety net had slightly higher pHRR (170.8–233.0 kW/m²) than non-FR (128.9–203.8 kW/m²), possibly due to retardant chemistry promoting condensed-phase reactions. FR safety net generally released more total heat and burned longer, especially in 4-layer configuration. FR safety net produced higher TSP (1.29–2.60 m³) than non-FR (0.47–1.01 m³). The scene-collected safety net (2-layer and 4-layer) exhibited ignition and heat release behavior more similar to the non-FR Sichuan safety net than the FR ones, particularly in shorter TTI and comparable pHRR values.

2. Full-scale Fire Test

2.1 Introduction to the Lab and facilities

2.1.1 About the Lab

The large-scale fire experiment located in Sichuan University of Science and Engineering covers an area of 406 acres with a construction area of approximately 130,000 square meters as shown in Fig 2.1 & 2.2. It is located far away from urban areas and equipped with the facilities to conduct large-scale fire burning experiments. Sichuan University of Science and Engineering and BYD Battery Co., Ltd. have jointly invested 30 million yuan to establish the "Joint Laboratory for Fire Safety of Power and Energy Storage Batteries".



Fig.2.1 Location of the test site



Fig. 2.2 Plan of the test site



Fig. 2.3 CSA authorization lab

2.1.2 Test facilities

The laboratory has been accredited to CSA/ANSI C800:25 large-scale fire test by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and is authorised by the CSA Group as shown in Fig. 2.3. The complete test apparatus is equipped with a 5 MW cone calorimeter (5 meters long, 5 meters wide, and 10 meters high), a 20 MW large-scale cone calorimeter (15 meters long, 13 meters wide, and 15.5 meters high) as shown in Fig. 2.4, an infrared spectrometer as shown in Fig. 2.5, and a large-scale exhaust gas treatment device. It addresses fire safety issues throughout the entire lifecycle of battery production, storage, transportation, use, and recycling. Currently, the experimental area of Huangling Campus has conducted a series of studies on thermal runaway combustion in energy storage power stations, the effectiveness of the cofferdam method in extinguishing new energy vehicles, electrolyte flow fire suppression tests, and battery pack thermal runaway tests.



Fig. 2.4 20MW and 5MW cone calorimeter



Fig. 2.5 an infrared spectrometer

2.1.3 The Model

The building portion with the origin of the fire ignition is considered in this physical fire model, as shown in Fig. 2.6.




Fig. 2.6 The area of interest

After simplifying the architectural prototype, the prototype of the final experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2.7.



Fig. 2.7. Simplified physical model

2.1.4 Measurement

Several cameras were installed at different locations as shown in Fig. 2.8 to monitor the fire development.




Fig. 2.8 Location of cameras

Four thermocouple Trees, namely I, II, III and IV, were arranged and each thermocouple tree has six measuring points. The temperature measuring points are shown in Fig. 2.9. They were

located at heights of 1.0 m, 1.5 m, 2.8 m, 4.1 m, 5.4 m, and 6.7 m above the ground, respectively, to monitor the temperature at different levels. Thermocouples were provided at G/F and 1/F. They were located at the windows of kitchens and the windows of foyers.




Fig. 2.9. Location of thermocouple Trees

For the first scenario, as shown in Fig. 2.10, heat flux detectors were installed at 0.1 m away from the window glass to measure the heat flux values transmitted outwards through the windows by high-temperature smoke during a fire. All measurement points were connected to a data acquisition device using high-temperature resistant cables, ensuring continuity and real-time recording of the dynamic changes in temperature and heat flux.




Fig. 2.10 location of heat flux measurement

2.2 Ignition Source & Test Scenarios

2.2.1 Ignition Source

Based on the initial video footage of the fire incident, the fire was found to be broken out on a flat roof located on 1/F. The combustible materials involved might be decoration materials such as wooden boards, cardboard, and other decorative items. It is assumed that the initial fire source on the platform was ignited accidentally and subsequently ignited other combustible materials.



Fig. 2.11 Picture of initial fire incident

In this experiment, a wood crib fire was proposed as the ignition source to ignite bamboo scaffolding and other combustible materials. The wood crib is constructed using 200 nos. of wooden sticks with dimensions of $5\text{ cm} \times 5\text{ cm} \times 100\text{ cm}$, arranged into a 0.2 m high crib. The bottom clearance height is 0.2 m , and the total height was approximately 0.4 m . About 5 kg of paperboard was stacked at the bottom of the crib.

To ensure that the ignition source power meeting the requirements of the experimental design, a pre-test on the combustion power of the wood crib fire was carried out before the formal experiment. During the test, the wood crib was constructed according to the aforementioned specifications in a dedicated calorimeter. To accelerate the ignition process of the wood crib, four wood cribs were soaked in 1 liter of n -heptane.

By measuring the amount of oxygen consumed, the concentrations of carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide produced during combustion, and combining relevant heat release rate calculation models, the heat release rate curve of the wood crib fire over time was monitored in real-time. This allows for the determination of the average and maximum power during the stable combustion phase, thereby verifying whether the ignition source can effectively ignite bamboo scaffolding and other combustible materials. This provides data support for controlling

the ignition timing in the formal experiment.



Fig. 2.12 wood pallet and fire behavior




Fig. 2.13 Heat release rate of the wood crib

The peak heat release rate of the wood crib combustion was measured to be approximately 2.5 MW.

2.2.2 Test scenarios

The main materials for this test, including bamboo, flame-retardant safety net, and non-flame-retardant safety net, were provided by a supplier who specialises in supplying goods to contractors in Hong Kong.

The construction of the bamboo scaffolding strictly adhered to the relevant regulations in Hong Kong, and the local workers were trained by Hong Kong-based instructors for a week. The quantity and arrangement of the model bamboo scaffolding closely matched to those of the

involved building as shown in Fig. 2.14. Furthermore, prior to each test, the Hong Kong Fire Services Department verified the quantity and distribution of bamboo to ensure consistency in each scenario.




Fig. 2.14. Layout of bamboo scaffolding

Four layers of scaffolding were considered for the test on 11 January 2026 and only two layers of scaffolding were studied for the rest of the tests. Table 2.1 lists the fire scenarios conducted.

Table 2.1 Test scenarios

Test No.	Date	No. of bamboo layer	Net	Window Glass
Trial Test	11/1	4	Flame retardant	No foam
1	27/1	2	Non-flame retardant	No foam
2	27/1		Flame retardant	No foam
3	18/1		Non-flame retardant	No foam
4	21/1		Flame retardant	No foam
5	24/1		Non-flame retardant	With foam

6	30/1	Flame retardant	With foam
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2.3 Data Analysis

2.3.1 Test data on 1/11 (Trial Test)

2.3.1.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Weather condition on 1/11

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
9.5	75.9	994	0.8	Northeast

2.3.1.2 Heat Release Rate (HRR) and Total Heat released




Fig. 2.15 HRR curve




Fig. 2.16 Total Heat released

As shown in Table 2.1, fire-retardant-net, windows-without-foam and 4 layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment. The ignition time of the experiment was at 18:19:36 on 11 January 2026. The Heat Release Rate (HRR) reached its peak at 18:53:52, with a value of 28.974 MW. This indicated the intense combustion phase of bamboo scaffolding and wooden blocks, with a further increasing trend in fire intensity. To avoid damage to the testing

equipment, firefighters began to spray water to extinguish the fire.

2.3.1.3 Temperature




Fig. 2.17 Temperature of Thermocouple tree I




Fig. 2.18 Temperature of Thermocouple tree II




Fig. 2.19 Temperature of Thermocouple tree III




Fig. 2.20 Temperature of Thermocouple tree IV

Due the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire, during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away and thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment.

2.3.1.4 Heat Flux




Fig. 2.21 Heat Flux at Point 2 at different floors




Fig. 2.22 Heat Flux at Point 4 at different floors

In this experiment, approx. 5 kg of cardboard was placed at the unexposed sides of the kitchen windows on the first floor and third floors. Also, approx. 5 kg of clothing was placed at the unexposed side of the window between the kitchen and the bedroom. It should be noted that all combustible materials were placed close to the windows and they were burned completely.

2.3.2 Test data on 1/27 (Test No. 1)

The experiment used wood sticks as ignition source to ignite bamboo scaffolds and other combustible materials. The ignition source consists of 450 wooden sticks measuring 1 cm × 1 cm × 50 cm, arranged to form a firewood stack 0.15 m high with a 0.15 m clearance at the base, totaling approximately 0.3 m in height. About 4 kg of cardboard is piled at the bottom of the wooden stack as ignition material.



Fig. 23 wood pallet

2.3.2.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Weather data on 1/27 (Non-flame-retardant net)

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
18	45.4	993	2	East

2.3.2.2 HRR and Total Heat released (non-flame retardant net)

This experiment was designed to study the flame spread behaviour of scaffolding fitted with non-FR safety net under a small fire size of not more than 0.5 MW at incipient stage. The

ignition time of the experiment was 13:49:40 on January 27, 2026, and the HRR reached its peak at 13:57:17, which was 0.943 MW. The non-FR safety net was ignited, and the dripping material ignited the local bamboo frame. The non-FR safety net combustion experiment lasted about 100 minutes.

It was noted that the fire caused ignition of the non-FR safety net but did not ignite the bamboo scaffolding. When the fire source began to decay, localised ignition of the non-flame-retardant safety net persisted, and the material continued to support slow flame propagation.

In this test, since comparably much smaller fire source was adopted, except the non-FR safety net exhibited persistent burning, nearly all other combustible contents remained unburnt till the end of the fire test. Also, the glass breakage and burning out of the plywood hinged doors were not observed.




Fig. 24 HRR curve




Fig. 25 Total Heat released






Fig. 26 fire behavior

2.3.3 Test data on 1/27 (Test No. 2)

2.3.3.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Weather data on 1/27 (flame-retardant net)

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	wind (m/s)	Direction
11.1	67.2	994	1	West

2.3.3.2 HRR and Total Heat released (flame retardant net)

This experiment was designed to study the flame spread behaviour of scaffolding fitted with FR safety net under a small fire size of not more than 0.5 MW at incipient stage. The ignition time of the experiment was 19:01:35 on 27 January 2026, and the HRR reached its peak at 19:09:12, which was 1.342 MW. The FR mesh partially melts at high temperatures without sustaining combustion. The wooden stack automatically extinguished after burning for 10 minutes.

It was observed that, following the decay of the fire source, no persistent flaming, surface ignition, or lateral flame propagation occurred in the FR safety net.

In this test, since comparably much smaller fire source was adopted, nearly all combustible contents remained unburnt till the end of the fire test. Also, the glass breakage and burning out of the plywood hinged doors were not observed.




Fig. 27 HRR curve




Fig. 28 Total Heat released




Fig.29 fire behavior

2.3.4 Test data on 1/18 (Test No. 3)

2.3.4.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Weather condition on 1/18

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
12.5	78.2	992	1.6	northeast

2.3.4.2 HRR and Total Heat released

As shown in Table 2.1, non-FR net, windows-without-foam and 2 layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment. The ignition time of the experiment was 10:50:24 AM on 18 January 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 10:58:12 AM, which was around 16.097 MW and the total heat released was around 12,705 MJ.




Fig. 2.30 HRR curve




Fig. 2.31 Total Heat released

2.3.4.3 Temperatures




Fig. 2.32 Temperature of Thermocouple tree I




Fig. 2.33 Temperature of Thermocouple tree II




Fig. 2.34 Temperature of Thermocouple tree III




Fig. 2.35 Temperature of Thermocouple tree IV




Fig. 2.36 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.37 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.38 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.39 Temperature at D of Floor I and II

Due to the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire, during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away and thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment.

2.3.5 Test data on 1/21 (Test No. 4)

2.3.5.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6 Weather data on 1/21

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
6.2	76.9	976	2.1	north-east

2.3.5.2 HRR and Total Heat released

As shown in Table 2.1 FR net, windows-without-foam and 2 layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment. The experimental ignition time was 16:35:00 on 21 January 2026.

Fig. 2.40 depicts the experimental heat release rate curve: the 0-15 minute period represents the ignition delay phase (with a heat release rate close to 0); after 15 minutes, it entered the growth phase, reaching its first peak at around 20 minutes (approximately 10 MW). After a brief decline, it reached its main peak at around 30 minutes (approximately 17 MW), reflecting the accelerated spread of the fire and the extensive combustion of combustible materials. After 30 minutes, it entered the decay phase, with the heat release rate gradually decreasing, and it approached 0 at around 75 minutes. The total heat released is 11,043 MJ as shown in Fig. 2.41.




Fig. 2.40 HRR curve




Fig. 2.41 Total Heat released

2.3.5.3 Temperature




Fig. 2.42 Temperature of Thermocouple tree I




Fig. 2.43 Temperature of Thermocouple tree II




Fig. 2.44 Temperature of Thermocouple tree III




Fig. 2.45 Temperature of Thermocouple tree IV




Fig. 2.46 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.47 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.48 Temperature at C of Floor I and I




Fig. 2.49 Temperature at D of Floor I and II

Due to the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire, during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away and thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment.

2.3.6 Test data on 1/24 (Test No. 5)

2.3.6.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7 weather data on 1/24

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
7.1	87.8	992	1.9	North

2.3.6.2 HRR and Total Heat released

As shown in Table 2.1 non-FR net, windows-with-foam and 2 layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment. The experimental ignition time was 09:55:05 on 24 January 2026.

As shown in Fig. 2.50, the heat release rate exhibited a rapid increase overall. The first peak, approximately 8 MW, appeared around 11 minutes, followed by the second peak, approximately 12.5 MW, around 19 minutes, and the third peak, approximately 14.5 MW, around 22 minutes. After 22 minutes, the heat release rate declined rapidly, and by around 45 minutes, it had dropped to 1 MW. The total calorific value was around 11,585 MJ as shown in Fig. 2.51.




Fig. 2.50 HRR curve




Fig. 2.51 Total Heat released

2.3.6.3 Temperature




Fig. 2.52 Temperature of Thermocouple tree I




Fig. 2.53 Temperature of Thermocouple tree II




Fig. 2.54 Temperature of Thermocouple tree III




Fig. 2.55 Temperature of Thermocouple tree IV




Fig. 2.56 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.57 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.58 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.59 Temperature at D of Floor I and II

2.3.7 Test data on 1/30 (Test No. 6)

2.3.7.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarised in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8 Weather data on 1/30

Temperature (°C)	Humidity (%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
10.7	75.5	978	0.8	North

2.3.7.2 HRR and Total Heat released

As shown in Table 2.1 FR net, windows-with-foam and 2 layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment. The experimental ignition time was 11:03:05 on 30 January 2026.




Fig. 2.60 HRR curve




Fig. 2.61 Total Heat released

As shown in Fig. 2.60, the heat release rate exhibits a rapid upward trend overall. It entered a significant growth phase around 10 minutes, reached its first peak of approximately 6 MW at around 15 minutes, and then experienced a second peak of about 13 MW at around 20 minutes. The heat release rate peaked at approximately 14.5 MW at around 22 minutes. It then began to decay rapidly after 22 minutes. The final total calorific value was around 11,443 MJ as shown in Fig. 2.61.

2.3.7.3 Temperature




Fig. 2.62 Temperature of Thermocouple tree I




Fig. 2.63 Temperature of Thermocouple tree II




Fig. 2.64 Temperature of Thermocouple tree III




Fig. 2.65 Temperature of Thermocouple tree IV




Fig. 2.66 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.67 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.68 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 2.69 Temperature at D of Floor I and II

Due to the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire, during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors

between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away and thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment.

2.4 Conclusions

The experimental results of the 7 tests are summarised in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9 Summary of Experimental Results

Test No.	Date	Layer of bamboo	Net	Foam	Peak HRR (MW)	Total Heat Release (MJ)
Trial Test	11/1	4	Flame retardant	No foam	28.974	-
1	27/1	2	Non-flame retardant	No foam	0.943	453
2	27/1		Flame retardant	No foam	1.342	295
3	18/1		Non-flame retardant	No foam	16.097	12705
4	21/1		Flame retardant	No foam	17.217	11043
5	24/1		Non-flame retardant	With foam	14.370	11585
6	30/1		Flame retardant	With foam	12.973	11443

Apart from the experiment conducted on 11 January 2026, the number of bamboos, the method of construction, and the total area of toe boards and wooden boards remained as consistent as possible in the four tests carried out on 18, 21, 24 and 30 January.

Whether using FR safety net or non-FR safety net, the total area of safety net and the way of laying them are also completely consistent.

The test conducted on 11 January 2026 involved a four-layer bamboo scaffold with a peak heat release rate reaching up to 29 MW. Due to the excessively high heat release rate, firefighters intervened to terminate the test prematurely. Therefore, the overall heat value was very low. Through the comparisons of the remaining 4 tests, it can be observed that whether using FR safety net or non-FR safety net, and whether windows are equipped with foam or not, the peak value of heat release rate and the total amount of heat released are not significantly affected.




Although the fire retardancy of safety net has an insignificant impact on the peak value and development speed of fires, it can be clearly observed that for the fire scenarios with FR safety net, the safety net was found not easily ignitable but swollen and/or detached dripped downward in pieces. Even in rare incidents that FR safety net were ignited, once there was a discontinuation and/or lack of supply of adequate heat from the adjacent burning materials, the FR net would quickly extinguish. However, for the fire scenarios with non-FR safety net, the non-flame-retardant net when ignited could continue to burn, and the fire could sustain to burn for more than an hour. It even ignites other unburnt foam, wood boards, and bamboo scaffolding. It can be inferred that the non-FR safety net does vastly increase the risk of fire spread given the presence of large amount of combustibles in the close vicinity in fire outbreak.

With the exceptions of Test No. 1 and 2 where the fire size was much smaller at its inception stage, in tests including the Trial Test, Test No. 3 to Test No. 6, due to the immense heat release and high temperature from the fire, during the fire tests, the wired glass between the re-entrant and staircase void was found broken allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through the resulted opening. Also, the plywood hinged doors between the re-entrant zone and the escape staircase void were found completely burnt away and thus allowing the spreading of flame and smoke intensively through these openings into the staircase void in the experiment.


For fire scenarios involving the use of foam, it can be observed that the presence of foam has little impact on the speed and spread of the fire.

Appendix A – TGA Results


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
Orange Toe Board TGA



Plywood TGA




Bamboo TGA




Safety Net TGA


Wang Yan House 303 Samples




Wang Yan House 1203A Samples




Wang Yan House 1203 B Samples



Wang Yan House Roof Sample A







Wang Yan House Roof Sample B















Appendix B – Cone Calorimeter Results

White Foamboard

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
foam_test_01	50	362.5	89	14.3	94	0.199	7.67	20.4
foam_test_02	87	351.7	122	14.4	88	0.215	8.51	20.3
foam_test_03	96	371.9	124	12.4	75	0.252	7.43	19
foam_test_04	44	417.7	75	14.5	80	0.228	7.35	21.4748
foam_test_05	54	403.2	78	13.4	81	0.244	7.34	28.207
foam_test_06	54	424.4	88	13.9	76	0.237	7.37	21.1
foam_test_07	36	425.8	73	14.6	91	0.221	7.98	20.9
foam_test_08	58	401.5	95	14.3	88	0.273	7.98	10.6
AVERAGE	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1
STDEV	21	29	20	0.7	7	0.023	0.42	4.7











Toe Board

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
toeboard_test_01	21	271.9	44	8.8	129	0.046	1.56	32
toeboard_test_02	19	272.8	41	8.2	65	0.046	1.59	30
toeboard_test_03	16	315.2	40	9.1	88	0.069	1.87	30.4
AVERAGE	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8
STDEV	3	24.8	2	0.4	32	0.014	0.17	1.1




Plywood

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
plywood_test_01	79	127.9	408	34.9	391	0.01	1.08	11.6282
plywood_test_02	58	143.1	401	33.9	377	0.011	0.78	12.3002
plywood_test_03	59	191.4	331	33.9	287	0.013	1.06	10.98
AVERAGE	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361
STDEV	12	33.2	43	0.6	56	0.002	0.17	0



Bamboo

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
bamboo_test_01	143	286.1	177	73.1	617	0.019	1.03	17.2209
bamboo_test_02	89	348.2	184	33.6	124	0.02	1.33	14.8178
bamboo_test_03	104	270.9	128	32.6	169	0.024	1.54	13.6246
AVERAGE	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211
STDEV	28	41	31	23.1	273	0.003	0.26	0.5




Safety Net


SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_2layer_test_01	27	171.2	67	5.7	54	0.044	1.16	27.6
mesh_2layer_test_02	69	130.3	104	4.3	39	0.03	1.49	25.3
mesh_2layer_test_03	33	174.8	65	4.5	42	0.046	0.94	36.6
mesh_2layer_test_04	36	187.7	84	5.8	55	0.037	1	29.9
mesh_2layer_test_05	36	128	81	5.2	61	0.035	1.16	24.1
mesh_2layer_test_06	75	175.5	119	4.8	51	0.038	0.91	30
mesh_2layer_test_07	78	158.3	124	5.7	62	0.04	1.28	26.2
mesh_2layer_test_08	42	115.4	98	4.2	74	0.028	0.93	33.6
mesh_2layer_test_09	160	191.6	193	4	41	0.042	0.9	NaN
mesh_2layer_test_10	42	176.3	77	4.4	50	0.038	0.93	27.6
AVERAGE	60	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29
STDEV	40	26.9	38	0.7	11	0.006	0.2	4

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_4layer_test_01	24	176.2	71	10.5	83	0.044	1.87	32.6
mesh_4layer_test_02	27	172.5	78	10.8	94	0.044	2.21	25.3
mesh_4layer_test_03	37	356.7	73	10.8	62	0.069	3.07	26.8
mesh_4layer_test_04	40	269.5	90	16.7	106	0.058	3.13	29.7
mesh_4layer_test_05	96	179.3	133	8.8	85	0.049	2.54	24.6
mesh_4layer_test_06	44	181.2	87	9.2	89	0.041	1.81	32.6
mesh_4layer_test_07	49	213.7	95	13.7	101	0.059	3.31	31.5
mesh_4layer_test_08	37	249.9	84	8.1	60	0.051	1.39	29.5
mesh_4layer_test_09	51	179.4	94	8	68	0.033	1.41	30.2
mesh_4layer_test_10	33	244.7	76	9.7	65	0.056	2.05	32
AVERAGE	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5
STDEV	20	59.3	18	2.7	17	0.01	0.7	3


Wang Yan House Roof A, green net







Wang Yan House 1203A







Wang Yan House 1201







Wang Yan House 303



Wang Yan House Roof B







Wang Yan House 1203B



Cone Calorimeter Results (Sichuan Full Scale Experiment)





White Foamboard

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
foam_sichuan_01	31	187.1	74	7.1	62	0.135	4.23	6.2
foam_sichuan_02	31	280.3	68	7.6	56	0.215	4.63	20.7
AVERAGE	31	233.7	71	7.3	59	0.175	4.43	13.4
STDEV	0	65.9	4	0.3	4	0.057	0.29	10.2




Toe board

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
toeboard_sichuan_01	43	338.1	104	33.7	179	0.086	7.4	29.4
toeboard_sichuan_02	40	303.7	95	30	178	0.089	6.89	30.7
AVERAGE	42	320.9	100	31.9	178	0.087	7.14	30
STDEV	2	24.3	6	2.7	1	0.002	0.36	0.9




Plywood





SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)
plywood_sichuan_01	44	302.6	120	19	92	0.028	0.87	10.1
plywood_sichuan_02	70	342	122	19.6	80	0.034	1.02	10.1
plywood_sichuan_03	64	294.5	155	22.4	109	0.026	1.22	9.5
AVERAGE	59	313	132	20.4	94	0.029	1.03	9.9
STDEV	14	25.4	20	1.8	15	0.004	0.18	0.3



Bamboo


SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
bamboo_sichuan_01	115	285.6	247	36.6	197	0.028	1.97	8.4
bamboo_sichuan_02	104	328.2	152	24	114	0.029	1.43	8.5
bamboo_sichuan_03	107	301.1	186	25.3	114	0.03	1.49	8.3
bamboo_sichuan_04	114	267.9	258	37	265	0.023	1.7	8.6
AVERAGE	110	295.7	211	30.7	172	0.028	1.65	8.5
STDEV	5	25.6	50	7	73	0.003	0.24	0.1






FR Safety Net

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_2layer_FR_Sichu	80	169.5	145	6.1	68	0.046	1.34	29.4
mesh_2layer_FR_Sichu	92	172.2	157	6.1	72	0.044	1.23	31.4
AVERAGE	86	170.8	151	6.1	70	0.045	1.29	30.4
STDEV	8	1.9	8	0	3	0.001	0.07	1.4





SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_4layer_FR_Sichu	75	230.8	173	12.2	96	0.057	2.7	28
mesh_4layer_FR_Sichu	77	235.2	170	12	107	0.061	2.49	32.6
AVERAGE	76	233	172	12.1	102	0.059	2.6	30.3
STDEV	1	3.1	2	0.2	8	0.003	0.15	3.3





Non-FR Safety Net

SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_2layer_nonFR_Si	46	117.6	103	3.6	58	0.022	0.49	31.5
mesh_2layer_nonFR_Si	54	140.2	109	4.4	61	0.024	0.45	27.5
AVERAGE	50	128.9	106	4	60	0.023	0.47	29.5
STDEV	6	16	4	0.6	2	0.002	0.03	2.8





SAMPLE	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
mesh_4layer_nonFR_Si	46	209.5	122	7.8	82	0.045	1.01	31
mesh_4layer_nonFR_Si	46	198.1	126	8.7	85	0.034	1.01	31.5
AVERAGE	46	203.8	124	8.2	84	0.039	1.01	31.2
STDEV	0	8	3	0.6	2	0.008	0	0.4



Appendix C – Test Reports of Flame-retardant net



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检测
TESTING
CNAS L4743

TEST REPORT

No.: AJFTS25008498R08_EN

Date: Dec 17, 2025

Page 1 of 4

ZHAOQING GAOYAO PENGYUAN BUILDING MATERIALS CO., LTD.

100 METERS EAST OF SINOCHEN OIL AND GUANGBEI GAS STATION, XUCUN VILLAGE, DAJITOU VILLAGE COMMITTEE, BAIZHU TOWN, GAOYAO DISTRICT, ZHAOQING CITY

Sample Description : DENSE-MESH SAFETY VERTICAL NET - GREEN

Style/Item No. : /

Hong Kong Regional Agent : KONG FAI (SAI WAN) BAMBOO TRADING COMPANY

The above sample(s) data and information was / were submitted and identified on behalf of the client. SGS is not responsible for the authenticity, integrity and results of the data and information and / or the validity of the conclusion arising therefrom. Results apply to the sample as received.

SGS Ref. No. : GZIN2512009590ML01

Sample Receiving Date : Dec 05, 2025

Testing Period : Dec 05, 2025 to Dec 15, 2025

Test Required : BS 5867-2:2008 Fabrics for curtains, drapes and window blinds – Part 2: Flammability requirements – Specification, 6.3 Type “B” performance requirements.

Test result(s) : See attached sheet

Conclusion : The tested sample **meets** the type “B” performance requirements of BS 5867-2:2008.

Signed for and on behalf of
SGS-CSTC Standards Technical Services Co., Ltd Anji Branch

zho

Echo Li
Approved signatory



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Test Conducted

The test was conducted accordance with BS 5867-2:2008 Fabrics for curtains, drapes and window blinds – Part 2: Flammability requirements – Specification, 6.3 Type “B” performance requirements and test method is based on BS EN ISO 15025: 2002.

Test Specimen

Description	Net
Color	Green
Area density	79 g/m ²
Size of specimen	200 mm × 160 mm

Conditioning

Cleansing procedure: Water soak as specified in BS EN 1021-1:2006, Annex D.

Prior to testing, the specimens were conditioned for at least 24 h in an atmosphere having a temperature of (20±2) °C and a relative humidity of (65±5) %.

Test Result

Before the cleansing

The test methods is BS EN ISO 15025:2002, Procedure “A” (surface ignition, flame application time 15 s)	Machine direction			Cross direction		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Whether a hole develops (Yes / No)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lowest boundary of flame reached the vertical edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Lowest boundary of flame reached the top edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hole reached the vertical edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hole reached the top edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Flaming debris (Yes or No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Duration of afterflame (s)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duration of afterglow (s)	0	0	0	0	0	0



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After the cleansing

The test methods is BS EN ISO 15025:2002, Procedure "A" (surface ignition, flame application time 15 s)	Machine direction			Cross direction		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Whether a hole develops (Yes / No)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lowest boundary of flame reached the vertical edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Lowest boundary of flame reached the top edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hole reached the vertical edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Hole reached the top edge (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Flaming debris (Yes / No)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Duration of afterflame (s)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duration of afterglow (s)	0	0	0	0	0	0

Criteria:

No part of any hole nor any part of the lowest boundary of any flame shall reach the top edge or either vertical edge of any specimen. If any part of any hole or any part of the lowest boundary of any flame, reaches the top edge or either vertical edge, or if there is any separation of any flaming debris droplets in the testing of one specimen, a further six specimens shall be tested. If all six new specimens comply with the above requirements, the fabric shall be deemed to conform to the requirements of type "B" of this British Standard.

Statement: This declaration of conformity is only based on the result of this laboratory activity, the impact of the uncertainty of the results was not included.



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Photo Appendix:



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End of Report



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
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ANNEX C

PROGRESSION OF SECONDARY IGNITION



Fire Peak (7 mins 45s)

1 hour 17 mins
(50 mins from decay)

1 hour 39 mins
(1 hour 12 mins from decay)

2 hours 11 mins
(1 hour 44 mins from decay)



1st
Secondary
Ignition



3rd
Secondary
Ignition



5th
Secondary
Ignition

Time

10:50:27

10:58:12

11:17:41

12:07:28

12:15:17

12:29:28

12:33:21

13:01:10

13:24:33



Test start



Fire decay (27 mins)



2nd
Secondary
Ignition

1 hour 24 mins
(57 mins from decay)



4th
Secondary
Ignition

1 hour 43 mins
(1 hour 16 mins from decay)



6th
Secondary
Ignition

2 hours 34 mins
(2 hours 7 mins from decay)

Appendix B

Report on Large-Scale Fire Experiment Base of Sichuan University of Science and Engineering Tests on 2026.4.11-2026.4.27

By

**Prof Richard Kwok Kit YUEN (CityU, HK)
Prof Lin PENG (SUSE, Zigong, Sichuan)¹**

¹ Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, Sichuan

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Test Report in accordance with GB/T 5455-2014..... B-32

Annex III: Sample 3 (Non-FR) Safety Net Test Report in accordance with BS 5867-2:2008 BS 5867-2:2008 Clause 6.3 Test Result B-37

1 Test scenarios

The main materials for this test, including bamboo, flame-retardant (“**FR**”) safety nets, and non-flame-retardant (“**non-FR**”) safety nets, were provided by a supplier who specializes in supplying goods to contractors in Hong Kong. The materials for some of the testing experiments were provided by the Hong Kong Police Force.




Fig. 1. Layout of bamboo scaffolding

The construction of the bamboo scaffolding strictly adhered to the relevant regulations in Hong Kong, and the local workers were trained by Hong Kong-based instructors for a week. The quantity and arrangement of the bamboo scaffolding model closely matched to those of the involved building as shown in Fig. 1. Furthermore, prior to each test, the Hong Kong Fire Services Department verified the quantity and distribution of bamboo to ensure consistency in each scenario.

Table 1 lists the fire scenarios conducted.

Table 1 Test scenarios

Test No.	Date	No. of bamboo layer	Fire Load	Safety Nets *	Bamboo Sticks	Foam Board	Toe-Boards	Staircase Opening
7	11/4	2	10 wooden sticks (Small Fire)	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Purchased in Sichuan	No foam	Purchased in Sichuan	1/F: Wired glass 2/F: Wooden board 3/F: Wooden board
8	11/4		200 wooden sticks (Large Fire)	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Purchased in Sichuan	No foam	Purchased in Sichuan	1/F: Wired glass 2/F: Wooden board 3/F: Wooden board
9	23/4		200 wooden sticks (Large Fire)	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Wang Chi House, Hong Kong	Wang Chi House, Hong Kong	Wang Chi House, Hong Kong	1/F: Fire-resistant glass 2/F: Aluminum composite 3/F: Wooden board
10	24/4			Sample 2 (FR)				
11	27/4		10 wooden sticks (Small Fire)	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Purchased in Sichuan	No foam	Purchased in Sichuan	All fire-resistant glasses
12								
13								

Remarks*

- (i) **Sample 2 (FR) Safety Nets:** While the test report of this sample passing BS 5867-2:2008 is included in the appendix of the expert report on 10 February 2026, the test report of this sample tested in accordance with GB/T 5455-2014 is supplemented in **Annex I**.
- (ii) **Sample 3 (Non-FR) Safety Nets:** The sample has gone through the drying aging process detailed in section 3.2.4 of this report.
- (iii) **Sample 4 (Wang Chi House):** The safety nets were sent by the Hong Kong Police Force to SUSE for fire tests.

3 Full-scale Fire Test - Data Analysis

3.1 Test data on 4/11 (Test No. 7)

3.1.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 2.

Table 2 Weather condition on 4/11

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
19.9	84.7	953	2	Southeast

3.1.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 3 (Non-FR) safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment (small fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 9:23:25 AM on April 11, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 9:30:52 AM, which was around 1.437 MW and the total heat released was around 609.218 MJ.




Fig. 4 HRR curve




Fig. 5 Total Heat released

3.1.3 Temperatures




Fig. 6 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 7 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 8 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 9 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV

3.2 Test data on 4/11 (Test No. 8)

3.2.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 3.

Table 3 Weather condition on 4/11

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
19.2	86.9	939	2.3	South

3.2.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 3 (Non-FR) safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment (large fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 12:03:00 PM on April 11, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 12:15:50 PM, which was around 20.881 MW and the total heat released was around 11317 MJ.




Fig. 10 HRR curve




Fig. 11 Total Heat released

3.2.3 Temperatures




Fig. 12 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 13 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 14 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 15 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV




Fig. 16 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 17 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 18 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 19 Temperature at D of Floor I and II




Fig. 20 Temperature at room L of Floor I




Fig. 21 Temperature at room L of Floor II




Fig. 22 Temperature at room R of Floor I




Fig. 23 Temperature at room R of Floor II

3.2.4 Drying aging process of uncertified safety nets

Safety nets without certificates were collected from the Huangling Experimental Area on April 9, 2026.

The nets were placed in an electric thermostatic blast drying oven (Model: DHG-9400(A)) (“**Equipment**”) (see Figure 24) and heated for 5 hours on April 10, 2026. After vacuum packaging, they were delivered to the experimental area prior to the formal test.

Attenuation Environment and related parameters inside the Equipment:

Temperature: 120° C

(The safety nets begin to shrink and deform after being heated to 120° C);

Heater: Stainless steel heating tubes;

Working Material: 9400A: Stainless steel inner chamber; 9400: Galvanized inner chamber;
Heating Power: 4 kW.




Fig. 24 Electric Thermostatic Blast Drying Oven, DHG-9400 (A)

The drying aging process of uncertified safety nets is divided into three stages: experimental preparation, drying aging, and sample delivery. For details, see the flow chart in Figure 25.




Fig. 25 Drying aging process of uncertified safety nets

The test report of aging uncertified safety nets (i.e. **Sample 3 (Non-FR)**) tested in accordance with GB/T 5455-2014 is detailed in **Annex II**, and that tested in accordance with BS 5867-2:2008 Clause 6.3 is detailed in **Annex III**.

3.3 Test data on 4/23 (Test No. 9)

3.3.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 4.

Table 4 Weather condition on 4/23

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
20.9	71.1	997	1.1	South

3.3.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets, windows-with-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo provided by the Hong Kong authorities were adopted in this experiment (large fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 8:18:56 AM on April 23, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 8:29:51 AM, which was around 25.975 MW and the total heat released was around 11999 MJ.




Fig. 26 HRR curve




Fig. 27 Total Heat released

3.3.3 Temperatures




Fig. 28 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 29 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 30 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 31 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV




Fig. 32 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 33 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 34 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 35 Temperature at D of Floor I and II




Fig. 36 Temperature at E of Floor I and II




Fig. 37 Temperature at room L of Floor I




Fig. 38 Temperature at room L of Floor II




Fig. 39 Temperature at room R of Floor I




Fig. 40 Temperature at room R of Floor II

3.4 Test data on 4/24 (Test No. 10)

3.4.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 5.

Table 5 Weather condition on 4/24

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
26.8	49.1	993	1.2	South

3.4.2 HRR and Total Heat released

This experiment (large fire size) used Sample 2 (FR) safety nets, window foam, and two layers of horizontal bamboo provided by Hong Kong. The ignition time of the experiment was 18:28:52 PM on April 24, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 18:36:35 PM, which was around 27.716 MW and the total heat released was around 1394.41 MJ. The equipment was shut down at 18:36:44 due to the flue pipe being too hot.




Fig. 41 HRR curve




Fig. 42 Total Heat released

3.4.3 Temperatures




Fig. 43 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 44 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 45 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 46 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV




Fig. 47 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 48 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 49 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig. 50 Temperature at D of Floor I and II




Fig. 51 Temperature at E of Floor I and II




Fig. 52 Temperature at room L of Floor I




Fig. 53 Temperature at room L of Floor II




Fig. 54 Temperature at room R of Floor I




Fig. 55 Temperature at room R of Floor II

3.5 Test data on 4/27 (Test No. 11)

3.5.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 6.

Table 6 Weather condition on 4/27

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
20	91.9	978	1.7	North

3.5.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 2 (FR) safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment (small fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 9:19:04 AM on April 27, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 9:27:58 AM, which was around 1.011 MW and the total heat released was around 281.573 MJ.




Fig. 56 HRR curve




Fig.57 Total Heat released

3.5.3 Temperatures




Fig. 58 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 59 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 60Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 61 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV

3.6 Test data on 4/27 (Test No. 12)

3.6.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 7.

Table 7 Weather condition on 4/27

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
21.4	85.3	980	1.9	Southeast

3.6.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 3 (non-FR) safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment (small fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 12:09:16 AM on April 27, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 12:25:27 AM, which was around 0.620 MW and the total heat released was around 1453.573 MJ.




Fig. 62 HRR curve




Fig. 63 Total Heat released

3.6.3 Temperatures




Fig. 64 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 65 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 66 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 67 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV

3.7 Test data on 4/27 (Test No. 13)

3.7.1 Weather condition

The weather parameters on the day of the experiment are summarized in the Table 8.

Table 8 Weather condition on 4/27

Temperature (°C)	Humidity(%RH)	Atmospheric pressure (hPa)	Wind (m/s)	Direction
21.3	85.3	1004	1.7	Southwest

3.7.2 HRR and Total Heat released

Sample 4 (Wang Chi House) safety nets, windows-without-foam and two layers of horizontal bamboo were adopted in this experiment (small fire size). The ignition time of the experiment was 18:47:30 PM on April 27, 2026. The HRR reached its peak at 19:58:09 PM, which was around 11.576 MW and the total heat released was around 6886 MJ.




Fig. 68 HRR curve




Fig. 69 Total Heat released

3.7.3 Temperatures




Fig. 70 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree I




Fig. 71 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree II




Fig. 72 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree III




Fig. 73 Temperature of Thermocouple Tree IV




Fig. 74 Temperature at A of Floor I and II




Fig. 75 Temperature at B of Floor I and II




Fig. 76 Temperature at C of Floor I and II




Fig.77 Temperature at D of Floor I and II




Fig. 78 Temperature at E of Floor I and II




Fig. 79 Temperature at room L of Floor I




Fig. 80 Temperature at room L of Floor II




Fig. 81 Temperature at room R of Floor I




Fig. 82 Temperature at room R of Floor II

Annex I :

Sample 2 (FR) Safety Nets Test Report in accordance with GB/T 5455-2014



中国认可
国际互认
检测
TESTING
CNAS L17416

检 验 报 告

报告编号：2026-WTCJC030021



样品名称： 阻燃安全网

委托单位： 四川轻化工大学消防与安全工程学院


检验类别： 委托检验



招商局检测认证（重庆）有限公司
国家消防及阻燃产品质量检验检测中心（重庆）
(电子)

招商局检测认证（重庆）有限公司
国家消防及阻燃产品质量检验检测中心（重庆）

检 验 报 告



报告编号：2026-WTCJC030021共 3 页 第 1 页

样品名称	阻燃安全网	检验类别	委托检验
规格型号	18米×1.8米	商 标	/
委托单位	四川轻化工大学消防与安全工程学院		
地址/电话	四川省自贡市四川轻化工大学汇东校区		
生产单位	ZHAOQING GAOYAO PENGYUAN BUILDING MATERIALS CO.,LTD.	样品状态	外观无异常
生产日期	2025-12-05	样品等级	合格品
抽样地点	/	样品数量	1张
抽样日期	/	抽样基数	/
检验日期	2026-03-05至2026-03-06	制样日期	2026-03-05
检验项目	具体见报告附表		
检验依据	GB/T 3453-2014《纺织品 燃烧性能 垂直方向损毁长度、阴燃和续燃时间的测定》		
判定依据	GB 5725-2009《安全网》		
检验结论	该样品经检验，所检项目符合GB 5725-2009标准要求。  报告签发日期：2026年03月10日 (电子)		
备注	报告中“/”表示无内容。		

招商局检测认证
检验检测中心
(重庆)
检验

批准： 董朋朋 审核： 王傲 编制： 吴朝辉

报告附表

报告编号：2026-WTCJC030021

共 3 页 第 2 页

序号	检验项目		单位	技术指标	检验结果	判定
1	阻燃性能	纵向续燃时间	s	≤4	条件A： 0.0\条件B： 0.0	合格
		纵向阴燃时间	s	≤4	条件A： 0.0\条件B： 0.0	
		横向续燃时间	s	≤4	条件A： 0.0\条件B： 0.0	
		横向阴燃时间	s	≤4	条件A： 0.0\条件B： 0.0	

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报告附页

报告编号: 2026-WTCJC030021

共 3 页 第 3 页



图1. 样品外观照片

用章

Annex II:

Sample 3 (Non-FR) Safety Nets

Test Report in accordance with

GB/T 5455-2014



中国认可
国际互认
检测
TESTING
CNAS L17416

检 验 报 告

报告编号：2026-WTCJC030128

样品名称：非阻燃安全网

委托单位：四川轻化工大学消防与安全工程学院


检验类别：委托检验

招商局检测认证（重庆）有限公司
国家消防及阻燃产品质量检验检测中心（重庆）



招商局检测认证（重庆）有限公司
国家消防及阻燃产品质量检验检测中心（重庆）

检 验 报 告



报告编号：2026-WTCJC030128

共 3 页 第 1 页

样品名称	非阻燃安全网		检验类别	委托检验
规格型号	18米×1.8米		商 标	/
委托单位	四川轻化工大学消防与安全工程学院			
地址/电话	四川省自贡市四川轻化工大学汇东校区			
生产单位	ZHAOQING GAOYAO PENGYUAN BUILDING MATERIALS CO.,LTD.	样品状态	外观无异常	
生产日期	2025-12-05	样品等级	合格品	
抽样地点	/	样品数量	1张	
抽样日期	/	抽样基数	/	
检验日期	2026-03-23至2026-03-25	到样日期	2026-03-23	
检验项目	具体见报告附表			
检验依据	GB/T 3455-2014《纺织品 燃烧性能 垂直方向损毁长度、阴燃和续燃时间的测定》			
判定依据	GB 5725-2009《安全网》			
检验结论	该样品经检验，阻燃性能项目不符合GB 5725-2009标准要求。  报告签发日期 2026年03月25日 (电子)			
备注	1、报告中“/”表示无内容。			

检验

批准：冉少金

审核：王傲

编制：吴朝辉

报告附表

报告编号: 2026-WTCJC030128

共 3 页 第 2 页

序号	检验项目		单位	技术指标	检验结果	判定
1	阻燃性能	纵向续燃时间	s	≤4	条件A:10.8 条件B:12.0	不合格
		纵向阴燃时间	s	≤4	条件A:0.0 条件B:0.0	
		横向续燃时间	s	≤4	条件A:12.9 条件B:11.0	
		横向阴燃时间	s	≤4	条件A:0.0 条件B:0.0	

以下空白



报告附表

报告编号: 2026-WTCJC030128

共 3 页 第 3 页



图1. 样品外观照片

味
用章

Annex III:

Sample 3 (Non-FR) Safety Nets
Test Report in accordance with BS
5867-2:2008



FUGRO TECHNICAL SERVICES (GUANGZHOU) LIMITED
No. 6 Nongye Gongsi Road
Caotang, Hualong, Panyu
Guangzhou
China

Supplementary Report
Statement of Conformity of Flammability Testing of Fabrics
(protective nets/screens/tarpaulin/plastic sheeting)

Test Method: BS EN ISO 15025:2002 (Procedure A - Surface Ignition) Test Report No.: G26765FU267444(1)

Specification: BS 5867-2:2008 Cl. 6.3 (Type "B" performance requirements) Page: 1 of 1

Date of Issue: 01/04/2026

Part 1 - Customer Information			
Name of Customer: 四川轻化工大学			
Address of Customer: 四川省自贡市四川轻化工大学汇东校区			
Project Name: --			
Part 2 - Test Results			
Test Report No.	Lab. Sample I.D.	Client Sample Ref.	Results (Pass / Fail)
G26765FU267444	FU267444	--	Fail
Remark: 1. Fugro Technical Services (Guangzhou) Limited did not get involve in sampling. 2. All test results relate to the tested samples only.			
			FUGRO PRELIMINARY TEST RESULT This result is released for information only and is not a formal report. Please note that the contents of this report may be revised. Released by:
Approved Signatory:			Yan Cai Sheng (Deputy General Manager)

** End of Report **



FUGRO TECHNICAL SERVICES (GUANGZHOU) LIMITED

No. 6 Nongye Gongsi Road

Caotang, Hualong, Panyu

Guangzhou

China

Test Report on Flammability Testing of Fabrics (protective nets/screens/tarpaulin/plastic sheeting)

Test Method: BS EN ISO 15025:2002 (Procedure A - Surface Ignition)

Test Report No.: G26765FU267444

Specification: BS 5867-2:2008 Cl. 6.3 (Type "B" performance requirements)

Page: 1 of 2

Date of Issue: 01/04/2026



Part 1 - Customer Information											
Name of Customer: 四川轻化工大学											
Address of Customer: 四川省自贡市四川轻化工大学汇东校区											
Project Name: -											
Part 2 - Site Information (as provided by Customer)											
BD Ref. No. / Statutory Order / Notice / Direction / MW Submission No.: --											
Name of Building: -											
Address: -											
Part 3 - Sample Details (as provided by Customer)											
Manufacturer: -											
Supplier: -											
Product No.: -											
Lot No.: -											
Sample Description: 非阻燃安全网											
Sampling Method: -											
Sampling Date: -											
Sampling Time: -											
Sample Serial No.: -											
Sample Dimensions (Width x Length): 18米 X 1.8米											
Location of Off-site Sampling: -											
Part 4 - Test Results											
Date of sample delivery: 27/03/2026											
Date of test: 31/03/2026											
Test location: No. 6 Nongye Gongsi Road, Caotang, Hualong, Panyu, Guangzhou, China											
Conditioning atmosphere: Temperature: 20 ± 2 °C, Relative humidity: (85 ± 5)%, Duration: ≥ 24 h											
Ambient conditions during test: Temperature: 25 °C, Relative humidity: 74%											
Supporting technique: By pins											
Pretreatment: No cleaning and soaking											
Surface exposed: Any surface											
Type of gas used during testing: Propane											
Flame application time: 15 s											
Lab. Sample I.D.	Direction	Whether any flaming reaches the upper edge or either vertical edge		Whether any hole reaches the upper edge or either vertical edge		Any occurrence of debris	Whether debris ignite the filter paper (flaming debris)		Whether afterglow spreads beyond the flame spread area into the undamaged area	After-flame time (s)	After-glow time (s)
		Result	Requirement	Result	Requirement		Result	Requirement			
FU267444/01	Machine	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	12	0
FU267444/02	Machine	No		No		No	Yes		Yes	27	0
FU267444/03	Machine	No		No		No	Yes		Yes	20	0
FU267444/04	Cross	Yes		Yes		No	Yes		No	19	0
FU267444/05	Cross	Yes		Yes		No	Yes		No	9	0
FU267444/06	Cross	No		No		No	Yes		No	0	0
Specification of BS 5867-2:2008, 6.3 Type "B" performance requirements: No part of any hole nor any part of the lowest boundary of any flame shall reach the top edge or either vertical edge of the sample. If any part of any hole or any part of the lowest boundary of any flame, reaches the top edge or either vertical edge, or if there is any separation of any flaming debris droplets in the testing of one specimen, a further six specimens shall be tested. If all six new specimens comply with the above requirements, the fabric shall be deemed to conform to the requirements for type "B" of this British Standard.											
Remark: 1. Fugro Technical Services (Guangzhou) Limited did not get involve in sampling. 2. All test results relate to the tested samples only. 3. Photos of the specimens before and after the test are recorded in Appendix I.											
Tested by: Bai Yongliang (Technician)						Approved Signatory: Yan Cai Sheng (Deputy General Manager)					

FU-R-59(20/03/2026)

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Guangzhou


China

Appendix I - Photos of the specimens before and after the test

Test Report No.: G28785FU267444

Page: 2 of 2

Date of Issue: 01/04/2026



Before the test



After the test

“ End of Report ”

FU-R-59(2003/2026)

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Appendix C

Bench-Scale Fire Performance Testing of Materials from the Wang Fuk Court Fire Incident, Hong Kong

By

Prof Richard Kwok Kit YUEN (CityU)

Prof Eric Wai Ming LEE (CityU)

Prof Anthony Chun Yin YUEN (PolyU)

Prof Timothy Bo Yuen CHEN (CityU)

Prof Bin FEI (PolyU)

Date: 7th May 2026

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1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to quantify the fire performance (thermal stability, ignition, burn duration, heat release and smoke production) of materials found on-site to provide scientific evidence for their behaviour and contribution towards the rapid fire spread during the fire incident at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025. Bench-scale fire tests were conducted on key materials recovered from Wang Fuk Court or materials representative of those used during the renovation of Wang Fuk Court: white foamboard, orange toe-board, plywood, bamboo, and scaffolding/construction safety nets with various flame-retardant (“FR”) properties.

2. Methodology

2.1 Material Sample Collection

The first lot of on-site material samples collected from the Wang Fuk Court fire incident were documented in the Preliminary Fire Engineering Expert Report (“PER”) provided in *Annex B of Appendix A*. The samples include the following materials collected from Wang Yan House: safety nets, foamboard (now referred to as “polystyrene window covers”), orange toe-board, plywood (now referred to as “wooden planks”) and bamboo. Identical types of materials were collected from the Sichuan full-scale experiments site for use in the cone calorimetry tests. The non-FR safety net previously purchased for the initial fire tests referenced in the PER is now referred to as “uncertified safety nets” for more accurate naming convention.

Subsequently, a second lot of material samples were collected for bench-scale fire testing which include:

1. Samples collected from Wang Chi House on 17 March 2026 with assistance from the Fire Services Department (FSD), which include (i) one bamboo sample, (ii) one green safety net sample from higher level and one green safety net sample from low level, (iii) orange toe-board and (iv) polystyrene window covers (sample shown in Figure 1).
2. Samples of non-flame retardant (“**non-FR**”) safety nets¹ from Sichuan on 9 April 2026 (Figure 2a).
3. Non-FR blue-white canvas collected from the FSD on 9 April 2026 (Figure 2b).
4. FR white canvas collected from the Hong Kong Police Force on 30 April 2026 (Figure 2c).
5. Carton box samples from packaging boxes in CityU laboratory.

¹ Uncertified safety net samples were thermally deteriorated for at least 4 hours in an electric thermostatic forced-air drying oven (4 kW) at 120°C to become non-FR. The non-FR safety nets were non-compliant with both GB 5725-2009 and BS 5867-2:2008 standards.



Figure 1. Image of the samples collected from Wang Chi House on 17 March 2026.




Figure 2. Image of the collected samples: (a) Non-FR safety nets, (b) New non-FR blue-white canvas and (c) New FR white canvas

2.2 Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA)

The experiments were performed on a PerkinElmer STA 6000 thermogravimetry instrument, with sample masses of approximately $5 \text{ mg} \pm 1 \text{ mg}$ and for three heating rates (5, 10 and $20 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}/\text{min}$) from $20 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ to $800 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ under a nitrogen environment. Apart from the white foamboard, all the other material samples were prepared by grinding into a powder before testing.

2.3 Cone Calorimeter Tests

Cone calorimeter tests were carried out with the cone calorimeter apparatus (FTT, UK) according to ISO 5660 standards. All samples were cut to $100 \text{ mm} \times 100 \text{ mm}$, then wrapped in aluminium foil with the upper surface exposed. The distance between the cone heater and test surface was set as 25 cm and the test were conducted under a constant $35 \text{ kW}/\text{m}^2$ incident heat flux. For the safety net and canvas samples, due to the significant material shrinkage undergone by the samples when they are placed under a radiant heat flux, the test results will vary significantly depending on how and at which direction the samples shrink and deform. Therefore, a 1 mm fine wired grid with wire spacing of 10 mm was placed on top of the samples

to control the material shrinkage and prevent the samples from coming into contact with the spark plug. These measures will enhance the consistency of the test results. For the bamboo samples, depending on the original diameter of samples, the circular sections were sliced into 2 to 4 approximately equal pieces and placed horizontally onto the sample holder.

3. Results

The combined results from the PER² (on the first lot of material samples) and the new sample tests (on the second lot of material samples) are presented below, including detailed TGA and cone calorimeter data. Key parameters for TGA include onset temperature (T_{onset}), temperature at 10% mass loss ($T_{10\%}$), main peak temperature (T_p), derivative thermogravimetry (DTG) peak rate, and residual weight at 800°C. For cone calorimeter, parameters include time to ignition (TTI), peak heat release rate (pHRR), time to pHRR (t_{pHRR}), total heat release (THR), burn duration, peak smoke production rate (pSPR), total smoke production (TSP), and effective heat of combustion (EHC). Averages and standard deviations are provided where multiple replicates were tested to account for variability.

3.1 TGA Data Summary

The results from the TGA analysis are summarized in **Table 1**. In the table, the Wang Fuk Safety Nets result is the averaged result for all the safety net samples collected from Wang Chi House and Wang Yan House. The critical parameters that are analysed include:

1. Onset temperature (T_{onset}) – the temperature at which the sample starts to degrade
2. Temperature at 10% mass loss ($T_{10\%}$) – indicator of initial thermal stability, less sensitive to minor early losses like moisture
3. Peak reaction rate temperature / main peak temperature (T_p) – the temperature at which the maximum reaction/degradation rate occurs
4. Peak reaction rate (DTG peak rate) – the peak rate of mass change observed during thermogravimetric analysis (TGA).
5. Residual weight at 800°C – mass remaining at 800°C, indicating char formation

Table 1. Thermogravimetric Analysis (TGA) results of material samples.

Sample	heating rate	onset temperature	temperature at 10% mass loss	main peak temperature	DTG peak rate	residual weight at 800°C
	(C/min)	T_{onset} (C)	$T_{10\%}$ (C)	T_p (C)	(%/C)	(wt.%)
Bamboo	5	68.47	242.41	321.64	0.77	0.56
	10	84.07	265.15	342.22	0.77	0.93
	20	101.62	283.34	359.56	0.76	8.27
Toe-board	5	303.92	348.97	403.55	1.28	6.2
	10	288.76	352.22	421.01	1.11	3.92
	20	316.05	385.36	455.12	1.19	2.77
Polystyrene Window Covers	5	279.66	331.21	377.54	1.56	1.82

² Details provided in [Annex B of Appendix A](#).

	10	338.14	373.23	404.63	1.81	0.89
	20	357.42	386.45	421.09	1.71	0
Wooden Planks	5	54.4	239.8	317.52	0.74	0.12
	10	70.21	260.17	338.1	0.74	0.46
	20	92.09	281.18	358.69	0.77	7.28
Wang Fuk Safety Nets	5	309.64	379.48	452.52	1.86	0.75
	10	327.58	399.01	467.91	1.77	1.15
	20	351.71	422.72	483	1.52	1.66
Uncertified Safety Nets	5	312.06	407.07	460.19	2.53	0
	10	321.41	412.37	465.01	2.24	0.33
	20	342.62	420.47	480.62	1.93	0.42

Sample	heating rate	onset temperature	temperature at 10% mass loss	main peak temperature	DTG peak rate	residual weight at 800°C
Non-FR Safety Nets	5	304.43	393.94	449.84	2.15	0
	10	317.99	414.47	464.71	2.27	0
	20	365.35	431.67	475.59	2.20	0.32
FR Safety Nets	5	320.5	411.48	445.79	2.46	0.33
	10	328.75	418.71	461.10	2.13	0.05
	20	351.75	429.13	476.23	2.21	0.56

The overall comparison between the different scaffolding materials have been discussed in the PER³. The key observations were that TGA test results show that the bamboo and wooden planks samples (i.e. cellulosic materials) exhibit lower thermal stability than the polymeric materials (i.e. polystyrene window covers, toe-board, and safety nets). While cellulosic materials begin losing significant mass at lower temperatures, their slower mass loss rate and charring behaviour may better limit the release of combustible volatiles than the polymers; in principle, cellulosic materials may therefore play a less critical role in ignition and fire spread than polymeric materials.

Focusing on the four different types of safety nets (i.e. Wang Fuk Safety Nets, Uncertified Safety Nets, Non-FR Safety Nets and FR Safety Nets), the Non-FR Safety Nets exhibited a low onset temperature (304.43°C) and a low temperature at 10 % mass loss $T_{10\%}$ (393.94 °C), which are attributed to the ageing process that was applied to reduce the thermal stability of the material, causing it to decompose earlier under fire conditions. The FR Safety Nets showed the highest onset temperature (320.5°C) and the highest $T_{10\%}$ (411.48°C), indicating that the addition of flame retardants suppressed the initial stage of thermal degradation, thereby delaying early mass loss. However, its DTG peak mass loss rate (2.46 %/°C) is higher than those of the Non-FR Safety Nets (2.15 %/°C) and Wang Fuk Safety Nets (1.86 %/°C). This

³ Details provided in *Annex B of Appendix A*.

suggests that while the flame retardant delays the start of pyrolysis, the material may experience a more rapid decomposition once it starts to pyrolyse.

The Wang Fuk Safety Nets have an average onset temperature (309.64 °C) and its average temperature at 10 % mass loss (379.48°C) is the lowest of all net samples, even lower than the $T_{10\%}$ of Non-FR Safety Nets (393.94°C), indicating a high susceptibility to early-stage decomposition. The main peak DTG peak mass loss rate (1.86 %/°C) was lower than that of all the other three net samples (2.15–2.53 %/°C) which indicates a slightly lower decomposition rate yet comparably in the same order of magnitude.

Overall, the pyrolysis characteristics of the Wang Fuk Safety Nets are the most similar to those of the Non-FR and Uncertified Safety Nets. The results indicate that the Wang Fuk Safety Nets will start to thermally degrade at the lowest temperature, but the peak mass loss rate (i.e. DTG) is lower compared to other safety net samples which indicates a slightly lower decomposition rate yet comparably in the same order of magnitude.

4 Cone Calorimeter Results

Each test was repeated at least 2 times to improve the consistency of the test results. For all the cone calorimeter tests, the key features of the test results are summarized in the tables below. The critical parameters that are analyzed include:

1. Time to ignition (TTI)
2. Peak heat release rate (pHRR)
3. Time to peak heat release (t_pHRR)
4. Burn duration
5. Peak smoke production rate (pSPR)
6. Total smoke production (TSP)
7. Effective heat of combustion (EHC)
8. Carbon Monoxide production (COP)
9. Carbon Dioxide production (CO2P)

4.1 Comparison of Fire Performance Across Different Materials

Table 2 compiled the averaged results for each type of material that was collected from the fire scene for testing. Compared to the PER⁴, additional COP and CO2P data have been added to the summary tables. A revision has been made to the TTI values for the “Safety Net 2 Layer” value. In one of the tests (“mesh_2layer_test_09”, in the Wang Yan House sample set), there were some erroneous readings from the load cell which caused the test to be invalid. That data point has been removed from the average calculation.

Table 2. Summary of the averaged cone calorimeter test results for the different types of materials collected from the fire scene at Wang Fuk Court.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Polystyrene Window Covers	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1	0.004427	0.11651
Toe-board	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8	0.000886	0.056797
Wooden Planks	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361	0.00079	0.087634
Bamboo	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211	0.001769	0.16804
Safety Net 2 Layer	49	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29	0.001002	0.060841
Safety Net 4 Layer	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5	0.001385	0.083279

⁴ Details provided in [Annex B of Appendix A](#).

4.2 Comparison of fire performance between fire scene and the Sichuan full-scale fire experiment

Table 3 compares averaged results between materials collected from the fire scene and those tested during the Sichuan experiment and the calculated relative difference between the two groups of samples. The comparison was discussed in detail in the PER.

Table 3 compiled the averaged results for each type of materials collected for fire testing.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)
Polystyrene Window Covers	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1
Polystyrene Window Covers (Sichuan)	31	233.7	71	7.3	59	0.175	4.43	13.4
Relative difference %	48%	41%	24%	48%	30%	25%	42%	26%
Toe-board	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8
Toe-board (Sichuan)	42	320.9	100	31.9	178	0.087	7.14	30
Relative difference %	-121%	-12%	-138%	-267%	-89%	-61%	-328%	3%
Wooden Planks	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361
Wooden Planks (Sichuan)	59	313	132	20.4	94	0.029	1.03	9.9
Relative difference %	9%	-103%	65%	40%	73%	-164%	-6%	15%
Bamboo	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211
Bamboo (Sichuan)	110	295.7	211	30.7	172	0.028	1.65	8.5
Relative difference %	2%	2%	-29%	34%	43%	-33%	-27%	44%
Wang Fuk Safety Net 2 Layer	49	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29
Uncertified Safety Net 2 Layer (Sichuan)	50	128.9	106	4	60	0.023	0.47	29.5
Relative difference %	2%	20%	-5%	18%	-13%	39%	56%	-2%
FR Safety Net 2 layer (Sichuan)	86	170.8	151	6.1	70	0.045	1.29	30.4
Relative difference %	-43%	-6%	-50%	-24%	-32%	-18%	-21%	-5%
Non-FR Net-2 Layer (Sichuan)	52	211.5	106	8.4	91	0.035	1.17	21.9
Relative difference %	13%	-31%	-5%	-72%	-72%	8%	-9%	24%
Wang Fuk Safety Net 4 Layer	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5
Uncertified Safety Net 4 Layer (Sichuan)	46	203.8	124	8.2	84	0.039	1.01	31.2
Relative difference %	-5%	8%	-41%	23%	-4%	22%	56%	-6%
FR Safety Net 4 Layer (Sichuan)	76	233	172	12.1	102	0.059	2.6	30.3
Relative difference %	-73%	-5%	-95%	-14%	-26%	-18%	-14%	-3%
Non-FR Net-4 Layer (Sichuan)	48	270.4	132.5	15.8	101.5	0.041	1.90	21.2
Relative difference %	-9%	-22%	-51%	-49%	-25%	18%	17%	28%

4.3 Comparison between FR and non-FR, Uncertified and Wang Fuk Safety Nets

Table 4 summarizes the fire performance parameters of the non-FR, uncertified, and FR safety nets in comparison with the Wang Fuk Safety Nets in both 2-layer and 4-layer configurations.

The Wang Fuk Safety Nets recorded TTI values of 49 s, which closely align with the uncertified nets (50 s) and the non-FR safety nets (52 s). These low TTI values categorize the Wang Fuk Safety Nets as “readily ignitable”, matching the behaviour of other hazardous site materials such as toe-boards and nylon strips. In contrast, the FR safety nets demonstrated significantly improved fire resistance, with TTI values reaching 86 s. This is also reflected in the highest t_{pHRR} of 151 s for the FR safety net compared to the other three types of safety nets at around 100 - 106 s.

In terms of heat release, the non-FR safety nets exhibited the highest pHRR and the highest THR across all configurations. The Wang Fuk Safety Nets and FR safety nets occupied an intermediate range, with pHRR values of 160.9 kW/m² and 170.8 kW/m² respectively (for 2-layer samples), while the uncertified safety nets consistently recorded the lowest pHRR (128.9 kW/m²) and THR. It means that once the safety net materials start burning, the non-FR safety nets are the most hazardous, exhibiting the highest peak heat release, while the uncertified safety nets consistently recorded the lowest heat release value but is negated by the fact that it ignites very quickly. So, although the FR safety nets and Wang Fuk Safety Nets have similar pHRR, the FR safety nets take much longer to ignite in the first place, which is the most critical factor in preventing a small flame from spreading across a construction site.

Regarding Carbon Monoxide production (COP), the FR safety nets exhibited the highest values. This is likely attributed to the flame-retardant additives; while these chemicals are effective at increasing the TTI and delaying the time to reach pHRR, they can also promote incomplete combustion, which yields higher concentrations of CO.

In summary, the Wang Fuk Safety Nets demonstrate a fire performance similar to that of uncertified and non-FR safety nets. Its low TTI facilitates rapid ignition from secondary sources, such as flaming droplets, which causes the safety nets to act as a catalyst for fire spread to adjacent combustibles and escalates the overall intensity of the fire.

Table 4 compiled the averaged results for all safety net samples collected for fire testing.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_{pHRR}	THR	Burn Duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Wang Fuk Safety Net 2 Layer	49	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29	0.001002	0.060841
Uncertified Safety Net 2 Layer (Sichuan)	50	128.9	106	4	60	0.023	0.47	29.5	0.000606	0.040742
Non-FR Safety Net 2 Layer	52.0	211.54	106.00	8.43	91	0.045	1.29	30.4	0.000843145	0.056324
FR Safety Net 2 Layer (Sichuan)	86	170.8	151	6.1	70	0.045	1.29	30.4	0.001377	0.0508
Wang Fuk Safety Net 4 Layer	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5	0.001385	0.083279
Non-FR Safety Net 4 Layer	48	270.36	132.5	15.815	101.5	0.059	2.6	30.3	0.0013487	0.097076
Uncertified Safety Net 4 Layer (Sichuan)	46	203.8	124	8.2	84	0.039	1.01	31.2	0.000809	0.057585
FR Safety Net 4 Layer (Sichuan)	76	233	172	12.1	102	0.059	2.6	30.3	0.002016	0.07184

4.4 Comparison between FR and non-FR canvas

Table 5 compiled the averaged results for the non-FR blue-white canvas and FR white canvas. Comparing the results, the most dramatic difference between the two samples is the peak heat release rate of 116 kW/m^2 for the non-FR blue-white canvas as compared to the exceptionally low value of 23.73 kW/m^2 for the FR white canvas. This demonstrates the fire suppression capability of the FR treatment. During the test, there was significant charring observed from the FR white canvas.

However, the TTI of 49 s for the FR white canvas is faster than the 77.5 s recorded for the non-FR blue-white canvas. The early ignition may be attributed to the significant char formation observed during the FR white canvas test. It decomposes at lower temperatures to build a protective char layer which suppresses heat release as indicated by the lower THR and EHC as compared to the non-FR blue-white canvas.

In summary, the FR canvas decomposes faster by turning into char rather than feeding the flames. Under a constant radiant heat flux, FR canvas technically catches fire more quickly than the non-FR canvas, but it does so with very little intensity. While the standard non-FR blue-white canvas takes longer to ignite, it burns much more aggressively once it starts.

Table 5 compiled the averaged results for FR white canvas and non-FR blue-white canvas.

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m ²)	(s)	(MJ/m ²)	(s)	(m ² /s)	(m ²)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Non-FR Blue-White Canvas	77.5	116.41	120	3.89	56.5	0.0228	0.709	35.06	0.00069	0.044
FR White Canvas	49	23.73	94.8	1.85	95.8	0.0211	1.12	12.05	0.00075	0.0111

5. Cone Calorimeter Results

5.1 Wang Yan House Samples

White Foamboard

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
foam_test_01	50	362.5	89	14.3	94	0.199	7.67	20.4	0.003917	0.1044
foam_test_02	87	351.7	122	14.4	88	0.215	8.51	20.3	0.004354	0.11572
foam_test_03	96	371.9	124	12.4	75	0.252	7.43	19	0.004543	0.11155
foam_test_04	44	417.7	75	14.5	80	0.228	7.35	21.4748	0.004493	0.12169
foam_test_05	54	403.2	78	13.4	81	0.244	7.34	28.207	0.004105	0.1092
foam_test_06	54	424.4	88	13.9	76	0.237	7.37	21.1	0.004608	0.12232
foam_test_07	36	425.8	73	14.6	91	0.221	7.98	20.9	0.005231	0.14246
foam_test_08	58	401.5	95	14.3	88	0.273	7.98	10.6	0.004162	0.1047
AVERAGE	60	394.9	93	14	84	0.234	7.7	18.1	0.004427	0.11651
STDEV	21	29	20	0.7	7	0.023	0.42	4.7	0.000403	0.01253

Orange Toe Board

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
toeboard_test_01	21	271.9	44	8.8	129	0.046	1.56	32	0.000552	0.039552
toeboard_test_02	19	272.8	41	8.2	65	0.046	1.59	30	0.001055	0.071961
toeboard_test_03	16	315.2	40	9.1	88	0.069	1.87	30.4	0.001051	0.058878
AVERAGE	19	286.6	42	8.7	94	0.054	1.67	30.8	0.000886	0.056797
STDEV	3	24.8	2	0.4	32	0.014	0.17	1.1	0.00029	0.016304

Plywood

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
plywood_test_01	79	127.9	408	34.9	391	0.01	1.08	11.6282	0.000671	0.0795
plywood_test_02	58	143.1	401	33.9	377	0.011	0.78	12.3002	0.000853	0.07821
plywood_test_03	59	191.4	331	33.9	287	0.013	1.06	10.98	0.000847	0.10519
AVERAGE	65	154.1	380	34.2	352	0.011	0.97	11.6361	0.00079	0.087634
STDEV	12	33.2	43	0.6	56	0.002	0.17	0	0.000103	0.015219

Bamboo

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
bamboo_test_01	143	286.1	177	73.1	617	0.019	1.03	17.2209	0.001366	0.10866
bamboo_test_02	89	348.2	184	33.6	124	0.02	1.33	14.8178	0.00207	0.22458
bamboo_test_03	104	270.9	128	32.6	169	0.024	1.54	13.6246	0.001872	0.1709
AVERAGE	112	301.8	163	46.4	303	0.021	1.3	15.2211	0.001769	0.16804
STDEV	28	41	31	23.1	273	0.003	0.26	0.5	0.000363	0.058014

Wang Yan Safety Net

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_2layer_test_01	27	171.2	67	5.7	54	0.044	1.16	27.6	0.000908	0.0656
mesh_2layer_test_02	69	130.3	104	4.3	39	0.03	1.49	25.3	0.001072	0.064013
mesh_2layer_test_03	33	174.8	65	4.5	42	0.046	0.94	36.6	0.001346	0.069858
mesh_2layer_test_04	36	187.7	84	5.8	55	0.037	1	29.9	0.000898	0.071424
mesh_2layer_test_05	36	128	81	5.2	61	0.035	1.16	24.1	0.000925	0.052832

mesh_2layer_test_06	75	175.5	119	4.8	51	0.038	0.91	30	0.001135	0.060684
mesh_2layer_test_07	78	158.3	124	5.7	62	0.04	1.28	26.2	0.001059	0.056345
mesh_2layer_test_08	42	115.4	98	4.2	74	0.028	0.93	33.6	0.000522	0.038917
mesh_2layer_test_09 (*removed outlier)	160	191.6	193	4	41	0.042	0.9	NaN	0.001186	0.069816
mesh_2layer_test_10	42	176.3	77	4.4	50	0.038	0.93	27.6	0.000972	0.058923
AVERAGE	49	160.9	101	4.9	53	0.038	1.07	29	0.001002	0.060841
STDEV	18.5	26.9	38	0.7	11	0.006	0.2	4	0.000209	0.009356

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_4layer_test_01	24	176.2	71	10.5	83	0.044	1.87	32.6	0.001046	0.080362
mesh_4layer_test_02	27	172.5	78	10.8	94	0.044	2.21	25.3	0.001046	0.07143
mesh_4layer_test_03	37	356.7	73	10.8	62	0.069	3.07	26.8	0.001805	0.10377
mesh_4layer_test_04	40	269.5	90	16.7	106	0.058	3.13	29.7	0.00139	0.098068
mesh_4layer_test_05	96	179.3	133	8.8	85	0.049	2.54	24.6	0.001401	0.065506
mesh_4layer_test_06	44	181.2	87	9.2	89	0.041	1.81	32.6	0.001181	0.06549
mesh_4layer_test_07	49	213.7	95	13.7	101	0.059	3.31	31.5	0.001278	0.082897
mesh_4layer_test_08	37	249.9	84	8.1	60	0.051	1.39	29.5	0.001495	0.092219
mesh_4layer_test_09	51	179.4	94	8	68	0.033	1.41	30.2	0.001388	0.076898
mesh_4layer_test_10	33	244.7	76	9.7	65	0.056	2.05	32	0.001824	0.096152
AVERAGE	44	222.3	88	10.6	81	0.05	2.28	29.5	0.001385	0.083279
STDEV	20	59.3	18	2.7	17	0.01	0.7	3	0.00027174	0.01377

5.2 Wang Chi House Samples

Wang Chi Safety Net

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
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(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
High_level_net_2L_1	72	101.965	104	3.25007	47	0.0274	1.142523	29.51298	0.000571	0.027778
High_level_net_2L_2	57	101.589	99	3.90406	54	0.024435	0.905523	27.68837	0.000594	0.038001
High_level_net_2L_3	27	115.505	87	3.87326	60	0.026518	0.616772	30.25984	0.000473	0.031618
low_net_2L_1	61	130.083	113	4.65518	47	0.03192	0.738689	34.48281	0.000722	0.039718
low_net_2L_2	30	99.9668	91	4.60125	69	0.029028	0.754108	35.94727	0.000432	0.032527
AVERAGE	49.40	109.82	98.80	4.06	55.40	0.03	0.83	31.58	0.000558	0.033928
STDEV	19.88	12.94	10.35	0.58	9.34	0.00281	0.20	3.49	0.00011	0.00488

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
High_level_net_4L_1	58	170.2	119	8.07022	66	0.041686	1.664883	38.30502	0.001009	0.059614
High_level_net_4L_2	30	198.324	97	8.94297	66	0.038591	1.29394	30.83783	0.000955	0.054538
low_net_4L_1	43	126.85	111	8.92817	96	0.035838	1.357553	36.59086	0.000653	0.044709
low_net_4L_2	60	149.235	142	9.40472	100	0.03953	1.590888	44.40386	0.000759	0.048153
AVERAGE	47.75	161.15	117.25	8.84	82.00	0.04	1.48	37.53	0.00084	0.05175
STDEV	14.06	30.45	18.84	0.56	18.55	0.00242	0.18	5.58	0.00017	0.00664

White Foamboard

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
foam_1	58	209.134	112	14.601	146	0.154016	7.857554	30.72271	0.002278	0.056244
foam_2	52	176.408	115	13.2981	112	0.125308	7.919082	26.86409	0.002637	0.072234
foam_3	116	290.992	167	15.6753	133	0.184602	7.622589	23.96835	0.002861	0.078517
foam_4	43	304.81	97	15.8863	127	0.200913	7.780809	24.36549	0.00327	0.085156
AVERAGE	67.25	245.34	122.75	14.87	129.5	0.17	7.8	26.48	0.00276	0.07304

STDEV	33.08	62.41	30.53	1.19	14.11	0.03	0.13	3.11	0.00042	0.01238
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Orange Toe Board

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
toeboard_1	20	196.999	61	4.93312	42	0.065273	1.59206	19.57587	0.001785	0.090276
toeboard_2	18	244.819	57	7.83358	49	0.076566	1.657936	30.48086	0.001633	0.077063
AVERAGE	19	220.909	59	6.38335	45.5	0.07082	1.624998	25.02836	0.001709	0.083669

Bamboo

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
bamboo_1	104	401.392	166	26.1523	94	0.049427	1.663332	10.47987	0.003077	0.198951
bamboo_2	128	417.04	187	24.7557	79	0.05574	2.609988	9.113419	0.003959	0.238051
AVERAGE	116	409.216	176.5	25.454	86.5	0.052583	2.13666	9.796645	0.003518	0.218501

5.3 Sichuan Full Scale Experiment samples

White Foamboard

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
foam_sichuan_01	31	187.1	74	7.1	062	0.135	4.23	6.2	0.002902	0.082321
foam_sichuan_02	31	280.3	68	7.6	56	0.215	4.63	20.7	0.003972	0.096976
AVERAGE	31	233.7	71	7.3	59	0.175	4.43	13.4	0.003437	0.089649
STDEV	0	65.9	4	0.3	4	0.057	0.29	10.2	0.000756	0.010363

Yellow Toe board

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
toeboard_sichuan_01	43	338.1	104	33.7	179	0.086	7.4	29.4	0.002329	0.10901
toeboard_sichuan_02	40	303.7	95	30	178	0.089	6.89	30.7	0.002118	0.1003
AVERAGE	42	320.9	100	31.9	178	0.087	7.14	30	0.002223	0.10465
STDEV	2	24.3	6	2.7	1	0.002	0.36	0.9	0.000149	0.006157

Plywood

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
plywood_sichuan_01	44	302.6	120	19	92	0.028	0.87	10.1	0.001515	0.15646
plywood_sichuan_02	70	342	122	19.6	80	0.034	1.02	10.1	0.00217	0.15777
plywood_sichuan_03	64	294.5	155	22.4	109	0.026	1.22	9.5	0.001791	0.15708
AVERAGE	59	313	132	20.4	94	0.029	1.03	9.9	0.001825	0.1571
STDEV	14	25.4	20	1.8	15	0.004	0.18	0.3	0.000329	0.000651

Bamboo

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
bamboo_sichuan_01	115	285.6	247	36.6	197	0.028	1.97	8.4	0.001485	0.16113
bamboo_sichuan_02	104	328.2	152	24	114	0.029	1.43	8.5	0.002317	0.18049
bamboo_sichuan_03	107	301.1	186	25.3	114	0.03	1.49	8.3	0.002181	0.19074
bamboo_sichuan_04	114	267.9	258	37	265	0.023	1.7	8.6	0.001674	0.12872
AVERAGE	110	295.7	211	30.7	172	0.028	1.65	8.5	0.0019145	0.16527
STDEV	5	25.6	50	7	73	0.003	0.24	0.1	0.00039793	0.027285

Black nylon strips

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
nylon_strip_sichuan01	36	329.363	115	20.7583	116	0.06283	3.10473	27.72447	0.001636	0.109266
nylon_strip_sichuan02	37	244.788	93	18.7042	100	0.06767	3.572102	29.77952	0.001756	0.107845
nylon_strip_sichuan03	35	344.049	118	19.6464	124	0.062067	2.781724	22.34254	0.001433	0.096405
AVERAGE	36	306.067	108.667	19.703	113.333	0.064	3.153	26.616	0.001608	0.104505
STDEV	1	53.574	13.650	1.028	12.220	0.003	0.397	3.841	0.000163	0.007051

FR Safety Nets

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_2layer_FR_Sichu	80	169.5	145	6.1	68	0.046	1.34	29.4	0.001526	0.054032
mesh_2layer_FR_Sichu	92	172.2	157	6.1	72	0.044	1.23	31.4	0.001228	0.047569
AVERAGE	86	170.8	151	6.1	70	0.045	1.29	30.4	0.001377	0.0508
STDEV	8	1.9	8	0	3	0.001	0.07	1.4	0.000211	0.00457

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_4layer_FR_Sichu	75	230.8	173	12.2	96	0.057	2.7	28	0.002124	0.074867
mesh_4layer_FR_Sichu	77	235.2	170	12	107	0.061	2.49	32.6	0.001907	0.068813
AVERAGE	76	233	172	12.1	102	0.059	2.6	30.3	0.002016	0.07184
STDEV	1	3.1	2	0.2	8	0.003	0.15	3.3	0.000153	0.004281

Non-FR Safety Nets

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_2layer_nonFR_Si	46	117.6	103	3.6	58	0.022	0.49	31.5	0.000598	0.038498
mesh_2layer_nonFR_Si	54	140.2	109	4.4	61	0.024	0.45	27.5	0.000614	0.042986
AVERAGE	50	128.9	106	4	60	0.023	0.47	29.5	0.000606	0.040742
STDEV	6	16	4	0.6	2	0.002	0.03	2.8	1.15E-05	0.003174

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
mesh_4layer_nonFR_Si	46	209.5	122	7.8	82	0.045	1.01	31	0.000838	0.056909
mesh_4layer_nonFR_Si	46	198.1	126	8.7	85	0.034	1.01	31.5	0.000779	0.058262
AVERAGE	46	203.8	124	8.2	84	0.039	1.01	31.2	0.000809	0.057585
STDEV	0	8	3	0.6	2	0.008	0	0.4	4.21E-05	0.000957

Aged Non-FR Safety Nets

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Aged_mesh_2layer_nonFR	50.0	182.24	105.00	7.98	89	0.03161	1.188	31.61	0.00085	0.059569
Aged_mesh_2layer_nonFR	54.0	240.84	107.00	8.88	93	0.038403	1.1522	41.947	0.000836	0.053079
AVERAGE	52.0	211.54	106.00	8.43	91	0.045	1.29	30.4	0.000843145	0.056324
STDEV	2.8	41.44	1.41	0.63	2.83	0.001	0.07	1.4	9.43988E-06	0.004589

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Aged_mesh_4layer_nonFR	49	258.22	128	15.575	105	0.036077	1.6857	28	0.001231	0.083701
Aged_mesh_4layer_nonFR	47	282.5	137	16.055	98	0.046141	2.1051	32.6	0.001467	0.11045
AVERAGE	48	270.36	132.5	15.815	101.5	0.059	2.6	30.3	0.0013487	0.097076
STDEV	1	12.14	4.5	0.24	3.5	0.003	0.15	3.3	0.0001178	0.013375

Blue-White Canvas

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
Blue-White_Canvas_01	62	117.569	113	4.23388	60	0.022828	0.610286	34.86491	0.000775	0.049063
Blue-White_Canvas_02	93	115.255	127	3.53925	53	0.022836	0.808616	35.25286	0.000595	0.03892
AVERAGE	77.5	116.412	120	3.886565	56.5	0.022832	0.709451	35.05889	0.000685	0.043992
STDEV	21.9	1.636245	9.899495	0.491178	4.949747	5.16E-06	0.14024	0.274322	0.000127	0.007172

FR White Canvas

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
FR_canvas_01	63	22.5791	104	1.61712	101	0.018363	1.160068	10.67998	0.000583	0.010699
FR_canvas_02	44	19.1308	103	2.16637	117	0.019988	1.136824	17.93976	0.000798	0.009751
FR_canvas_03	55	22.6088	95	1.37308	77	0.02382	1.093572	6.417638	0.000648	0.010653
FR_canvas_04	34	30.6091	77	2.25674	88	0.022204	1.087537	13.15937	0.000951	0.013363
AVERAGE	49	23.73195	94.75	1.853328	95.75	0.021094	1.1195	12.04919	0.000745	0.011116
STDEV	12.67544	4.866768	12.5	0.427071	17.23127	0.002404	0.034832	4.813885	0.000164	0.00156

Carton box

Sample	TTI	pHRR	t_pHRR	THR	Burn duration	pSPR	TSP	EHC	COP	CO2P
(Unit)	(s)	(kW/m2)	(s)	(MJ/m2)	(s)	(m2/s)	(m2)	(MJ/kg)	(g/s)	(g/s)
carton_box_01	11	170.419	58	6.74517	43	0.040132	0.154235	11.44086	0.000881	0.064573
carton_box_02	11	170.796	53	7.10206	48	0.019678	0.114649	17.32086	0.001195	0.074068
carton_box_03	10	158.052	55	7.2209	46	0.01321	0.05172	15.80226	0.000727	0.073532
AVERAGE	10.7	166.4	55.3	7.0	45.7	0.0	0.1	14.855	0.000934	0.070724
STDEV	0.577	7.251	2.517	0.248	2.517	0.014	0.052	3.052	0.000238	0.005334

Appendix D

Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulation of the Wang Fuk Court Fire Incident

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Date: 7th May 2026

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1 Introduction

In this report, the key findings based on numerical simulations of the Wang Fuk Court fire incident are demonstrated through Computational Fluid Dynamics (“CFD”) simulation results. This appendix includes two main parts: (1) modelling of the wind effects on fire spread at Wang Fuk Court using ANSYS Fluent Software and (2) reconstructing the fire scene and generating numerical representation of the fire scene using the software Fire Dynamics Simulator (“FDS”). The simulations were conducted to study the occurrence times for major fire events and analyze the temperature and smoke development within the re-entrant space and staircase void, the chimney effect associated with external upward fire spread, re-entry effect to units via hot smoke and/or radiation, and wind-driven fire spread considerations. The simulations were separated into two distinct models to manage the computational load and reduce modelling complexity. It allows the local wind effects to be modelled on a much larger scale while for the fire spread, the scale is reduced to more accurately model the vertical fire spread along the scaffolding elements.

The primary objectives were to:

- Assess how the local wind patterns effect the fire spread at Wang Fuk Court.
- Analyze the observed rapid vertical fire spread along external scaffolding and the fire dynamics within the re-entrant space during the fire incident.
- Compare fire development across scenarios with variations in initial fire size, flame-retardant (“FR”) properties of safety net, and different configurations.

2 Numerical Setup

2.1 ANSYS Fluent

To assess the wind effects on the fire spread, a full scale model of Wang Fuk Court was constructed using ANSYS Fluent 2025 R2. The model consists of all eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court, incorporating the configuration, building height, and separation based on building plan records as shown in Figure 1. A 100 m extension zone was added upstream, 150 m downstream and 50 m laterally on both sides of the buildings. The height was extended by approximately 50 m to ensure flow stability and capture the full wind patterns. According to the Hong Kong Observatory (HKO), the average wind speed and direction recorded at the Tai Po Kau Anemometer at 1500 hours on 26.11.2025 were approximately 14 km/hr (i.e. 3.89 m/s)

and East to Southeast respectively (i.e. 112 degree). These wind conditions were applied in the simulation to represent the wind profile at Wang Fuk Court during that time. The wind velocity profile was modelled according to a typical atmospheric boundary layer (ABL) approach [1, 2]. Note that the effects of the fire was excluded for this model.




Figure. 1 Computational domain for wind effect simulation consisting of the eight domestic blocks of Wang Fuk Court in ANSYS Fluent 2025 R2.

2.2 Fire Dynamic Simulator

To analyze the actual fire spread along the external scaffolding and the fire dynamics within the re-entrant space during the fire incident, a single building case was modelled to represent the complete geometry of Wang Cheong House (Block F) using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) version FDS 6.10.1. The model includes the external façade, re-entrant spaces, staircase void, and bamboo scaffolding arrangement observed during the incident. The computational domain extends 15 m beyond each side of the building footprint and 10 m above the roof level to minimise boundary effects on plume entrainment and outflow. The overall domain dimensions are approximately 65 m (width) $\times$ 54 m (depth) $\times$ 90 m (height). Figure 2 illustrates the computational domain and key geometric features, vertical scaffolding grid, and extended

boundaries. All the external boundaries except the floor were defined as open boundary conditions to allow natural inflow and outflow. The fire-escape staircase was modelled as a isolated compartment with fire-rated glass windows on each floor except for 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F and 25/F where they were replaced with plywood. Grid sensitivity was assessed with cell sizes ranging from 0.1 m to 0.2 m in preliminary runs; the coarse grid was selected for its balance of accuracy and computational cost (approximately 24 hours per 20 seconds of physical time on 96 cores with ~100 GB RAM).




Figure. 2 Computational domain for the full single building case of Wang Cheong House: (a) isometric view, (b) top view of re-entrant cross-section (centre), and (c) side view.

To comprehensively evaluate the variables impacting fire spread, six primary cases (“Cases”) were established, divided by the size of the initial ignition source:

Table 1. Summary of the simulation cases

Large Fire Size (Ignition Source of 1MW)		
Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers (foamboard)
1	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	Yes
2	Sample 2 (FR)	Yes
3	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	Yes
Small Fire Size (Ignition Source of 0.7MW)		
Case	Safety Nets	Polystyrene Window Covers (foamboard)
4	Sample 2 (FR)	No
5	Sample 3 (Non-FR)	No

6	Sample 4 (Wang Chi House)	No
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2.3 Ignition Source and Initial Fire Growth

The suspected origin was at the 1/F platform outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House. The simulations utilize a t^2 -growing fire model prescribed to represent the rapid involvement of initial combustible materials (see Figure 3):

- for the large fire size cases (Cases 1–3), a 1 MW fire source is applied;
- and for the small fire size cases (Cases 4–6), a 700 kW fire source is applied.

A fast growth time ($t = 10$ s) was selected for both fire sizes to speed up the simulation time, as the main aim of this study is not to recreate the initial smouldering and growth of the fire but to analyse the fire spread after ignition.




Figure. 3 Location of the initial fire.

2.4 Material Properties in the Model

Combustion and thermal degradation parameters for bamboo, non-FR green safety nets, white foamboard, orange toe-board, and plywood were directly implemented from the bench-scale results (Section 1). More specifically, the key input parameters include:

- Activation energy (E_a) and pre-exponential factor (A) from TGA kinetic analysis;
- Effective heat of combustion (HOC), soot and CO yield values from cone calorimeter tests.

The kinetic parameters were extracted using the Kissinger-Akahira-Sunose (KAS) method, a pyrolysis kinetics approach applied to non-isothermal thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) data under three heating conditions (5 °C/min, 10 °C/min, and 20 °C/min was applied in this study). The safety nets were modelled using a Lagrangian particle cloud approach with drag law to account for the high permeability of the safety nets and allow for air flow to penetrate through

the safety net layer. Particles were oriented in horizontal and vertical directions to represent net layers.

3. Wind Effects on Fire Spread at Wang Fuk Court

Wind vector contours at heights of 10 m (bottom level), 40 m (middle level), 80 m (top level), 97 m (rooftop level), and 120 m (above the buildings) are presented in Figures 4 (a) to (e). The simulated wind vectors provided critical insights into the trajectory of flying embers, which served as secondary ignition sources for nearby structures. The wind profile demonstrated a notable increase in velocity as it flowed over the structures and through the narrow gaps between adjacent buildings. For instance, the vector plots show a high velocity region in the gap between Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House which aligns with the smoke drifting that was observed during the actual fire as shown in Figure 5 (a) to (c).




Figure 4 (a): Wind Vector Contour (10 m – bottom level)




Figure 4 (b): Wind Vector Contour (40 m – middle level)




Figure 4(c): Wind Vector Contour (80 m – top level)




Figure 4 (d): Wind Vector Contour (97 m – rooftop level)




Figure 4 (e): Wind Vector Contour (120 m – above building)



Figure 5 (a):
Heavy Smoke on the South-east Façade of Wang Cheong House at 1508 hours





Figure 5 (b):
Extract of Wind vector contour at 80 m height




Figure 5 (c):
Heavy Smoke on the South Re-entrant of Wang Cheong House at 1537 hours

To specifically analyze the trajectory of flying embers and their potential for secondary ignition, discrete particle tracking was implemented. By injecting particles at the re-entrant areas highlighted in red, the simulation mapped the probable flight paths of fire debris across the estate as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7.



(a) Iso View



(b) Top view

Figure 6 Particle tracking image of the possible fire debris travelling pathway from Wang Cheong House (a) Iso View and (b) Top View.

In the first scenario, particles were injected at the Wang Cheong House 3 re-entrants indicated as red dots in Figure 6 representing the initial release of embers from the suspected fire origin. As shown in Figure 6, the simulation illustrates how the localized wind profile carried these particles toward adjacent structures, particularly near Wang Tai House.




Figure 7 Particle tracking image of the possible fire debris travelling pathway from Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House (a) Iso View and (b) Top View.

In the second scenario, shown in Figure 7, particles were injected at both Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House re-entrants to simulate the escalation of debris release as the fire spread between buildings. Compared to Figure 6, there is a wider area of possible flight paths for the fire debris downstream from Wang Tai House and it covers all the subsequent rapid fire spreading re-entrant zones as showcased in Figure 8. There is little to no particles passed near Wang Chi House. This lack of particle presence provides a strong numerical explanation for why Wang Chi House was the only unaffected building within Wang Fuk Court fire incident. The wind profile likely has shielded the building by directing the trajectory of firebrands toward the south and west instead.




Figure 8: Particle tracking image of the possible fire debris travelling pathway from Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House with Rapid Fire Spread along Re-entrants Marked in red.

It is important to note that the simulated trajectories represent the “natural” path of embers and smoke based purely on atmospheric conditions. The simulation does not account for the fire services interventions performed by the FSD. Consequently, while the simulation explains the initial mechanisms of fire spread, the actual final extent of damage was also influenced by external firefighting efforts that were beyond the scope of this numerical model.

4 Vertical Fire Spread

The simulation results for the large-fire scenarios (Cases 1–3) and small-fire scenarios (Cases 4–6) are presented below. The three large-fire cases represent the full matrix of safety net types and foamboard configurations examined in the study, with Case 1 corresponding to the materials and arrangement observed at the incident (Wang Chi safety net with foamboard). The key vertical spread timelines for these cases are summarized in Table 2.

4.1 Fire Spread Behavior (Large Fire Scenario)

For the large-scale fire scenarios (Cases 1 through 3), the fire was initiated at the 1/F platform burner, representing the suspected origin outside Flats 104 and 105 of Wang Cheong House, using a 1 MW fire source. The simulations show that fire propagation occurred upward along the bamboo scaffolding and safety net layers within the re-entrant space. This process was driven by buoyancy-induced flow, which created a pronounced chimney effect that enhanced vertical momentum. The extent and speed of this fire spread differed significantly between cases, primarily due to the combustible properties of the safety net and the presence of additional fuel loads at the window openings.

First, a comparison is made between Case 1, which represent the fire site scenario (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard), and Case 2, the scenario (Sichuan FR safety nets with foamboard). The key vertical spread timelines from the simulations are summarized below:

1. Initial fire growth: t^2 ramp to 1 MW at approximately 10 s (both cases)
2. Fire spread to level 10: approximately **120 s** (Case 1) vs approximately **129 s** (Case 2)
3. Fire spread to level 20: approximately **130 s** (Case 1) vs approximately **137 s** (Case 2)
4. Fire spread to roof level (level 31): approximately **137 s** (Case 1) vs approximately **146 s** (Case 2)

This faster progression can be attributed to the higher flammability of the Wang Chi safety net (which continued to burn even after interruption of adjacent heat) and the additional fuel contribution from foamboard at window openings, which accelerated vertical momentum through secondary ignition and increased heat release. In contrast, the delayed fire spread and lower heat release predicted in Case 2 are consistent with the FR properties of the Sichuan FR safety nets (i.e. higher ignition temperature, lower heat release). Figure 9 shows a visualization of vertical fire spread progression of Case 1 as compared to Case 2.

Case 1:**Safety Nets collected from Wang Chi House with Polystyrene Window Covers**

Legend:  zone with an HRRPUV > 80kW/m³




**Case 2:****FR Safety Nets with Polystyrene Window Covers****Case 3:****Non-FR Safety Nets with Polystyrene Window Covers**

Figure. 9 Visualisation of vertical fire spread progression of Case 1 – 3.

Similar trends can be observed when comparing the heat release rate (HRR) profile shown in Figure. 10 for Cases 1, 2 and 3. During the initial stage (0–125 s), all scenarios exhibit comparable thermal outputs as the 1 MW ignition source dominates the localised fire near the ignition location. The early peak at around 78 s for Case 3 (non-FR safety nets with foamboard) corresponds directly to the ignition and initial involvement of the safety net material. However, a significant divergence occurs as the fire involve the upper scaffolding layers and triggers the chimney effect within the re-entrant space. Additionally, it can be seen that the differences in HRR between Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard) and Case 2 (Sichuan FR safety nets with foamboard) becomes progressively more significant with time. By 200 seconds, the HRR value of Case 1 is approximately 800 MW compared to the 600 MW for Case 2. It is important to note that the resulting difference in peak HRR is not solely attributable to the heat released by the safety nets and foamboard itself. Rather, the materials provide a higher fuel load that facilitates faster vertical fire spread. This accelerated upward propagation leads to a larger concurrent burning area for the other primary scaffolding materials (e.g. bamboo, plywood, etc.)

In this section, a comparison of the three primary large-scale scenarios (Cases 1 through 3) is presented to illustrate the additive risk factors involved in external vertical fire spread. As shown in Figures 9-10, the simulation results reveal a clear hierarchy of fire severity dictated by the combination of safety net combustibility and secondary window fuel loads.

Impact of Non-FR Safety Nets vs Wang Chi Safety Nets

Comparing Case 1 (Wang Chi safety net with foamboard) and Case 3 (non-FR safety net with foamboard) highlights the difference in initial fire spread rate and maximum HRR. The simulation data showed that Case 3 initiates rapid fire growth noticeably earlier than the Wang Chi safety nets, resulting in a faster initial vertical fire spread across the lower levels. However, as the fires reach the fully developed phase, both scenarios generate comparable peak HRRs. Case 1 produces a maximum HRR of approximately 800 MW, which is marginally higher than the 780 MW peak observed in Case 3. The key vertical spread timelines from the simulations are summarized in Table 2 below:

Table 2. Summary of estimated vertical fire spread timeline.

Case	Scenario Description	Spread to L10	Spread to L20	Spread to Roof
------	----------------------	---------------	---------------	----------------

Case 1	Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard	120 s	130 s	137 s
Case 2	Sichuan FR safety nets with foamboard	129 s	137 s	146 s
Case 3	Non-FR safety nets with foamboard	118 s	128 s	135 s
Case 4	Sichuan FR safety nets with no foamboard (700kW)	-	-	-
Case 5	Non-FR safety nets with no foamboard (700kW)	158 s	168 s	178 s
Case 6	Wang Chi safety nets with no foamboard (700kW)	160 s	166 s	171 s




Figure. 10. Heat release rate (HRR) profile of Case 1 to 3.

4.2 Fire Spread Behavior (Small Fire Scenario)

In the small fire scenarios (Cases 4 - 6), the ignition source at the 1/F platform was reduced to a 700 kW t^2 -growing fire. For the 700 kW fire source, the simulation results demonstrate a significant difference in fire development driven by the combustible properties of the safety net material. For Case 5 with the non-FR safety nets, the simulation predicted a rapid transition

to a sustained fire. The HRR initially increased to approximately 65 MW at 145 seconds. While a brief fluctuation followed, the fire did not self-extinguish or decay. Instead, it entered a phase of exponential growth after 180 seconds, reaching a peak HRR of approximately 740 MW by 270 seconds. This confirms that the non-FR material provides a sufficient fuel load to support rapid vertical fire spread even when the initial ignition source is relatively small.





Figure. 11. The Heat Release Rate (HRR) Profile for Case 4, Case 5 and Case 6


In comparison, Case 4, which utilized the Sichuan FR safety nets, effectively suppressed early fire growth and upward spread. The HRR remained at negligible levels for the majority of the simulation, indicating that the FR treatment successfully prevented the safety nets from contributing to the fire spread. A localized flare-up was recorded late in the simulation at 265 seconds, peaking at only 35 MW. This peak is significantly lower than the values observed in Case 5, representing a reduction in peak thermal intensity of over 95%. These results indicate that the use of compliant FR materials is a factor in mitigating the chimney effect and preventing an initial localized fire from developing into a large-scale fire within the re-entrant spaces.

Case 4:
FR Safety Nets without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire

Legend:  zone with a HRRPUV $> 80\text{kW/m}^3$



Case 5:
Non-FR Safety Nets without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire



Case 6:
Safety Nets collected from Wang Chi House without Polystyrene Window Covers under small fire




Figure. 12. Visualisation of vertical fire spread progression of Case 4 – 6.

4.3 Staircase tenability

As mentioned previously, the fire-escape staircase was modelled as an isolated compartment with fire-rated glass windows on each floor except for 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F and 25/F where they were replaced with plywood panels. For the plywood panels, approximately 9% of the window area exhibited gas leakage, allowing hot smoke to leak through the plywood into the staircase. Gas probes located 20cm from the center of the staircase window were set on each floor to measure the tenability (i.e. temperature, radiation, visibility, Carbon Monoxide (CO)) inside the staircase compartment. The standard tenability thresholds utilized for this assessment are a maximum gas temperature of 60 °C, radiation of 2.5 kW/m², minimum visibility of 10 meters.




Figure. 13. Location of the vertical contour slice for visibility

Figure. 14 presents a clear time-series of vertical visibility contours inside the staircase at the location indicated in Figure 13 (blue = high visibility/good; red = very low visibility/poor). The results in Figure 14(a) show that in Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard) with plywood panels replacing fire-rated glass windows on 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F & 25/F), smoke begins to leak into the staircase through the plywood panels shortly after 45 s. By approximately 90 s, visible smoke is present at all plywood-covered windows except 5/F. The smoke then gradually spreads upward through the shaft. By around 200 s the upper half of the staircase (15/F and above) shows extensive regions of very low visibility. Because the staircase in the model is closed off from the rest of the building, the lower visibility in the other

compartment spaces is a result of window breakage. For comparison, the same case, i.e. Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard), but without the plywood panels on 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F & 25/F which are replaced by fire-rated glass is presented in Figure 14 (b). From the visibility contours, the staircase area remains free of smoke by the end of the 200s instance.

For further comparison, an additional case scenario not included in Table 2 was tested, involving a large-fire scenario similar to Case 2 but without foamboard, i.e. using Sichuan FR safety nets without foamboard. A summary of the tenability conditions for Case 1 and the said additional scenario (i.e. Sichuan FR safety nets with no foamboard) (both case scenarios with fire-rated glass windows on each floor of the fire-escape staircase except for 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F & 25/F where they were replaced with plywood panels) are presented in Tables 3 and 4.




Figure. 14. Image of the visibility contour at different time instance for (a) Case 1 (with plywood panels on 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F & 25/F), (b) Case 1 (with fire-rated glass on 5/F, 10/F, 15/F, 20/F & 25/F) i.e. with plywood panels replaced by fire-rated glass.

Table 3. Staircase Tenability Criteria for an additional scenario (Sichuan FR safety nets with no foamboard)

Floor	Max Temp (°C)	Time to >60°C (s)	Max Radiation (kW/m ²)	Time to radiation >2.5 kW/m ² (s)	Min Visibility (m)	Time to <10 m Visibility (s)	Max CO (ppm)
5	30.8	—	0	—	5.9	180	63
10	146.3	152	21.1	151	0.9	69	570
15	1133.9	138	174.4	138	0.2	75	7,655
20	144.2	183	1	—	0.1	78	5,743
25	159.5	153	6.4	145	0.8	78	561

Table 4. Staircase Tenability Criteria for Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard)

Floor	Max Temp (°C)	Time to >60°C (s)	Max Radiation (kW/m ²)	Time to radiation >2.5 kW/m ² (s)	Min Visibility (m)	Time to <10 m Visibility (s)	Max CO (ppm)
5	27.3	—	0	—	9.1	168	40
10	1103.4	133	180.4	130	0.2	70	7,410
15	663.8	126	51.5	124	0.2	68	5,619
20	55.4	—	0.1	—	0.7	85	570
25	72.8	128	10.8	123	0.8	79	526

As mentioned in section 4.3 above, standard tenability thresholds utilized for this assessment are a maximum gas temperature of 60 °C, radiation of 2.5 kW/m², and minimum visibility of 10 meters. Therefore, the loss of tenability is when any one of following criteria occurs: (i) temperature of >60 °C, (ii) radiation of >2.5 kW/m², and (iii) visibility of <10 meters.

The simulation results in Tables 3 and 4 show that in a situation where fire-rated glass windows on every 5 floors are replaced by plywood panels, both Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard) and the additional scenario (Sichuan FR safety nets with no foamboard) experience a rapid loss of tenability inside the staircase compartment. In the additional scenario (Sichuan FR safety nets with no foamboard), the highest temperatures and radiation levels develop around the mid-height, while in Case 1 (Wang Chi safety nets with foamboard), the most severe conditions appear earlier at the lower-to-mid levels. Overall, the data indicate that the faster

vertical fire spread in Case 1 leads to earlier degradation of conditions at floors that would be critical for occupant egress compared with the additional scenario. Visibility is the first parameter to fall below the tenable threshold in both cases, followed by progressive increases in temperature, radiation and CO concentration.

4.4 Limitations

It is noted that the CFD simulations tend to predict a faster vertical upward fire spread than that observed in the full-scale physical tests. This discrepancy arises primarily because the current numerical representation does not fully capture the real physical behaviour of the safety nets. In the actual incident and full-scale experiments, the net material shrinks under heat exposure, detaches in pieces, and falls to lower levels. As a result, combustible mass is removed from the upper scaffolding layers and gaps are created that interrupt continuous upward flame propagation.

In contrast, the Lagrangian particle-cloud approach used in the FDS model employs a fixed drag law and static particle orientation. This assumes that the safety nets remain in its original position and does not dynamically shrink, melt, or relocate downward. Consequently, the combustible material stays distributed across the vertical layers for a longer duration. This sustains combustion and enhances the chimney-driven upward momentum, leading to the earlier arrival at higher floor levels (for example, roof level at approximately 137 s in Case 1 compared with later times in the physical tests).

References

- [1] D.M. Hargreaves, N.G. Wright, On the use of the $k-\epsilon$ model in commercial CFD software to model the neutral atmospheric boundary layer, *Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics*, 95(5) (2007) 355-369.
- [2] P.J. Richards, S.E. Norris, Appropriate boundary conditions for computational wind engineering models revisited, *Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics*, 99(4) (2011) 257-266.


Wang Yan House




Wang Yan House Rear staircase between 3/F & 4/F




Wang Yan House Front staircase between 8/F & 9/F



Wang Yan House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Yan House Rear staircase between 19/F & 20/F




Wang Yan House Front staircase between 24/F & 25/F



Wang Yan House Front staircase between 28/F & 29/F

Wang Tao House



Wang Tao House Front staircase between 4/F & 5/F




Wang Tao House Front staircase between 10/F & 11/F



Wang Tao House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Tao House Front staircase between 20/F & 21/F



Wang Tao House Front staircase between 26/F & 27/F

Wang Sun House



Wang Sun House Rear staircase between 5/F & 6/F



Wang Sun House Front staircase between 10/F & 11/F



Wang Sun House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Sun House Rear staircase between 19/F & 20/F



Wang Sun House Front staircase between 24/F & 25/F

Wang Kin House



Wang Kin House Front staircase between 4/F & 5/F



Wang Kin House Rear staircase between 9/F & 10/F



Wang Kin House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Kin House Rear staircase between 19/F & 20/F



Wang Kin House Front staircase between 24/F & 25/F

Wang Tai House



Wang Tai House Rear staircase between 5/F & 6/F



Wang Tai House Front staircase between 10/F & 11/F



Wang Tai House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Tai House Front staircase between 20/F & 21/F



Wang Tai House Rear staircase between 25/F & 26/F

Wang Cheong House

Wang Cheong House Rear staircase between 5/F & 6/F



Wang Cheong House Front staircase between 10/F & 11/F



Wang Cheong House Rear staircase between 15/F & 16/F



Wang Cheong House Front staircase between 20/F & 21/F



Wang Cheong House Rear staircase between 25/F & 26/F

Wang Shing House



Wang Shing House Rear staircase between 3/F & 4/F



Wang Shing House Rear staircase between 9/F & 10/F



Wang Shing House Front staircase between 14/F & 15/F



Wang Shing House Rear staircase between 19/F & 20/F



Wang Shing House Front staircase between 24/F & 25/F

Wang Chi House



Wang Chi House Front staircase between 4/F & 5/F



Wang Chi House Rear staircase between 9/F & 10/F



Wang Chi House Front staircase between 14/F & 15/F



Wang Chi House Rear staircase between 19/F & 20/F



Wang Chi House Front staircase between 24/F & 25/F

Samples of the Movable Board in Wang Fuk Court



Front View of the Movable Board
(Aluminium Composite Side)



Back View of the Movable Board
(Wooden Side)



Left View of the Movable Board

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Yan House (Block A)	Between 3/F and 4/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 8/F and 9/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 19/F and 20/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 24/F and 25/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Partially Damaged
	Between 28/F and 29/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact

total 6 wooden panel: 1
wooden and aluminium composite panel: 5 Intact: 5
Partially Damaged: 1

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Tao House (Block B)	Between 4/F and 5/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 10/F and 11/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden panel	Partially Damaged
	Between 20/F and 21/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 26/F and 27/F	1	wooden panel	Intact

total 5 wooden panel: 4
wooden and aluminium composite panel: 1 Intact: 4
Partially Damaged: 1

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Sun House (Block C)	Between 5/F and 6/F	1	wooden panel	Completely Damaged
	Between 10/F and 11/F	1	wooden panel	Partially Damaged
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden panel	Completely Damaged
	Between 19/F and 20/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged
	Between 24/F and 25/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Slightly Damaged

total 5 wooden panel: 4
wooden and aluminium composite panel: 1 Slightly Damaged: 1
Partially Damaged: 1
Almost Completely Damaged: 1
Completely Damaged: 2

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Kin House (Block D)	Between 5/F and 6/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 9/F and 10/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 19/F and 20/F	1	wooden panel	Intact
	Between 24/F and 25/F	1	wooden panel	Intact

total 5 ~~wooden panel: 4~~
~~wooden and aluminium composite panel: 1~~ Intact: 5

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Tai House (Block E)	Between 5/F and 6/F	1	wooden panel	Completely Damaged
	Between 10/F and 11/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged
	Between 20/F and 21/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged
	Between 25/F and 26/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged

total 5 ~~wooden panel: 5~~
Almost Completely Damaged: 4
Completely Damaged: 1

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Cheong House (Block F)	Between 5/F and 6/F	0	completely burnt	Completely Damaged
	Between 10/F and 11/F	1	wooden panel	Almost Completely Damaged
	Between 15/F and 16/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact
	Between 20/F and 21/F	0	completely burnt	Completely Damaged
	Between 25/F and 26/F	1	wooden and aluminium composite panel	Intact

total 3 ~~wooden panel: 1~~
~~wooden and aluminium composite panel: 2~~ Intact: 2
Almost Completely Damaged: 1
Completely Damaged: 2

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Shing House (Block G)	Between 3/F and 4/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 9/F and 10/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel (the wooden panel part was completely burnt)	Almost Completely Damged
	Between 14/F and 15/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Slightly Damaged
	Between 19/F and 20/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 24/F and 25/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact

total

5

wooden and alumium composite panel: 5

Intact: 3

Slightly Damaged: 1

Almost Completely Damaged: 1

Block	Staircase Opening	Quantity	Types	Condition
Wang Chi House (Block H)	Between 4/F and 5/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 9/F and 10/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 14/F and 15/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 19/F and 20/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact
	Between 24/F and 25/F	1	wooden and alumium composite panel	Intact

total

5

wooden and alumium composite panel: 5

Intact: 5

Total Seized	39	100%
wooden panel	19	49%
wooden and alumium composite panel	20	51%


Legend	Condition	Criteria
	Intact	100% area not damaged
	Slightly Damaged	around 25% area damaged
	Partially Damaged	around 50% area damaged
	Almost Completely Damaged	around 75% area damaged
	Completely Damaged	100% area

1. Building Description

1.1 Wang Fuk Court (宏福苑), Tai Po is a Home Ownership Scheme residential complex under the Hong Kong Housing Authority. This residential complex comprises eight 32-storey domestic buildings, all of which share an identical design. Each building is structured with 8 residential units on every floor, offering a total of 1984 apartments across the entire development. Each building is equipped with two staircases leading to street level outside the building, one of which is designed to provide access to the roof, ensuring an additional evacuation route in case of emergencies.

1.2 The building names are listed as below:

- Block A - Wang Yan House (宏仁閣)
- Block B - Wang Tao House (宏道閣)
- Block C - Wang Sun House (宏新閣)
- Block D - Wang Kin House (宏建閣)
- Block E - Wang Tai House (宏泰閣)
- Block F - Wang Cheong House (宏昌閣)
- Block G - Wang Shing House (宏盛閣)
- Block H - Wang Chi House (宏志閣)



Floor plan / Map showing 8 residential buildings of Wang Fuk Court

2 Fire Service Installations and Equipment (“FSI”) provision in Wang Fuk Court

2.1 According to Section 16 of the Buildings Ordinance (“**Cap. 123**”), it is stated that:

The Building Authority may refuse to give his approval of any plans of building works where—

- (a) the plans are not such as are prescribed by regulations or are not such as he may have required under this section;
- (b) the plans are not endorsed with or accompanied by a certificate from the Director of Fire Services certifying either:
 - (i) that, having regard to the purpose to which the building is intended to be put (which purpose shall be stated in the certificate), no fire service installation or equipment is necessary in connexion with the building that will result from the carrying out of the building works shown on the plans; or
 - (ii) that the plans have been examined and are approved by him as showing all such fire service installations and equipment as in his opinion, having regard to the purpose to which the building is intended to be put (which purpose shall be stated in the certificate), comprise the minimum fire service installations and equipment necessary for such building in accordance with a Code of Practice published from time to time by the Director of Fire Services.

2.2 The aforementioned regulation stipulates that compliance with the requirements as outlined in the Code of Practice (“CoP”) published by the Director of Fire Services (“D of FS”), is a mandatory prerequisite for obtaining approval of the plans of building works from the Building Authority.

2.3 Based on the record of Fire Services Department (“FSD”), the first General Building Plan (“GBP”) for the development of Wang Fuk Court was submitted in October 1980. The FSIs of Wang Fuk Court were installed in accordance with the 4th version of the Code of Practice for Minimum Fire Service Installations and Equipment November 1979 (“CoP FSI 1979”).

2.4 It is important to note that the FSIs in Wang Fuk Court shall conform with the specifications/requirement in the CoP FSI 1979 which is the applicable version of CoP at the time of GBP submitted for approval. Therefore, the compliance assessment of the FSIs installed in Wang Fuk Court shall be based on the specifications/requirements stipulated in the CoP FSI 1979, as it was the applicable standard at the time of construction.

2.5 According to the approved F.S. 21¹ (Appendix I), the required FSIs in each building of Wang Fuk Court are as follows:

¹ Section 21(6)(d) of the Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123): in the case of a building the plans whereof were certified by the Director of Fire Services in the terms indicated in section 16(1)(b)(ii), the applicant for the permit fails to produce to the Building Authority a certificate from the Director of Fire Services in such form as may be prescribed certifying that he is satisfied that the fire service installations and equipment shown on the plans aforesaid have been provided and are in efficient working order and satisfactory condition

- Fire Alarm Systems (“FAS”)
- Fire Hydrant/Hose Reel (“FH/HR”) System
- Fire Extinguisher (“FE”)


2.5.1 FAS

The FAS in Wang Fuk Court is designed to warn residents and building occupants of an outbreak of fire. The system comprises the following:-

<u>Component</u>	<u>Photo</u>
<u>Manual Call Point (Break Glass Unit)</u> This device enables occupants to manually activate the FAS by breaking the glass and pressing the button, initiating an evacuation.	 <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)
<u>Fire Alarm Sounder (Alarm Bell)</u> This component produces a loud and audible alarm to warn residents and building occupants of an outbreak of fire, ensuring timely evacuation.	 <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

Remarks: In accordance with the CoP FSI 1979, an independent alarm panel was not required for a manually operated FAS. The system is designed with one Break Glass Unit and one alarm bell installed on each floor, positioned adjacent to the Hose Reel. This arrangement is consistent from the Ground floor to the 31st floor of every building. The strategic placement of these components ensures they are easily accessible, visible and audible to residents, facilitating a swift and effective response in the event of an outbreak of fire.

2.5.2 FH/HR System




FH/HR system provides coverage across the entire building, from the ground level to the roof. The FS tank and FS pump are built to provide water supply, while the hydrant outlets on each staircase half landing and the hose reel installed in the common corridors allow water discharge to every part of the building. The system comprises of the following components:

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

<u>Component</u>	<u>Photo</u>
<u>FS Transfer Tank</u> ● Located on the G/F of each building; and ● FS transfer tank with 2,000 L water capacity. ● Designed to prevent the pollution of fresh water distribution network by water in the FS pipe, by using the FS Transfer Tank to store fresh water temporarily and ensure that the water in the tank could not flow back to the water supply.	 <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)
<u>FS Tank</u> ● Located on the R/F of each building; and ● The minimum effective quantity of water required to be available at each building of Wang Fuk Court is 18,200 L for firefighting purpose. ● Designed to provide temporary water supply to hose reel points and fire hydrant outlets in the building for fire fighting at the initial stage.	 <u>Wang Shing House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)
<u>Upfeed pump</u> ● Located on the G/F of each building; and ● Ensure water relaying from the FS transfer tank to the FS tank.	 <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

<u>Component</u>	<u>Photo</u>
<u>FS/Intermediate Booster pump*</u> ● Located on the G/F of each building; ● Ensure adequate water pressure for the FH/HR system; ● Two FS/intermediate booster pumps are installed in each building. While one of them is used as duty pump, the other is used as standby pump. <i>* FS/Intermediate booster pump could ensure satisfactory pressure and flow available for the FH/HR system. All buildings, where the height between the topmost hydrant and the lowest FS inlet in excess of 60m, shall be maintained by the intermediate booster pump. Intermediate booster pump serves to increase pressure of water from FS appliance via FS inlet while fixed fire pump serves to increase pressure of water from FS tank. For FH/HR systems in Wang Fuk Court, the pumps at G/F serves as both the functions of intermediate booster pump and FS fixed pump to pressurize the water both from FS inlet and FS tank with sufficient required pressure.</i>	 <u>Duty Pump in FS pump room on G/F</u> <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)  <u>Standby Pump in FS pump room on G/F</u> <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

<u>FS Inlet</u> ● Located on the G/F of each building; ● Situated as to be within easy reach of, a fire appliance parked in a thoroughfare adjacent to the building protected; ● Installed with a non-return valve behind each inlet to prevent “back flow” of water; and ● Remote control buttons are sited at the FS inlet and wired solely for starting the intermediate booster pump and operating the FAS.	 “On” Button <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)
<u>Component</u>	<u>Photo</u>
<u>Hydrant Outlets</u> ● Installed at the half landing of every staircase on each floor; ● The pressure and flow available for the FH/HR system shall be such as to provide for a pressure of not less than 400 kPa and not more than 700 kPa with a flow of not less than 900L/min for domestic buildings. <i>*Since the FS tank is situated on the R/F of the buildings, the water pressure increases due to gravity, resulting in excessive pressure on the lower floors. To address this, two types of hydrants are installed in these buildings. Standard hydrants are placed at the 7/F to 14/F and 22/F to R/F while hydrants equipped with pressure-reducing valves (parity valves) are installed on the 1/F to 6/F and 15/F to 21/F to control and regulate the discharge pressure.</i>	 Photo showing the standard hydrant outlet <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)  Parity Valve Photo showing the hydrant pressure-reducing valves (parity valves)* <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

Hose Reel (HR) Point

- Positioned in the common corridor on each floor, one HR set on each floor is available from G/F to 31/F of every building;
- Allow for immediate response to fire incidents; and
- The HR branch nozzle shall have a 4.5 mm orifice and capable of projecting a jet not less than 6 m in length.




Wang Chi House
(Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

Component

FH/HR FS Pump Panel*

- Equipped inside the pump room on G/F of each building;
- Activation of the fire pumps so as to ensure adequate water pressure for effective fire suppression; and
- Display the operational status of the fire pumps, including:
 - Three-phase power status
 - Normal test switch
 - Duty and Standby pumps isolator
 - Duty and Standby pumps failure status
 - Duty and Standby pumps selector
 - System reset button
 - Flashing light
 - Silence alarm switch

Photo



Wang Chi House
(Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

** The 9th version of the Code of Practice for Minimum Fire Service Installations and Equipment March 1994 specifies that the status of each intermediate booster pump shall be monitored and displayed at the pump control panel and repeated to the fire control room or to a status panel at the main entrance of the building. For the situation in Wang Fuk Court, only pump control panel is required.*

<u>Component</u>	<u>Photo</u>
<u>Main Power Switch</u> ● Served as the central control point for the electrical power supply to both the FH/HR systems and FAS; and ● Alternative to the previous components, two different types of switches are noted at Wang Fuk Court.	 <u>Wang Yan House</u> (Photo taken on 28.11.2025)  <u>Wang Chi House</u> (Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

2.5.3 FE

FE are required to be installed in each building at designated locations, including all Electrical and Mechanical plant rooms such as the FS Pump Room, FS Transfer Pump Room, Main Switch Room and other relevant areas where in portion of premises containing only electrical apparatus or in which inflammable liquids or fats and greases are stored or used.



Photo showing the Fire Extinguisher in FS pump room on G/F
Wang Chi House
(Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

2.5.4 Emergency Lighting

Emergency Lighting which is not a mandatory requirement by FSD has been installed along all exit routes, including the common corridors and staircases. These emergency lightings are designed to provide adequate illumination and indication of exit routes within a building under emergency conditions.



Photo showing the fluorescent tube-type emergency light
Wang Chi House
(Photo taken on 1.12.2025)



Photo showing the LED panel type emergency light
Wang Chi House
(Photo taken on 1.12.2025)

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

3.1 FSI condition of each block during post-fire investigation

<u>Building</u>	<u>First Inspection Date / Time</u>	<u>FS Pump Room Lock</u>	<u>Entry Method</u>	<u>Power switch of pump panel</u>	<u>FS/Intermediate Booster Pumps</u>	<u>Fire Alarm</u>	<u>Action taken by FSD</u>
Wang Yan House (Block A)	26.11.2025 / 1600 hrs	Unlocked	--	“OFF” position	Could not be actuated after replacement of fuses	Could not be actuated after replacement of fuses (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- After switching on the power supply to “ON” position, intermediate booster pumps and MFA System still failed to work in order. - Intermediate booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate booster pump beside the FS inlet. - During post-fire investigation, the control fuse was replaced with the others fuses, however, the fuses became blown after replacement. It was suspected that the wiring in the upper floor was short circuit.
Wang Tao House (Block B)	26.11.2025 / 1633 hrs	Unlocked	--	“OFF” position	Could not be actuated	Could not be actuated (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- After switching on the power supply to “ON” position, intermediate booster pumps and MFA System still failed to work in order. - Intermediate booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate pump beside the FS inlet.
Wang Sun House (Block C)	27.11.2025 / 1400 hrs	Unlocked	--	“ON” position	Could not be actuated	Could not be actuated (FAS was momentarily actuated at the incipient phase)	- Intermediated booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate booster pump beside the FS inlet.

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

						of the fire)	
--	--	--	--	--	--	--------------	--

<u>Building</u>	<u>Inspection Date / Time</u>	<u>FS Pump Room Lock</u>	<u>Entry Method</u>	<u>Power switch of pump panel</u>	<u>FS/Intermediate Booster Pumps</u>	<u>Fire Alarm</u>	<u>Action taken by FSD</u>
Wang Kin House (Block D)	27.11.2025 / 1527 hrs	Locked	Key	“OFF” position	Could not be actuated	Could not be actuated (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- After switching on the power supply to “ON” position, intermediate booster pumps and MFA System still failed to work in order. - Intermediate booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate booster pump beside the FS inlet.
Wang Tai House (Block E)	27.11.2025 / 1810 hrs	Locked	Forcible Entry	“OFF” position	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- Testing was not performed due to waterlogged in the pump room
Wang Cheong House (Block F)	27.11.2025 / 1145 hrs	Unlocked	--	“OFF” position	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room (Not actuated throughout	- Testing was not performed due to waterlogged in the pump room

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

						fire incident)	
<u>Building</u>	<u>Inspection Date / Time</u>	<u>Pump Room Lock</u>	<u>Entry Method</u>	<u>Power switch of pump panel</u>	<u>FS/Intermediate Booster Pumps</u>	<u>Fire Alarm</u>	<u>Action taken by FSD</u>
Wang Shing House (Block G)	27.11.2025 / 1420 hrs	Locked	Forcible Entry	“OFF” position	Could not be actuated	Could not be actuated (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- After switching on the power supply to “ON” position, intermediate booster pumps and MFA System still failed to work in order. - Intermediate booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate booster pump beside the FS inlet.
Wang Chi House (Block H which is unaffected by the fire)	26.11.2025 / 1600 hrs	Unlocked	--	“OFF” position	Could not be actuated during fire Could be actuated after replacement of fuse during the investigation	Could not be actuated during fire Could be actuated after replacement of fuse during the investigation (Not actuated throughout fire incident)	- After switching on the power supply to “ON” position, intermediate booster pumps and MFA System still failed to work in order. - Intermediate booster pumps could not be actuated by pressing the “ON” button of intermediate booster pump beside the FS inlet.

3.2 The Water Quantity of FS Tank and Transfer Tank found during post-fire investigation

<u>Building</u>	<u>FS Tank (Inspection Date/Time)</u>	<u>Transfer Tank (Inspection Date/Time)</u>
Wang Yan House (Block A)	Empty (28.11.2025 / 1500 hrs)	Empty (28.11.2025 / 1600 hrs)
		
Wang Tao House (Block B)	With Water (1.12.2025 / 1100 hrs)	With Water (2.12.2025 / 1330 hrs)
		
Wang Sun House (Block C)	Empty (1.12.2025 / 1100 hrs)	Empty (2.12.2025 / 1148 hrs)
		

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

1813

Wang Kin House (Block D)	Empty (30.11.2025 / 1020 hrs)	Empty (30.11.2025 / 1208 hrs)
		
		Empty (2.12.2025 / 1417 hrs)
		
Wang Tai House (Block E)	Empty (1.12.2025 / 1109 hrs)	Empty (2.12.2025 / 1445 hrs)
		

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

1814

Wang Cheong House (Block F)	Empty (29.11.2025 / 1033 hrs) 	Empty (2.12.2025 / 1502 hrs) 
Wang Shing House (Block G)	With Water (1.12.2025 / 1136 hrs) 	Empty (2.12.2025 / 1046 hrs) 

Report on FSI of Wang Fuk Court

1815

Wang Chi House (Block H) (Unaffected by the fire)	Empty (26.11.2025 / 1628 hrs) (from Witnesses Statement)	With Water (2.12.2025 / 1022 hrs)
		
	Empty (1.12.2025 / 1117 hrs) (Photo)	
		

3.3 Other Findings and Observations

<u>Building</u>	<u>FS/Intermediate Booster Pumps</u>	<u>Control Fuse</u>	<u>Main Power Switch</u>
Wang Yan House (Block A)	Could not be actuated after replacement of fuses	Blown	Off
Wang Tao House (Block B)	Could not be actuated	Blown	Off
Wang Sun House (Block C)	Could not be actuated	Blown	On
Wang Kin House (Block D)	Could not be actuated	Blown	Off
Wang Tai House (Block E)	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room	Blown	Off
Wang Cheong House (Block F)	Not tested due to waterlogged in the pump room	Normal	Off
Wang Shing House (Block G)	Could not be actuated	Blown and mouldy	Off
Wang Chi House (Block H which is unaffected by the fire)	Could not be actuated during fire Could be actuated after replacement of fuse during the investigation	Blown	Off

- i. All FS pumps were designed as fixed pump and intermediate booster pump; All fuses of pump panels of individual building were found blown, except the one found normal at Wang Cheong House (Block F); All main power switch of pump panels of individual buildings were in “OFF” position, except Wang Sun House (Block C);
- ii. The FAS of Wang Sun House (Block C) was momentarily actuated at the incipient phase of the fire;
- iii. The fuses of pump panel in Wang Shing House (Block G) was found mouldy; FS pump and fire alarm could be actuated after replacing the fuse into pump panel of Wang Chi House (Block H);
- iv. The fuses of pump panel of Wang Chi House (Block H) was sealed and sent to a laboratory for examination, and findings indicated that they operated normally. The results suggested that the fuses were damaged due to overcurrent.
- v. Inspection photos by FPFS were attached at Appendix II.

10 AUTO. WATER SPRAY SYSTEM:-

Areas protected

Manufactured by

Number of spray projectors

Number and location of control valve

Number and location of inlets

Water supply

Location and capacity of:-

Fire pump

Water tank

Other source of water supply

Detection system:-

Sprinkler

Heat detector

11 AUTO. CO2/BCF/BTM SYSTEMS:-

Areas protected

Manufactured by

Number of discharge nozzles

Detection system:-

Smoke detectors

Heat detectors

Location and capacity of cylinders

12 OTHERS:-

Fire Doors/Rolling Shutters

Number and location

Operated by

Emergency generator

Number and location

Fireman's Lift

Number and floors served 15 (5 x 3) serving from G/F to 31/F

E. & M. certificate number... Block 9-1707/3, Block 10-1.708/3, Block 11-1709/3,
Block 12-1673/4 & Block 13-1674/4

Remarks:-

Inspection Officer. SSND(P) LO Hing-cheung

Signature

Date 24th June, 1983

1817
21

File Ref. FFB 20/6807

FIRE SERVICE INSTALLATIONS (Section 21, sub-section (6) (d), Buildings Ord. Cap. 123)

Building or Premises 32-storey domestic building (5 blocks)

Address Kwong Fuk Estate Phase 1A Area 24, Tai Po (For Block 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 only)

Fire Station Area Tai Po Fire Station

1 SUMMARY OF F.S.I.

☒ Portable Equipment	☐ Drencher
☒ Manual Fire Alarm	☐ Auto Water Spray
☐ Dry Riser	☐ Auto. CO2/BCF/BTM
☒ Fire Hydrant/Hose Reel	☐ Fire Doors/Rolling Shutters
☐ Auto. Smoke and/or Heat Detection System	☐ Emergency Generator
☐ Auto. Sprinkler	☒ Fireman's Lift
☐ Dry Sprinkler	

Installed by ... Arnold & Co. Ltd., Date 21st April, 1983
14th, 20th & 22nd June, 1983

Inspected and Accepted by ... SSND(P) LO Hing-cheung Date June, 1983

2 PORTABLE EQUIPMENT:-

Water/CO2-9 litre/2 gallon Nine (9), Two for Block 9 to 12, One for Block 13

Foam-9 litre/2 gallon

Stored Pressure/Water/Dry Powder/Foam Extinguisher

Dry Powder kg/lb.

CO2 Extinguisher kg/lb. 1 x 2.3 kg for Block 9 only

CO2 Extinguisher 20 x 4.6 kg (4 per each Block)

Fire Blankets

Sand Buckets

3 MANUAL FIRE ALARM SYSTEM:-

Number and location of actuation points 160 (5 x 32) as per hose reel points

Incorporated into the FH/HR system? YES/NO

4 DRY RISER SYSTEM:-

Number and location of F.S. inlets
 Number and location of fire hydrants
 Number and diameter of rising mains

5 FIRE HYDRANT AND HOSE REEL SYSTEM:-

Number and location of F.S. inlets Five (One for each block)
 Number of floors on which hydrants are installed Thirty two (32)
 Number and diameter of rising mains 10 x 100 mm (2 for each block)
 Number of hydrant valves, single outlet/~~twin outlet~~ 160 (5 x 32)
 Location of hydrant valves Staircase landings from G/F to 31/F

Location and capacity of:-

Fire pump 5 x 15 kw on G/F (One for each Block)
Standby/Intermediate Booster pump 5 x 15 kw on G/F (One for each Block)
 F.S.I. tank 5 x 18200 litre on roof
 Pressure at highest point 700 kPa
 Flow at highest point 100 lpm
 Fixed hose-reels, c/w nozzles, total 160 (5 x 32)
 Length of hosereels 40 m
 Location of hosereels corridor from G/F to 31/F

6 AUTO. SMOKE AND/OR HEAT DETECTION SYSTEM:-

Areas protected
 Smoke detectors Nos. Manufactured by
 Heat detectors Nos. Manufactured by
 Location of annunciator panel
 Total number of zones
 Termination point/panel No. (if any)

AUTO. SPRINKLER SYSTEM:-

Manufactured by
 Type and number of heads
 Number and location of valve groups and alarm bell

Floors served by each valve group
 Number and location of sprinkler inlets
 Water supply

Location and capacity of:-

Fire pump
 F.S.I. tank
 Other source of water supply

Direct line to Fire Control (if any) YES/NO

Panel No. (if known)

8 DRY SPRINKLER SYSTEM:-

Number and location of inlets
 Type and number of heads
 Manufactured by

9 DRENCHER SYSTEM:-

Areas protected
 Number and location of inlets
 Number and location of control valves

Number of drencher heads
 Manufactured by
 Water supply

Location and capacity of:-


Fire pump
 F.S.I. tank
 Other source of water supply

Wang Yan House (Block A)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the piping of upfeed water pump (Disconnected)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel



2.12.2025

Photo showing the fuses of the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Tao House (Block B)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the new installed upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the new installed piping of upfeed water pump




2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water available)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room




2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Sun House (Block C)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the upfeed water pump and piping




2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)

Fire Booster Pump Room




2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Kin House (Block D)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the piping of upfeed water pump (Disconnected)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room




2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025



2.12.2025


Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Tai House (Block E)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the piping of upfeed water pump (Connected)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)

Fire Booster Pump Room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)




2.12.2025



2.12.2025


Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Cheong House (Block F)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the piping and the upfeed water pump (Connected)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room




2.12.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)




2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Shing House (Block G)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the new installed piping of upfeed water pump (Disconnected)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power off position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water unavailable)



27.11.2025

Photo showing the door of fire booster pump room



27.11.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)



27.11.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power available after switch on)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

Wang Chi House (Block H)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the door of pump room



2.12.2025

Photo showing the new installed upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the new installed piping of upfeed water pump (Disconnected)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the main switch of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power unavailable)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the power breaker of the control panel of upfeed water pump (Power on position)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. Up-feed tank of upfeed water pump (Water available)



2.12.2025

Photo showing the F.S. tank of 18200 L



27.11.2025

Photo showing the situation inside the F.S. tank of 18200 L



27.11.2025

Photo showing the situation of water level sensor



29.11.2025

Photo showing the 100A TPN switch of fire booster pump panel (Power off position)



29.11.2025

Photo showing the control panel of fire booster pump (Power unavailable)



29.11.2025

Photo showing the control panel wiring of fire booster pump control panel

就大埔宏福苑火災成立的獨立委員會

聽證會

高等法院原訟法庭陸啟康法官
陳健波議員
歐陽伯權博士

日期：

第七天
2026 年 4 月 1 日

杜淦堃資深大律師, 俞匡庭大律師, 李澍桓大律師, 馮天榮大律師,
張天風大律師及李俊軒大律師代表獨立委員會

許偉強資深大律師, 何卓衡大律師及楊志聰大律師代表置邦興業有限公司

孫靖乾資深大律師, 卓元暢大律師及陸栩然大律師代表政府

林樂夫大律師代表宏泰消防工程有限公司

律政司代表

呂世杰資深大律師及阮文躍大律師代表市區重建局

柯愷欣大律師代表宏福苑業主立案法團第十二屆管理委員會

譚俊傑大律師及李峰琦大律師代表宏福苑居民

競爭事務委員會代表

陳熾龍大律師代表梁秉基先生

文國灝大律師代表合安管理有限公司

以下內容乃聆訊數碼錄音謄本

10 時 00 分聆訊恢復

10 時 00 分置邦興業有限公司文員證人駱倩盈女士恢復作供

陸啟康法官：杜大律師，我諗呢一兩日都會係處理主要係置邦嘅證人，係咪？

杜淦堃資深大律師：冇錯，主席。駱小姐，早晨。

駱倩盈女士：早晨。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋尋日喺休息之前你協助緊我哋就去解釋，喺證供上高你同羅先生可能唔係好啱合嘅地方。我都想問一問你，因為你喺宏福苑工作咗好長一段時間，你嘅證供都提到其實你參加咗好多佢哋嗰啲同維修有關嘅會議。

駱倩盈女士：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：而有好多啲會議紀錄係你本人去撰寫嘅，係咪呀？

駱倩盈女士：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：所以就嗰啲問題，我想你幫一幫我哋。

駱倩盈女士：好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我明白你可能有啲事情係你唔知道嘅，但係因為你有份參與，所以都想盡量請你幫一幫忙。我想問一問你，琴日可能你都喺度，關於嗰個消防水缸嘅問題，你知道喺天面位有個水缸？

駱倩盈女士：唔。

杜淦堃資深大律師：就唔係竊住大廈天面，係擲起咗嘅。

駱倩盈女士：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你有上過去㗎，係咪呀？

駱倩盈女士：如果你指係要擒天台嗰貓梯上去嘅一個，稱之為高天面嘅地方，我有上過。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係，我想你幫一幫我哋睇一睇呢一份文件先，喺 H1-1/155 頁，我哋知道喺宏福苑嘅維修工程裏面，業主同宏業嘅合約呢，係有包括維修呢啲水缸嘅，你見到 6.2 (a)。

駱倩盈女士：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：首先，你知道工程有一部分係同維修消防水缸有關，係咪？喺你處理過嘅文件裏面你應該曾經見過？

駱倩盈女士：有。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇見過呢份合約，你有冇睇過㗎？

駱倩盈女士：呢份合約我有攞過，但係冇仔細咁睇。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白，6.2(a)呢一度，你見到呢個工程係為數唔細嘅工程嚟嘅，
2 \$616 萬嘅。

3 駱倩盈女士：係。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個應該係咁多座加埋嘅，係咪？

5 駱倩盈女士：唔清楚。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，明白。你見到呢度講，佢係所有公用石屎水缸，但包括不--但不限
7 於泵房內嘅水缸，高天面嘅水缸等修葺工程。高天面嘅水缸就係我哋頭先講，你講
8 嗰個喇，係咪？爬貓梯上去嗰個？

9 駱倩盈女士：係，我估係，因為爬貓梯上上面，有幾個蓋，我唔知道個打邊個。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，係嘞，我哋睇到呢一項，其實如果我哋掃落去 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
11 6, 7, 8, 咁呀有唔同嘅工程都係關於啲水缸嘅。琴日 Victory Fire 嘅代表喺
12 庭上作供嘅時候，你都喺度喇，係咪？

13 駱倩盈女士：喺度。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都有聽到佢講關於要鋪番啲磚喺嗰個消防缸嗰一段嘅證據，係咪？

15 駱倩盈女士：係。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：對於要做消防缸呢個工程呢，似乎喺換咗法團代表之後，管委會之後
17 呢，大家係有一啲意見係其實我哋需唔需要做咁多呢啲工程嘅，你記唔記得？

18 駱倩盈女士：記得。

19 杜淦堃資深大律師：而當時 IO 嘅代表係有嘗試因應居民嘅要求，似乎把工程嘅範圍係縮細
20 嘅？

21 駱倩盈女士：係。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係大家去睇下係咪真係要做㗎，如果唔使做啲啲，cut 啲，慳番啲
23 錢，咁講啱唔啱？

24 駱倩盈女士：啱。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你幫一幫我哋睇一份可能都係你準備嘅記錄，H1-3/6033 頁，我
26 哋見到呢一個係 2024 年 11 月 13 號嘅紀錄，喺宏志閣會議室，而出席嘅有法
27 團、管理處、鴻毅同埋宏業嘅，呢一個紀錄係唔係--似唔似係你做嘅紀錄？

28 駱倩盈女士：係。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到喺 6033 頁一開始就話「法團就個別刪除項目逐一與宏業及鴻
30 毅討論。細項同埋結論詳見大維修工程另外有個表格」，但係我想你睇一睇嘅就係
31 喺下一頁 6034，你見到而家螢光幕較下部分有個「天台儲水缸呢個題目」嘅。

32 駱倩盈女士：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢度就提到，法團將申請水務處推行呢個水安全計劃嘅資助喇，咁就話
34 叫宏業可唔可以暫時停止打鑿天台儲水缸喇。咁呢度講咗個程序，你見到呢度當時
35 係你做嘅紀錄，係咪？

36 駱倩盈女士：係。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋講完呢個程式之後，下一段係咁講「宏業只可先做消防缸，再整咸
2 水及淡水缸，屆時要借用消防缸」，跟住就話「此項目特定先由宏業嘅侯生介紹水
3 喉匠」你記得有呢個討論㗎，係咪？

4 駱倩盈女士：有。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以講到畀我哋聽，以你嘅記憶，當時個討論應該就係話居民表
6 達其實啲天台嘅呢啲水缸可唔可以唔整？但似乎宏業表示都係要整，你個印象係咪
7 咁呀？

8 駱倩盈女士：係。

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：你仲可唔可以幫到我哋，你記唔記得當時有冇啲乜嘢嘅解說話點解要整
10 呀？同埋其他嘅細節？因為你有參加會議，所以想麻煩你幫一幫忙？

11 駱倩盈女士：真係有印象嘅就係——因為始終太耐。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。

13 駱倩盈女士：我記得有講過就係話水缸入面有啲配件可能損毀㗎或者失效㗎，咁亦都有可能
14 有啲水管係生鏽，咁對於一個食水缸，畀人飲用嘅，水質唔係咁理想，所以會有呢
15 個工程去做，喺印象中我係咁。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個印象係關於嗰個食水缸。

17 駱倩盈女士：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋頭先講㗎生鏽，你記唔記得有冇咩嘢理由係要整個消防缸？

19 駱倩盈女士：有，因為食水缸要整嘅情況下，你必須要搵一個臨時嘅替代缸，所以照呢份
20 字面解釋就係話可以先維修個消防缸，維修完消防缸之後，消防缸就會轉做臨時嘅
21 食水缸，到時真正嘅食水缸就可以做維修。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，呢個似乎文件都係顯示到呢一樣嘢嘅，因為如果你睇——我再帶你去
23 睇 6080 頁，你睇番之前嗰頁你就會——6079 呢個係大廈大維修工程嘅進度會議摘
24 要，我哋見到管理處有兩個代表，你都係喺度。當時法團就有徐滿柑主席同埋副主
25 席，同埋江祥發先生，你記得呢個文件應該都係咁做，係咪？

26 駱倩盈女士：唔，冇錯。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果你去睇番下一頁，第 8 項，呢度咁講「宏業報告會於 2025 年 4 月
28 7 日起進行宏泰閣、宏志閣嘅消防缸防水工程，屆時消防缸會暫停運作，及向消防
29 處申請掛牌，另外，亦會於單數單位——單數層嘅樓層擺放防水——擺放水劑及滅火
30 筒」，你都記得有呢個討論，係咪？

31 駱倩盈女士：有。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：聽你咁講同埋文件顯示，似乎當時建議嘅做法就係將嗰個消防缸去翻
33 新，令到佢做到可以裝食水？

34 駱倩盈女士：係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：而呢個係一個臨時做法，而佢哋話要咁做，係因為整食水缸嗰陣可以用
36 個消防缸嚟頂住先，係咪咁？

1 駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

2 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇人質疑過呢個做法係咪唯一嘅做法或者係咪合適嘅做法？

3 駱倩盈女士：我記得有人提議過好多唔同嘅做法嘅，但係而家呢一刻，因為喺開會嘅期間，
4 其實會有其他街坊列席，又或者有好多承辦商嘅人都會一齊，嗰啲商討期間嗰啲唔
5 係一啲結果嘅嘢我有--冇記憶係，係嘞。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白，亦都一段時間之前，所以都係想你儘量協助我哋。我睇番呢個文
7 件，如果去番之前嗰頁，我哋留意到個日期係 3 月 29 日嘅，如果我哋睇番呢個文
8 件夾 6113 頁，我哋睇到過幾個月發生咩嘢事。去到 8 月嘅時候，我哋睇番呢個文
9 件應該都係顯示一個你有出席嘅會議？

10 駱倩盈女士：係。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：見到你同埋黎經理嘅名，呢份文件都係你做㗎喇應該？

12 駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，咁我哋睇番 6113，睇第 6 項，嗰度講咗個消防缸個進度，呢度咁
14 講，「G、H 座消防缸維修工程已完成，將會與管理處商討消防缸轉為臨時食水缸嘅
15 安排」，跟住又講到「D 唔、E、F 座消防缸維修工程仍然進行中」，呢個就同我哋
16 頭先睇個文件，基本上就係記錄番同一個處理方法，同埋嗰個進程嘅進度嘞。

17 駱倩盈女士：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，似乎文件顯示到就係，因為要做呢啲工程呢，嗰個消防栓同喉轆系
19 統係長期咁樣去關閉嘅？

20 駱倩盈女士：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：而呢一個--睇下你幫唔幫到我哋，亦都可能解釋到，我哋去 Bundle
22 R1/第 1 頁，我哋之前喺聽證會都顯示過呢個文件出嚟，呢個係中華發展，即係另
23 外嗰個消防工程嘅承辦商嘅發票嚟嘅，呢啲文件你可能都會見過，係咪？

24 駱倩盈女士：我有見過。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有見過，但係如果我哋睇番第三項，如果我哋一路落去，你見到第二
26 項嗰度，我哋之前都提過呢一點嘅，其實係喺呢一日，上少少會見到日期嘅，就係
27 你哋頭先開--我睇過一個會議記錄就係 3 月 29 號，其實 3 月 28 號，即係之前嗰
28 日有張咁嘅發票，裏面就講咗話第二項消防工程關閉係要每次十四日，嗰陣已經預
29 咗一年㗎嘞。似乎我哋睇到個情況就係因為有人提議用個消防缸嚟代替--做臨時食
30 水缸，所以要做呢啲嘅工程，而似乎係要做好耐，所以一開始已經因為呢個做法就
31 關閉一年。你有冇印象喺開會嘅時候有討論呢啲問題？

32 駱倩盈女士：冇印象。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外一樣嘢，我哋喺啲相度睇到嘅琴日就係，似乎有啲同消防缸連接嘅
34 喉管係有啲工程係進行中嘅喺大火嘅時候，而有啲喉管似乎係被拆除，琴日我哋睇
35 到啲相，似乎呢個都係同--將呢個消防缸做臨時食水缸有關嘅，你對於呢一樣嘢又
36 有冇印象？

1 駱倩盈女士：我對於關於呢個消防缸嘅維修，涉及啲咩嘢部分係完全唔清楚，我淨係知道會
2 冇水。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。另外一方面想你記一記，睇下幫唔幫到我哋嘅。八座都有消防缸
4 㗎，有啲證據顯示有人話有漏水，但係亦都有人質疑其實係冇漏水，冇必要去做呢
5 個工程，你記唔記得有冇呢啲嘅討論？

6 駱倩盈女士：有。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你記得啲乜嘢，可唔可以講畀委員會聽？

8 駱倩盈女士：都係啲句，印象中嘅啫。

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇問題。

10 駱倩盈女士：係嘞，因為有啲 31 樓嘅住戶，即係最高層樓上就係天台嘅住戶，個天花係會
11 有滲漏，為數都唔係話兩三隻咁少嘅，每一座。咁個陣時我記得有傾過究竟係啲水-
12 -天台水缸漏水㗎，定係因為個天台地面防水層有損壞。亦都有講過，宏業嗰邊亦都
13 有講過就係話好大機會係個陣時做天台嗰個太陽能板工程，係嘞，導致個--因為做
14 呢個太陽能板工程嘅時候，我唔在職，我都係聽番佢哋講。佢哋就話嗰個太陽能板
15 工程做嘅時候係包括天面層，即係天台我哋行嘅位置去做一個防水，咁個防水
16 呢，根據佢哋工程經驗係做得唔理想嘅，所以嗰個防水層有機會其實係已經損壞
17 㗎，係嘞，咁所以喺會議之中有要求過再聯絡番太陽能板嘅工程公司嚟再睇下可唔
18 可以做多次天面防水，從而再睇下住戶單位上面嘅天花究竟會唔會有好轉呢個情
19 況，主要講關於天台滲水嘅係呢樣嘢，對於水缸有冇漏水，呢個我有乜印象。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：駱小姐，都想你諗一諗呢樣嘢，因為你--你都會理解我哋而家探討嘅其
21 中一個問題就係有冇一啲其實唔需要做嘅工程，喺某些其他原因之下就做㗎，咁令
22 到啲業主可能做㗎一啲其實有需要嘅嘢，你會明白就係 31 樓嘅住戶滲水，呢個唔
23 等於啲消防缸漏水嘅。

24 駱倩盈女士：同意。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，佢個天面防水工程做得唔好係其中一個理由。

26 駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：同埋因為啲消防缸係擲起㗎㗎。

28 駱倩盈女士：係。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，咁所以我想問下就係有冇人就質疑就係話 31 樓居民個單位可能有
30 漏水嘅情況，但係呢個同消防缸有關㗎㗎，有冇人去睇清楚消防缸其實係咪真係漏
31 水呢？同埋係咪八座都漏水？

32 駱倩盈女士：喺我印象中有人可以好斷定咁樣話 31 樓住戶天花嘅漏水究竟係真係天面防水
33 層破損，定係水缸有損壞而導致，係嘞。

34 陸啟康法官：或者我想問一問有冇人個陣時--首先，多謝你解釋㗎我尋日個疑問。有冇人
35 解釋過畀居民聽，如果用咁嘅方法，其實佢個消防嘅缸係會一個長時間係用唔
36 到，而係可能喺如果有火災嘅情況之下危險，有冇人解釋過呢一個危險性畀居民

1 聽？

2 駱倩盈女士：印象中係有出過通告嘅，但係你話張通告係咪貼咗好長時間或者係咪一個大家
3 認為好顯眼嘅位，我唔敢肯定。咁但係另外嘅...

4 陸啟康法官：唔該，個通告講乜嘢？

5 駱倩盈女士：張通告就係話因應個消防水缸一個工程，所以而家就會喺單數樓層擺滅火筒
6 喺個水錶房度。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：都想問埋你最幾條問題，睇下你記唔記得。事實上高有冇人講過話
8 「啊，睇過嘞，消防水缸真係漏水，所以要整」？

9 駱倩盈女士：印象中有。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒你。接住落嚟我想問一問你一啲有關開會嘅情況，因為好多時，
11 我見到開會你都有參與，呢啲包括一啲周年大會或者一啲叫 EGM，即係唔係周年
12 嘅，就係或者係平時特別召開嘅會議。好多時我哋知道有啲業主冇嚟，但係有啲授
13 權票或者委任文件委任其他人幫佢哋去投票嘅。

14 駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個情況本身冇問題嘅。

16 駱倩盈女士：係。

17 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你見過呢啲情況出現當然？

18 駱倩盈女士：係。

19 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，我想問下你一般嚟講，喺宏福苑就大維修工程裏面有人用授權票嚟
20 投票，普唔普遍呀？你嘅記憶。

21 駱倩盈女士：你指係投選大維修承辦商嗰次，定係唔好理邊次？

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔好理邊次，我想講...（聽不清）

23 駱倩盈女士：普遍嘅。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：普遍嘅。

25 駱倩盈女士：唔。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：有證據顯示係喺有關維修工程係好多授權票嘅，即係我哋講唔到幾多，
27 所以想你憑一憑你嘅印象講畀我哋聽。

28 駱倩盈女士：過百㗎，過百㗎，甚至乎印象中喺譬如 9 月 6 號，即係轉法團成員嗰屆，成二
29 百幾、三百添，係呀，多㗎。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。咁去譬如另外揀選邊個承辦商、揀選顧問，嗰啲全部都有開會㗎
31 嘛？

32 駱倩盈女士：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰啲會嘅授權票多唔多？

34 駱倩盈女士：揀選顧問公司嘅時候，我係在職嘅。咁嗰陣時應該--因為每次大會都係百零張
35 喇，呢個基本嘅。係嘞，但係你話揀選大維修承辦商，即係選宏業出嚟嗰陣時，我
36 就唔在職，所以呢個我答你唔到。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅在職期間，就收到個驗樓--強制驗樓通知書嘅，係咪呀？
- 2 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：揀註冊檢驗人員，即係個 RI 嘅時候你都喺度嘅？
- 4 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 5 陳健波議員：駱小姐，我想問一問呢，因為我哋比較關注嗰啲授權書嘅問題，因為我哋屋苑
- 6 都好困擾呢樣嘢。
- 7 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 8 陳健波議員：我想問一問你，你大概--頭先你話有過百，佔個總比例幾多，即係個授權書？
- 9 駱倩盈女士：我哋全苑 1,984，咁過百嘅，基本上--或者簡單啲咁講，基本上只要被授權嘅
- 10 人嚟到簽到晒，其實個會已經夠人數開㗎喇。
- 11 陳健波議員：係呀，但係我想知呢，即係頭先你講，因為你只係計嗰個分數，即係唔...
- 12 (聽不清)
- 13 駱倩盈女士：唔，唔，唔，係。
- 14 陳健波議員：...嗰個--喺呢個公契嘅分數去計㗎嘛，即係我想就係佔--譬如授權票佔七成
- 15 咩、五成咩、定係三成？即係授權票係咪一個影響好大嘅因素呢？
- 16 駱倩盈女士：喺宏福苑嚟講係。
- 17 陳健波議員：即係會佔七成呀，頭先如果你用百四同埋一百嗰個...(聽不清)
- 18 駱倩盈女士：你話個 percentage 我真係答你唔到。但係喺我即係過去參與嘅業主大會，
- 19 總之有投票嗰啲嘢嘢，其實授權書嗰個佔嘅--令到個結果出嚟，我覺得係好明顯
- 20 嘅。
- 21 陳健波議員：即係會超過一半，你會唔會講係超過一半呀？
- 22 駱倩盈女士：可以咁講。
- 23 陳健波議員：Okay，咁我想問...
- 24 駱倩盈女士：但係呢個係印象㗎，事實上係咪，我真係唔知，係呀。
- 25 陳健波議員：係，明白。我都想問呢，咁你哋有冇 check 嗰個授權書係咪真假呢？因為有
- 26 啲屋苑會點做呢？譬如你有授權書，佢會抽查，譬如抽查三成，打電話畀嗰個業
- 27 主，問下你係咪真係簽過一張咁嘅授權書，咁你哋有冇做呢個抽查嘅工作呀？
- 28 駱倩盈女士：喺我在任嘅期間，我就有做抽查嘅工作，我只會跟番嗰張授權書上面核對個業
- 29 主名...
- 30 陳健波議員：個名...
- 31 駱倩盈女士：...同埋個單位，同埋佢個...
- 32 陳健波議員：核對個簽名咁，係咪呀？
- 33 駱倩盈女士：簽名冇得對㗎，講真。
- 34 陳健波議員：...(聽不清)你淨係檢對個單位咋嘛。
- 35 駱倩盈女士：打個交叉我都當佢簽咗名㗎喇，係呀。除非佢張授權書係漏咗一啲資料，可能
- 36 佢冇寫樓層或者係真係冇簽名，咁我就會聯絡番嗰個業主，「啊，我哋收到張咁嘅

1 嘢，想確認係咪你㗎？哦，如果係你嘅，其實我而家見到某一啲位置，可能有啲嘢
2 未齊㗎，咁你需唔需要補充番？」咁樣囉，係嘞。

3 陳健波議員：即係如果資料足夠呢，你係唔會跟查，亦都唔會去打--抽查問你係唔係佢簽
4 嘅，你唔會做呢個工作㗎嘛？

5 駱倩盈女士：唔會，只會發一張法定嘅所謂收據，由秘書簽署嘅收據畀番個--嗰戶人囉。

6 陳健波議員：即係個事後...

7 駱倩盈女士：咁嗰戶人如果收到個--都唔算事後，喺大會開之前必須發番呢張回條畀個
8 住客嘅。咁如果個住客收到呢張嘢，而佢認為我有交過授權書，點解你會畀呢張
9 嘢我，咁我哋--係有發生㗎，不過唔多。咁我哋就會即刻 check 番個業主先。
10 首先佢話佢係業主㗎，咁我哋都要 check 番㗎，如果核實咗佢係業主身份，我哋
11 就會畀番佢個單位我哋收到嘅授權書，畀番佢睇，係呢張㗎，會唔會係多於一個
12 業主去簽而你哋唔知呀？有咁嘅發生嘅，係嘞。

13 陳健波議員：即係呢個程序係都有發生過，有啲人係唔認嗰張係佢簽嘅...（聽不清）。

14 駱倩盈女士：係，冇錯，冇錯，係嘞。

15 陳健波議員：咁你最多取消嗰張授權書嘅㗎，係咪？

16 駱倩盈女士：唔係㗎，因為有啲人會堅持佢--有人冒佢簽名做一個假嘅文書出嚟㗎，咁我
17 哋通常就會首先建議佢問清楚屋企人先㗎，係嘞，第二就係話會建議佢考慮需唔需
18 要報警處理，係嘞。

19 陳健波議員：冇知道冇冇啲真係報警㗎，冇冇㗎？

20 駱倩盈女士：以我所知，冇。

21 陳健波議員：冇，哦。

22 駱倩盈女士：係嘞。經我手嘅冇囉只可以話，佢冇冇自己去報警，我唔知。

23 陳健波議員：Okay，我想問呢，你覺得--因為呢個都係香港嘅整體一個問題，都係我哋檢
24 討嘅方向，即係點樣改善個授權書嘅制度，呢個可以造成好多問題，你會唔會有啲
25 咩嘢--因為你做咗咁耐，又經歷咗咁多，你覺得有咩嘢方法可以即係令到個授權
26 書嘅制度更加係--即係一方面授權書係需要嘅，因為有時你唔夠人根本就開唔到
27 會，但係都畀人濫用㗎，或者畀人去即係做咗啲非法嘅行為，咁你覺得點樣可以加
28 強控制？我哋有可能百分之百控制，但係我哋點樣去提高個控制個水平，令
29 到佢更加正路咁去做呢件事？

30 駱倩盈女士：如果可以嘅話，首先業主要個業權改咗名，或者有所改變嘅情況，第一時間通
31 知番管理處先。

32 陳健波議員：係。

33 駱倩盈女士：因為喺宏福苑，舉個例，其實有好多好多單位可能爸爸媽媽離開㗎，子女冇去
34 搞個業權，變相我哋喺查冊嘅名冊上面都係已經離開咗嘅人，咁佢哋嘅子女就有權
35 去代佢爸爸媽媽去做投票呢樣嘢，呢樣嘢喺宏福苑嚟講係好普遍嘅。係，咁第二樣
36 嘢就係話睇下冇冇可能物管公司或者立例，可能要提供一份（English

Spoken) 嘅業主嘅文件，上面係有業主嘅簽名模式。

陳健波議員：係。

駱倩盈女士：咁變相作為物管公司或者法團都好，嚟收到呢個單位上面就可以拎番呢個業主嘅簽名樣式去核對，我覺得起碼唔會真係打個交叉，潦隻龜，我就已經可以當佢係一份正式簽署嘅文件。同埋可以--學你話齋，隨機抽查，可能收到一百份，我抽其中十五份出嚟打電話問下係咪囉，咁樣。但係因為而家有呢樣規定，但係有陣時亦都係曾經宏福苑發生，亦都係我個人發生嘅，就係話見到一啲授權書資料唔齊，我咪打電話上去同個業主講，你想--譬如欠簽名，「咁你需唔需要加簽番？」咁樣，咁個住客話「好」咁樣，咁我話「咁你想你落嚟定係我拎上嚟畀你加簽？」咁有陣時多老人家「你上嚟喇」咁樣，咁可能佢都識我咁樣，咁我就拎上去佢單位，咁畀--嚟門口同佢對一對個身份證，雖然就算我知道佢係一定係業主，但係我都會對身份證嘅，咁我亦都會出示我個員工證，咁就嚟門口度畀佢加簽，簽完，我就會拎番去寫字樓。但係喺呢段期間，曾經有一啲住客可能唔清楚或者本身對法團或者對管理處本身個印象都唔係咁好，就話「管理處駱小姐上門收授權書，騙阿婆簽名」，係有發生過呢啲嘢嘅，係，咁樣。咁我覺得喺呢一(English Spoken)度，唔會係得宏福苑曾經發生呢樣嘢，我諗全港屋苑或者物管公司都曾經會經歷過呢樣嘢。係，因為呢樣嘢係好普遍。

陳健波議員：多謝你寶貴意見。

杜淦堃資深大律師：如果可以跟進咁問一問，我哋知道呢啲嘢係有法例規管，但係就宏福苑嚟講，嗰啲授權票係要開會之前幾耐交到你哋手上？

駱倩盈女士：四十八小時。

杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你哋去核實或者你去 Check 嗰啲授權票有冇問題，係相信係喺嗰四十八小時裏面做完，係咪？

駱倩盈女士：必須要。

杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你嘅意思就係，你哋雖然唔會每一個居民都打去問下「喂，你哋係咪真係授權咗第二位嚟投票？」

駱倩盈女士：係，唔會。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你哋見到有問題嗰啲，你哋會跟進？

駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。而你哋一路嘅做法都係管理處幫手，物業管理公司去處理呢一part 嘅工作，係咪？

駱倩盈女士：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你開會本身，個會，邊個可以入去嗰個會場，係你哋用咩嘢方法去核實嗰個身分？

駱倩盈女士：其實好多時都唔限個喎，你鍾意入嚟咪入嚟。

杜淦堃資深大律師：所以入到嚟開會，即係啲居民大會，其實就都好多人，有時。

1 駱倩盈女士：係。

2 杜淦堃資深大律師：就似乎就係邊個嚟就入得，就有話要居民、要業主先入得，係咪？

3 駱倩盈女士：都係--照用番，譬如好似 9 月 6 號咁，新舊法團有機會係改變，咁嗰下因為其
4 實喺開會之前，啲居民嘅反應係寧舍熱烈嘅，咁係--咁場地上面亦都有所限制，因
5 為都驚話會人多擠逼，所以當時係限咗如果你係業主，確認咗你係業主嘅，或者你
6 係正式一個被授權人嘅，就上樓上主會場一個禮堂，如果你都係業主，但係禮堂已
7 經爆咗一個人數，而業主本身帶一個可能工人姐姐，或者佢嘅唔係業主嘅朋友或者
8 屋企人，你就可以坐樓下嘅兩天操場。咁簡單啲嚟講，你要入嚟嘅，而有業主帶你
9 入嚟嘅，其實我哋都有權拒絕。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：你會知道有一個講法，就係喺有啲重要嘅會議裏面，有可能有好多唔係
11 居民嘅人入咗去，搞到啲居民入唔到，聽你咁講，即係呢個係有可能嘅？

12 駱倩盈女士：有。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係個原因就唔知？

14 駱倩盈女士：唔。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：而除咗你講 9 月 6 號嗰次，其他一啲嘅要投票嘅大會，如果我理解你嘅
16 證據冇錯，就係好多時都係冇核實身份，但係就可以--嚟到就可以入嘅？

17 駱倩盈女士：係，冇錯。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係呢個唔係一個批評，但係真係咁樣發生？

19 駱倩盈女士：係，真嘅。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：就嗰個授權票問多你一樣嘢，睇下可唔可以幫到我哋，有冇一個--有一
21 個指控就係話，有好多時好多張授權票係授權畀一個人或者幾個人嘅，你記唔記得
22 有啲咁嘅情況？

23 駱倩盈女士：會有。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇印象，有冇一啲記憶係特別多人授權啲乜嘢人？

25 駱倩盈女士：通常都係主席、副主席呢啲，係，委員，係。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係有邊個可能收得特別多，你就冇乜記憶？

27 駱倩盈女士：通常都係主席、副主席。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該。我想問下你，我哋知道就管委會同可能鴻毅或者宏業去揀呢啲顧
29 問或者承判商嘅時候有安排過一啲面試，你有冇參加啲面試？

30 駱倩盈女士：冇。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你頭先所講 2021 年 12 月 11 號嗰個特別業主大會，去委任鴻毅做
32 顧問，嗰次你喺度，係咪？

33 駱倩盈女士：係。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰次個爭議大唔大，你嘅記憶？

35 駱倩盈女士：其實每次業主大會爭議都好大。

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：而照你嘅印象，主要爭議嘅內容係啲乜嘢？即係唔滿意嘅係啲乜嘢？

1 駱倩盈女士：唔滿意嘅係，有啲住客會認為資料唔全面，未清晰嘅情況下就要投票。

2 杜淦堃資深大律師：仲有呢？有冇其他你有印象？

3 駱倩盈女士：對於個金額，因為其實每次可能一啲工程嘅金額，最低同最高上落都會好大分
4 別。咁通常主要就係居民，因為始終佢哋係畀錢嘅一方，咁佢哋會覺得同一個內容
5 嘅報價，點解落差會咁大？唔同公司，所以佢哋好多時就會喺業主大會上面好想問
6 清楚呢樣嘢，點解會有落差咁大，但係內容一樣嘅工作。係，但係因為奈何業主大
7 會時間係有限制，有啲時候係睇住時間就局住要開始投票咁樣。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：就你嘅觀察，你覺得居民呢啲嘅投訴合唔合理？

9 駱倩盈女士：合理嘅，但係又咁講，居民畀每一筆錢需要了解多啲嘅，我覺得好合理。我作
10 為自己屋苑嘅居民，我都會覺得需要了解多啲嘅。但係其實可以——因為其實任何業
11 主大會，甚至乎唔好話業主大會，一啲管理委員會嘅會議，其實都會張貼議程喺大
12 堂，業主大會嘅議程甚至乎會派入信箱，十四日前，其實喺你收到呢個議程同業主
13 大會開始投票嘅中間，你多除少補有十三日、十二日，其實居民可以喺呢十幾日入
14 面去就嗰個會議入面嘅內容去問清楚，而唔需要逼到喺業主大會嗰兩三個鐘頭先去
15 問。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：據你所知，你話開會之前嗰十四日都可以問，有冇啲居民投訴就唔知問
17 邊個，或者問完之後都有一個合理嘅答覆？

18 駱倩盈女士：居民就通常點都嚟管理處先㗎㗎，不論佢嗰樣嘢係咪管理處——或者有啲居民會
19 問法團，因為可能法團有啲定期會議，點都見到法團，同埋法團成員住喺屋苑㗎
20 嘛，係，你都會問佢嘅。如果要睇文件，其實都會指示佢嚟管理處。如果係法團批
21 准嘅情況下，其實任何文件管理處都開放畀居民隨時嚟睇，但係唔可以帶走。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：最後我想問一問你，就係其實可能係更正番證人供詞裏面一啲嘅時間，
23 因為鄭芷盈小姐佢嘅證人供詞第 28 段就係話你係置邦團隊嘅一員，亦都話你曾經
24 協助 2024 年 1 月 28 日嗰次嘅會議嘅行政工作，準備文件，出席登記。但係你嗰
25 陣應該有參與，係咪？

26 駱倩盈女士：24 年 1 月？

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：28。

28 駱倩盈女士：我應該係未入職，24 年。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，你應該係 2020 或者 2021 離開㗎，2024 年 8 月先返嚟嘅。

30 駱倩盈女士：係。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係所以佢呢個講法可能係記錯㗎？

32 駱倩盈女士：係，係。嗰次係——聽番同事講應該喺籃球場，如果係嗰次嘅話，就我諗同事記
33 錯㗎。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：最後就一啲——即係當然你公司有公司嘅立場，居民關於大維修嘅一啲問
35 題，公司有冇指示你哋點樣去處理或者點樣去解答，或者搵邊個？

36 駱倩盈女士：公司只會——其實唔好話公司，上司就係話「肯定嘅先可以答」。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。

2 駱倩盈女士：同埋工程會入面都有--其中一份有講過就係話，如果住客問工程嘅嘢，就轉介
3 番畀宏業，或者直接叫佢聯絡搵職員，管理處淨係答番管理處嘅日常工作就算。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：駱小姐，多謝你。最後我想問你呢條問題，我問你因為你喺宏福苑工作
5 時間好長。

6 駱倩盈女士：唔。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：同埋我諗大家都會同意，你嘅答案好清晰，我想畀個機會你，就呢一次
8 事件，你有冇其他嘢想同委員會講？

9 駱倩盈女士：同委員會講就有，但係因為尋日我曾經作過供，網上面都好多唔係咁公平嘅。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。

11 駱倩盈女士：有好、有唔好嘅嘢，我反而想同居民講，唔知容唔容許。第一，雖然尋日話我
12 同另外一位同事羅先生嘅證供有好大嘅出入，但係希望大家知道，始終過咗咁耐，
13 我唔排除我自己又或者我同事，其實個記憶有機會係出現錯亂。唔可以喺我同事未
14 作供之前，就斷定我哋任何一方係想卸責，或者已經斷定我哋係呢件火災嘅其中一
15 個製造者。

16 同埋另外亦都有居民--我肯定佢係居民嘅，就話想知道火災當日其實管理處嘅
17 職員做過啲乜，因為有居民就話「火災走咗之後，管理處嘅職員消失晒」，喺度，
18 我想用一分鐘嘅時間去講多少少，當日火災其實我哋管理處職員係做咗啲乜。我唔
19 係話我哋管理處做過啲乜，想話去努力維護我哋自己，我唔係咁。係因為有居民真
20 係想知道。除咗琴日我作供嘅，話拎個大聲公、聽電話，其實我哋每座嘅保安員，
21 係，甚至乎喺（English Spoken）嘅保安員，其實係好自發性跑上一啲佢哋認
22 為未有危險嘅樓層，每座大廈，佢哋真係有拍門㗎。只不過可能佢哋真係上到好低
23 層，真係濃煙嚟到，佢哋冇得再上，而冇拍到你屋企門口。

24 另外就係話，當下警方有要求我哋聯絡承辦商去剪棚網，當然，火勢咁大，我
25 唔知究竟承辦商跟咗警察入去火場入面之後，有冇能力去做到呢樣嘢。另外就係
26 話，喺管理處職員撤離管理處嘅時候，其實我哋係帶走咗兩本全苑嘅業主聯絡嘅
27 簿，去到社區會堂嘅時候，亦都即時同警察講，話我哋有呢兩本聯絡簿，睇下警察
28 有冇用，係，我哋並唔係因為火災而唔理大家囉，我哋冇囉，係。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：駱小姐，我想講兩點，第一，即係你明白我哋嘅職責係嘗試重組當日發
30 生嘅事，同埋尋找個真相。所以琴日我哋都講得好清楚，都希望大家留意，我哋係
31 冇向你指出你嘅證供係唔正確或者係一個大話，而證人嘅證供唔吻合其實可能有好
32 多嘅理由，所以我哋嘅立場亦都唔係話喺你同埋羅先生個版本唔同嘅時候係一個大
33 話，咁我想--如果有人覺得可能有呢個理解，我想講出呢個理解係唔正確嘅。

34 第二件事，你嘅證供裏面都睇到，其實火警發生之後，你琴日都交代咗，你哋
35 係有盡力去協助通知啲居民嘅，呢一點我哋係留意到。

36 主席...

1 陸啟康法官：我諗未問問題之前，咁我諗我都想講幾句說話。其實我諗今次做呢個聽證會最
2 困難，或者調查，係情緒，因為今次呢件事我哋--實在對我哋好多人都好痛，亦都
3 係情緒，呢個係絕對可以理解，亦都係理所當然嘅。我哋都好希望藉住呢個聽證會
4 可以畀好多人可以講番佢心入面想講嘅嘢，解開我哋嘅心結。

5 但係我亦都好希望各位真係可以好--比較客觀同埋理性咁去對待所有嘅事，責
6 任有責任，但係都有啲人係付出咗好多嘅。所以我希望各位真係可以理性咁去看
7 待，同埋喺處理--我哋其實最怕就係一啲起底、公審，呢啲其實就係其中都係一個
8 原因我哋唔想網上直播嘅一個原因嚟嘅，呢個係一個--有個危險性喺度。

9 而今次呢件事情，我哋都睇得到係真係有呢個危險性喺度，咁我好希望即係各
10 位，我喺度再呼籲傳媒或者公眾，真係可以理性咁去盡量客觀去分析件事本身，而
11 係唔好過早對任何事情作出任何嘅睇法。譬如我尋日嘅睇法，都可能今日認為解釋
12 咗，譬如我尋日問點解要做，其實嗰個缸嗰度，其實原來佢哋個業主係一早已經決
13 定咗咁做。咁我哋個--要調查嘅方向就有少少唔同。所以其實大家一定要--我希望
14 各位可以好理性咁去，同埋唔好--對所有出席嘅人士都有一個尊重，同埋就--因為
15 我哋見譬如喺採訪嘅時間，有啲即係可能即係走幾條街或者--咁，咁我諗都希望大
16 家有少少--因為我諗對於任何出席聆訊嘅人都係一個相當之大嘅壓力嘅，咁亦都係
17 --我諗個個都有啲心結嘅，咁我諗希望大家都可以真係好理性咁去--係情緒可以理
18 解，但係希望各位真係可以理性咁去對待今次呢個聆訊。

19 咁但係你未走得住，咁而家我哋就到會--亦都係其他涉事方問問題嘅時間，咁
20 我諗相信富邦應該會最後，係咪？咁仲有冇其他涉事方會有其他問題？

21 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席同埋兩位委員，我都會有啲問題係會想問一問駱小姐。

22 陸啟康法官：你遲啲可唔可以？

23 譚俊傑大律師：我就大約五至十分鐘嘅問題嘅啫。

24 陸啟康法官：咁政府問先。

25 譚俊傑大律師：好。

26 孫靖乾資深大律師：好。

27 係，早晨，駱小姐，我係代表政府都係有一啲問題想同你去了解番同澄清番
28 嘅。咁首先我諗可能即係比較容易就睇番你嗰個證人供詞，咁我係就其中嘅一啲嘅
29 段落去問你澄清。咁第一，就係我想你睇一睇就係嗰個 WS2 第 1223 頁嘅。

30 駱倩盈女士：係。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，呢度你喺--我哋可能 1223 我哋去到下面 9(b) 嗰度，9(b) 嗰
32 度你就話你都知道就係有一家係稱為呢個中華--我哋而家知道係一個中華發展公司
33 就係去協助嗰個宏業去處理呢個有關呢個宏福苑嗰個消防水缸嗰個工程嘅。咁你就
34 亦都有講，你就係喺宏業提供嘅文件中就知道佢個全名，你就話你唔係好清楚中華
35 發展喺嗰個大維修個工程裏面實際負責嘅工作，同埋你就同呢個中華發展就有直接
36 嘅接觸，唔係--唔認識佢嘅員工嘅。

1 咁呢度我就有少少問題想問一問番你嘅。第一樣嘢，就係我留意到就係其中都
2 係置邦嘅另外一位嘅同事就有做過一個證人供詞，如果我可能畀你睇一睇就係林文
3 欣先生佢個證人供詞，如果麻煩就係可能我哋去一去 1217 頁，呢度就我喺呢度想
4 --上面 17 段，最上面嗰度，1217 嗰度，咁呢度林文欣先生其實就有講過，就話
5 一般嚟講，喺第三行，就話宏泰，宏泰就係呢一個宏福苑係聘請佢做一個消防裝置
6 嘅年檢嘅一個承辦商，咁就話一般嚟講，宏泰佢提交嘅嗰啲消防裝置同埋設備嘅證
7 書會係一式兩份，一份就會提交過消防，一份就會存放喺嗰個管理處。咁我首先會
8 想問下，宏泰佢哋做嘅一啲嘅--向消防處去提交嗰啲咁樣嘅證書，即係譬如呢個
9 FS251，咁你係咪當時嚟講，你都會知道係有一份係存放咗喺管理處？

10 駱倩盈女士：宏泰消防嘅嘢，我就完全係冇接觸過同處理過嘅。

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：你完全冇接觸過，明白。如果係去番頭先你嗰個證人供詞，關於嗰個中
12 華嚟講，你會唔會知道會唔會係--即係你會唔會知道都好似宏泰咁，係會可能一式
13 兩份，如果佢冇入過一啲嘢畀消防處，咁就可能會有了一份喺管理處？定係話你其實
14 係唔知道個情況？

15 駱倩盈女士：我淨係知道宏業嘅職員會透過 WhatsApp 提交一份嗰啲你哋講嘅消防設備關閉
16 通知書，即係有摺印、有日期嘅畀我哋，係，畀一個群組，個群組入面係有大維--
17 有宏業、有鴻毅、有管理處喺度。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：Okay，即係我諗我哋了解番先。宏泰嗰啲你就唔清楚？

19 駱倩盈女士：係。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係如果係關於嗰個消防裝備個關閉通知書，即係我哋而家知道係由中
21 華發展去呈交嘅，咁就係應該係由嗰個宏業就會透過一個 WhatsApp 嘅群組就會係
22 即係發畀你哋？

23 駱倩盈女士：係。

24 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁嗰個 WhatsApp 群組你會唔會記得--你自己係咪嗰個 WhatsApp 群
25 組裏面嘅其中一個成員？

26 駱倩盈女士：係。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，仲會有啲咩嘢成員，嗰個 WhatsApp 群組？

28 駱倩盈女士：鴻毅有三四個人，宏業最少都有四個人，跟住管理處就得我同黎經理嘅啫。

29 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係得你同埋黎經理，明白。

30 駱倩盈女士：黎經理，係，跟住就應該冇其他人。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，咁或者我都問埋你，咁我哋都知道呢一個宏泰佢哋琴日同埋再之前
32 係作供嘅時候有提過，就有問過呢個管理處嘅鄭小姐，咁鄭小姐就唔喺嗰個
33 WhatsApp 群組裏面嘅？

34 駱倩盈女士：唔喺。

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁鄭小姐會唔會--據你所理解，佢會唔會知道其實係有一個咁樣嘅消防
36 裝置嗰個關閉通知書係曾經喺呢個群組裏面發過出嚟，有冇向佢提及過，或者佢會

1 唔會知道？

2 駱倩盈女士：我有向鄭小姐提及過有呢樣嘢。

3 孫靖乾資深大律師：佢有冇向你提及過？

4 駱倩盈女士：但係有同過--即係因為其實個 office 好細嘅啫，其實我淨係知道--可能我
5 喺收到所謂掛牌嗰張紙，即係通知書，咁我就會喺我自己個位度「我今日收到宏仁
6 閣嗰張關閉通知書嘞」咁樣，咁我唔會話特登同經理講定主任講，就係我會喺個位
7 度咁樣講出嚟。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以你相信因為其實前後講緊有八座，你會即係--如果咁樣講公唔公
9 道，即係你會認為管理處嘅--大家坐喺同一個寫字樓嘅員工，即係包括鄭小姐佢應
10 該會知道管理處係曾經收過一啲咁樣嘅類型。

11 駱倩盈女士：會知道掛牌。

12 孫靖乾資深大律師：會知道掛牌？

13 駱倩盈女士：係嘞，但係掛牌嘅內容，鄭小姐應該係有睇過，即係最好問番鄭小姐。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，唔該晒。跟住我就想再問一問，頭先就係杜大律師就同你睇過一啲
15 文件，就都係講緊喺 2025 年嘅 3 月份左右係有啲會議，我都係跟番個時間即係同
16 你問一問。我就想你睇一睇，就應該係喺嗰個--我諗係應該去睇番呢個 H1，跟住
17 係 3，然後就係--你等一等。係，H1-3，我哋首先可能麻煩你去睇一睇第 6076
18 頁，呢一個就係喺 2025 年 3 月 15 號嗰個大維修工程進度會議，你會唔會記得其
19 實喺呢個時間，即係講緊 3 月中嘅時間，亦都係同時間係呢個宏泰亦都喺 3 月份就
20 係針對呢一個宏福苑係進行一啲年檢嘅工作？

21 駱倩盈女士：我本人有留意宏泰幾時會喺屋苑做嘢。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：如果你有留意，你會唔會知道喺譬如管理處或者係置邦嚟講，有邊位同
23 事係會比較清楚關於宏泰嘅事情？

24 駱倩盈女士：工程主任同埋經理主任。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，明白。

26 駱倩盈女士：我就係記得主要我睇到有張消防檢查嘅通告，我咪會知道。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：可能我同你睇兩個文件，我再問一問你問題。而家呢個文件裏面，如果
28 我哋睇一睇，就係你去到第 6077 頁，6077 頁如果你睇一睇第 12 段，第 12 段裏
29 面就有講過，就話係宏業表示就會去進行嗰個消防缸嘅防水工程，咁就嗰個施工嘅
30 時間大概就會係個半月呢度，即係講淨係針對消防缸嘅防水工程。然後我同你再
31 睇多一個文件，就係下一個會議，就喺 6079 頁，6079 頁就係即係過咗兩個星期
32 之後嘅一個星期六，咁係另一個大維修工程嘅進度會議，頭先杜大律師亦都有同你
33 睇過嘅，如果我哋望一望譬如第 8 段，咁你就會睇到就係呢度都有講過，就係話宏
34 業係報告喺 2025 年 4 月 7 號就會係進行呢個宏泰閣同埋宏志閣消防缸嘅防水工
35 程，而且就係話消防缸會暫停運作同埋會向消防處申請呢個掛牌嘅，咁你都見到
36 嘞？

1 駱倩盈女士：係。

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，所以因為你就有負責去聯絡呢個宏泰，咁如果我問你當時呢個管理
3 處有冇諗過既然呢個宏泰都做緊年檢，去徵詢下呢個宏泰對呢一方面有冇啲咩嘢意
4 見，或者覺得咁樣嘅安排係唔係合適，即係呢樣嘢應該或者都係唔係你負責？

5 駱倩盈女士：我有考慮過呢樣嘢。

6 孫靖乾資深大律師：跟住我就想同你講一講你琴日嘅作供時候，就有講過係我哋叫做一啲
7 job order？

8 駱倩盈女士：係。

9 孫靖乾資深大律師：我諗我哋亦都唔使睇個文件，因為你應該記得我哋琴日問過，就亦都
10 你有簽署過一啲嘅 job order。你記得琴日杜資深大律師問你嘅時候，你有答過
11 就係話其實宏業係要求即係你哋係去協助即係可能個天台消防水缸放水工程嘅時
12 候，呢樣嘢係唔係合理你就覺得應該都係留番畀個師傅佢哋自己去決定嘅？

13 駱倩盈女士：冇錯。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：我就想純粹同你澄清下，如果根據你頭先--即係你琴日作供嘅時候個講
15 法，你頭先亦都確認咗係等啲師傅去決定，咁你去出個 job order 之前，你會
16 唔會有冇同過譬如話羅師傅或者係另外一位就應該係李師傅，係有問過佢哋其實呢
17 個宏業方面有個咁樣嘅要求係唔係合理嘅呢？即係你出個 job order 之前有冇同
18 佢哋問過或者溝通過，你記唔記得？

19 駱倩盈女士：我出--寫張紙之前，我會有問過羅師傅，我就直接轉述，就係話「宏業張生
20 話下個」--我假設「下個禮拜二第 3 座消防水缸想幫手褪水，你 o 唔 okay？」我
21 淨係咁樣問佢，佢就答我「Okay 嘅。」我咪覆番宏業張生「羅師傅話 okay 㗎，
22 咁到時大堂等喇。」咁當中我有問過佢哋究竟要做啲乜，要幫手做啲乜，咁印象中
23 佢哋亦都有問過我個日要幫手做啲乜，咁有嘞。

24 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，明白。我亦都會想問你，當時嚟講，你會唔會知道其實個消防水
25 缸其實都係我哋所謂嘅消防裝備嘅其中一種，你有冇呢方面嘅認知？

26 駱倩盈女士：我同意。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：你同意嘅，係。可能如果係咁，我問一問你兩樣嘢。第一個就係--或者
28 我哋可能去睇一睇--請稍等。好，我就想同你睇一睇就係呢個 B2 嘅文件冊，我想
29 同你睇睇一睇就係第 177 頁嘅，呢個就係關於個消防裝置同埋設備嘅規例，如果
30 左手面就係第 7 條嘅度，第 7 條你就見到佢有講話係消防裝置設備同埋設備嘅保
31 養、檢查同埋修理，咁喺個第一小段嘅度就有咁講話「任何非註冊承辦商嘅人就
32 均不得保養、檢查或修理裝置，在任何處所內嘅任何消防裝置及設備」。咁我想問
33 當時嚟講，你會唔會知道其實喺即係有關呢個法例裏面係有一個咁樣嘅規定，即係
34 如果你唔係一個註冊承辦商嘅人，就唔可以去保養、檢查或者去修理一啲嘅消防裝
35 置？

36 駱倩盈女士：我有睇過呢啲條文，係嘞，但係我本身係認同消防裝置應該係由註冊承辦商啲

1 人去處理。

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：我再同你睇多一樣嘢，然後跟住我再問你一啲問題。另一個，物管局
3 其實有一個文件嘅，嗰個文件其實個英文嘅版本就而家已經喺我哋文件案係有㗎
4 嘞。係，呢個英文版本就應該係喺 B2/2625 頁，好，你呢度會見到一份係物業管
5 理業監管局，我就咁簡稱就叫做即係「物管局」，呢度就係話一個關於（English
6 Spoken）一個咁樣嘅（English Spoken）嘅文件。其實我哋應該係有一個中
7 文嘅版本嘅，我想睇下我哋可唔可以——即係呢個中文版本似乎好似唔喺嗰個文件冊
8 裏面，但係呢個應該係一個公開文件。

9 主席，我了解可能嗰個中文版本我哋需要少少時間，可能我哋暫時而階段睇住
10 個英文版本先。

11 我哋可能去一去就係下一頁，2626 頁，呢度見到就係有個關於背景，然後
12 我哋跟住再去就應該裏面有一個係——我睇一睇個頁數。我諗可能要再褪多去呢個
13 2630，係嘞，2630 頁——可能 2631，唔該，2631。咁 2631 裏面就我哋會見到
14 就係有一啲嘅（English Spoken），佢就會係用 A(I)、A(II) 等等嘅。然後
15 我就麻煩去到 2632 頁，我哋就睇一睇嗰個 A(III)，其實我自己有個中文版本，
16 呢個就係英文版本，可能我讀一讀出嚟，如果需要嘅時候，我哋稍候再提供番個中
17 文版本。嗰個 A(III) 裏面就係咁樣寫嘅，個中文版本就係話「根據消防裝置及設
18 備規例第 95B 章第 7(1) 條，任何非註冊承辦商的人，均不得保養、檢查或修理裝
19 置在任何處所內的任何消防裝置或設備，因此持牌物管公司、業主組織及業主需委
20 聘註冊承辦商保養、檢查或修理物業公用部分的消防裝置及設備。」我呢度就想問
21 一問你，就可能係兩三個問題。

22 即係第一個，就係當時宏業佢提出就想你哋去幫手係針對嗰個消防水缸去做個
23 個放水嘅一啲工序嘅時候，第一樣嘢，你有冇去問過譬如宏業佢本身，或者佢係唔
24 係會搵一個都係呢啲頭先我所講一啲嘅註冊承辦商去進行嗰個消防水缸嘅工程，即
25 係有冇同佢查詢過？

26 駱倩盈女士：冇。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：第二樣嘢，有冇當時係有諗過，如果要做到關於消防水缸嗰個放水嘅時
28 候，會唔會未必適合係由管理處嘅同事去做，可能都應該係要搵番呢啲咁樣嘅承辦
29 商去做，有冇咁樣諗過？

30 駱倩盈女士：冇。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇嘅，係。好，跟住就我想問一問，就係頭先你講過，就係你哋會有個
32 WhatsApp 嘅群組，就會收到係宏福苑嗰八座前後嘅一啲即係都係消防裝置關閉嘅
33 通知書，我想問你哋呢啲咁嘅通知書，你哋話 WhatsApp 收到，你印象中有冇即係
34 亦都係有一啲直情打印咗出嚟，或者有啲副本你哋係即係擺喺個管理處嗰度，即係
35 除咗 WhatsApp，有冇即係譬如話係列印咗出嚟，或者係有去存檔等等嘅呢？

36 駱倩盈女士：我有列印過出嚟，同事我就唔知。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，請你等一等。主席，可能我睇下仲有冇其他嘅問題。

2 駱倩盈女士：我就想問一問你，即係如果係你頭先提到嗰啲 WhatsApp，係唔係印
3 象中好似應該未喺今次嗰個聽證會裏面披露㗎，定係你會唔會知道？

4 駱倩盈女士：應該冇披露過。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：你會唔會即係可以或者願意去搵番嗰啲有關嘅 WhatsApp，睇下可唔可
6 以係都披露到出嚟，即係畀呢個獨立委員會去睇嘅呢？

7 駱倩盈女士：可以，可以。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：好。

9 駱倩盈女士：不過因為當中涉及有好多跟進過個別單位嘅嘢，可能涉及一啲住戶嘅私人資
10 料，所以...

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：可能淨係即係需要嘅時候...（聽不清）

12 駱倩盈女士：我覺得你哋睇情況去公開出嚟。

13 孫靖乾資深大律師：...（聽不清）獨立委員會嘅代表大律師再去跟進。

14 陸啟康法官：我諗你可以同置邦嘅代表律師可以跟進呢個問題。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，我哋都可以跟進。我就再有少少問題再問一問你，第一個，就係我
16 想你睇睇 R1/第 78 頁嘅。呢度係其中一個嘅例子，我哋見到就係有一個嘅消防裝
17 置嘅關閉通告嘅，呢度係--而家呢一張我哋睇到就係喺 2025 年 4 月 7 號至 2025
18 年 4 月 20 號，就係進行呢個消防裝置嘅保養，咁個承辦商嘅名稱就係「中華發
19 展」，亦都有聯絡電話，下面就係寫住關於個消防栓同喉轆系統。我想問一問你，
20 呢啲咁樣嘅通告你會唔會--係邊個負責去黏呢啲通告？都係呢個管理處？

21 駱倩盈女士：唔係，如果係關於宏業嗰啲，係宏業安排去黏嘅。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：Okay，即係宏業佢安排去黏嘅。咁宏業安排去黏呢啲通告嘅時候，佢哋
23 會唔會都即係通知管理處，就話佢係黏咗啲通告或者喺咩嘢地方去黏呢啲通告？

24 駱倩盈女士：宏業黏通告之前就必須得到鴻毅同埋法團嘅批准，過咗目先始終，任何通告
25 喇，我唔針對呢張黃色嘅通告。

26 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，係。

27 駱倩盈女士：咁得到佢哋嘅同意之後，佢哋就會有職員拎嗰張通告入嚟管理處，喺張通告上
28 面撥一個管理處嘅圓印仔，宏業先可以將嗰張撥咗圓印仔嘅通告黏出去大堂。

29 孫靖乾資深大律師：我想問一問就係幾樣嘢，第一，就係有冇問過話呢啲通告係唔係應該由
30 其實係由譬如中華發展呢間公司，即係我哋見到個承辦商係去張貼嘅呢？或者有冇
31 嘗試去即係聯絡下中華發展呢個承辦商，去了解一下個情況呢？

32 駱倩盈女士：我從嚟都有接觸過中華發展，咁但係因為通常--呢張通告我有見過嘅，亦都係
33 經 WhatsApp，宏業嘅職員 send 過出嚟。咁我印象中，我有問過佢一次嘅，就係
34 話「呢張嘢你哋係唔係會搵人竊番喺呢度？」佢話「係。」咁我亦都有曾經問過
35 「會竊喺邊呀？」「竊番喺個水缸囉」咁樣，佢咁樣答咗我，我就不以為意，咁就
36 冇再去睇究竟佢係唔係真係竊咗喺水缸，又或者去了解番呢張通告其實要竊喺邊個

1 位置。

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係你頭先就係話你問過一次，佢哋就話會竊喺水缸，但係你就唔知道
3 實際上佢係竊喺邊度或者係唔係真係竊喺個水缸個位置？

4 駱倩盈女士：係，冇錯。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：呢個咁樣嘅通告，當時你嘅理解，你有冇一個認知就係其實呢個係要話
6 畀啲啲居民知會係門咗一啲相關嘅消防裝置？

7 駱倩盈女士：我有了解過。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁如果你話個通告係由宏業黏咗喺個水缸嗰度，其實水缸你意思，即
9 係譬如就係喺天面個水缸，咁其實一般情況即係話啲居民都唔會去到嗰個地方個
10 啲？

11 駱倩盈女士：唔。

12 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁喺其他當眼，譬如話係大廈大堂等等，就有貼過呢啲咁嘅通告？

13 駱倩盈女士：呢張冇，但係頭先我亦都有講過，我哋管理處係有出過通告，就係話因應個消
14 防水缸冇咗水，所以喺單數嘅樓層擺咗滅火筒。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白。

16 駱倩盈女士：係有一張咁嘅通告，另外本身宏業都會有一張通告，就係話--個標題係點寫--
17 總之都係話消防水缸維修咁樣，都有咁嘅通告。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：我就想再問埋，咁啲通告就會係張貼喺--即係頭先你講啲類型嘅通告
19 就會張貼喺大堂？

20 駱倩盈女士：係，地下大堂。

21 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係每一座宏福苑，八座嘅地下大堂？

22 駱倩盈女士：係。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：嗰個張貼時間你會唔會記得--我哋見到最早有啲就其中可能喺 4 月份已
24 經開始，你會唔會記得係唔係即係如果佢開始有關嘅工程，一路係張貼到譬如話嗰
25 個 2025 年 11 月定係乜嘢嘅情況呢？

26 駱倩盈女士：我有留意張通告會竊幾耐。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：如果係咁，我可能最後一個問題同你澄清番，就想番你嗰個證人供詞
28 WS2/1226 頁，喺第 15 段裏面，你就有講過話你係有睇過由宏業提供嘅中華發展
29 喺 2025 年 4 月 7 號至到 11 月期間向消防處發出一啲嘅消防裝置關閉通知書，但
30 係你唔係好肯定睇到啲通知書嗰個確實時間。根據你頭先所講，第一，就應該你收
31 到呢啲通知書嘅方式就係通過頭先講嗰個 WhatsApp 嘅群組？

32 駱倩盈女士：係。

33 孫靖乾資深大律師：你會唔會記得收到嘅時間，即係譬如如果嗰個裝置關閉通知書係某一個
34 日子嘅，咁會係喺大概乜嘢時間，即係譬如話同一日，又或者可能係好快，即係譬
35 如幾日內係會通過個 WhatsApp 群組去收到嗰個通知書，大概個時間相隔係幾耐同
36 佢原本嘅日期？

- 1 駱倩盈女士：我諗我都係要睇番啲對話紀錄先可以答到。
- 2 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，唔該晒你，我有其他問題。
- 3 陸啟康法官：唔該。譚大律師。
- 4 譚俊傑大律師：主席，我見到個時間，但係我絕對樂意可以問埋啲問題，因為唔係好長。
- 5 陸啟康法官：...（聽不清）
- 6 譚俊傑大律師：首先，我係想--駱小姐，我係代表居民嘅，我想你睇睇 I1-4/8756 頁，呢
- 7 個係一個電郵嚟嘅，我首先想問，你見到副本抄送有一個係「（English
- 8 Spoken）」，你見唔見到？
- 9 駱倩盈女士：見到。
- 10 譚俊傑大律師：請問你係見唔見到--你係有冇可以睇到呢一個電郵箱？
- 11 駱倩盈女士：我會睇到。
- 12 譚俊傑大律師：你會睇到嘅，係咪？呢個係 2025 年 1 月 17 號嘅，我相信係關於投訴一啲
- 13 窗眉或者係啲冷氣機台縮短嘅問題，因為如果你睇睇當天下面嗰個電郵係都有講過
- 14 啲投訴嘅內容，喺 8757，我哋好快睇一睇。就咁望一望，係關於窗楣暴露鋼筋咁
- 15 嘅投訴，係咪？
- 16 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 17 譚俊傑大律師：我哋返番去 8756，我見到其實實際--呢度就係獨立調查組嘅劉嘉敏小姐就
- 18 寫咗畀鴻毅，就係話獨立調查組係希望喺禮拜一或者禮拜二嘅晏晝係去實地視察，
- 19 到最後你記唔記得係唔係禮拜二去咗？
- 20 駱倩盈女士：唔可以好肯定。
- 21 譚俊傑大律師：好，唔緊要。或者我哋好快咁--我相信唔會有爭議，因為古小平先生喺佢自
- 22 己嘅證供就係 WS1/678，你睇睇 14 段，呢個係古先生嘅供詞。第 14 段佢都講到
- 23 喺 2025 年 1 月 21 號佢與劉小姐同埋李先生去咗做一個實地視察，你見到嘛？
- 24 駱倩盈女士：唔。
- 25 譚俊傑大律師：係，見到，好。即係其實呢一次就應該係一個四天嘅通知，係咪？我哋返番
- 26 去 8756，1 月 17 號下午 5 點 46 分，你就收到呢個電郵，係咪？
- 27 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 28 譚俊傑大律師：係，好，咁我想畀多另外一個例子，因為其實我淨係會問一啲 ISS 呢個電郵
- 29 都收到嘅一啲嘅資訊，就係 8760 頁，呢一個就係一個 2025 年 5 月 29 號，即係
- 30 另外一次，駱小姐。
- 31 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 32 譚俊傑大律師：又係劉嘉敏小姐，今次就淨係寫咗畀鴻毅同埋 ISS 嘅，你見到就係話佢哋會
- 33 喺 6 月 3 號上晝十點半就會有一個嘅實地視察，係咪？
- 34 駱倩盈女士：係。
- 35 譚俊傑大律師：咁我亦都想問下，其實以你所知，即係你 2024 年 8 月至到大火當時，其實
- 36 過往，以你所知得架嘞，獨立調查組係通常會畀一個幾耐嘅通知鴻毅呢個會嚟實地

1 視察？請問。

2 駱倩盈女士：好，第一樣嘢，其實通常收到呢啲咁嘅電郵，我見到個標題（English
3 Spoken）嗰度，其實我唔會好仔細咁樣睇個內容，我只會叫經理，ICU 有
4 email，咁叫佢睇嘅啫。

5 譚俊傑大律師：係。

6 駱倩盈女士：係，另外第二樣嘢，就係話你話通常 ICU 嚟屋苑會提早幾耐通知，你撇除呢兩
7 個電郵，其實喺我記憶所及，喺工程會議入面，好多時鴻毅出席嘅職員都會講話
8 「我下個禮拜約咗 Amanda。」即係可能就係呢個姓劉嘅女士嚟屋苑睇嘢咁樣，跟
9 住--其實都講過幾次，咁你話佢嚟睇啲咩嘢呢？佢冇仔細咁講，淨係話佢都成日同
10 Amanda 保持聯絡咁樣，亦都真係發生過會提早幾日，我諗幾日，可能禮拜六開完
11 會，「我下個禮拜約咗 Amanda 咁樣嚟屋苑。」但係究竟呢個政府部門嚟幾多次屋
12 苑，我哋冇紀錄。

13 譚俊傑大律師：明白。我有其他問題。

14 陸啟康法官：唔該。

15 柯愷欣大律師：委員會，唔好意思，因為頭先聽到政府嘅孫大律師提及過有--駱小姐提及過
16 有兩張通告嘅，咁啲兩張通告係關於呢一個樓層放置滅火筒嗰個事宜，似乎喺我哋
17 而家嘅啲啲（English Spoken）嗰度沒有嘅，但係我代表嘅呢一個第二屆嗰個
18 IO，其實我哋係有兩張咁樣嘅通告，唔知會唔會可以協助到委員會，如果我哋可以
19 將呢張通告去畀駱小姐睇一睇，去確認呢一張通告係唔係就係駱小姐口頭上面提及
20 嘅啲一張通告呢？

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋冇反對。

22 陸啟康法官：可以。

23 柯愷欣大律師：或者可能都因為嗰個 IT 方面要有少少嘅...

24 陸啟康法官：不如我哋而家就早休，我諗變咗亦都可以置邦嗰面個律師有啲時間準備個問
25 題，或者我等呢個時間十分鐘，你可以安排呢一樣嘢，好唔好？

26 柯愷欣大律師：好，好。

27 陸啟康法官：我哋而家正式休息十分鐘。

28

29 11 時 21 分聆訊押後

30 11 時 33 分聆訊恢復

31

32 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席、兩位委員，頭先小休之後我哋同柯大律師就係溝通過，就係話我
33 哋應該可能仲有一兩個問題我哋發覺可能係需要同駱小姐再去澄清一下，柯大律師
34 都即係同意可以畀我問咗嗰啲問題先，咁去再繼續，係。

35 陸啟康法官：我哋一路調查個過程之中，我哋其實真係發覺都有好多嘢要跟進嘅，呢個我哋
36 都可以理解。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，唔該晒。

2 陸啟康法官：所以我哋一啲嘅所謂（English Spoken），即係有啲彈性去處理嘅。

3 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，明白。駱小姐，其實都係有兩個問題。第一個問題，我就係想問一
4 問你，你就頭先亦都講過話你係知道係有一啲消防裝置嘅關閉通知書嘅，我就想針
5 對呢樣嘢就想問一問，管理處首先有冇係針對一啲管理處嘅員工，包括可能係一啲
6 每一座嘅座頭係同佢哋去解釋咗就係有關嗰個消防裝置，包括譬如話嗰個消防喉轆
7 其實係閃咗或者唔會有水㗎嘞，呢個佢哋會唔會係清楚，之前有冇同佢哋交代過，
8 解釋過畀佢哋知？

9 駱倩盈女士：有講過嘅，但係我本人唔係每一個講，我又係打張紙，一張非正式嘅通告，一
10 張 memo 紙。因為點解我會咁講呢？就係話因為佢哋單嘅數樓層嘅細水錶房入面放
11 咗滅火筒，咁我就要求同事，係嘞，我會突擊叫同事去 check 每一支滅火筒究竟
12 係唔係度。亦都會同——啊，因為而家消防水泵冇水，所以要擺滅火筒喺度，咁樣
13 囉。即係好簡單講，你話好詳細咁解釋，我係有嘅。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白，明白，其實我問個問題個原因最主要係想睇下即係當時火災嘅時
15 候，置邦嗰啲嘅員工係咪已經預先係知道咗譬如其實個消防喉轆係冇水嘅，佢哋就
16 唔需要睇時間即係嘗試去操作消防喉轆。所以我就問你即係有冇呢方面嘅即係預先
17 同嗰個員工講咗？

18 駱倩盈女士：有。

19 孫靖乾資深大律師：第二，就係如果係針對居民方面，就主要應該係靠頭先你講嘅通知易，
20 我相信應該稍候柯大律師就會將有關嘅文件就會畀你睇嘅，係咪呀？

21 駱倩盈女士：係。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：除咗個通知之外，有冇用其他嘅譬如話係用其他方式係話過畀居民知嘅
23 呢？

24 駱倩盈女士：印象中就有。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，最後就要問埋你，就係頭先我哋講到係關於嗰個消防裝置，我同你
26 睇過一啲有關嘅法例嘅條文，亦都有睇過呢個物業管理嗰個，即係物管局有啲嘅
27 Code of Conduct，係，我亦都想問一問，據你當時所知，除咗呢啲譬如話有關
28 嘅條例或者物管局嘅一啲嘅 Code of Conduct 之外，你哋嗰個管理處裏面，
29 如果係要牽涉到處理一啲消防裝置嘅時候，有冇話係有一啲流程或者係有啲嘅做
30 法，你哋係需要去做，即係嗰個管理公司裏面或者係嗰個管理處裏面。即係有冇話如
31 果係逢係針對一啲消防裝置嘅事宜嘅時候，咁有一個指引或者有個流程話要點樣做
32 㗎？

33 駱倩盈女士：唔明，唔明白你嘅問題。

34 孫靖乾資深大律師：唔係咁明白。即係譬如如果有牽涉到有任何嘅情況，話譬如如果你要睇
35 一睇某啲消防裝置或者譬如話要去睇下嗰個——或者要去驗下嗰個譬如消防水缸，又
36 或者嗰個消防嘅譬如話加壓泵房裏面嘅一啲掣呀等等。有冇任何關於呢啲咁嘅消防

裝置，如果係要去針對佢哋去進行任何嘅程序，個流程應該點呀？係咪需要預先係問過一啲嘅承辦商呀？即係呢一方面我想問有冇係公司有出過一啲嘅指引，或者係同你講過話如果咁嘅情況你哋應該點做？

駱倩盈女士：會有嘅，但係唔會話好詳細，只會一個類似聯絡表嘅嘢，即係可能如果譬如韞粒，你要打電話畀邊間公司嘅邊一個，如果係消防嘅嘢你要打畀邊一個承辦商，因為有時唔係辦公時間嘅，咁保安同事就唔會聯絡到我哋，我哋喺度嘅辦公時間，佢哋就會聯絡我哋喇，即係聯絡寫字樓職員或者工程主任。

孫靖乾資深大律師：明白。

駱倩盈女士：係嘞，如果係非辦公時間，真係冇文職人員喺度嘅，其實佢哋會有個聯絡表。

孫靖乾資深大律師：唔，明白，好，咁唔該晒。

駱倩盈女士：就唔會自己去鬥呢個。

孫靖乾資深大律師：好，唔該晒主席，，唔該晒兩位委員。

陸啟康法官：柯大律師。

柯愷欣大律師：係，主席，兩位委員，多謝委員會畀嘅時間。駱小姐，我係代表呢個第二任嘅第十二屆管理委員會嘅，咁想畀張通告你睇一睇。係，請問你見唔見到呢張通告呀？

駱倩盈女士：見到。

柯愷欣大律師：呢張通告個日期係 2025 年 4 月 3 號，我代表嘅第二任 IO 我簡稱。

駱倩盈女士：係。

柯愷欣大律師：咁去到呢度淨係搵到兩張通告嘅啫。

駱倩盈女士：唔。

柯愷欣大律師：咁但係我相信可能呢一張通告本身係置邦興業嗰邊出嚟㗎喇。

駱倩盈女士：係。

柯愷欣大律師：咁呢一張通告會唔會就係剛才你提及嘅個嗰一張通告，係擺放滅火筒嗰張呀？

駱倩盈女士：係，係。

柯愷欣大律師：係。咁呢一張就係其中嘅一張通告喇，咁就係放喺應該宏志閣嘅。

駱倩盈女士：唔。

柯愷欣大律師：另外，仲有一張通告嘅。呢張都同樣係 2025 年 4 月 3 日嘅。

駱倩盈女士：係。

柯愷欣大律師：呢張我見到應該係放喺宏泰閣，係咪呀？

駱倩盈女士：係。

柯愷欣大律師：我哋淨係搵到呢兩張通告啫。但係你會唔會可以話到畀我哋聽，當時你有冇印象呢兩張通告係放喺大廈嘅咩嘢位置㗎？

駱倩盈女士：地下大堂。

- 1 柯愷欣大律師：地下大堂，咁係地下大堂--具體少少咩嘢位置，講唔講到畀我哋聽？
- 2 駱倩盈女士：如果係呢類型嘅通告，你話當時好肯定放嘅位置，我真係唔會答到，但係如果
- 3 而家呢一刻宏福苑要出呢張通告嘅話，係會黏喺咁嘅牆，咁嘅牆，即係地下大
- 4 堂 Ground Floor 有三部牆嘅，牆，一堵牆，牆，一堵牆，牆，一堵牆，就會黏
- 5 喺咁與咁之間嗰堵牆嘅其中一堵牆。
- 6 柯愷欣大律師：明白。唔該晒你，我沒有其他問題。
- 7 駱倩盈女士：唔。
- 8 陸啟康法官：我想問下柯大律師，你呢兩張通告會用咩嘢方式擺入去個 bundle？如果有嘅
- 9 話，係咪我哋將佢 mark 咗做頭先--有冇辦法係 mark exhibit 呀？
- 10 柯愷欣大律師：或者可能 mark 咗做（English Spoken）先，我哋稍候會提供番畀委員
- 11 會。
- 12 陸啟康法官：好唔好呀？
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：或者，主席，我哋同柯大律師一方傾一傾或者就咁攤喺其中一個
- 14 Bundle 度可能會方便啲。
- 15 陸啟康法官：Okay，唔該。
- 16 柯愷欣大律師：唔該。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋處理。
- 18 陸啟康法官：係。跟住係置邦嘅大律師。
- 19 許偉強資深大律師：係，主席，兩位委員，我哋呢邊係有覆問嘅。
- 20 陸啟康法官：冇覆問。
- 21 許偉強資深大律師：係，就至於剛才孫大律師有同駱小姐提過，會唔會有啲其他嘅通訊紀錄
- 22 可以提交，駱小姐亦都係表示願意嘅，喺呢方面，我相信個流程將會係--如果係有
- 23 需要嘅話，我哋會將呢啲文件直接係交畀委員會律師嗰邊，佢哋處理咗啲文件之
- 24 後，就會向其他涉事方作出適當嘅安排，唔該。
- 25 陸啟康法官：唔該晒大律師。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我哋有一條問題想同駱小姐駱小姐澄清一下嘅啫。如果睇番
- 27 Bundle R1/78 頁，駱小姐，頭先你睇過孫大律師畀你睇呢張通告，你頭先似乎
- 28 係講到話呢個會貼喺嗰個天台嗰度，係咪？
- 29 駱倩盈女士：當時宏業職員係咁樣答我。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，因為證據顯示第五日聽證會有位居民叫做羅德沛，佢喺當日，我畀
- 31 呢張通告佢睇嘅時候，佢話佢哋有收過嘅啲居民。你除咗張貼喺--你嘅記憶係除咗
- 32 張貼喺天台嗰度，其實係咪都係有第二啲方法將呢啲通告畀啲居民知道嘅呢？你記
- 33 唔記得？
- 34 駱倩盈女士：喺我哋管理處嘅操作入面，我哋有貼過呢張通告。至於居民喺咩嘢途徑見過呢
- 35 張通告呢，我就真係唔知。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒你，冇其他問題。

1 陸啟康法官：好，唔該晒，駱小姐，多謝你出席。

2 駱倩盈女士：唔該。

3
4 11 時 42 分置邦興業有限公司文員證人駱倩盈女士作供完畢

5 11 時 43 分置邦興業有限公司管理員證人鍾瑞霞女士開始作供

6
7 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席、兩位委員，下一位嚟協助我哋嘅人係鍾瑞霞女士。鍾女士，你
8 好。

9 鍾瑞霞女士：你好，早晨。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你可以企一企起身讀一讀你面前嗰份聲明。

11 鍾瑞霞女士：係。本人鍾瑞霞聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真
12 實。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你，鍾女士，可以坐低。

14 陸啟康法官：鍾女士，你係有啲緊張，係咪呀？

15 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

16 陸啟康法官：但係唔緊要嘅，你放鬆，即係我哋想聽番件事本身嘅啫，所以你唔使咁擔心
17 嘅，總之你盡你所知講番件事出嚟畀我哋聽就得㗎喇。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：鍾女士，我都可以同你講我睇完你哋嘅證供之後，其實我哋最主要係想
19 問番你火警當日你所見到嘅一啲嘢。

20 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：你唔使擔心我哋冇咩嘢特別嘅事情係覺得——就睇到嘅證據係覺得你做錯
22 嘢，我係想知道你見到同睇到啲乜嘢嘅啫，好唔好呀？

23 鍾瑞霞女士：明白，好。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以你放心回答我哋嘅問題。

25 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：你畀咗兩份證供，一份係你代表你公司嘅律師畀委員會嘅一份證人供
27 詞。

28 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：相信你睇過？

30 鍾瑞霞女士：睇過。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：之前你都喺警方度落咗份口供嘅？

32 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都相信你會可以確認就係你兩份嘅內容都係真實同埋準確嘅，係咪？

34 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，我知道你係喺宏福苑做保安員，亦都叫做「座頭」，係咪？

36 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係由 2010 年 5 月到火災當日都係宏昌閣日間嘅座頭嚟㗎，係咪？
- 2 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你，你喺大堂坐嘅位置睇唔睇到嗰個閣路電視㗎，個 CCTV
- 4 㗎？
- 5 鍾瑞霞女士：座頭嗰度有嘅。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：有嘅。
- 7 鍾瑞霞女士：喺單車位同埋——係嘞，嗰個𨮒嘅——係，三部𨮒嘅 CCTV 都睇到，係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，唔。所以你——火警嘅時候你——發現火警嘅時候，你係喺個座頭度
- 9 㗎，係咪？
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都想問一問你就係當時發現火警嘅經過，但係講呢樣嘢之前，可唔可
- 12 以麻煩你講兩樣嘢畀我哋聽，你巡邏嘅時候係有行樓梯㗎嘛，係咪？
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，我想問下你行樓梯嘅時候，維修嗰陣你應該知道其實開咗一啲我哋
- 15 叫做「生口」嘅。
- 16 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：啲工人喺度出出入入嘅？
- 18 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：公司有冇畀任何指示你哋對於嗰啲生口，你哋要留意啲乜嘢？或者有咩
- 20 嘢要處理㗎？
- 21 鍾瑞霞女士：冇。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：因為置邦有一個講法，你哋——有指示過你哋就係話如果個生口未上鎖
- 23 呢，喺基於保安嘅理由，其實有時係要鎖番佢嘅。
- 24 鍾瑞霞女士：呢個有，係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，收工嘅時候會咁做，係咪呀啲工人？
- 26 鍾瑞霞女士：係嘞。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。另外一樣嘢，我都想問下你，就係你都聽過好多居民就擔心發泡
- 28 膠呢一樣嘢喇，係咪？
- 29 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：竊住啲窗嗰啲呢。
- 31 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，你講唔講到畀我哋聽，就你工作嘅宏昌閣而言。幾時上㗎啲發泡
- 33 膠，幾時竊架？
- 34 鍾瑞霞女士：大概係搭完棚之後囉，即係 9 月、10 月，大概係嗰個時候。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：2024，係咪？
- 36 鍾瑞霞女士：係嘞，係嘞。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問個火警當日，係啲發泡膠仲係竊住晒咗，定係有啲拆咗，定係
2 點？

3 鍾瑞霞女士：聽啲啲居民，佢就話好少部分，佢話佢嗰度拆咗，大部分都話未拆咁樣囉。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外，想問下你喺大維修期間，我哋都聽到有啲居民話有工人食煙呢一
5 個問題，你自己有冇留意到啲工人食煙呀？

6 鍾瑞霞女士：我睇唔到，但係曾經有一次係佢哋收工落到嚟大堂呢，就見到有一個工人喺個
7 口就係--係嘞，含住一支煙嘅。我第一時間就話畀佢聽「唔可以，喂，唔可以食煙
8 㗎」咁樣囉，佢話窒番我話「冇點著，阿姐」咁樣囉，係嘞。

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，咁我想問下你巡邏嘅時候有冇發覺有煙頭呢地下有時？

10 鍾瑞霞女士：唔多覺。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，我想問你另外一樣嘢，就係啲啲建築材料或者廢物，你巡邏嘅時
12 候，喺附近有冇見到都擺放咗好多建築啲啲材料或者有好多垃圾？

13 鍾瑞霞女士：垃圾，佢哋開緊工嗰陣時都會有啲，但係佢哋--如果下晝我巡樓就見到佢哋會
14 喺度清垃圾咁樣囉，係嘞，啲啲建築材料地下係有嘅，因為佢哋預備材料啲啲。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：啲居民有冇同你投訴？

16 鍾瑞霞女士：印象中唔--冇乜--冇乜投訴話啲垃圾點樣嘅，係嘞，咁樣囉。

17 杜淦堃資深大律師：有啲居民話見過喺啲樓梯生口附近有陣時有啲水樽，裏面有啲煙頭，應
18 該有人食完煙攞落去，呢個你有冇見過？

19 鍾瑞霞女士：我又冇見過，記得都有人同我咁樣講。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。我想問你另外一樣嘢，你知道宏昌閣呢，你巡邏嘅時候，你亦都
21 喺嗰度做咗咁耐，你知道有四個天井位嘅，或者光井位嘅。

22 鍾瑞霞女士：係，係。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：有個平台喇。

24 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：而有個鐵閘喺外面欄住嘅。

26 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，你巡邏嘅時候有冇望下嗰一度嘅情況㗎，維修緊嗰陣？

28 鍾瑞霞女士：望到㗎，因為喺樓梯嗰度佢有個玻璃窗，就係嗰個望到，其他望唔到。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：係呀，我想問下嗰個閘係平時鎖住㗎，係咪呀？

30 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇鎖匙㗎？

32 鍾瑞霞女士：我有，喺座頭嗰度。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：座頭有鎖匙。

34 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，你望到嘅時候，你見唔見到個光井位嗰個情況？因為有啲
36 人話就其實都幾亂，有啲廢物呀，有啲人就話有工人喺度食煙，有啲就話--甚至乎

- 1 話有啲工人喺嗰度煮食。
- 2 鍾瑞霞女士：未見過。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到啲乜嘢？
- 4 鍾瑞霞女士：未見講過，係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：未見--你未見過乜嘢呀？
- 6 鍾瑞霞女士：即係你頭先講嗰啲囉，係嘞。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：建築廢...
- 8 鍾瑞霞女士：建築個垃圾行嗰度過都唔係好多，即係話少少喇，嗰啲「滅仔」呀咁有時或者
- 9 會...
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰啲咩嘢話？
- 11 鍾瑞霞女士：滅仔呀。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：哦，即係綁住啲竹棚嗰啲。
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：係囉，因為佢有--係嘞，嗰啲咁樣遮住就--係嘞，同埋係囉，係嘞，係嘞，嗰
- 14 啲玻璃窗呢，佢就唔係睇得好清楚嘅，因為佢係有花紋嘅，唔係睇得好清楚嘅，係
- 15 嘞。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有喺外面望上去過？你都...
- 17 鍾瑞霞女士：外面望唔到嘅。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。我想問下你，我哋同委員會去過宏福苑之後--火災之後，我哋都見
- 19 過其實係有啲竹棚做嘅樓梯係可以畀啲工人喺外面行上去嗰個天井嗰度嘅，你有冇
- 20 見過呢樣嘢？
- 21 鍾瑞霞女士：但係佢個樓梯係咪通上天井嗰度，我唔知，但係佢嗰度係有條樓梯出大廈門口
- 22 嘅左手邊嗰度係有條樓梯上。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：你講緊呢個係大廈嘅一部分嚟嘅，室內嘅樓梯嚟㗎，係咪呀？
- 24 鍾瑞霞女士：室外。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：竹造嘅？
- 26 鍾瑞霞女士：竹造，室外嘅，係嘞。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白，同我哋所知嘅應該係同一條嚟嘅，我想特別問下你就係 104、
- 28 105 號單位出面有個天井平台嘅。
- 29 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：你知我講邊個？
- 31 鍾瑞霞女士：我知。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係而家話可能火燭喺嗰度起碼嗰度。
- 33 鍾瑞霞女士：我知，係嘞。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：就嗰個天井平台，你有冇見過啲工人喺嗰度聚集或者工人喺嗰度工作？
- 35 鍾瑞霞女士：冇見到。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，想問下你另外一個問題，你知道宏昌閣地下有啲消防嘅泵房，係

- 1 咪？
- 2 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。個泵房房門據你嘅理解係應該鎖住嘅，係咪？
- 4 鍾瑞霞女士：鎖住嘅。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你巡邏嘅時候會唔會睇下有冇鎖呀？
- 6 鍾瑞霞女士：有。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，座頭有鎖匙開嗰條——開到個泵房，係咪呀？
- 8 鍾瑞霞女士：有。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果你巡邏嘅時候發覺個泵房冇鎖，你會點做呀？
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：我會通知管理處泵房冇鎖，然後擺鎖匙去鎖番，如果我係——如果係要——發覺
- 11 冇鎖嘅話我會咁做，但係未見過話冇鎖㗎囉。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你完全冇見過。
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：因為我想問一問你，就係因為消防處嘅資料顯示，...
- 15 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：...喺火警當日宏昌閣嗰個泵房係冇鎖嘅。
- 17 鍾瑞霞女士：佢有人借鎖匙去開咗做緊嘢咪冇鎖囉，應該係咁㗎，即係我嘅認知就，係㗎。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到泵房冇鎖呢個情況，你咪同我講從來都未見過呀你？
- 19 鍾瑞霞女士：我以為你話我巡樓嗰陣，sorry，我誤會咗，我以為你問我巡樓嗰陣。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。
- 21 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到有冇鎖都要你經過先見到㗎，係咪？
- 23 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你有冇試過巡樓嘅時候或者你咩嘢原因都好，經過個泵房見到冇鎖
- 25 呀？
- 26 鍾瑞霞女士：咪就係佢㗎——係㗎，做緊嘢嗰陣囉。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：都會發生嘅？
- 28 鍾瑞霞女士：我知道佢㗎有冇借鎖匙囉，如果知道佢㗎係借鎖匙，咁就知係佢㗎做緊嘢囉。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。佢㗎借鎖匙係嚟座頭問你借嘅，係咪？
- 30 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：借鎖匙要有本簿記錄低邊個借嘅，係咪呀？
- 32 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你要 mark 番嘅？
- 34 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：係㗎，嗰本借匙嘅記錄簿係放喺邊度？放喺邊度㗎？
- 36 鍾瑞霞女士：放喺座頭嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。如果維修工人要借鎖匙會問邊個㗎？問你定係問你啲同事？
- 2 鍾瑞霞女士：如果我响度就問我，如果我行開咗就問我——係嘞，喺度頂我位嗰個同事，咁樣
- 3 樣。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道呢，2025 年，舊年 5 月到 8 月期間有啲消防水缸嘅工程，有
- 5 啲工人係要入嗰個泵房嘅，你知唔知道呢件事？
- 6 鍾瑞霞女士：點講呢？佢哋消防嚟同我借鎖匙，咁我呀知道係消防做緊嘢，但係佢哋做乜
- 7 嘢，我又唔知，佢哋要借鎖匙，咁我咪登記佢哋嘅資料，然後借鎖匙畀佢囉。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你記得喺 25 年有啲做消防工程嘅人問你借鎖匙，你就登記咗，係
- 9 咪？
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：係嘞，係嘞。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗你嗰條呢，其實屋苑裏面負責——你哋公司負責工程嘅一位李承富先
- 12 生佢有另外一條鎖匙開到啲泵房嘅，你知唔知呀？
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：我唔知㗎。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都唔知呢件事。
- 15 鍾瑞霞女士：係呀。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，我想問番你火警當日嗰個情況，我明白有啲嘢未必記得，但係請
- 17 你盡量答我哋，因為你嘅證據都好緊要。你嗰日好似平時咁七點半返工，係咪？
- 18 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：你應該都有——唔係淨係坐喺座頭度，你有巡邏㗎嘛火警之前，係咪呀？
- 20 有冇行過呀嗰日？
- 21 鍾瑞霞女士：嗰日未到我巡樓。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。當日你嘅證人供詞其實都幾詳細記錄咗當日你留意到出出入入嗰啲
- 23 人嘅，我麻煩你睇第 18 段。
- 24 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你呢度第 18 段有——你見到喇，前面 a、b 一路落去，如果睇下一頁
- 26 c、d、e、f，咁你講，基本上你就解釋咗當日你見到嘅一啲嘢喇。我同你慢慢睇，
- 27 你 a 段話，8 點鐘左右有啲工人同埋周女士就登記喇，係咪？
- 28 鍾瑞霞女士：唔。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住 b 嗰度，你就話 8 點 20 分有四個負責維修嘅工人嚟喇。
- 30 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都認得佢哋喇。
- 32 鍾瑞霞女士：認得。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：有咩嘢事發生，所以你都有叫佢哋登記，係咪？因為都熟口熟面嘞，咁
- 34 就入去嘞。
- 35 鍾瑞霞女士：我有再睇，因為我認得佢哋嗰幾個，然後就搵番琴日佢幾個再寫番落嚟，咁
- 36 樣樣。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白，唔好擔心，我只係想知道發生咩嘢事啫。跟住你之後講，其實都
2 有啲工人出出入入。
- 3 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：去到 d 個度，你就講到下晝，呢度差唔多起火嘅時候，你話有一個年約
5 60 歲嘅男士就走嚟同你講，宏昌閣後面起火。
- 6 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你唔認得佢嘅，係咪呀？
- 8 鍾瑞霞女士：我唔識佢。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係似乎係工人嚟嘅？
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：佢唔係着宏業嗰啲衫，係着個街坊衫，即係嗰啲 T 恤，淡黃色嘅 T 恤衫，係
11 嘞。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，但係你唔知道佢——你未見過，唔認得佢，係咪？
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：我唔認得佢。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，唔。你座頭嗰個閉路電視呢係睇到後面泊單車個度㗎嘛，係咪？
- 15 鍾瑞霞女士：後面泊單車位，睇到。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：係呀，我想問下你有冇望過嗰度嘅情況呀？喺起火前後。
- 17 鍾瑞霞女士：都有望，冇乜特別嘢。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。我哋嘅資料就係喺嗰日晏晝 2 點 48 分嘅呢，...
- 19 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：...咁嗰個閉路電視就熄咗，因為可能有啲線路嘅問題，或者有啲燒到
21 啲線，你記唔記得有一個階段你再睇唔到閉路電視呀？我想你...
- 22 鍾瑞霞女士：我哋單車位有嘢呀。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，即係你留唔留意到閉路電視熄咗呀無端端？
- 24 鍾瑞霞女士：冇熄㗎。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你唔記得有啲咁嘅事，係咪？
- 26 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你睇 18 (d) 呢度，咁你講咗你見到嗰位男士喇。
- 28 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你就同佢一齊就跑去後面睇下個火喇，係咪？
- 30 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你就話見到 4 樓同 5--4 號同 5 號單位之間個天井位有火喇，係咪？
- 32 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢就同你講話嗰個棚網著咗火喇。你見到嗰陣，似乎個火勢唔係好大
34 嘅，係咪呀？
- 35 鍾瑞霞女士：唔大，淨係炳着咗咁樣樣，係嘞。即係見到嗰啲綠色嗰啲網咁樣攀住去咁樣樣
36 囉，咁樣慢慢慢慢一路攀咁樣樣嘅情況囉。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：個火燒得快唔快，你嘅觀察啲陣？
- 2 鍾瑞霞女士：啲陣時唔快嘅，就係咁攞--一路--係嘞，啲火就咁係咁攞啲綠色啲嘢咁
- 3 樣攞住去囉，係嘞。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，著火喇，咁四圍啲人嘅反應你睇唔睇到？譬如有冇啲工人嗌或者
- 5 走，或者再有人嚟搵你？
- 6 鍾瑞霞女士：我印象中我見唔到有工人，係嘞。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你之後用對講機就話畀控制室知有火？
- 8 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後黃百盛先生同埋其他保安就到場，係咪？
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後你就返番--我哋睇（e）段，你好快就返番去宏昌閣啲度叫大家儘快
- 12 離開同唔好再上去，係咪？
- 13 鍾瑞霞女士：係，因為我話畀佢哋聽後面著咗火，咁呀大家先唔同上樓住，我話等一等，睇
- 14 下救熄咗火先咁樣樣囉，同埋入大堂嗌啲人儘快出番去先，咁樣樣囉。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想話之後就跑去 1 樓試過揸個--打爛個消防鐘，揸個拎手，但係
- 16 就有火警鐘，係咪？
- 17 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住你之後又跑去 3 樓試下整著個火警鐘，但係當然都係整唔著喇，係
- 19 咪？你跑緊啲陣有冇煙呀，你記唔記得？
- 20 鍾瑞霞女士：我上 1 樓啲陣時，個個樓梯佢有個好大嘅玻璃窗已經係睇啲火係咁燒，我都
- 21 估唔到係--即係當時我咁--點解咁快呀？即係我自己都話啲火點解咁快，當時我發
- 22 現啲陣時係微微燒咁樣樣，即係啲綠色棚網燒即係個幾--係囉，三兩分鐘，點解
- 23 燒得咁大火呀咁囉，啲陣時先發覺係嘞，因為個玻璃窗睇到出面係好大火。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：個樓梯啲陣有煙未呀？你跑上去 1 樓同埋 3 樓啲陣？
- 25 鍾瑞霞女士：啲陣都仲未有煙，淨係見到火同--即係玻璃窗出面嘅火同埋聽到啪啪聲。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：我知道你嘗試上去拍門，係咪呀？
- 27 鍾瑞霞女士：因為打警鐘啲陣時呢，咁我望到啲煙開始喺上面啲度樓梯落緊嚟，因為我上
- 28 到 3 樓，4 樓，5 樓個個--有個生口呀所謂，佢哋啲工人出去做嘢個個口。係
- 29 嘞，我就個--總之個樓梯，可能--我懷疑喺啲度入嚟啲煙，係開始入嚟嘞煙。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你係喺樓梯啲度，你有去到 5 樓見到個生口？
- 31 鍾瑞霞女士：冇上到啲度。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係懷疑啲煙喺啲度入嚟咁樣？
- 33 鍾瑞霞女士：係嘞，係嘞。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：你去到幾多樓呀？係咪去到 3 樓？
- 35 鍾瑞霞女士：3 樓，係。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住你就返番落大堂，係咪？

- 1 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：你話畀--當時你就話畀鄭小姐聽冇火警鐘喇，係咪？
- 3 鍾瑞霞女士：係，...（聽不清）係，因為落到嚟我見到鄭小姐，鄭小姐話，係囉，打警鐘
- 4 唔響呀。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：有啲居民話呢，大概當日 2 點 55 分，有送貨嘅人想走入宏昌閣，但係
- 6 管理處有人就叫佢唔好入嚟喇，你記唔記得嗰個係咪你呀？你係咪試過？可唔可以
- 7 同我哋講？
- 8 鍾瑞霞女士：我已經唔知係邊個，總之係人我都趕佢哋出去，唔畀佢哋入囉。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。
- 10 鍾瑞霞女士：即係係咩嘢人，我都唔記得㗎，佢哋係咁攞住啲乜嘢，我已經唔記得㗎。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：你講到 3 點嘅，消防同埋警察就嚟到宏昌閣之後，係咪？
- 12 鍾瑞霞女士：係。大概喇，即係時間我唔知，係喇。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：大概喇，係。咁呀當時佢哋叫你哋走，係咪？
- 14 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你就決定留低叫啲居民走，係咪？
- 16 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你幾時走㗎？
- 18 鍾瑞霞女士：因為期間我都有返番去大堂，睇下有冇人留嚟大堂，跟住--係喇，總言之我走
- 19 嗰陣啲火已經燒到大門上面，係喇，即係可以講話啲火已經係圍到過嚟門口呢度，
- 20 咁佢正正喺後面嗰度著咗嘛，即係已經燒到嚟門口呢度，嗰陣時，係，咁我係最--
- 21 可以講話係我望--我一路疏散住嗰啲人走，跟住連埋宏昌，總之係人我都嗌佢哋
- 22 走，咁一路轉頭望，睇下仲有冇人喺後面，嗰陣時我唔知係幾多點。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：你會唔會記得你離開嗰陣，大堂仲有冇電？
- 24 鍾瑞霞女士：大堂有冇電？
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：有冇燈？
- 26 鍾瑞霞女士：嗰啲係燈--係電--好似冇電，好似有啲啲話--嗰隻 LED 燈，冇電佢可以著一
- 27 陣啲啲。唔係好記得。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。鄭女士，我哋知道你有嘗試叫啲居民走嘅，所以你都唔好太難過。
- 29 主席，我有其他問題。
- 30 陸啟康法官：請問各個涉事方有冇問題？
- 31 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，我只係有一個問題。
- 32 係，鍾女士，首先都好多謝你嚟畀證供去協助呢個獨立委員會，我其實只係有
- 33 一個問題想問一問你嘅。
- 34 鍾瑞霞女士：係。
- 35 孫靖乾資深大律師：因為你喺你嘅證人供詞裏面，我舉個例子，喺 WS2/1246 頁，咁就係喺
- 36 第 11 段裏面，你有講過就係話，你係有喺個宏昌閣嘅大堂通告裏面就知道一啲事

1 情嘅，咁你有講到話呢個宏昌閣嘅大堂通告，咁我淨係想問一問你，你作為個個宏
2 昌閣嘅座頭。

3 鍾瑞霞女士：係。

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你有冇透過一啲嘅宏昌閣嘅大堂通告，係知道就係有啲消防裝置，譬
5 如話個消防喉轆係關閉，你哋有冇留意到有啲咁嘅通告？

6 鍾瑞霞女士：有留意到，但係嗰啲通告有個日期嘅，到日期就清咗，但係我唔知幾時恢復。

7 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白。即係你都會唔會有印象，呢啲通告係張貼咗幾耐，你有冇印象？

8 鍾瑞霞女士：冇印象，總之--係，嗰啲貼嘅--即係話貼到至到幾時為止，咁檢查咗，佢到日
9 期，咁就--係，會清咗咁樣樣。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：同埋我淨係想問多一樣嘢，就係除咗呢啲通告之外，有冇一啲係管理處
11 嘅同事係會同你哋交帶過就係話其實有關一啲嘅消防嘅裝置，譬如係個消防喉轆
12 係當時嚟講係停用，即係有冇人係即係喺管理處係會話過畀你知呢個情況？

13 鍾瑞霞女士：我唔記得。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：你唔記得，好，唔該晒，我有其他問題。

15 陸啟康法官：有冇其他？置邦。

16 許偉強資深大律師：主席，我哋有覆問。

17 陸啟康法官：有覆問，唔該，有其他問題。咁鍾女士，其實我諗--我知道我哋--我諗我哋委
18 員會知道你今日上嚟個壓力都好大，但係你嘅證供對我哋了解件事非常之重要，咁
19 亦都係我諗你嘅證供亦都可以幫我哋還原，等我哋可以調查，還我哋即係嗰日咁多
20 死者一個公道，所以亦都唔使太過自責，咁總之我哋明白嘅，咁你嘅證供係對呢個
21 調查非常之有作用，多謝你今日出席，鍾女士。

22 鍾瑞霞女士：我有個要求，可唔可以借呢個機會畀少少時間我講一樣嘢？

23 陸啟康法官：請講。

24 鍾瑞霞女士：我係想為我自己澄清，因為有街坊話我係第一時間離開--第一時間最快離開，
25 我想話畀大家聽，我有咁做到，我係有喺度一路協助啲人走，同埋一路--可以講話
26 我係最遲離開，我一路疏散嗰啲人，同啲同事--唔係，同其他同事一路疏散到去呢
27 個中央公園都還未--都--喺中央公園我都仲逗留咗好耐，同駱--唔係，同鄭主
28 任，我哋鄭主任一路疏散埋其他座嗰啲居民。係，就係呢樣嘢，因為--係囉，佢話
29 我係走得最快嗰個。係，冇嘢，係呢樣嘢，我想係為我自己澄清呢點。唔該晒。

30 陸啟康法官：鍾女士，我諗大家都聽到嘅，我諗大家可能都會有情緒，可能都會有一啲--可
31 能都會--我亦都希望你都要理解，可能真係有啲人會有啲咁嘅，但係我相信你做嘅
32 嘢或者你係會--係知嘅，所以我希望即係總之...

33 鍾瑞霞女士：唔該晒。

34 陸啟康法官：我亦都喺度好希望大家，再重申一次，我都講多次，即係希望大家喺採訪嘅時
35 間真係畀番少少--大家其實我諗都可以睇得到每一個人，尤其是喺宏福苑工作嘅
36 人，其實我諗大家--佢哋嘅情緒，大家可以想像得到嘅，咁我都希望大家可以將心

比己，睇睇--真係可以企喺佢嘅立場去諗一諗，咁喺咁嘅情況之下，請大家真係留番少少空間畀我哋所有作供嘅人士，佢哋今日上得嚟，其實佢哋嘅壓力，我諗係唔係一般人可以想像得到嘅，請各位可以理解。多謝鍾女士。

鍾瑞霞女士：唔該晒，多謝晒。

12 時 11 分置邦興業有限公司管理員證人鍾瑞霞女士作供完畢

12 時 12 分置邦興業有限公司木工證人李承富先生開始作供

杜淦堃資深大律師：下一位嚟協助我哋嘅證人係李承富先生。

李先生，你好。

李承富先生：你好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你企起身讀一讀面前份聲明。

李承富先生：本人李承富聲明，本人作證供，盡本人所知、所屬、所信，均屬真實。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該，李先生，請坐。你現時都係受僱於 ISS，你係木工維修嘅做？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：喺大火之前，你就喺宏福苑工作？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道你提供咗兩份嘅供詞，一份就係 ISS 嘅律師提供畀委員會？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：另外一份就係你畀警方嘅口供？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係，相信你都確認兩份供詞嘅內容都係真確？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋從你證人供詞睇到，你係負責宏福苑裏面一啲非電工嘅維修嘅，即係主要係做同木有關，可唔可以咁講？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：或者可唔可以咁講，總之唔係涉及電嘅嘢都係你去搞嘅，係咪？

李承富先生：係，冇錯。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係咪成個屋苑都係你負責？

李承富先生：我同羅師傅單獨負責嘅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，拍檔。

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你哋維修工人宏福苑，基本上就係你同埋羅師傅，係咪？

李承富先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你哋平時要報告，你哋嘅老闆係咪林文欣先生？

李承富先生：係，我上司。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。你上司林生，我哋知道佢 2025 年 4 月到 9 月嗰段時間就有喺宏福
2 苑嘅，係咪？
- 3 李承富先生：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁嗰幾個月你就同黎永利經理匯報，係咪？
- 5 李承富先生：係。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋根據你嘅證人供詞第 13 段嗰度睇到，我可以打出嚟，昇委員會嘅
7 證人供詞。我哋知道你哋工程部有條匙，有條通鎖匙係可以開晒宏福苑八座大廈嗰
8 啲消防泵房嘅？
- 9 李承富先生：係。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰條鎖匙係你保管，係咪？
- 11 李承富先生：我有一條。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有一條。
- 13 李承富先生：係。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：羅師傅呢？
- 15 李承富先生：都有嘅。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你各自有一條？
- 17 李承富先生：係，係。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果有外判工人要入泵房，咁通常你哋點做？你哋開昇佢定係佢要去座
19 頭借？
- 20 李承富先生：我哋叫佢去座頭借鎖匙。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道有個鎖匙登記簿嘅，如果畀你睇一睇 Bundle B5/2748 頁，
22 你會唔會見過？
- 23 李承富先生：我有睇過。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有睇過，但係因為即係呢個係管理處嘅問題？
- 25 李承富先生：係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：但我想你睇睇第 15、第 16 項，我哋見到宏仁閣地下嘅泵房匙，或者地
27 下嘅消防加壓泵房匙，即係呢啲就係我哋所講嘅有關嘅鎖匙。而我想同你確認嘅就
28 係，座頭有鎖匙開到呢啲泵房，但係你哋袋住嗰條都開到嘅，係咪？
- 29 李承富先生：係。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：而要佢哋去借嘅原因就係因為如果佢哋去借就會落簿，係咪？
- 31 李承富先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都提到，你嘅證人供詞第 17 段你提到 2025 年 5 月到 8 月期間，工
33 程部收到八份嗰啲工作單，job order，話你哋去協助宏業去宏福閣（原文照
34 錄）八座大廈嘅消防水缸度放水嘅，你記得嘛？
- 35 李承富先生：記得。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋而家搵到三份有關嘅工作單，如果我哋去 Bundle H2，麻煩。你

- 1 去 H2 就會睇到 6779 頁，呢啲係你哋平時處理嘅工作單，係咪？
- 2 李承富先生：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：對面工作單嘅內容，呢啲係寫字樓同事寫出嚟，係咪？
- 4 李承富先生：係，冇錯。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁下低我哋見到工作完成，有冇一個剔，嗰一個剔係咪你哋去剔㗎通
- 6 常？
- 7 李承富先生：係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住我哋見到下低有寫住「完工者」同埋「查核者」，我想問下，完工
- 9 者嗰個係邊個嘅簽名，你知唔知？
- 10 李承富先生：有一個係我寫嘅，嗰個姓羅嗰個都係我寫嘅，因為我當時張單喺我手，咁我就
- 11 問過羅師傅「我幫你寫落去，好唔好？」呢個係姓名嚟嘅啫。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，咁下低有個查核者嗰個係邊個簽？
- 13 李承富先生：呢個唔知。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你交番去寫字樓？佢哋...
- 15 李承富先生：係，寫字樓，係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到有個「完工者」隔離有個日期及時間，嗰個係咪你哋寫？
- 17 李承富先生：係。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁下低「核實者」嗰個日期及時間你就唔知邊個寫，係咪？
- 19 李承富先生：係。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：知唔知邊個寫？
- 21 李承富先生：唔知。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋嘅理解，宏業係要求你哋工程部幫手做一啲消防缸放水嘅工作，因
- 23 為第一，佢哋有消防泵房嘅鎖匙，同埋佢哋唔知道邊個掣係用嚟放水，係咪？
- 24 李承富先生：係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以要靠你哋幫手？
- 26 李承富先生：係。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想話喺當時，個情況係咪咁？你哋冇叫佢哋返去借座頭嗰條鎖匙，你
- 28 收到張工作單，其實係你哋用你哋條鎖匙去幫佢哋做呢樣嘢？
- 29 李承富先生：係。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：而當日你哋係帶埋佢哋去，係咪？
- 31 李承富先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解唔叫佢哋去座頭借，等有番個紀錄？
- 33 李承富先生：因為佢呢度寫住，我哋約咗時間喺個地下大堂嗰度等，咁我哋一齊就去個泵房
- 34 嗰度，所以我就協助佢開咗條鎖匙——開門。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。你嘅——去番你嘅證人供詞，我想麻煩你幫一幫我哋睇一睇第 20
- 36 段，不如由 19 段開始睇，等你清楚啲個內容。你呢度咁講嘅，你話你哋按照咗當

1 時嘅理解，消防水缸維修係翻新大維修工程嘅一部分，而宏業係要將水缸裏面嘅水
2 放出嚟，如上述提到因為每一座大廈都有兩個消防嘅水缸，而兩個水缸都係由水管
3 連接，所以兩個消防水缸都要放水。呢個係你嘅證供？

4 李承富先生：係。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果睇番 20 段，你咁講，你話你當時理解操作消防裝置通常係需要通
6 知消防處，因此喺執行消防水缸放水工作單時，你有同羅先生就提出處理消防水缸
7 係要有牌先可以做呢個操作，羅先生就話接到單就要根據工作單去執行。你係好清
8 楚你有咁同佢講過，係咪？

9 李承富先生：係。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你嘅理解，你係點知道操作嗰個消防泵房裏面嘅裝置要有牌
11 先做得？

12 李承富先生：因為做嘅消防裝置或維修，一定係有消防牌先可以做到。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你哋而家係入去幫佢去扭開佢，唔係做維修，點解你覺得需要消防
14 牌？

15 李承富先生：總之掂嘅消防系統嘅嘢都係要有消防牌先可以做到。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。據你所講，你就同羅先生講，你係面對面同佢講，係咪？

17 李承富先生：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係你哋見到宏業嘅工人之前講，係咪？

19 李承富先生：呢度應該係之後講嘅，睇下先，我諗下先。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你講到你收到張單之後。

21 李承富先生：哦。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你 19 段嗰度你就講話，你個理解工作係咩嘢，20 段你就講話你個操
23 作消防裝置呢個理解嘅，你可唔可以諗一諗其實係當時係收到張單講或者之後幾耐
24 講？

25 李承富先生：當時收到張單之後講。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係係未去幫佢哋放水之前？

27 李承富先生：係，冇錯。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你同羅先生講完，佢係即刻答你定係佢係去咗擺指示定係點？

29 李承富先生：佢係即刻答。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你跟住睇第 22 段，22 段你之後就講你點去做呢個工作，你就話打
31 開咗——你用你嘅鎖匙打開咗嗰個加壓泵房，宏業嘅人同埋羅先生就入咗去，你就喺
32 個加壓泵房嘅門口外面等佢哋做呢個放水嘅工作，你有入過去嘅？

33 李承富先生：係。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以入面發生咩嘢事，你係唔知嘅，係咪？

35 李承富先生：係。

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你喺呢次之前，你應該係有入過個泵房嘅？

- 1 李承富先生：之前係我入職嗰陣，因為羅師傅帶我睇過嘅。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係換句話講，呢一次帶宏業啲人去嘅時候，入去開同埋關任何掣，你
- 3 係唔清楚嘅，係咪？
- 4 李承富先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，我哋知道入面有個刀掣係開關嗰個系統嘅，你知道嘛？
- 6 李承富先生：應該知道。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：係唔係八座嘅情況都係咁？即係你八座都有入過去個加壓泵房？
- 8 李承富先生：係。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有鬥過啲嘢？
- 10 李承富先生：係。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果我哋睇番 22、23 段，其實你做——據你所講，你係做啲咩嘢？你係
- 12 主要幫手喺另外一個位置扭動個泵房裏面嗰個塘環，係咪？
- 13 李承富先生：係。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：而羅先生就關閉咗嗰個街喉上水掣，係咪？
- 15 李承富先生：係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都想同你澄清另外一樣嘢嘅，呢個就係喺另外一個泵房裏面發生嘅
- 17 事，係咪？因為有兩個泵房，我哋知道。
- 18 李承富先生：係，係，冇錯。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：羅先生佢喺佢畀警方嘅口供，主席，記錄喺 Bundle C1-2/1223
- 20 頁，我可以同你講羅先生係咁講嘅，佢話宏福苑八座嘅水缸維修工程，放水過程都
- 21 基本上係用佢解釋嘅流程去做，如果佢有返工，就會由佢去關閉消防系統嘅總掣同
- 22 埋消防用嘅水泵掣，佢話如果佢放假，就會由你去處理，由李師傅去處理，咁得一個
- 23 李師傅，應該係你，係咪？
- 24 李承富先生：嘅。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你印象中有冇試過係佢放假，所以係由你去處理嗰個加壓泵房裏面嗰啲
- 26 工作？
- 27 李承富先生：係有嘅。因為我記得有一單係星期三羅師傅放假嘅，跟住羅師傅有返工就改咗
- 28 期。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，我想問一問你，你幫手處理咗嗰個——做完嗰個塘環之後，如果返番
- 30 去你嘅證人供詞第 24 段，你講到話你之後同宏業嘅人員上咗天台消防水缸，天台
- 31 消防水缸都有一個塘環嘅，喺個棚架上高，咁你就叫佢自己上去轉嗰個塘環，係
- 32 咪？
- 33 李承富先生：係。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住 25 段你搞完八座你就走咗喇，八座嘅情況都係咁，係咪？
- 35 李承富先生：係。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：扭嗰個塘環，佢做完嗰個——佢要扭番去——扭完——扭開咗佢，應該要扭

- 1 番問埋佢嘅，做完，係咪？
- 2 李承富先生：冇，佢冇問到。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢冇問到嘅？
- 4 李承富先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外我想問下你個泵房個鎖嘅問題，泵房係應該有個鎖塔鎖住嘅，係
- 6 咪？
- 7 李承富先生：係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：平時應該係一路都係上鎖？
- 9 李承富先生：係。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇留意到，喺嗰幾個月，有冇啲情況你經過，發覺冇鎖？
- 11 李承富先生：冇。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：個情況係點，你可唔可以講一講畀我哋聽？
- 13 李承富先生：我臨收工嗰陣睇到宏泰出面嗰個大泵房係冇鎖嘅。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有鎖——見到冇鎖，跟住點？
- 15 李承富先生：係，我見到冇鎖。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你點做？
- 17 李承富先生：咁我嘗試過有一兩次鎖咗，鎖番，但係我都通知咗佢哋，話畀佢聽冇鎖，咁佢
- 18 哋話會跟進。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你知唔知點解，邊個開咗跟住冇鎖番？
- 20 李承富先生：應該佢哋啲工人。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：宏泰？
- 22 李承富先生：係。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解你覺得係宏泰啲工人？
- 24 李承富先生：因為佢哋喺裏面做工程。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：大概係幾時，嗰個情況係？你如果用大火之前嚟計幾多個月？
- 26 李承富先生：應該大火之前兩三個月嘅。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：你幾多次見過冇上鎖？
- 28 李承富先生：一兩次。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒你，我有其他問題，唔該主席。
- 30 陸啟康法官：唔該。其他涉事方，唔該。
- 31 林樂夫大律師：係，主席，我有少少問題想問李生。
- 32 李生，啱啱你講宏泰定宏業？
- 33 李承富先生：宏泰——咩嘢...
- 34 林樂夫大律師：宏泰就係消防年檢嗰個分判商，宏...
- 35 李承富先生：唔係，唔係，宏業呀，...（聽不清）宏業。
- 36 林樂夫大律師：宏業，係咪？你啱啱講係宏業，做大維修嗰個？

- 1 李承富先生：係。
- 2 林樂夫大律師：就做工程之後就有門...
- 3 李承富先生：鎖番。
- 4 林樂夫大律師：冇鎖番，係咪？
- 5 李承富先生：係，係。
- 6 林樂夫大律師：宏業，係咪？
- 7 李承富先生：係，宏業。
- 8 林樂夫大律師：係，係。跟住仲有少少問題，咁就係喺你嘅證人口供 WS2 嘅第 20 段，係，
- 9 第 20 段，咁就想問下你係咪八次你都有同羅師傅一齊去，喺唔同日子去協助宏業
- 10 係放消防水缸水？
- 11 李承富先生：係。
- 12 林樂夫大律師：咁你呢度第 20 段講話「提醒羅師傅話消防水缸要處理就要有消防牌照」，
- 13 係淨係第一次有提醒羅師傅定係八次都有提醒？
- 14 李承富先生：第一次。
- 15 林樂夫大律師：淨係第一次？
- 16 李承富先生：係。
- 17 林樂夫大律師：你係從乜嘢嘅途徑知道處理消防水缸係--或者裝置，要需要消防牌照？
- 18 李承富先生：我嘅認知係知道啫。
- 19 林樂夫大律師：係咪因為有人職嘅訓練定點？
- 20 李承富先生：即係有時睇過下啲廣告啲啲，同埋之前做過啲盤，都知道下嘅。
- 21 林樂夫大律師：即係工作經驗？
- 22 李承富先生：係。
- 23 林樂夫大律師：係。咁啱啱你都有提過話你知道喺個加壓泵房入面有刀掣，係咪？
- 24 李承富先生：係。
- 25 林樂夫大律師：「刀掣」即係一個總電掣開關，係咪？
- 26 李承富先生：嘎，嘎。
- 27 林樂夫大律師：咁你知唔知一門咗刀掣，係連消防警鐘都會門埋？
- 28 李承富先生：唔知。
- 29 林樂夫大律師：喺你最初入職嘅時候，羅師傅帶你入去呢個加壓消防泵房嘅時候，羅師傅有
- 30 冇同你講解每一個消防裝置入面嘅功用？
- 31 李承富先生：冇。
- 32 林樂夫大律師：淨係帶你入去嘅啫？
- 33 李承富先生：係，係。
- 34 林樂夫大律師：但係你就知道有個刀掣喺入面？
- 35 李承富先生：係，嘎。
- 36 林樂夫大律師：唔該晒，主席，我有其他問題，係。

1 陸啟康法官：其他涉事方有冇其他問題？

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，主席、兩位委員，我會有一啲問題。

3 李先生，我都係代表政府嘅大律師，有少少問題想同你去澄清番嘅。

4 李承富先生：好。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁首先你就有講過，就話喺 2025 年嘅 4 月至到 9 月期間，就係應該係
6 當時嚟講就係呢個林文欣先生嗰陣時就唔係喺宏福苑工作緊嘅？

7 李承富先生：係。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以即係變咗如果當時你嗰個上司或者係直屬嘅上司，就唔會係林文欣
9 先生，就會係變咗係嗰個宏福苑嘅直接就係個黎經理？

10 李承富先生：係。

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁我就想問一問，頭先都問過你，就係你嗰個證人供詞第 20 段，
12 第 20 段就喺 WS2/1256 頁，咁 1256 頁嘅時候，你就話係你有係同羅先生提出處
13 理消防水缸係需要消防牌照係先至能夠去操作嘅。咁頭先就係代表宏泰嘅林大律師
14 有問過你，咁你就話應該係第一座嘅時候，咁嘅放水嘅時候，
15 咁你先至係有同羅先生咁講。咁當時據你記得係咪應該就係大約係 2025 年嘅 7 月
16 份左右，即係我哋見到嗰啲其中一啲工作單，有啲係 7 月份定係咩嘢時間？

17 李承富先生：應該早之前有幾張工作單嘅。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：早之前嘅工作單？

19 李承富先生：嘎，嘎。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你同羅師傅去講嘅時候，當時嚟講，係咪應該係林文欣先生其實就已
21 經--喺當時嚟講，你記唔記得林文欣先生係咪唔喺宏福苑工作？

22 李承富先生：係。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁除咗同羅師傅講之餘，針對你第 20 段講嘅呢個情況，即係話只係有
24 呢一個牌嘅承辦商先至可以去掂嗰啲消防裝置，你有冇當時有諗過係要同你嘅上司
25 去報告，或者係去諮詢下你個上司點樣去做？

26 李承富先生：冇，冇。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：同埋我就想問，就呢個係咪你第一次係有去協助譬如任何其他嘅承辦商
28 係去做嗰個消防水缸嗰個放水嘅工作？

29 李承富先生：係。

30 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁你當時嚟講，係咪應該都知道其實宏泰，其實一直以嚟都係呢一
31 個宏福苑所委派嘅一個關於消防裝置嘅承辦商，呢樣嘢你係知唔知道？

32 李承富先生：都知道。

33 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁有冇喺嗰陣時係諗過，其實係可以譬如去聯絡下宏泰，或者打個
34 電話畀佢哋，去問下佢哋，或者睇下點樣去做，即係了解下，有冇咁樣諗過？

35 李承富先生：冇諗過。

36 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁最後你千祈唔好介意，即係你同羅師傅傾，又或者你問佢即係話「呢

1 啲消防裝置應該係要有牌嘅人先至可以去做個啲」咁，咁當時你記唔記得羅師傅，
2 即係除咗話——即係或者直接咁講，羅師傅有冇啲咩嘢特別嘅回應，你可唔可以再講
3 一講畀我哋聽？

4 李承富先生：冇乜特別回應。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：喺當刻你有冇考慮過，如果咁做會唔會有可能係會違反咗一啲嘅可能法
6 例或者規則，有冇呢個考慮，有冇諗過？

7 李承富先生：冇。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇嘅，好。好，唔該晒李先生。我有其他問題。

9 陸啟康法官：係，置邦。

10 許偉強資深大律師：李師傅，我就就住你口供，剛才委員會大律師杜大律師問過你一個問
11 題，我想同你澄清下嘅啫，就係如果我哋睇番你嘅口供第 22 至到 24 段，麻煩你等
12 一等，唔該。喺 22 段至到 24 段，其實你都係同我哋講番你當時同羅師傅就住去協
13 助宏業嗰啲工作嘅時候嗰個流程嘅，咁第 22 段你就講話係先去到嗰個消防加壓泵
14 房，第 23 段，就跟住就去個主要泵房，24 段就係話之後就去咗天台嗰個防火水缸
15 嗰個位置。我想問下呢一個咁嘅流程，呢個咁嘅程序，因為你哋做咗八座都係提供
16 咗類似嘅協助，我想問一問呢一個咁嘅流程，即係話去咗邊一個泵房先，呢一個流
17 慘，八座係咪都係一樣定係八座個情況有時會唔同？

18 李承富先生：八座嘅情況會有啲唔同嘅。

19 許偉強資深大律師：明白。

20 李承富先生：係。

21 許偉強資深大律師：有冇咩嘢特別原因係有唔同？

22 李承富先生：都冇乜嘅。

23 許偉強資深大律師：唔。通常都係跟邊一個指示去做？

24 李承富先生：羅師傅帶住我哋去做。

25 許偉強資深大律師：明白。好，唔該晒，冇其他問題。

26 陸啟康法官：係，冇其他問題，咁李先生，多謝你今日出席，你嘅證供對我哋嘅調查非常之
27 有幫助，多謝你。

28 李承富先生：唔該晒。

29
30 12 時 36 分置邦興業有限公司木工證人李承富先生作供完畢

31 12 時 36 分置邦興業有限公司電工證人羅國瑞先生開始作供

32
33 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位證人係羅國瑞先生。麻煩你讀一讀你面前嘅聲明，羅先
34 生。

35 羅國瑞先生：本人羅國瑞聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬正確、真
36 實。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：羅生，你好，請坐。
- 2 羅國瑞先生：好，唔該。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺宏福苑都做咗二十年電工，係咪？
- 4 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你一路都有電工牌，係咪？
- 6 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你平時就係向林文欣先生匯報，係咪？
- 8 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道 2025 年有幾個月佢就唔喺度，咁你嘅上司就變咗黎永利經
- 10 理，係咪？
- 11 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想麻煩你睇番你嘅證人供詞，呢份係--你前面個螢光幕睇到，你證人
- 13 供詞嘅第 1 頁，如果我哋去第 9 段，睇得清唔清楚你而家？
- 14 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到第 9 段講你係宏福苑嘅電工？
- 16 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：你一般嘅職責係修理同埋同電力有關嘅工作。
- 18 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：維修同埋維護啲照明系統。
- 20 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：處理公共區域嘅一般維修同埋做一啲根據需要--咁好啲，係咪？清楚
- 22 啲。
- 23 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：做其他電力嘅維護工作嘅。
- 25 羅國瑞先生：係，照明啲啲。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問你同埋另外一位李師傅，係唔係你嘅拍檔？
- 27 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢就有電工牌嘅？
- 29 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：係唔係可以咁分，即係同電有關啲啲嘢就你去處理，其他啲啲嘢就佢
- 31 搞？
- 32 羅國瑞先生：係，係。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係呢度講你都有處理一般維修嘅。
- 34 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，如果譬如啲水箱漏水啲啲，你會唔會去處理嘅呢？
- 36 羅國瑞先生：水箱漏水唔關我哋事。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係譬如呢個天台嗰啲水缸會唔會係你哋去睇嘅呢？
- 2 羅國瑞先生：食水同埋鹹水嗰啲會跟進下。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係換句話講，如果有水缸漏水嘅情況，其實管理處或者寫字樓都會通
- 4 知你兩位，係咪？
- 5 羅國瑞先生：係，係。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：你兩個都會一齊去睇睇，係咪？
- 7 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺你嘅證人供詞第 10 段，你講咗你唔負責屋苑管理、住戶聯絡、承辦
- 9 商嘅工作，你亦都唔會負責消防裝置同埋設備，包括消防水缸同其他相關嘅系統呢
- 10 一啲合規嘅事情，係咪？
- 11 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你講得好清楚，呢啲事情係需要一啲持牌嘅人士去跟進，係咪？
- 13 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺宏福苑工作咁耐，你知道消防設備嗰個承辦商係邊間公司嘛？
- 15 羅國瑞先生：承辦商最近就應該係嗰個叫做宏泰，之前第二間我都唔記得咗乜嘢。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：一般嚟講，因為你呢個認知，我相信你唔會去鬥嗰啲消防系統裝置嘅，
- 17 係咪？
- 18 羅國瑞先生：係，一定。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：開關你都唔會去搞，係咪？
- 20 羅國瑞先生：係，係。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺 2025 年之前，相信可唔可以咁講？你都有嘗試去就嗰啲系統嘅開
- 22 關，你自己走去做，你都係交界承辦商搞嘅，係咪？
- 23 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：第 15 段嗰度我哋就睇到，你講得好清楚每座大廈有兩個泵房，一個主
- 25 要泵房同一個加壓泵房，係咪？
- 26 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：裏面泵房啲設施你應該都係熟悉嘅，係咪？
- 28 羅國瑞先生：熟悉。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：或者幫一幫我哋去睇一睇，如果 bundle C1-2/1619，呢個係第一個
- 30 --有兩個泵房嘅，呢個係個主要泵房，係咪？
- 31 羅國瑞先生：呢個大泵房。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，呢度我哋見到有處理食水、鹹水，同埋消防上水嗰個泵嘅，係咪？
- 33 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋叫佢做運轉水缸。
- 35 羅國瑞先生：咩嘢叫運轉水缸？
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：有三個設施嘅，一個係處理食水，一個係處理鹹水，係咪？

- 1 羅國瑞先生：唔，唔。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：一個就係個消防上水泵，係咪？
- 3 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果我哋睇番--呢個係第一個泵房，另外有個消防加壓泵房嘅，睇
- 5 1641 頁，1641、1642 我哋就見到有啲裝置，呢個係加壓泵房裏面見到，係咪？
- 6 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢啲裝置你都--因為同電有關，所以你應該都熟悉嘅？
- 8 羅國瑞先生：係，見過，見過。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，你唔會操作佢哋，...
- 10 羅國瑞先生：唔會。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：...但係因為你係有電工牌嘅，呢啲設施你邊嚟打邊嚟，佢哋愛嚟做乜
- 12 你應該係知嘅，係咪？
- 13 羅國瑞先生：知。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋睇番之前嘅一頁，呢度。
- 15 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係加壓泵房裏面嘅設施，之前嘅證人似乎係咁講嘅，如果我哋睇番
- 17 呢個板面，我哋見到有一個 1 號泵，如果放大少少，你見到左手邊同右手邊分別有
- 18 1 號泵同 2 號泵掣嘅，英文叫 (English Spoken)，你知道有呢兩個泵掣嘅，
- 19 而家寫住 “off” 嘅，O-F-F 嘅。
- 20 羅國瑞先生：我唔知，我淨係知道嗰個係一個總掣。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢啲即係板面上高呢啲掣你唔清楚嘅？
- 22 羅國瑞先生：唔清楚。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：你話知道個總掣，你嘅意思係唔係指--如果睇下一頁，你總掣係唔係指
- 24 呢個？
- 25 羅國瑞先生：係嘞，指呢個就係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你嘅理解，就係頭先紅色嗰個板面上高邊個掣打邊個，你就唔理解
- 27 嘅？
- 28 羅國瑞先生：唔理解嘅。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係個總掣你就知嘅？
- 30 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果我哋需要問嗰啲泵嘅話，問咗呢個掣啲泵就會冇電，係咪？
- 32 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問你，你知唔知道問咗呢個掣，其實嗰個火警鐘都會冇電？
- 34 羅國瑞先生：唔知道。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：你唔知道。消防處有一個講法嘅，佢哋就話其實問啲泵就唔使問呢個掣
- 36 嘅，其實板面上高有其他掣係可以問咗啲消防水泵，呢個刀掣唔使問嘅，你知唔知

1 道？

2 羅國瑞先生：唔知。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：睇番你個證人供詞第 18 段，你呢度提到喺大維修期間，2025 年 7 月

4 到 8 月，你就收到啲工作單要幫宏業去做一啲消防水缸放水嘅工程，係咪？

5 羅國瑞先生：係。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，因為你呢度就係講 7 月至 8 月，你曾經同警方講過係 4 月

7 至 8 月嘅，我知道有時可能好難記邊個月打邊個月，...

8 羅國瑞先生：係，記唔到。

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：...但係你可唔可以--而家如果我問你，我哋知道個火警係 11 月尾，

10 推斷番之前，你應該係邊個月開始幫宏業做呢啲放水嘅工作？

11 羅國瑞先生：我已經忘記咗，睇番單就知。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，管理處如果畀單你，佢係點樣畀你嘅，即係佢叫你去收

13 咁？

14 羅國瑞先生：我返工嗰陣時，佢啲單夾喺個打卡機上面，咁我同李師傅邊個早就邊個去收

15 嘅。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：李師傅係你拍檔，...

17 羅國瑞先生：拍檔。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：...你識咗好多年，係咪？

19 羅國瑞先生：係，一入職入嚟就識。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：入嚟就識，即係識咗好多年已經？

21 羅國瑞先生：總之佢入職我先識佢。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想話你幫一幫我哋一樣嘢，因為李師傅有一個講法嘅，佢話收到要放

23 水嗰個工作單嘅時候，佢就話--你識睇--證人供詞所有中文你睇到？

24 羅國瑞先生：睇到。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想麻煩你，咁你去睇一睇李師傅嘅供詞，（English Spoken）/第

26 1256 頁。李師傅咁講嘅，佢話佢理解去操作呢啲消防裝置係要通知消防處，所以

27 執行呢啲消防水缸放水工作單嘅時候，佢曾經同你講過係處理消防水缸應該要有消

28 防牌先做嘅，...

29 羅國瑞先生：係。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：...你就話「接到單就做喇」。

31 羅國瑞先生：係。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你記唔記得佢有咁同你講過？

33 羅國瑞先生：記得。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁我想問下當時你嘅理解係唔係都係同佢一樣，其實去操作呢啲消防裝

35 置要有牌先做得嘅？

36 羅國瑞先生：係。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁點解佢同你講完之後，你就話「接到單就做」，你唔去問下「喂，有
2 牌先鬥得個嗎，我哋唔好搞嗎」？
- 3 羅國瑞先生：我咪拎張單去管理處問囉。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：你搵張單去管理處問邊位？
- 5 羅國瑞先生：問嗰啲同事同埋駱小姐。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：可唔可以話畀我知你問駱小姐嘅時候，佢點同你講？
- 7 羅國瑞先生：佢話「即係今次係宏業要放水，叫我哋協助。」咁我有電動牌，所以咪要協助
8 佢囉。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：羅先生，我知道發生咗事情，大家都唔想。
- 10 羅國瑞先生：唔想。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都想同你講清楚，我唔係話你講大話，因為有唔同嘅記憶，好多唔同
12 嘅理由。
- 13 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我想問你嘅，就係當時既然你理解係要消防牌至做，駱小姐咁同你
15 講，你都應該知道係唔啱，係咪？
- 16 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢咁同你講完之後，你點做？
- 18 羅國瑞先生：咪照張單做囉。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係既然你知道駱小姐呢個講法唔啱，點解你依然照做？
- 20 羅國瑞先生：因為張單出咗，我驚我個咩嘢——工作...
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：慢慢。
- 22 羅國瑞先生：...驚有處分同埋...
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問清楚你，其實駱小姐唔係你老闆嚟㗎嘛，你平時唔係向佢匯報㗎
24 嘛？
- 25 羅國瑞先生：唔係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解唔同老闆講——同你嘅上司講？
- 27 羅國瑞先生：我上司林文欣唔因為唔喺度。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁有冇諗過問一問黎經理，咁做唔係好妥當嗎？
- 29 羅國瑞先生：都有諗過，但係冇做。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你睇一睇你證人供詞第 21 段，你講出放水嗰三個步驟，係咪？
- 31 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：第一，就係喺個主要嘅泵房門咗個水掣；第二，就係將水缸嘅水通過嗰
33 個塘環就喺水缸度排出，係咪？
- 34 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：第三，就係要門咗嗰個加壓泵房嘅刀掣，係咪？
- 36 羅國瑞先生：係。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋留意到你亦都有澄清番嘅，你係未做過呢個水缸放水嘅工作，係
2 咪？
- 3 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以你呢個都係喺同宏泰工作嘅時候知道，係咪？
- 5 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：做年檢嗰陣？
- 7 羅國瑞先生：維修年檢。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係維修年檢嗰陣應該都係宏泰做，佢應該都係唔使你幫手嘅，係咪？
- 9 羅國瑞先生：唔使。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁如果你有參與，你點解會知道嘅？
- 11 羅國瑞先生：佢有講過，即係有了解過。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都要講清楚，頭先我畀你睇過你話你同駱小姐有個對話，咁你知道駱
13 小姐個講法就係佢真係話你有咁同佢講過嘅，我要重複一次，我唔係話你係講大
14 話，但係你係唔係肯定你講嗰個係駱小姐同埋你有咁同佢講呀？
- 15 羅國瑞先生：我收第一張單嗰陣時我係講過嘅。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你記得好清楚，你係有同佢講嘅？
- 17 羅國瑞先生：係，提及過嘅。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：有一個講法，就係其實你去做放水唔使門個刀掣，你頭先都講你係唔知
19 道呢樣嘢，係咪？
- 20 羅國瑞先生：你再講多次？
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：有一個講法，消防處嘅講法，就係話其實放水，你想熄個泵係唔使門個
22 刀掣嘅，你頭先講咗畀我哋聽呢樣嘢你係唔知嘅，係咪？
- 23 羅國瑞先生：即係嗰個泵一定要門個掣，唔係你行空泵冇水發生事故㗎嘛。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你嘅講法就係話你認為如果要熄個泵，就要熄埋個刀掣嘅？
- 25 羅國瑞先生：係要門咗個掣。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係你點知？邊個講你聽㗎？
- 27 羅國瑞先生：我個認知。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你呢個認知，你可唔可以話畀我哋知喺邊度嚟㗎？
- 29 羅國瑞先生：係嗰啲叫做咩嘢？嗰啲消防承辦商嗰啲咁講。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢哋點同你講，你可唔可以解一解畀我哋聽？你頭先講過行空泵呢一樣
31 嘢。
- 32 羅國瑞先生：即係根本你放晒啲水，冇水，譬如個泵行，變咗咪燒泵。即係等如汽車，你個
33 水箱冇水咪掙車頭，即係咁。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你嘅講法係你唔知道熄嗰個刀掣會影響到個火警鐘嘅，係咪？
- 35 羅國瑞先生：係，冇錯。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果你知道，你會唔會熄？

- 1 羅國瑞先生：如果知道梗係唔會熄。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：你同警方講過，如果係放水熄掣嗰啲問題，你如果喺度就你去處理，你
- 3 放假就李師傅處理。但係就宏福苑八座去處理呢個水缸放水，熄呢啲掣嘅問題都係
- 4 其實你做，係咪？你放假嘅時候，李師傅做咗嘅，你同唔同意？
- 5 羅國瑞先生：同意。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：同意，係咪？
- 7 羅國瑞先生：唔係，你再講一次。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：你同警方講過，就係話如果宏福苑裏面八座嘅水缸維修工程個放水時
- 9 候，要熄嗰個消防系統個總掣，如果你放假就係李師傅去處理嘅呢一樣嘢？
- 10 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係就今次呢八座熄掣呢個問題，你同唔同意其實都係你去處理，李師
- 12 傅冇處理過？
- 13 羅國瑞先生：係，一齊去處理。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：李師傅嘅講法係佢冇入泵房嘅，佢係喺門口嘅？
- 15 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係所以入去門個掣對於你個講法，其實係你去門嘅，係咪？
- 17 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：其實你都好坦白，喺今年 1 月 15 號你畀警方嘅口供裏面，你都承認咗
- 19 其實呢八座嗰個刀掣都係你自己去關閉佢，個原因係你唔知道會熄到個消防系統，
- 20 係咪？
- 21 羅國瑞先生：係，係。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你熄咗嗰個刀掣去畀佢哋做工程，你有冇同佢哋傾過幾時開番，之後
- 23 點跟進嘅問題？
- 24 羅國瑞先生：冇，我淨係簽番張工作單交番管理處，因為嗰啲工程嘅嘢唔係我負責㗎嘛。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你覺唔覺得其實熄咗你都要開番，咁邊個去做呢樣嘢？
- 26 羅國瑞先生：唔知就係，應該係佢哋承辦商做，我上一次都係協助佢，我做協助㗎咋嘛。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，羅師傅，唔該晒你。
- 28 羅國瑞先生：唔使，唔好客氣。
- 29 陸啟康法官：有冇人——即係我仲有少少時間，睇下可唔可以——有冇問題？
- 30 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席、兩位委員，我諗我同埋應該係林大律師都有少少問題，但係我應
- 31 該唔多，因為都大部分其實獨音委員會嘅杜大律師問咗，咁我淨係想問少少，係
- 32 喇。係，羅師傅，我淨係可能有兩三個問題係想問一問你嘅。第一個問題，就係我
- 33 想你睇番你嘅證人供詞嘅第 21 段，咁係喺呢個 WS2/1234 頁。呢度就你有講過話
- 34 你未做過呢個消防水缸嗰個放水，但係你曾經就係喺一啲註冊消防承辦商係進行年
- 35 檢嘅時候就理解過。
- 36 羅國瑞先生：係。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：就話例如係宏泰，你會唔會記得譬如話宏泰邊一位同事有同你講過，你
2 有冇印象？

3 羅國瑞先生：啲啲我唔識個嗰，因為我都唔識啲啲人，即係大家傾偈咁傾，佢講畀我聽。

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：第二個問題，就係我都會想問番你，即係頭先我亦都問過李師傅，就係
5 話當你係接到嗰個 job order，即係嗰個工作單，咁而李師傅亦都同你講咗話其
6 實應該係要有一啲即係註冊承辦商先至可以去做或者去掂呢啲消防裝置嘅時候，你
7 有冇諗過係去接觸下呢個譬如宏泰，亦都去問下佢哋個情況，有冇咁樣諗過當時？

8 羅國瑞先生：因為我唔識啲啲人，我哋唔識宏泰承辦商啲啲人㗎嘛。

9 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，明白。即係你意思係當時就有咁樣諗，因為其實你唔特別認識宏泰
10 啲啲嘅職員？

11 羅國瑞先生：係。

12 孫靖乾資深大律師：或者亦都有佢哋嘅聯絡電話？

13 羅國瑞先生：冇。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁就有諗過更進一步，即係譬如話要問下呢啲管理處嘅同事可唔可以聯
15 絡宏泰，就有諗到嗰一步應該？

16 羅國瑞先生：冇，冇。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，明白。跟住我都想問一問你，就係頭先杜大律師都有問過，即係你
18 有冇再諗去同譬如話經理黎先生，就係再去同佢講或者係匯報，咁你都解釋咗就話
19 你有諗過，但係冇咁樣去做。但係我淨係想問你，咁一開始嘅時候，李師傅同你講
20 咗，而你都同樣地覺得係要有持牌嘅人先至可以去掂呢啲嘅消防裝置嘅時候，咁喺
21 嗰一刻點解你會首先問咗駱小姐先呢？純粹係唔係因為嗰個係佢去簽 job
22 order？定係咩嘢原因呢？

23 羅國瑞先生：佢係發單人㗎嘛。

24 孫靖乾資深大律師：佢係發單人，係。好，唔該晒，羅師傅。我有其他問題。

25 林樂夫大律師：主席，我都係得兩三個問題，會好快嘅。唔該晒，主席。羅師傅，我哋睇一
26 睇李師傅嘅證人口供，WS2/1255，第 17 段。1255 頁，係嘞，第 17 段，純粹時
27 間性嘅啫，因為李師傅就話喺 2025 年 5 月及 8 月期間入面有八個呢啲 job
28 order，咁所以你同唔同意其實就係大約喺 2025 年 5 月，你第一次入去呢個加壓
29 泵房放水呢？放消防水缸嘅水。

30 羅國瑞先生：我已經忘記咗，我要睇番單先知道時間。

31 林樂夫大律師：係，明白。跟住就再問，就係你門咗刀掣之後，八棟刀掣都係咁門，除咗
32 你，仲有邊位 ISS 同事係知道刀掣已經門咗？

33 羅國瑞先生：唔知。

34 林樂夫大律師：淨係得你知？

35 羅國瑞先生：同埋李師傅知。

36 林樂夫大律師：李師傅知。

- 1 羅國瑞先生：同埋呢個——嗰個叫咩嘢？宏業喇。
- 2 林樂夫大律師：宏業。
- 3 羅國瑞先生：宏業嗌我哋去做嘢嗰個。
- 4 林樂夫大律師：即係你有特別同其他同事交代？
- 5 羅國瑞先生：冇。
- 6 林樂夫大律師：跟住就最後一個問題，就係因為林生，你上司唔再喺公司做嘅時候，你係直
- 7 屬黎經理，係咪？
- 8 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 9 林樂夫大律師：咁黎經理佢管唔管電力、消防啲啲嘢？
- 10 羅國瑞先生：咁我又唔清楚佢管乜，即係佢係管我。
- 11 林樂夫大律師：管你？
- 12 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 13 林樂夫大律師：咁你就係管電力？
- 14 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 15 林樂夫大律師：好，唔該晒。我有其他問題，唔該。
- 16 陳熾龍大律師：主席，如果時間容許嘅話，可唔可以——我今日代表梁秉基（譯音）先生嘅，
- 17 如果可以嘅話想簡單問多兩個問題，幾分鐘嘅啫，如果時間容許嘅話。
- 18 陸啟康法官：你問幾耐？
- 19 陳熾龍大律師：兩三個問題，幾分鐘就可以，如果時間容許。
- 20 陸啟康法官：我畀你問。
- 21 陳熾龍大律師：多謝主席。羅先生，你證供都提及過，你係陪同宏業嘅工人一齊去，你係協
- 22 助佢哋去關呢個——去做呢個消防放水缸呢個行為，咁去到呢個加壓泵房嘅時候，你
- 23 哋一齊入去㗎嘛？
- 24 羅國瑞先生：係。
- 25 陳熾龍大律師：我想問佢哋有冇畀咩嘢指示係話佢哋想做啲咩嘢？即係佢哋係就咁同講話佢
- 26 想放水，定還是有同你講話麻煩你幫手問咗乜嘢掣咁樣？
- 27 羅國瑞先生：佢話放水。
- 28 梁秉基代表：佢係淨係同你講放水嘅？
- 29 羅國瑞先生：唔。
- 30 梁秉基代表：好，唔該晒。有其他問題。
- 31 許偉強資深大律師：主席，就有兩個問題想澄清下嘅。羅師傅，就我想問一問你，就係根據
- 32 你嘅證人口供，剛才我哋睇過，喺 17 段嗰度有講，雖然你同我哋講而家嗰個實際
- 33 嘅時間可能你真係唔記得，根據你口供應該係就住呢八座，你協助呢啲放水工程應
- 34 該係一路做到差唔多 8 月份，大概差唔多係 8 月份，根據你嘅口供。我想問下呢八
- 35 座你協助宏業進行呢啲放水工程之後，你仲有冇再去過呢一個消防嘅加壓泵房？
- 36 羅國瑞先生：冇。

1 許偉強資深大律師：另外一個問題，就係睇番你嘅證人口供第 21 段，剛才杜大律師都有問
2 過你，關於呢一個當時你哋協助放水嗰個工作嗰個程序，呢度你都話先就係去咗
3 嗰個主要嘅泵房先，然後就去天台，跟住就先至去呢個加壓泵房，我都有問過李師
4 傅關於呢個程序，其實八座係唔係都會有唔同嘅，即係未必係一定係梗咗呢個程序
5 嘅，咁李師傅就話八座都可能會唔同嘅，你同唔同意佢嘅講法？

6 羅國瑞先生：同意。

7 許偉強資深大律師：最後一個問題，就係就住你剛才講話收到第一個工作單，就因為你考慮
8 過呢啲咁嘅工作係唔係應該由一啲消防承辦商去做呢，所以提出咗疑問嘅，你記
9 得？

10 羅國瑞先生：係，記得。

11 許偉強資深大律師：咁你當時去到個管理處提出過呢樣嘢，係咪？

12 羅國瑞先生：係，係。

13 許偉強資深大律師：當時管理處係唔係除咗駱小姐，仲有其他職員喺度㗎？

14 羅國瑞先生：仲有其他職員嘅。

15 許偉強資深大律師：你記唔記得你係唔係都有——除咗駱小姐之外，都會有同其他職員提過呢
16 一個咁嘅考慮㗎？

17 羅國瑞先生：提過咁又唔記得。

18 許偉強資深大律師：記唔記？

19 羅國瑞先生：記唔到。

20 許偉強資深大律師：記唔到。我就想問下，你實際上當時同駱小姐，即係實際上，你講嗰啲
21 字眼、用字，你而家仲記唔記得，定係隔咗咁耐唔係好記得自己講過嗰啲字眼係乜
22 嘢？

23 羅國瑞先生：忘記咗㗎，咁耐。

24 許偉強資深大律師：唔該。我有其他問題。

25 陸啟康法官：唔該晒。有其他問題？

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：羅師傅，為咗公平起見，我都想同你澄清番一樣嘢，李師傅頭先畀口供
27 嘅時候，我咪畀你睇過個證人供詞其中一段話佢同你講過呢啲工程係熄掣呢啲嘢要
28 由消防承辦商做嘅，咁佢嘅證供就係佢話你其實即刻答佢話「收到單就做」，當時
29 係唔係咁，佢一問你你已經即刻答佢，定係你走咗去問咗寫字樓先？

30 羅國瑞先生：梗係問咗寫字樓先。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係佢同你講完之後，你係冇即刻回應？

32 羅國瑞先生：冇，冇。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇。

34 陸啟康法官：好多謝晒羅先生你嚟到聽證會畀證供。我作出同一嘅呼籲，咁就我唔需要再重
35 複。我哋押後到 2 點 15 分繼續。

36

1
2 13 時 08 分置邦興業有限公司電工證人羅國瑞先生作供完畢

3
4 13 時 08 分聆訊押後

5 14 時 15 分聆訊恢復

6
7 14 時 15 分置邦興業有限公司高級管理員證人黃百盛先生開始作供

8
9 陸啟康法官：係，杜律師。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位證人係黃百盛先生。黃先生，午安，你見到你前面有一份
11 聲明，麻煩你企起身讀出嚟。

12 黃百盛先生：本人黃百盛聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你坐低。黃先生，你係現時都係受僱於置邦興業，任職高級嘅保安
14 員，係咪呀？

15 黃百盛先生：係。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺大火之前你都係喺宏福苑工作喇？

17 黃百盛先生：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到你提交咗幾份證供嘅，第一份就係你僱主律師為你準備提交畀
19 委員會嘅證供。而你同警方都係落咗兩份口供嘅。

20 黃百盛先生：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：相信你都可以確認呢三份嘅文件裏面嘅內容都係準確，係咪？

22 黃百盛先生：係。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想睇一睇你畀委員會嘅證供。第 7 段就提到其實你係喺 2009 年嘅 6
24 月份就係入職擔任宏福苑嘅高級管理員喇。

25 黃百盛先生：係。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係負責保安工作喇？

27 黃百盛先生：係。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係一路到火災嗰一日嘅。

29 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以你係宏福苑工作咗好耐㗎嘞。

31 黃百盛先生：係喇。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：第 8 段就講到其中一樣嘢，就係你主要係管理處嘅控制室嗰度工作，係
33 咪呀？

34 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰個控制室喺屋苑邊個位？

36 黃百盛先生：喺宏仁閣第 1 座 3 號位。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：同一段你講到你負責屋苑嘅一般保安工作。
- 2 黃百盛先生：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：包括處理屋苑住戶嘅投訴同埋突發事件，同埋協助編排更表等等嘅。
- 4 黃百盛先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：就投訴嚟講，多數居民嘅投訴係咪都係口頭打嚟控制室㗎？
- 6 黃百盛先生：用電話打嚟。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。另外，我哋知道你哋係有電郵嘅，有時佢哋都用電郵投訴，係咪？
- 8 黃百盛先生：係，但係電郵嗰啲係屬於裏面文職嗰啲人員睇到，我哋睇唔到。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以就你嚟講，你最主要處理嘅投訴就係打嚟喇。
- 10 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：同埋你會撞到啲街坊，係咪？
- 12 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，相信你做咗咁多年，其實好多街坊都識你喇，係咪？
- 14 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想同你睇一睇幾類型投訴嘅，當時大家都知道宏福苑做緊大維修，你
- 16 睇你嘅證人供詞第 10 段，如果睇落去。提到你接過一啲有關吸煙嘅投——工人吸煙
- 17 嘅投訴，係咪？
- 18 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：而收到啲投訴之後你會記錄低，係咪？
- 20 黃百盛先生：冇錯。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢份記錄就係有一個叫大維修投訴紀錄嗰度喇，我哋之前都睇過嘅。
- 22 黃百盛先生：大維修紀錄簿嗰度。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：係喇，Bundle C1-1/749 頁，你見到，如果放大少少呢，你都會見
- 24 到其實有啲都係關食煙嘅事嘅？譬如 5 號。
- 25 黃百盛先生：係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：工人喺棚架時候食煙，落去 37、38 都同食煙有關嘅。你好多時喺跟進
- 27 嗰度我哋都見到你寫住就係「通知宏業」嘅。
- 28 黃百盛先生：係。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：基本上你管理處收到嘅投訴，其實係因為工人係宏業嘅工人，係咪？所
- 30 以你都會交界佢哋處理？
- 31 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你知唔知道宏業點樣跟進？
- 33 黃百盛先生：佢淨係通知我「得嘞，佢會知道嘞」。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。即係至於宏業點樣處理工人吸煙嘅問題，其實你知唔知㗎？
- 35 黃百盛先生：唔清楚。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你供詞同一段講過話，其實你都親自聽見有住戶喺管理處外討論吸

- 1 煙嘅問題，咁你就去宏仁閣視察過嘅，係咪？你記得嘛？
- 2 黃百盛先生：記得。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：係囉。你見到工人食煙嘞，當時，係咪？
- 4 黃百盛先生：係嘞。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你叫佢唔好食喇，你...
- 6 黃百盛先生：大聲喝上去，因為當時佢喺棚架度，1 樓至 2 樓之間。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。咁其實你都係勸佢啫？
- 8 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：你會唔會同意咁講呀？居民有居民投訴，你哋又同咗宏業講，但係似乎
- 10 我哋見唔到喺大維修期間，食煙呢個情況係有改善嘅，你同唔同意呢個講法？
- 11 黃百盛先生：同意。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你作為物業管理公司，其實你哋自己內部或者同你嘅上司有冇討論過
- 13 「喂，我不停同宏業講，但係個情況都係一樣，你哋駛唔使做啲其他嘅措施或者點
- 14 同宏業再跟進」，有冇咁做過呢？
- 15 黃百盛先生：冇。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解冇咁做？
- 17 黃百盛先生：因為宏業嘅工人係屬於宏業管理嘅，但係我哋係置邦嘅，就唔同關係公司，所
- 18 以我哋交番畀宏業跟進就最重要。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你哋公司做嘅嘢好似傳聲筒咁咋㗎，同唔同意？
- 20 黃百盛先生：同意。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外一樣嘢，我想問你嘅，就係後樓梯--走火樓梯嗰啲生口，你知我講
- 22 緊咩嘢喇？
- 23 黃百盛先生：明白。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：每 5 層就有個生口。
- 25 黃百盛先生：係嘞，冇錯，5 樓，10 樓。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：大家都知道有呢啲生口，當時有冇居民同你提過話呢個危險呀？
- 27 黃百盛先生：冇講過。冇收過任何嘢。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你哋自己覺唔覺得有危險？
- 29 黃百盛先生：冇咁樣意識到。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。所以管理處都有跟進過嘞全完，係咪呀？
- 31 黃百盛先生：冇。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外一樣嘢，我想問你嘅就係喺你畀警方嘅口供，你都有提過每座地下
- 33 泵房有鎖匙喇，我哋知道佢係放喺大堂嘅座頭。
- 34 黃百盛先生：係。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：管理處都係有後備匙嘅，係咪？
- 36 黃百盛先生：有後備匙。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅口供講話如果同事巡樓嘅時候發覺加壓泵房冇鎖就會鎖番，係咪？
- 2 黃百盛先生：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個都係你哋工作指引畀員工嘅指示喇，係咪？
- 4 黃百盛先生：冇錯。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：係咪你哋所有嘅前線同事都知道呢個職責？
- 6 黃百盛先生：全部知道。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：據你所知，喺大維修期間，呢個情況有冇發生過？即係冇鎖番個泵房。
- 8 黃百盛先生：冇人通知過，即係冇。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外一樣嘢，我想你幫幫手嘅，就係你嘅證人供詞亦都提咗處理消防設
- 10 備嘅工作，我想你幫一幫我哋嘅就係有啲維修工作單嘅，係咪？
- 11 黃百盛先生：唔。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有處理過呢啲文件，係咪？
- 13 黃百盛先生：有。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你亦都提過，你話你有時會收到座頭嘅報告話啲消防設備壞咗嘅，
- 15 係咪？而當值嘅人員包括你就會通知消防設備嘅承辦商，係咪咁呀？
- 16 黃百盛先生：喎。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：你自己有冇收過呢啲投訴，有冇處理過呢一啲嘅維修？
- 18 黃百盛先生：譬如消防喉漏水呀，咁我就有。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，咁都係你負責通知宏泰，係咪？
- 20 黃百盛先生：我會通知工程主任，然後通知宏泰嚟維修。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：工程主任就林先生，係咪？
- 22 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你自己，你知唔知道其實處理呢啲消防裝置係要承辦商先可以
- 24 處理㗎？
- 25 黃百盛先生：心裏面知道。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：你點知道㗎？
- 27 黃百盛先生：噃？
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你點知㗎，邊個同你講㗎？
- 29 黃百盛先生：呢啲基本知識㗎㗎㗎。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你都講唔到邊個同你講，係咪呀？
- 31 黃百盛先生：噏。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：總之你知道嘅？
- 33 黃百盛先生：知道。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅證人供詞裏面都提過呢，關於消防水缸排水呢件事嘅，喺第 14 段
- 35 開始有講，見唔見到？
- 36 黃百盛先生：見到。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你當時亦都有處理過一啲嘅工作單嘅，偶爾，係咪？
- 2 黃百盛先生：係，處理過兩張。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，出過，我哋睇過啲嘅工作單嘅。
- 4 黃百盛先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你啲嘅工作單就通常發畀屋苑裏面你啲兩位同事，羅師傅同李師傅，
- 6 係咪？
- 7 黃百盛先生：嘅，嘅，冇錯。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你出啲單畀佢，佢哋會唔會走番嚟同你澄清或者佢問你「喂，應唔
- 9 應該做？或者點做㗎？」
- 10 黃百盛先生：未有打過嚟。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：總之你出，佢哋就會做嘅？
- 12 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道你發出過我哋而家搵到啲三張工作單裏面呢，有兩張係你發出
- 14 嘅，相信你睇過喇，係咪？
- 15 黃百盛先生：係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺 H2，麻煩，6780 頁。6780 同埋之後個頁 6781，你睇一睇。
- 17 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：我相信你睇過兩張工作單喇。邊個叫你出呢個工作單㗎流程上高？唔係
- 19 你自己決定㗎喇，係咪？
- 20 黃百盛先生：通常由宏業通知裏面，然後我哋就——裏面就叫佢哋出呢張工作單嘅。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。我想問下你出呢啲同消防有關嘅工作單時候，你有冇聽過啲師傅
- 22 會問話「喂，同消防有關，要搵承辦商」？
- 23 黃百盛先生：冇聽過。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢啲講法你有聽過，係咪？
- 25 黃百盛先生：冇聽過。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：你出咗兩張單之後有冇跟進啲兩張單做成點呀？幾時做完，係咪你嘅工
- 27 作範圍？
- 28 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，咁就呢兩張單而言，你收番師傅交番嚟時候，我哋見到下低有一個
- 30 「查核者」嘅，個簽名係邊個？
- 31 黃百盛先生：係我。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你點去查核佢哋有冇做完或者幾時做完呀？
- 33 黃百盛先生：我係以師傅——李師傅同羅師傅簽咗名為核實。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係佢哋簽番嚟，你就認為做完喇？
- 35 黃百盛先生：係喇。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以佢簽完名，你就簽名？

- 1 黃百盛先生：係嘞。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，即係你有獨立地去核實係咪真係有做完嘅，係咪？咁講啱唔啱？
- 3 黃百盛先生：啱。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住你個供詞就講到大火當日嗰個情況嘅，你話其實喺宏昌閣個座頭嘅
- 5 鍾瑞霞用對講機講話起火，係咪？
- 6 黃百盛先生：係嘞。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你就好快趕到大堂，係咪？
- 8 黃百盛先生：唔。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇走出去睇下個火勢當時即刻？
- 10 黃百盛先生：我走出去睇個火勢嗰陣時，已經差唔多去到天台燒到去。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。
- 12 黃百盛先生：所以我即刻就返去座頭嗰度，就由 1 樓就拍到去 6 樓就拍門叫啲人儘快走咁解
- 13 啫。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你由 1 樓走到上 6 樓？
- 15 黃百盛先生：嘎。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：你走上去嗰陣樓梯有冇煙㗎？
- 17 黃百盛先生：冇，只不過見到玻璃——出面就已經燒緊，所以我哋儘快就走去 1 至 6 樓。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果你去到 6 樓，你應該經過 5 樓嗰個生口？
- 19 黃百盛先生：嘎。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：見唔見到有煙入嚟嗰度？
- 21 黃百盛先生：暫時未見到。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你跑過去所以未見到？
- 23 黃百盛先生：未見到我走過嗰陣時。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：去到 6 樓，跟住點呀？講一講畀我哋聽。
- 25 黃百盛先生：去到 6 樓之後呢，就叫咗 6 樓嗰啲住戶走，跟住我又打開咗嗰個防煙門，叫佢
- 26 哋盡快落去，點知啲煙呢，不斷咁攻上嚟，我哋呀跟住落去，落番去 1 樓座頭地
- 27 下，叫人哋疏散出去嘞，要走嘞。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住呢，你自己呢？
- 29 黃百盛先生：跟住我喺座頭留咗一陣間，見啲火舌一路去到 5 座、4 座，咁我都要走嘞，當
- 30 時我走嗰陣時仲有電嘅，電梯亦都郁得。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。
- 32 黃百盛先生：跟住有啲住戶喺 31 樓落嚟都可以走，都可以落到地下。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你離開嘅時候係幾多點？你有冇留意到？
- 34 黃百盛先生：唔記得嘞，大概三點零鐘，3 點 05 分左右，3 點 05 分至 3 點 10 分左右。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。黃先生，唔該晒你，我有其他問題。主席。
- 36 陸啟康法官：唔該，其他涉事方。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，兩位委員，我會有啲問題問一問黃先生。

2 陸啟康法官：孫大律師。

3

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：黃先生，想睇番你個證人供詞，喺 WS2 嘅第 1238 頁，可能有少少嘅技
5 術嘅--需要我哋要等一等。

6 陸啟康法官：冇問題。

7 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，咁我就想同你睇一睇第 8 段裏面，第 8 段就你去--我哋去睇一睇番
8 第 1238 頁先，好，咁可能要麻煩放大少少嘞。好，黃先生，咁如果你睇呢一度
9 呢，你有講過就係話你會按照管理處嘅需要，第三行開始，就協助一啲雜項嘅工
10 作，就係包括出嗰啲維修工作單，就係頭先杜大律師問你嘅嗰啲工作單。

11 黃百盛先生：冇錯。

12 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，然後你亦都話會向你發出呢啲咁嘅指示嘅管理處嘅人員係會包括，
13 譬如係鄭芷盈小姐，文員就係駱倩盈小姐嘞，又或者係其他管理處當值嘅職員嘅，
14 係咪？

15 黃百盛先生：係。

16 孫靖乾資深大律師：除此之外，頭先你亦都有講過就係話針對而家關於嗰個消防水缸嘅兩張
17 由你去發出嘅嗰個工作單呢，我想問呢個係宏業--頭先你講宏業就係去搵，係宏業
18 直接去搵你㗎，定係話其實都係宏業通過一啲管理處嘅人員，然後就係同你講
19 㗎？

20 黃百盛先生：係宏業通知裏面管理處人員同我講嘅，如果係宏業叫我開嘅話呢，我唔會開
21 嘅，因為佢唔係我哋公司人員。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白，咁即係話應該就係管理處嘅人員，即係包括你呢度提到的譬如可
23 能係鄭小姐或者駱小姐，佢哋收到宏業嘅要求，...

24 黃百盛先生：係嘞。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁然後佢就會同黃生你講，咁你就會去發出嗰個工作單嘞？

26 黃百盛先生：冇錯。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，好。我想問如果譬如話係經過鄭小姐或者駱小姐等等去發出，即係
28 叫你去發出嗰個工作單，你會發出工作單嘅時候，如果係阿林先生，即係講緊林文
29 欣先生，如果佢係喺宏福苑工作嘅時候，有冇一個機制係會話畀或者匯報畀林先
30 生聽㗎？

31 黃百盛先生：唔清楚，冇呢樣。

32 孫靖乾資深大律師：唔清楚嘅，係。跟住我就想同你了解下就係你喺呢個第 8 段嘅最尾嗰四
33 行亦都有講，就話假如管理處係收到座頭嘅報告，係喺巡樓嘅時發現嗰個消防嘅裝
34 置或者嗰個設備嘅外部係有損壞，例如係個消防喉轆突然間出現滴水嘅情況，咁就
35 會係管理處當時在場嘅職員，有時係你自己，就會話畀工程部嘅工程主任林文欣先
36 生聽，就等佢去聯絡嗰個宏福苑嗰個消防裝置承辦商宏泰嘅。

1 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：第一樣嘢我就想問一問，就係呢一個咁樣嘅做法呢，係有冇一啲嘅指引
3 話咁樣做？定係話係純粹係你哋自己即係遇到咁嘅情況，你就自己諗住用呢個方面
4 去做，即係有冇一個指引或者有冇話係有一啲嘅流程，話你如果咁嘅情況，遇到消
5 防裝置係有咁嘅損壞，你就要咁樣做嘅？

6 黃百盛先生：冇。

7 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係有一個流程？

8 黃百盛先生：只不過係工程嘅嘢，我哋係負責林生--係負責林--由林生負責，所以我一定要
9 report 畀林生聽咁解啫。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白，所以你意思都係話因為係牽涉一啲嘅工程，尤其係一啲嘅消防裝
11 置喇。

12 黃百盛先生：係喇。

13 孫靖乾資深大律師：你好自然地你就會同林生講？

14 黃百盛先生：係。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：然之後，林生就可以--亦都佢就要--就可以再去聯絡番呢個宏泰？

16 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，明白。好，如果係咁，當林生唔喺度，即係話係喺 2025 年 4 月份
18 至到 9 月份嘅時間，咁又會係點呢？會係同邊個講呢？

19 黃百盛先生：我會 report 畀主任或者經理。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：主任或者經理就係黎先生，主任係邊位呀即係？

21 黃百盛先生：鄭芷盈小姐。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：就係鄭小姐，明白。我想問當時嚟講，如果據你自己本人所知，譬如係
23 講緊 2025 年，有冇試過一啲情況真係有發現過嗰個消防裝置有一啲損壞，然之後
24 你同林生，又或者係黎經理，又或者係鄭小--鄭主任去講，有冇咁樣嘅情況發生過？

25 黃百盛先生：冇收過任何嘢。

26 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇收過任何嘢。好，咁我跟住就要再跟進番，就係頭先你就有講就係話
27 宏業就係應該經過管理處嘅職員，就係講話需要管理處去派人去協助就係嗰個消防
28 水缸放水嘅情況，咁喺嗰陣時你記唔記得係邊一個同你講？即係管理處邊一位職員
29 同你講？

30 黃百盛先生：唔記得。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：唔記得。咁你會唔會都記得當時同你講嘅時候，係咪應該就係咁啱嗰時
32 林先生就係唔喺宏福苑，呢個你定係唔記得？

33 黃百盛先生：唔記得。

34 孫靖乾資深大律師：好。咁我跟住就要想問一問，就係另外你嗰個證人供詞我要問多其中一
35 段裏面有啲嘅問題。我哋可能睇番頭先嘅第 1240 頁，第 1240 頁如果我哋睇一睇
36 第 14 (b) 嗰段，第 14 (b) 嗰段你就有講過，就係話我哋見到你就係講過話「當

1 時如果工程人員係沒有拒絕協助，當值管理處職員就會發出相關嘅工作嘅工作單
2 嘅」。如果我哋睇番上面（a）嗰度，你係話「管理處收到宏業嘅請求之後，係會聯
3 絡工程部嘅嗰個電工，詢問佢哋係咪可以提供協助」嘅。我想問其實宏業有請求過
4 工程部或者請求過呢個管理處係去協助，係咪只係發生過一次，淨係關於消防--即
5 係淨係針對消防水缸呢個事宜發生過？

6 黃百盛先生：係。

7 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁喺呢一個宏業作出呢個要求之前，有冇試過係有一啲其他嘅一啲
8 嘅承辦商，係要求過管理處或者係一啲嘅工程部嘅羅先生或者李先生去協助，有冇
9 咁嘅情況出現過？

10 黃百盛先生：我記憶之中就有。

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：記憶中有，所以呢個係--即係其實都係唯一一次，或者係都係唯一係針
12 對呢一件事，即係消防水缸有發生過呢個咁嘅要求？

13 黃百盛先生：係，係，冇錯。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：係咪？係。所以其實都有一個流程話，如果咁嘅情況，係咪要問過個師
15 傅，因為呢個其實都係唯一一次，但係你記得好似就係應該係會有問過啲師傅，係
16 咪咁嘅情況？

17 黃百盛先生：係。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁唔係你本人去問嘅？

19 黃百盛先生：我本人去問嘅。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：你本人去問嘅，okay。你去問嘅時候，你就知道都係關於嗰個消防水
21 缸？

22 黃百盛先生：係。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁頭先你作供嘅時候，你就講過話你都知道一啲嘅消防嘅裝置一定係要
24 持牌嘅人士或者係承辦商先至可以去處理嘅？係。你頭先個講法就話你覺得--杜大
25 律師問你點解會得知，你話覺得呢個係一個基本嘅常識，記得喇嘛？

26 黃百盛先生：（點頭）

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁我就想問下，咁頭先你亦都有講就話，工程部嘅羅先生同李先
28 生，你同佢講嘅時候，佢哋就--根據你證供，佢哋就有再去問或者係去提出一啲嘅
29 任何嘅...

30 黃百盛先生：佢哋冇拒絕工作。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇拒絕，係。咁我就想問下你就係一個問題嘅啫，你話其實你都知道呢
32 啲消防裝置就係應該係持牌人士先至可以去做，咁撇除話羅先生同埋李先生，佢哋
33 有冇拒絕或者有冇問，咁你去問佢哋或者要求佢哋會唔會做呢樣嘢嘅時候，你自己
34 有冇諗過--因為呢個係牽涉一個消防嘅裝置，其實係唔係好應該係由呢個工程部嘅
35 同事去協助或者去處理嘅？有冇諗過？

36 黃百盛先生：心裏面有諗過。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：心裏面有諗過。

2 黃百盛先生：但係羅師傅同李師傅佢都有拒絕，咁咪照做囉，咁解咋嘛。

3 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁即係你心裏面有諗過，但係就因為啲師傅冇拒絕？

4 黃百盛先生：嘎。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你心裏面有諗過嘅時候，無論係管理處邊位同事同你轉達呢個宏業嘅
6 嗰個要求都好，你有冇諗過去問番嗰位同事，叫佢同呢個宏業反映下？有冇諗過應
7 該？

8 黃百盛先生：冇。

9 孫靖乾資深大律師：唔。同埋你之前有講過，就係話如果遇到一啲嘅消防裝置係損壞嘅時
10 候，咁你都係會聯絡番即係一係就係林先生，或者如果佢唔喺度嘅時候就係黎經
11 理，或者就係鄭主任，就等佢哋可以再去聯絡番呢個宏泰嘅。所以今次係牽涉到就
12 係有關呢個消防水缸嘅情況，咁你有冇諗過係要同佢哋是但一位係去講番個情況，
13 或者問下佢哋係咪應該要去再聯絡番呢個宏泰？

14 黃百盛先生：冇呢樣，冇。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係冇咁樣諗到？

16 黃百盛先生：冇。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。

18 黃百盛先生：純粹真係羅師傅同李師傅冇拒絕過，就照做。

19 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白，明白。好，可能最後同你澄清多一樣嘢，即係應該據你嘅證供嚟
20 講，就你自己本人就從來冇直接係同宏泰去接觸？

21 黃百盛先生：冇。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁而係據你所知，都係一係就係通過林先生、黎經理或者鄭主任，
23 佢哋就再去接觸宏泰？係。

24 好，唔該晒，主席，我有其他嘅問題。

25 陸啟康法官：其他涉事方有冇其他問題？如果有，置邦。

26 許偉強資深大律師：主席，有少少覆問嘅。

27 黃生，啱啱就住委員會大律師杜大律師問過你，有關管理處處理吸煙投訴嗰個
28 問題，我想問一問，就係啱啱你回答杜律師嘅時候都有講到，就係你哋會同宏業嗰
29 度跟進？

30 黃百盛先生：係。

31 許偉強資深大律師：咁而你作為管理人員嘅，如果你見到有人食煙，亦都會當場作出制止、
32 勸喻咁喇？

33 黃百盛先生：係，冇錯。

34 許偉強資深大律師：我想畀你睇一睇就係鄭小姐，即係物業主任鄭小姐嗰份口供入面有提過
35 嘅，呢個問題，喺佢嘅第 50 頁，最後嗰四行嘅，黃生你睇一睇呢度就係鄭小姐講
36 「我及黎先生會向管理員作出指示，如果管理員在巡查當中注意到有建築工人吸

1 煙，管理員應該要求建築工人停止吸煙」，呢個剛才你有同我哋提過嘅，「同時我
2 理解管理員也在宏福苑的公眾位置貼上『禁止吸煙』的通告」，呢個通告你係咪都
3 有見過？

4 黃百盛先生：有。

5 許偉強資深大律師：咁你有冇都幫手貼呢啲通告？

6 黃百盛先生：冇。

7 許偉強資深大律師：冇，好，唔該晒。冇嘞，唔該。

8 陸啟康法官：冇冇其他問題？如果有，就唔該晒你，黃生，咁你可以作供完畢，唔該。

9

10 14 時 44 分置邦興業有限公司高級管理員證人黃百盛先生作供完畢

11 14 時 44 分置邦興業有限公司工程主任證人林文欣先生開始作供

12

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位證人係林文欣先生。

14 林先生，你好。

15 林文欣先生：係。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，麻煩你將你面前嘅聲明企起身讀出嚟。

17 林文欣先生：本人林文欣聲明，本人所作出的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒你，林先生，請坐。你現時都係受僱於置邦興業做工程主任，係
19 咪？

20 林文欣先生：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：你要大聲少少。

22 林文欣先生：冇錯，係，係。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺大火之前係喺宏福苑工作，係咪？

24 林文欣先生：係。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你提供咗兩份供詞，一份就係你畀委員會嘅證供，另外一份就係你向警
26 方提供嘅證供。相信你都會同意，兩份都係準確？

27 林文欣先生：同意。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺你嘅證供裏面第三段提到，如果我哋去一去，呢度提到你喺 19 年
29 7 月開始做你而家份工作，2025 年 4 月，其實你離開過嘅。

30 林文欣先生：係。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：到 10 月 8 號先至係再一次加入你而家嘅公司，係咪？

32 林文欣先生：冇錯。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你一路嘅工作地點都係喺宏福苑嘅？

34 林文欣先生：係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：你持有電工牌嘅，係咪？

36 林文欣先生：有。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：都超過十年，係咪？

2 林文欣先生：冇錯。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅職責除咗包括處理住戶日常嘅投訴同埋維修之外，仲當然你會係羅
4 師傅同埋李師傅嘅上司，係咪？

5 林文欣先生：冇錯。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：一啲日常維修嘅投訴，包括啲乜嘢？畀啲例子我哋，得唔得？

7 林文欣先生：日常投訴，即係譬如家居啲啲，譬如漏水、單位入面有時會有電，同埋有啲叫
8 做室內嘅——我哋啲污水喉就係室內嘅，咁有時有啲滲漏，咁我都要去上去跟進。如
9 果係公家嘅設施或者公家嘅喉管屬於我哋嘅，咁我要儘快出呢個招標，咁等承辦商
10 快啲嚟做，咁解決咗單位嘅投訴咁解嘅。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你幫一幫我哋，如果我哋睇番你畀警方嗰份口供，喺 Bundle C1-
12 2/1217 頁第 5 段，呢個係——我哋睇下之前嗰頁開始，你呢度講到個水缸嘅問題，
13 你話你喺 2025 年 11 月 21 日你當值期間，你曾經睇過宏建閣天台水缸，有兩個
14 水缸，係咪？見唔見到？第 5 段最尾嗰行。

15 林文欣先生：見到。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：分別為食水缸同消防水缸。

17 林文欣先生：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你話你嘅工作係為咗檢查水缸嗰個聞掣老化嘅情況，跟住睇落去。涉及
19 日後時間更換啲配件嘅，係咪？

20 林文欣先生：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：你話你嘅工作唔涉及消防水泵掣嘅裝置嘅維修，係咪？

22 林文欣先生：唔。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問你嘅係，如果你睇咗呢段，我想問下你水缸漏水嘅問題，因為你
24 到最尾你話，你喺工作期間，第 5 段最尾嗰行，「並有收到有涉及水缸漏水或天台
25 滲漏嘅任何投訴嘅」，見到嘛？

26 林文欣先生：見到。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果有——因為你係工程主管，你一定知嘅，係咪？

28 林文欣先生：呢單嘢其實我唔知個啲，其實有滲漏啲啲我唔知。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果有人投訴，你就一定知，係咪？

30 林文欣先生：係。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果有——你嘅意思係如果有人投訴，你就未必一定知，係咪？

32 林文欣先生：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你或者你嘅師傅會唔會定期上天台檢查個水缸有冇漏水？

34 林文欣先生：冇個啲。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇㗎？咁漏水你哋會唔會知？定係你哋都唔知？

36 林文欣先生：唔係，通常如果有呢啲咁嘅投訴或者——就佢哋會——譬如保安員，好簡單，就有

--譬如舉個例有客打嚟「喂，我邊度邊度有事」，咁保安員咪去開維修單去了解，咁了解完，跟住就會 pass 咗畀工程部，佢開維修單畀師傅去睇，如果真係屬實嘅，咁我兩位師傅會話番畀我聽，究竟係咪真係有事，我先知道有件咁嘅事咁樣。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你自己唔會去巡？

林文欣先生：我係一個文職嚟㗎嘛，係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：得，我想問你就係，如果天台嘅水缸，食水缸也好、消防水缸也好，真係有漏水嘅情況，其實有巡邏嘅保安可能會睇到，你哋啲師傅應該都會睇到嘅，咁講法同唔同意？

林文欣先生：都可以嘅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。而你嘅理解就係，即係唔計你離開咗一段時間，喺你離開前、離開後，你都有收過有關水缸漏水呢個投訴，係咪？

林文欣先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：至於天台滲漏嘅問題，你知唔知道其實係有頂層嘅住戶投訴過天花滲水？

林文欣先生：我唔知。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我畀你睇一睇一份文件，C1-2/1208，你見到呢份文件係報（English Spoken）嘅文件「公眾責任險意外報告書」，你有冇見過呢啲文件？

林文欣先生：冇。

杜淦堃資深大律師：所以可能你唔知。

林文欣先生：因為呢 part 嘢...

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔係你搞？

林文欣先生：...唔係我搞，係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我想你幫一幫我就係，你去 1211 頁嗰度，似乎就係有啲住戶係喺--住喺 31 樓嘅住戶係投訴過，係話有滲水嘅情況嘅，文件似乎係咁講，係咪？

林文欣先生：唔。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係當時就有通知到你，咁講準唔準確？

林文欣先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係。而呢個係即係常識嘅問題，31 樓嘅住戶可能屋企有天花有滲水，呢個就唔等於喺天台嘅水缸有漏水嘅，同意嘛？

林文欣先生：同意。

杜淦堃資深大律師：佢滲水有好多--可能有好多...

林文欣先生：好多原因嘅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：冇錯。我想同你講嘅，就係因為可能你有為意，根據宏泰消防嘅黃健華先生喺佢作供，嚟到委員會作供嘅時候，佢就話有人指示佢水缸出現滲水嘅問題，佢要去檢查，即係個消防水缸。佢哋嘅年檢都睇唔到有消防水缸滲水嘅問題。佢哋

- 1 年檢睇到有啲咩嘢問題，你應該會知道，係咪？
- 2 林文欣先生：佢有--如果有，佢有個（English Spoken），咁我先見到。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，所以理論上高亦都係，如果佢呢個講法同你嘅認知應該都係吻合，
- 4 因為佢話佢有曾--佢都有--自己有檢查到有問題，所以亦都有報過畀你，咁講啱唔
- 5 啱？
- 6 林文欣先生：啱。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅供詞第 10 段睇番，你話喺大概 2025 年 3 月左右，有部分嘅水掣
- 8 可能已經老化，你見到？
- 9 林文欣先生：唔。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係宏業講嘅，係咪？
- 11 林文欣先生：係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：我見到，我諗我哋可以快少少處理個問題，你見到你有啲--如果睇下呢
- 13 頁嘅最低，你見到有啲註腳嘅，咁就引用一啲文件嘅。啲文件係其實一啲會議紀錄
- 14 嚟嘅，但係你就有親身去參加有關嘅會議，呢個你可唔可以--你知唔知？
- 15 林文欣先生：唔係好明。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：啲註腳--呢份你嘅證人供詞嚟㗎嘛，係咪？
- 17 林文欣先生：係。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢啲註腳話「詳見文件 7.2、7.26」，你有睇過啲啲文件？
- 19 林文欣先生：我有㗎。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有呀？有冇人畀過你睇？你諗清楚。畀你睇一睇。
- 21 林文欣先生：哦。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：H1-3/6074 頁，你如果睇一睇呢份文件嘅一開始第 1 頁，或者畀佢睇
- 23 睇。呢啲係一啲大廈維修工程摘要嚟嘅，似乎你就有參加呢啲會議嘅？
- 24 林文欣先生：冇，冇，我有印象，我直頭有睇過添，呢份。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇睇過。
- 26 林文欣先生：係。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：點都好，呢個係你嘅供詞，裏面就引用咗一啲文件，咁你而家同我哋講
- 28 你有睇過。但係以你嘅理解，我想問一問你就係，因為你呢一段提到呢個「宏業指
- 29 有部分水掣可能已經老化嘅問題」，就呢一方面，其實你知唔知㗎咁？你有睇過呢
- 30 啲文件。
- 31 林文欣先生：冇睇過，但係點解我知，就係皆因而家話水掣嘅問題，就係駐場經理同我講，
- 32 要我（English Spoken）嘅。咁之後就係獨立就有啲要更換閘掣嘅，咁嘅情
- 33 況。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：你所指嘅呢啲水掣係消防缸嗰個閘掣，係咪？
- 35 林文欣先生：唔係。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：係咩嘢閘掣？

- 1 林文欣先生：係食水--總之有--見到有閘掣有老化嘅就要更換。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你記憶係呢啲唔涉及消防缸掣？消防缸嘅水掣？
- 3 林文欣先生：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：係食水掣，你嘅記憶係？
- 5 林文欣先生：水掣，總之係，有--即係閘掣。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，咁有幾個消防缸嘅啫？
- 7 林文欣先生：係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：我知道有鹹水缸、食水缸、消防缸。
- 9 林文欣先生：係。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：你而家講緊呢個閘掣係咩嘢缸？
- 11 林文欣先生：佢--我淨係知呢單嘢講老化掣就係見到即係有水掣有老化嘅就要更換。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。咁你知唔知道嗰啲水掣係連接邊個缸？你知定唔知？
- 13 林文欣先生：知，知，知。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，唔知唔使估嘅，冇問題嘅。
- 15 林文欣先生：係，得。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你可唔可以話畀我哋知？
- 17 林文欣先生：我見到就係食水同埋沖廁水。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你嘅證人供詞裏面，第二個註腳講咗有文件 7.21 第 14 項，我想
- 19 你睇一睇 6077 頁，第 14 項，你有睇過呢份文件，係咪？
- 20 林文欣先生：冇，冇。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：冇，但係你證供有引用。你睇埋第 12 段--第 12 項。你而家睇完，你
- 22 知道呢度提及嘅係話宏業會先進行消防水缸嗰個防水工程，為期一個半月，係咪？
- 23 林文欣先生：唔。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢都係咁講呢個項目唔會影響...（聽不清）安全計劃嘅資助，在未完
- 25 成批盪前都可以更換呢個炮筒喉，鴻毅表示目前炮筒喉沒有發現問題。跟住你睇下
- 26 第 14 項，雖然你未睇過，你而家睇番知道講緊咩嘢？
- 27 林文欣先生：我知。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，你繼續睇落去，呢份文件。呢度一路都係施工要做嘅地方，係咪？
- 29 呢啲文件你平時會睇，係咪？
- 30 林文欣先生：冇。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你平時唔睇嘅？
- 32 林文欣先生：冇睇過。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，睇番上高第 12 同第 14。咁你有睇過裏面講嘅事情，有冇人向你報
- 34 告或者你知唔知㗎？
- 35 林文欣先生：我唔知呢個，就係我頭先解釋番點解我要換嗰啲老化閘掣，就係經理 pass 咗
- 36 畀我，叫我（English Spoken）嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到呢份文件，你睇番抬頭就知道時間，第 1 頁，呢個係 3 月嘅情
2 況，你未走㗎嘛，係咪？
- 3 林文欣先生：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁所以嗰陣決定去更換，去做呢啲工程你應該知道，係咪？有人同你講
5 番，頭先你所講。
- 6 林文欣先生：我係返嚟先知個㗎。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係 3 月嗰陣你有處理嘅？
- 8 林文欣先生：冇㗎。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁返嚟嗰陣，你而家喺證人供詞講，你喺 11 月左右，你就知道呢個工
10 程有間叫駿昇嘅公司中咗標，係咪？
- 11 林文欣先生：係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁樣講㗎唔㗎？因為呢啲工程唔係包括喺大維修嘅項目之內嘅，所以要
13 分開招標，分開做，係咪？
- 14 林文欣先生：係。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：聽你咁講管理公司去招標搵人做呢啲工程，係喺你走咗嘅時候發生，係
16 咪？你有冇參與？
- 17 林文欣先生：呢個招標應該就好耐其實係，但係到我返嚟先知道話要做。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你話「呢個招標好耐」，你咩嘢意思？
- 19 林文欣先生：呢個招標係我未走之前就有招標嘅。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你走之前知唔知道駿昇中咗？
- 21 林文欣先生：唔知。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以處理嗰個招標嘅時候你喺度嘅，即係準備個招標？
- 23 林文欣先生：招標係我做嘅。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你做嘅？
- 25 林文欣先生：係，到我走咗，我都未知係邊個中標嘅，完全都唔知。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：返到嚟就知？
- 27 林文欣先生：返到嚟就知道有結果話要做。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁駿昇你知唔知道個全名，呢間公司？
- 29 林文欣先生：而家抄唔到住。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以話到畀我知，你返到嚟就見到駿昇中咗標，咁呢個更換閘掣
31 嘅工程其實係幾時開始？你記唔記得？你返到嚟做未呀？
- 32 林文欣先生：幾時開始？略略有籌備嘅咁囉。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔係，你聽住我條問題。你返到嚟 11 月，你而家知道駿昇中咗，係
34 咪？
- 35 林文欣先生：我返嚟 10 月嘅。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁 11 月嘅時候，你話你知道駿昇中咗，係咪？

- 1 林文欣先生：唔，唔。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁嗰陣開始咗個工程未呀？
- 3 林文欣先生：未嘅。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：仲未開始。所以你返到嚟 11 月，你喺呢度提到 11 月左右，你喺當值期
- 5 間同埋中標嗰間駿昇去到天台檢測水缸，呢一個係仲未開始工程嘅檢測，係咪？
- 6 林文欣先生：唔係，佢中咗標，但係佢要上去睇下嗰個掣喺邊度嚟嘅。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：係囉，所以我咪話仲未開始個工程，係咪？
- 8 林文欣先生：未，未。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：你聽住我問題答會快啲㗎，好唔好？
- 10 林文欣先生：唔。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，我想問下你知唔知佢係幾時中標㗎？
- 12 林文欣先生：唔知。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：你走嗰陣 3 月，你返嚟 10 月。
- 14 林文欣先生：個招標，但係未 confirm 邊個做--未決定係邊間中㗎嘛。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：知唔知--你返到嚟睇唔睇到點解你走咗七個月，中間好似冇進展，你知
- 16 唔知呀？
- 17 林文欣先生：我唔知。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇問過返嚟，「喂，呢單嘢我走之前已經招標個囉㗎，呢啲同消防
- 19 有關嘅嘢點解七個月都好似冇事發生咁？淨係招標同中標。」有冇問過任何人？
- 20 林文欣先生：呢個唔一定係屬於消防掣個㗎。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。消唔消防我哋再講。
- 22 林文欣先生：好。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個工程你走之前已經招標，七個月之後返嚟都未開始工程，我想問下
- 24 你知唔知道嗰七個月發生咩嘢事呢？
- 25 林文欣先生：唔知。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係如果我想問你點解做得咁慢，你都唔會幫到我㗎，係咪？講唔到，
- 27 係咪？
- 28 林文欣先生：講唔到。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果真係要做呢個工程，要做幾耐？
- 30 林文欣先生：大概一個禮拜㗎，大概。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解我問你時間呢，因為我哋有一啲警方提供畀我哋嘅口供，我哋根據
- 32 警方提供嘅資料，我哋知道喺宏泰閣、宏建閣、宏新閣、宏道閣消防水泥工程嘅工
- 33 人有位吳日照先生，我畀你睇一睇佢畀警方嘅口供，C1-2/1191，第 8 段，佢咁
- 34 講嘅，你睇到喇，佢話喺 2025 年 10 月尾我完成宏泰閣、宏建閣消防水缸泥水方
- 35 面個維修，11 月頭完成咗宏道閣嘅消防缸水泥方面嘅維修，佢一直都係阿忠（譯
- 36 音）大約一星期前問佢進度，11 月 6 號阿忠就問佢，跟住佢就 send 咗啲圖片去

報告，跟住佢就話完成咗石屎、鋪磚、防水，但係消防缸並未能使用，因為還需要加裝水閘、浮波等裝置，而呢啲唔係水泥嘅工作，係水喉嘅工作，佢話唔知道完成咗整個防水缸後要通知消防，因為佢淨係負責水泥嗰一部分。你見到，係咪？

林文欣先生：唔。

杜淦堃資深大律師：即係話佢由 10 月尾到 11 月頭完成咗佢嗰部分嘅工作，但係跟住落嚟另外一啲嘅工序就未做好，你睇到，係咪？

林文欣先生：唔。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你知唔知道——而呢一 part 嘅工作有啲係駁昇做，而我哋睇到有啲可能係宏泰有份做嘅，你知唔知道呢件事？

林文欣先生：唔知。

杜淦堃資深大律師：知唔知，唔知就唔知。

林文欣先生：唔知。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係呢啲工作唔喺大維修工程裏面嘅一部分，係你哋去招標，你哋去處理，係咪？

林文欣先生：呢個如果整缸應該係建築部做個嘢。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔好理邊個部門，係唔係置邦做？係唔係你哋？

林文欣先生：呢個我唔清楚。

杜淦堃資深大律師：喂，你係宏福苑個工程主任，我而家問緊你個天台水缸嘅工程邊個做，你有理由唔知個嘢，啱唔啱？

林文欣先生：天台水缸如果你話維修，就係宏業。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係似乎駁昇嗰個招標係你哋去做，係咪？

林文欣先生：招標嗰個係換掣，唔係維修。

杜淦堃資深大律師：但係換掣同呢部分工序係相連，同唔同意？做完石屎工程先去做換掣，呢個講法你同唔同意？

林文欣先生：因為執修嗰 part 唔係我做嘅，唔係我負責。

杜淦堃資深大律師：咁邊個負責？

林文欣先生：建築部，宏業囉。

杜淦堃資深大律師：宏業嘅建築部負責？

林文欣先生：即係宏業，即係我哋大維修嗰個負責執修。我負責係水掣嗰 part 最重要。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我問多你一次，睇下你幫唔幫到我哋，好唔好？你啱啱所講水掣嗰 part 係你哋做嘅，啱唔啱？係咪呀？

林文欣先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：而似乎我哋睇到嘅證據顯示，呢個泥水工就話佢哋做完就會之後有啲水掣嘅工程，啱唔啱？

林文欣先生：啱。

杜淦堃資深大律師：而水掣嗰 part 係你哋負責，係咪？

- 1 林文欣先生：係。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：就唔關宏業事，係咪咁呀？
- 3 林文欣先生：可以咁講。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，你亦都確認咗負責去處理駿昇呢一樣嘢係唔關宏業事嘅，
- 5 咁你可唔可以講到係你哋去處理定係 Victory Fire（宏泰）去處理？
- 6 林文欣先生：換掣嗰個就係我哋管理處嘅。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你由 10 月尾到 11 月頭，似乎啲消防缸未用得，係好似等緊駿
- 8 昇做呢 part 工作，呢個係唔係你嘅理解？
- 9 林文欣先生：我個理解就係未到嗰 part，因為我未知泥水嗰邊幾時起貨？
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係泥水仲匠咪話起咗貨，到 11 月頭，你見唔見到啱啱？
- 11 林文欣先生：見到，見到。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁到時當——呢個同你嘅理解有冇出入定係你唔知？
- 13 林文欣先生：我唔知。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果做好你應該知，係咪？
- 15 林文欣先生：冇人通知我，我唔知個嗰，因為建築部嗰 part 唔係我對㗎嘛。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁應該邊個通知你？
- 17 林文欣先生：如果呢個通知應該如果最快就係黎經理會話我聽嘅。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係黎經理冇通知你，你嘅意思係？
- 19 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你同事黎經理？
- 21 林文欣先生：因為佢哋有開嗰個每個禮拜六嗰個工程會㗎嘛。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：我問多你一樣嘢，你講建築部，你指緊嘅係？
- 23 林文欣先生：宏業。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：宏業？
- 25 林文欣先生：係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係唔係你公司嘅一個部門，你講緊個外判商，係咪？
- 27 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我哋啱啱都確認咗，就講緊呢一部分嘅工程，換個閘掣唔關宏業
- 29 事，係咪？
- 30 林文欣先生：係。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你啱啱所講，你唔知道點解未換個閘掣呢個工程會開始，你而家畀我
- 32 哋嘅解釋，就係基本上你老細冇同你講，係唔係咁？
- 33 林文欣先生：係。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係工程呢樣嘢唔係你嘅責任㗎嘅咩？點解要等你老細同你講呢？你係
- 35 工程主任。
- 36 林文欣先生：唔係，我解釋畀你聽，因為嗰邊建築部，即係宏業做嘅嘢，佢哋每個禮拜六有

- 1 開，我有開㗎，所以我淨係做維修嗰 part，如果佢好快同我講，我唔知佢個進度
2 係幾多，冇人同我匯報。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我哋頭先唔係講咗——我哋而家講緊呢系列嘅工程應該唔關宏業事。
4 我哋而家水掣呢一度係你嘅責任？
- 5 林文欣先生：但係頭先我咪講過，整水缸個內膽係屬於建築部宏業負責。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你意思係做完冇人同你講，就有去跟進，係咪？
- 7 林文欣先生：係，係，如果嗰邊有同我講嘅，我即刻配合同佢換掣會係好快㗎。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你應該知道——你嗰陣都返咗嚟成個月，係咪？你 10 月頭返？中定
9 尾？
- 10 林文欣先生：10 月 8 號。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：10 月 8 號返，你返咗嚟成個月，你應該知道成個月呢個掣未換嘅，
12 係咪？
- 13 林文欣先生：我唔知個啲。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你有去問，因為冇人同你講，你就冇去問？
- 15 林文欣先生：係。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：而呢個係消防系統嘅一部分㗎，係咪？因為講緊消防水缸。
- 17 林文欣先生：嗰個唔係——個執修嗰度冇人同我講。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你睇下另外一份證供，另外一位泥水工程人員呂時龍先生，C1-
19 2/1179 頁，你睇番之前嗰頁，等你知道呢份文件係乜嘢。呢份係一個呂先生畀警
20 方嘅口供，你睇下佢第 4 段，佢話喺 2024 年 10 月，佢哋喺 H、G、F、A 座逐座
21 形式負責水泥結構修補工程，2025 年 4 月完成四座嘅水泥結構工程，你睇到，係
22 咪？呢四座即係宏志、宏盛、宏昌、宏仁，同唔同意？
- 23 林文欣先生：同意。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你睇下第 6 段。警方有進一步問佢點解啲工程未做完嘅，佢基本上講咗
25 三個原因，睇唔睇到？你睇睇呢個表，睇完話我知。
- 26 林文欣先生：等等。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：見唔見到？
- 28 林文欣先生：見到。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：幾樣嘢，第一樣有接駁位漏水嘅問題，係咪？
- 30 林文欣先生：唔。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁呢個係要——佢就話要等待更換一啲過牆喉，見唔見到？
- 32 林文欣先生：見到。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢 part 邊個負責？
- 34 林文欣先生：呢 part 就係嗰陣時我就知道係咩嘢呢，因為佢哋每禮拜六要開會。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢 part 邊個負責，你可唔可以答我？
- 36 林文欣先生：呢 part 係管理處嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你哋嘅責任，係咪？即係你公司嘅責任，係咪？同唔同意？
- 2 林文欣先生：同意。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住第二部再講，等待水喉師傅轉缸，第二個，即係而隻手隔離嗰度。
- 4 林文欣先生：唔。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個即係由食水缸抽水到消防水缸暫時做食水嗰樣嘢，你知唔知呢個問
- 6 題？
- 7 林文欣先生：呢個又係宏業做個嗎，呢個係。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個就係宏業做，係咪？
- 9 林文欣先生：係。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住下低，「完成防水及鋪瓦仔，等候水喉師傅轉缸」，呢個都係宏業
- 11 做，係咪？
- 12 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：再落去，你見到佢點講呀？未能完成嘅原因，以我所知當初大判同宏福
- 14 苑簽嘅合約中並唔包括換牆喉同埋水閘掣，要等佢哋開會，出錢批喇，搵其他公司
- 15 換，我哋先進行其他工程，例如鋪英泥其他，咁安排我同埋班散工做四座嘅打針工
- 16 程，打針工程即係將水泥注入牆身空心嘅地方。佢解釋咗之後仲有啲工序嘅，係
- 17 咪？你熟唔熟悉呢啲工序嘅流程？
- 18 林文欣先生：唔係好熟悉。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇去研究過？
- 20 林文欣先生：「打針」我略略知，知佢講乜，略略囉。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁講啱唔啱？如果我哋睇番呢啲文件，消防缸嗰啲泥水工程其實基本上
- 22 做完，啱唔啱？10 月尾、11 月頭一定完，有啲仲早啲添，係咪？同唔同意？
- 23 林文欣先生：同意。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：剩番落嚟未做完嘅工程係同一啲水喉有關嘅工程，係咪？
- 25 林文欣先生：係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係你哋置邦搵人去做嘅？
- 27 林文欣先生：過牆嗰啲係，即係位置係炮筒位嗰啲囉。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係你同意係你哋去做，係咪？而你哋冇及時去做其實係會影響到消防
- 29 缸可唔可以用得番嘅，同唔同意？
- 30 林文欣先生：但係嗰啲全部要開會，唔係話我哋...
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你答咗我條問題先。
- 32 林文欣先生：好。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果冇及時做，我唔先講邊個嘅錯，或者每人嘅錯唔引起幾多延誤，但
- 34 係及時去處理呢啲工程，置邦一定係有佢嘅角色嘅度，係咪？因為係你哋搵人做，
- 35 係咪？
- 36 林文欣先生：係。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，可能係一個適合嘅時間。

2 陸啟康法官：我哋休息十分鐘。

3

4 15 時 17 分聆訊押後

5 15 時 27 分聆訊恢復

6

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：林先生，我同事提醒咗我，我講嘢比較快，我要畀機會同畀時間你諗同
8 埋答，所以我慢啲問你幾條問題。第一件事，我想問下你嘅就係你喺 2025 年，你
9 咪走咗幾個月嘅，你喺離開咗公司再返嚟，係咪？

10 林文欣先生：係，冇錯。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。咁你走咗嗰段期間，你嗰啲工作係邊個去做，你知唔知？

12 林文欣先生：唔知。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：你走咗嗰幾個月，你完全唔知道邊個頂你呀你返咗嚟之後？

14 林文欣先生：我返嚟都係有人喺度俾我個 post 位。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你走咗之後，你嗰個位就一路懸空咗？

16 林文欣先生：係。

17 杜淦堃資深大律師：你原本嗰啲工作，據你個理解，邊個做咗呀，公司有搵第二個人頂替？

18 林文欣先生：因為我有同——黎經理冇同我講嘅。

19 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，但係你返嚟你睇番啲文件，你同啲同事交往，你一定知道，喂，走
20 咗呢幾個月，原本我做嗰啲嘢邊個做咗呀？你應該有個概念㗎，你幫唔幫到我㗎？

21 林文欣先生：我話你聽，我返嚟，我就知道之前就有一個做咗——頂咗我呢個位，有個姓馬
22 嘅，但係呢，佢做咗，我唔知佢做咗兩個月定三個月，佢又就走咗喇，咁變咗我返
23 嚟嗰陣時呢，我記得，我知道就係佢有兩個月定咩都係吉咗嘅。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，即係唔係你走嘅全段時間都有人頂嘅。

25 林文欣先生：係。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：只不過係臨返嚟之前嗰兩個月，因為姓馬嘅走咗，所以就吉咗？

27 林文欣先生：係呀，係呀。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，第二樣嘢我想同你講嘅就係似乎有個情況就係我哋同你講，駿昇又
29 好或者宏泰又好，邊一個承辦商去處理頭先我哋講嗰啲水閘掣嗰啲工程，似乎你走
30 咗幾個月係冇進展嘅，呢一樣嘢你同意嗎？

31 林文欣先生：同意。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，而你係唔知點解你走咗嗰幾個月冇人跟嘅，係咪呀？

33 林文欣先生：係。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，對你公道少少，我而家唔係話如果嗰幾個月好迅速咁去做，喺 11
35 月嘅時候，成個喉轆系統或者消防栓一定有番水，因為我哋見到有個情況就係有人
36 提議話轉番做——用個消防缸嚟做臨時嘅食水缸，咁再去做完第二啲工程，嗰個消防

1 缸已經運作番，你知道呢件事㗎嘛，係咪？

2 林文欣先生：略略知，但係唔係我開會嘛，我唔可以話——即係我話知道話係吓嘛。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你有聽過呢樣嘢㗎嘛，你略略知嘅意思係有人提過喇，詳情你唔知，
4 係咪？

5 林文欣先生：係。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁所以我同你講嘅就係，我而家唔係向你提出，話如果你唔喺度嗰幾個月
7 有人好迅速咁去處理，到 11 月 26 號就一定會做完，但係似乎你走咗嗰幾個月，
8 真係呢樣嘢，如果講得俗少少就好似嘆咗慢板咁，有人去跟進同埋好迅速咁處理，
9 呢個你同意嗎？

10 林文欣先生：同意。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，而呢個——其實呢啲工作我哋去睇，其實係影響到個消防系統，係
12 咪？

13 林文欣先生：唔。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：同意嗎？

15 林文欣先生：同意。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以其實任何影響消防系統嘅工作其實都唔應該等，係咪？

17 林文欣先生：係。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個有安全嘅風險，係咪？

19 林文欣先生：唔。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係即係我明你有幾個月唔喺度，但係似乎頂替你嘅同事又好、公司又
21 好，都有好好咁樣去迅速咁樣去督促有關嘅承辦商儘快咁樣做完呢個工程，係咪？

22 林文欣先生：係。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：就呢方面，我唔繼續問你。主席，喺我盤問緊頭先十零分鐘之前，
24 Victory Fire 宏泰啱啱提供咗啲新嘅文件，同我問緊林先生嘅嘢有關，所以對
25 佢公平起見，我啱咗呢一部分先，我處理咗其他問題先。林先生，我都再一次向你
26 強調，因為呢個係好緊要嘅嘢，我想大家都明白。我唔係話呢幾個月嘅耽誤一定影
27 響到 11 月 26 號嗰個消防系統可唔可以全面回復正常運作，你明唔明呀？

28 林文欣先生：唔。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我諗我哋大家都同意喺處理呢件事上高，似乎個態度同埋個效率都
30 有改善嘅空間，同意嗎？

31 林文欣先生：同意。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：我相信你今朝——你今朝有嚟聽㗎嘛，係咪？

33 林文欣先生：有。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都見到你嘅同事，嗰兩位師傅，李師傅同埋羅師傅畀證供，你知道佢
35 哋講過啲乜嘢，係咪？

36 林文欣先生：知道。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你自己都應該知道其實處理嗰啲消防系統，係要有消防系統裝置承辦商
2 至可以去關閉有關嘅係統，係咪？
- 3 林文欣先生：係。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢樣嘢，你點知㗎你自己？
- 5 林文欣先生：我嘅知識話我知。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有電工牌，作為一個有牌嘅電工呢一樣嘢都應該係喺你專業範疇裏面
7 嘅其中一部分，係咪？
- 8 林文欣先生：我自己識囉，因為我有了解過。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你唔係因為呢一個火警先了解喇？
- 10 林文欣先生：唔係。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：一路都知嘅？
- 12 林文欣先生：一路都知。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以其實喺制度上高，你哋應該係唔會容許你哋屋苑裏面嘅師傅自己去
14 鬥啲消防系統嘅，同唔同意？
- 15 林文欣先生：同意。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以你哋嘅習慣應該就係每一次有關於消防系統損壞嘅投訴，你哋都係
17 會搵承辦商去處理，係咪？
- 18 林文欣先生：係。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道--你今朝睇過，我哋全部喺度嘅人都睇過，我想慳番啲時間，
20 你都知道有三張工作單，係咪？你坐咗喺後面睇到喇？
- 21 林文欣先生：睇到。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你知道其中有工作單係要求去幫宏泰--宏業去放咗個消防缸嘅水，呢個
23 就導致咗嗰個消防喉轆系統嘅關閉，係咪？
- 24 林文欣先生：係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你亦都知道實際上發生咩嘢事？
- 26 林文欣先生：我知道。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：因為羅師傅唔清楚，...
- 28 林文欣先生：係喇。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：...問咗個刀掣，就會搞到個火警鐘個系統都熄咗，咁所以就問咗，係
30 咪？
- 31 林文欣先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，你返到嚟，10 月之後，你知唔知道有工程部嘅同事幫宏業
33 放水呢件事？
- 34 林文欣先生：唔知。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：出嗰啲 Job Order，嗰啲工作單你睇唔睇到㗎？
- 36 林文欣先生：我就冇去睇嗰啲嘅，如果--點解我有啲--譬如你--兩個師傅做咗唔得嘅嘢，

- 1 有困難佢會即刻同我講嘅。即係佢見到有啲維修單有古怪，佢 handle 唔到，佢會
2 話我聽。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係作為你係佢兩個嘅上司喇，係咪？
- 4 林文欣先生：唔。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢哋每日做咗啲咩嘢工程，你知唔知㗎？
- 6 林文欣先生：我咪講咗囉，如果佢有困難，佢會直接話我聽。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係佢有困難，你唔知，係咪？
- 8 林文欣先生：係。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁畀張咩嘢 Job Order 佢，都冇人會話你知同埋你唔會去睇，係咪？
- 10 林文欣先生：係。有困難啲啲囉，有困難佢會話我聽，有困難啲啲一般我都唔知㗎。
- 11 陸啟康法官：即係我諗好多人咁問，咁你做咩嘢㗎你？即係其實你工作唔係應該啲啲單係應
12 該經你㗎㗎？因為呢啲係工程單㗎㗎嘛？
- 13 林文欣先生：唔知，我知，佢一貫做法呢，個屋苑開維修單所有都係（English
14 Spoken）開啲啲單，唔係我，佢有投訴就去開單嘅啫，咁囉。
- 15 陸啟康法官：咁但係唔應該就算係管理處都係應該經你去——工程㗎㗎嘛，呢啲係。
- 16 林文欣先生：但係佢哋做法個流程係咁樣囉，譬如有啲真係好——好“kam”嘅啲啲，全部先
17 畀我㗎，去處理㗎。一般啲啲...
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：好“kam”即係好困難，係咪？
- 19 陸啟康法官：即係總之你係負責解決問題？
- 20 林文欣先生：係呀，係呀，係呀，係呀。
- 21 陸啟康法官：唔，明白。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋想了解個流程。
- 23 林文欣先生：我知，我知，我知，我話聲畀你聽我哋係咁做，唔係——唔係好似你覺得好似我
24 一個廢物咁，其實有乜嘢...
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔係，我哋有咁講。
- 26 林文欣先生：你聽我講，有乜嘢工程上出標，各樣那樣全部都係我做 paper 㗎，係嘞。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以我頭先咪講個去搵駿昇個出標個應該係你處理。
- 28 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你走咗就冇人處理，係咪？
- 30 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 31 陸啟康法官：對唔住，我明白你係有工作，不過我覺得有啲奇怪就係，頭先經過個工程嘅流
32 程係有經過你，我覺得有啲奇怪，請繼續。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都想問番你，喺個架構上高，其實成個宏福苑呢，做工程我哋知道有
34 呢兩位師傅，一個做電、一個做木，即係非電嘅工程，除咗佢兩個之外，係咪淨係
35 得你？
- 36 林文欣先生：我咪帶兩個師傅囉。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你帶佢兩--即係得你三個人嘅啫？
- 2 林文欣先生：係呀，係呀，係呀。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你，睇你幫唔幫到我哋，如果你唔知話你唔知。宏泰嘅水喉
- 4 工有個唐慶麟先生，佢嘅證人陳述書第 5 段，佢話喺 2025 年嘅 10 月 16 日，佢
- 5 發現咗宏仁、宏道、宏新嘅消防缸係冇水嘅，亦都係跟你查詢過嘅，你有冇印象？
- 6 林文欣先生：佢有略略咁講囉，但係我當時係管理處話畀我聽，就係掛咗牌嘅，就係咁囉。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢話打過個電話同你有過對話添，佢講嗰個電話係 6902，嗰個係咪你
- 8 電話？
- 9 林文欣先生：6902 係呀，係我個電話。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。你有冇印象呢個唐先生打過畀你同你講呢個問題？
- 11 林文欣先生：冇印象。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：睇番你證人供詞第 17 段，你話當日，火警當日大概 2 點，我哋見到...
- 13 林文欣先生：飯後，我飯後，唔。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，你話就同 Victory Fire 個鍾先生通電話，係咪呀？
- 15 林文欣先生：唔。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：就問佢係咪已經完成咗消防年檢嘅問題，做有關嘅維修同埋出埋張
- 17 FS251，係咪？
- 18 林文欣先生：係。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：而你嘅憶述就係當時佢同你講出唔到，因為水缸冇水，係咪？
- 20 林文欣先生：係。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：有冇提過--大家有冇提過消防鐘嗰個狀態？
- 22 林文欣先生：冇講。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你知唔知道個水缸係咪真係冇水嗰陣？
- 24 林文欣先生：係冇水呀，佢講咗畀你聽講--即係我--因為點解我憶述呢？就係嗰日我返嚟，
- 25 擺咗我張檯有張員工單嚟嘅，係宏泰嘅，我再--咦，做完我...（聽不清），我咪
- 26 追佢擺（English Spoken），但係佢同我講阿鍾生話「喂，你個水缸冇水，出
- 27 唔到住」咁囉。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你呢段裏面呢，你就話--你話--你講呢個電話，你話跟住最尾你話「當
- 29 時我才首次知道有關水源的情況」，即係喺呢個電話個對話嗰陣你先知嘅，係咪？
- 30 你睇番 17 段，你見唔見到你自已嘅口供？最後尾嗰句，隻手隔離嗰度？
- 31 林文欣先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你嗰陣先至知道水缸冇水呢個問題，係咪？
- 33 林文欣先生：唔。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：係咪呀？
- 35 林文欣先生：係。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係其實你應該晨早知道，你返咗嚟嗰幾月，你係應該知道消防水缸其

- 1 實做緊工程㗎嘛，係咪？
- 2 林文欣先生：但係我唔知係所有八座一齊冇晒咁嘛。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，因為冇人同你講，係咪？
- 4 林文欣先生：係。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁我想問下嘞，有個大維修有消防系統有關嘅工程，當時進行中，你知
- 6 道㗎？因為你知道有修葺呢個水缸嘅工程做緊，係咪？
- 7 林文欣先生：唔。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：你走之前已經處理相關嘅工程，係咪？
- 9 林文欣先生：我走嗰時未做呢啲工程。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：未做，未做，但係你走之前已經招緊標做嗰個同個水箱有關嘅工程喇
- 11 嘛，講緊駿昇嗰度，我哋頭先咪講㗎。
- 12 林文欣先生：閘掣囉，閘掣囉，閘掣。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：係囉，個閘掣係同嗰個水箱有關㗎嘛，係咪？嚟住㗎嘛。個閘掣搞唔
- 14 掂，個消防系統應該運作唔到㗎嘛，係咪呀？我諗我哋頭先都同意㗎呢一點，係咪
- 15 呀？
- 16 林文欣先生：係。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以換句話講，其實你一路呢幾個月，個消防系統未搞掂呢一樣嘢同埋
- 18 水缸冇水呢樣嘢，你應該係有個意識，你會意識到㗎，係咪？
- 19 林文欣先生：唔。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：同意嗎？
- 21 林文欣先生：同意。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。有關火警鐘系統嘅問題，都講㗎幾日嘞，大家都知嘞，據你理解係
- 23 咪都係咁呀？其實要熄個泵，唔使熄個刀掣，喺個紅色個板面度，嗰個 control
- 24 panel 上高，有兩個掣叫做（English Spoken），你知道呢樣嘢，係咪？
- 25 林文欣先生：知道，知道。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係換句話講你同意——你同唔同意其實要熄個泵而唔影響個火警警報系
- 27 統，即係警鐘係可以做到而唔熄個刀掣，呢樣嘢你知㗎嘛，係咪？
- 28 林文欣先生：知。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係羅師傅就唔知道呢一樣嘢？
- 30 林文欣先生：就係大鑊囉。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：係囉。咁...
- 32 陸啟康法官：所以個工作流程係應該經你㗎嘛，係咪呢？
- 33 林文欣先生：我知，但係我想講就係當日佢哋做嗰個我唔喺呢間公司咁嘛。
- 34 陸啟康法官：我明，我明。
- 35 林文欣先生：所以我就唔知件咁嘅嘢，如果畀我知，我唔畀佢咁做添喇。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，對你公道啲，因為嗰幾個月你唔喺度。

- 1 林文欣先生：係呀。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以如果你喺度嘅話，有機會...
- 3 林文欣先生：就唔會有個--發生呢件事嘞。
- 4 陸啟康法官：有機會可能你會察覺到。
- 5 林文欣先生：我制止...
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係返嚟都有人同你講熄咗個掣，係咪？
- 7 林文欣先生：冇呀，冇呀。
- 8 陸啟康法官：但係個流程就算你喺度都唔會經你㗎嘛，你明唔明呀？因為你其實可能管理處
- 9 開單畀羅師傅去做，應該係唔會經--呢樣我真係覺得有啲奇怪，就算你喺度，你都
- 10 未必察覺得到㗎，如果依呢個嘅工作流程。
- 11 林文欣先生：我咪講咗囉，主席，如果羅師傅或者李師傅有困難，佢即刻同我講，咁我或者
- 12 制止作事囉，即係佢做唔到，解決唔到就會搵我囉，咁樣囉。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果當時佢去問個消--如果佢哋當時有懷疑個消防系統係唔係佢哋可以
- 14 去熄個掣，佢哋係應該問你嘅，係咪？
- 15 林文欣先生：係呀，係呀，最慘就當時我唔喺度㗎嘛。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁我想問下你，主席問過流程嘅問題，其實工程有關嘅人得三個啫，你
- 17 同嗰兩位師傅。
- 18 林文欣先生：唔。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係佢兩個嘅上司，喺個流程上高點解可以落咗啲 Job Order，完全
- 20 係你唔知，同埋好似有關係，就咁夾咗喺個打卡位嗰度呢？正如羅師傅講。
- 21 林文欣先生：唔係，佢哋一貫做法個屋邨就係開維修單，有咩嘢整，有咩嘢整，就牽咗喺嗰
- 22 度，嗰度兩個師傅返是但一個，見到維修單就喺嗰度攞去做嘅啫，不嬲都係咁嘅。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，我明不嬲都係咁，所以我哋搞清楚個流程，就係可能出咗張單，師
- 24 傅攞咗，做埋你都係唔知嘅，如果佢哋有遇到困難，係咪咁呀？
- 25 林文欣先生：係。
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以呢個流程係咪有啲問題呢你覺得？
- 27 林文欣先生：如果出事呢就覺得係囉，如果一般有事咪唔係囉，即係佢哋係咁玩法，即係嗰
- 28 個流程係咁樣㗎嘛。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你火警當日嘅情況。11 月 26 號兩點半左右，你喺宏新閣
- 30 嘅，係咪？
- 31 林文欣先生：我敘述一次畀你聽，嗰日我打完電話畀鍾生話攞 FS251，跟住我就出去做嘢
- 32 嘞，我即刻去第三座我係檢查地下水泵房更換閘掣嗰啲位置嘅，我做咗下嘢突然間
- 33 呢...
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：停一停先，我諗你會講一段時間。你 10 月 8 號返嚟，係咪？
- 35 林文欣先生：係。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁點解你到 11 月 26 號先同鍾生講話要攞番有關嘅文件嘅？

- 1 林文欣先生：因為當天佢做完嗰個 order，全部執修完，扰喺我檯，就嗰日嘞。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係做完個 order...
- 3 林文欣先生：即係嗰啲執修嗰啲（English Spoken），做完滿意擺低喺我度，我要...
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁嗰個 order 係邊個做完㗎？
- 5 林文欣先生：宏泰做。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：宏泰做嘅。
- 7 林文欣先生：係嘞。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係宏泰有啲關於水--消防系統嘅...
- 9 林文欣先生：水喉同埋電嘅嗰兩 part 嘢，嗰兩 part 做晒嘞，跟住嗰日咁蹺就當日擺喺
- 10 度，就係嗰日嘞。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔㗎。咁你嗰日--所以你就嗰日先識去問佢，「喂，嗰 SDN 點呀？」
- 12 林文欣先生：係嘞，就係咁囉。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，你繼續講。
- 14 林文欣先生：繼續講，跟住我喺泵房做緊嘢，檢查啲閘掣，跟住大概兩點零鐘，差唔多喇，
- 15 時間我唔有 confirm。跟住我收到個邨經理打電話嚟「喂，好似有火㗎，睇下點解
- 16 有警鐘嘅？」叫我去檢查，我咪隨即又收到鄭小姐個電話，又係同一個嘢，我咪即
- 17 刻走出去泵房睇，咦，我見宏昌嗰度就開始有火，我想走去宏昌幫手嘅，但係去唔
- 18 到，太多人，又地盤工人，跟人主我唔好諗嘞，我即刻跑返去 A 座，去救下，睇下
- 19 有冇--欸，去到 A 座，我見到 break glass 就扑落去囉，咦，唔成功㗎，跟住
- 20 我去加壓房，即刻開門，咦，有個掣，...（聽不清）去開，即刻開番著番嘞。有
- 21 （English Spoken）響，跟住就去第二座，第二座同一個做法，扑 break
- 22 glass，開刀掣唔成功，跟住我又再去第三座，即係宏新閣，咁第三座又成功嘅。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：停一停先，即係你喺宏仁同宏道開得番，係咪？
- 24 林文欣先生：唔係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：Sorry，sorry。
- 26 林文欣先生：A 座 okay，B 座唔得，C 座得。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：Okay，明白。好，跟住我想問下你，你去完 C 座，之後點？
- 28 林文欣先生：我想去 D 座嘅，但係太勁啲火勢，阿 Sir 唔畀我去，所以我要退後。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：你去每一個泵房嘅時候，你係攞住抽鎖匙開定係根本上個泵房有鎖？
- 30 林文欣先生：我自己有鎖匙㗎嘛。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：我知，我知你自己有鎖匙。
- 32 林文欣先生：我去開。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：我頭先條問題係問你，你要唔要用你條鎖匙去開？
- 34 林文欣先生：要，要，要，要，要，要，要用鎖匙。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，即係你去嘅每一個泵房都有鎖嘅，係咪？
- 36 林文欣先生：有，有。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：得。跟住點？
- 2 林文欣先生：跟住咪第三座做完，跟住我想去第四座，去唔到嘞，我咪折返。跟住我再想去
- 3 走，跟住阿 Sir 搵我幫手，就去管理處印（English Spoken）囉。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住呢？
- 5 林文欣先生：跟住我印完（English Spoken），跟住問阿 Sir 仲有冇嘢要幫手，如果
- 6 冇，咁我咪大概 4 點走人，離開呢個屋苑，最後一個囉。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：鍾先生，宏泰鍾傑文佢就係咁講過嘅，你嗰日打過電話畀佢，係咪？3
- 8 點 10 分。
- 9 林文欣先生：我唔記得嘞，當時好緊張，就係我個人慌晒我都，真係唔記得，唔好意思。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係你唔記得你同佢有過對話？
- 11 林文欣先生：係，唔記得。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：消防嘅證據顯示火警當日有幾個加壓泵房係冇上鎖，宏仁、宏道、宏新
- 13 可以自由出入嘅。你知唔知點解？
- 14 林文欣先生：唔知。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：你去過嗰啲座數，你開咗啟動咗個裝置，你走你應該冇時間鎖番門，亦
- 16 都，係咪？
- 17 林文欣先生：我記得好似係，我趕住要救番--著番，多啲人--即係冇咁仔細，可能就係咁。
- 18 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，另外我想問你嘅嘢，就係嗰個一晚你同鍾先生有講過電話嘅，記唔
- 19 記得？火警之後，夜深。
- 20 林文欣先生：記得。
- 21 杜淦堃資深大律師：你問緊--當時佢就問你擺番啲啲（English Spoken），係咪？
- 22 林文欣先生：即係停水紙嗰張紙。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：你知咩嘢係（English Spoken）？
- 24 林文欣先生：嘎，我知。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：佢問你擺番（English Spoken）？
- 26 林文欣先生：係，係。但係嗰個唔係喺我度咁嘛，我提供唔到畀佢咁嘛。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：你聽住我條問題答，你一步一步嚟，好唔好？
- 28 林文欣先生：唔。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰晚你同佢講咗好耐，講咗成個鐘？
- 30 林文欣先生：唔。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，你記唔記得你交談嘅內容？
- 32 林文欣先生：圍繞就係問下嗰個--點樣擺啲啲 form 啲啲，因為我未 download 過啲啲
- 33 form 㗎嘛。
- 34 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係佢問你啲啲嘢已經係畀咗消防處個囉嗰，係咪？係，你同佢有傾過
- 35 呢個問題，係咪？
- 36 林文欣先生：消防處--唔係，我問下佢有冇咩嘢證書係關於我哋個場嘅證書佢有嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解你會問佢嘅？
- 2 林文欣先生：唔係，咁我睇下嗰啲證書睇下...
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：個（English Spoken）唔係佢入，你知唔知？
- 4 林文欣先生：我唔係好清楚㗎。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你當時清唔清楚有幾多個消防承建商？
- 6 林文欣先生：得佢咋嘛其實，我都係問佢咋嘛。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁中華有個（English Spoken），呢樣嘢你唔知嘅？
- 8 林文欣先生：我唔知嘅。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：我諗對你公道少少，你係處--同埋兩位師傅係處理日常嘅維修同埋一啲
- 10 嘅執漏嘅工作，係咪？可唔可以咁講？
- 11 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果一啲你哋去招標，你哋負責搵承判商做嘅，你哋就會去處理，係
- 13 咪？
- 14 林文欣先生：唔。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係大維修宏業嘅嘢，似乎聽你咁講，你哋就唔會去理啲細節，係咪？
- 16 林文欣先生：因為我唔係專責嗰個人去（English Spoken）㗎嘛。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外，我都想問一問你另外一個範疇嘅嘢，喺警察畀我哋嘅文件裏面，
- 18 我哋喺宏福苑管理處嘅電腦檢取咗一啲嘅文件，其中有啲喺你電腦嗰度嘅。我哋或
- 19 者--呢個應該係一個草稿嚟嘅，唔係出咗嘅信嚟嘅，但係關於啲業主簽名文件嘅事
- 20 情嚟嘅。
- 21 陸啟康法官：唔該，可唔可以畀個（English Spoken）我哋？
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：未有（English Spoken），因為呢個--唔好意思，主席，因為係我
- 23 哋啲發覺有呢啲文件未喺個 bundle 度，但係因為喺你嘅電腦--林先生嘅電腦嗰
- 24 度檢取，所以我睇下你幫唔幫到我哋？
- 25 林文欣先生：你講（English Spoken）定咩嘢先？
- 26 杜淦堃資深大律師：（English Spoken）嚟嘅，我哋唔知（English Spoken）定
- 27 （English Spoken），總之喺似乎係你個電腦嚟。
- 28 林文欣先生：哦。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係呢啲就同工程...
- 30 林文欣先生：呢啲唔關我事，呢啲。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，維修有關嘅事情。
- 32 林文欣先生：唔係好關係到。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：所以呢啲文件係咪你都有認知？
- 34 林文欣先生：冇，呢啲唔係我出嚟嘅。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。我想你明白一樣嘢，林先生，頭先有啲嘅問題可能係因為可能我
- 36 嘅問法，或者可能你嘅答案，可能會引起一啲尷尬，我哋唔係想羞辱你，但係我希

1 望你明白，喺個流程上高，大家都睇到可能係有一啲可以改善嘅空間，呢個你同意
2 㗎，相信？

3 林文欣先生：唔。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：你亦都會同意就係，可能就係呢啲流程上高嘅問題，衍生咗一啲影響到
5 今次火警警報系統個運作嘅問題出現咗，我相信呢個你都同意？

6 林文欣先生：唔。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋唔係想冒犯你，我亦都唔係話喺個制度裏面，你做咗一啲同你平時
8 做好唔同嘅嘢，但係似乎你哋個系統就真係影響到今次個火警警報系統個個關
9 閉，你明白我哋呢一點，係咪？

10 林文欣先生：唔。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：而正如你頭先所講，其實羅師傅係唔應該走去問咗個刀掣，係咪？

12 林文欣先生：係。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果個指示係畀你，你係唔會做嘅，係咪？

14 林文欣先生：一定唔會囉。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係正如主席所講，如果用番你哋個流程去做，就算你喺度，如果佢
16 冇問你，問咗佢都唔知——你都唔會知嘅，係咪？

17 林文欣先生：係㗎。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你唔會去 check 㗎嘛？

19 林文欣先生：因為你——有危險嘅嘢佢哋個個都畀我刮渣㗎嘛，佢覺得有問題，一定要搵我
20 㗎。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：我講得好聽啲，你把關，係咪？

22 林文欣先生：係。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我現階段有其他問題，但係基於因為今日下午先收到一啲文件係
24 Victory Fire 今日畀我哋嘅，我好可能要再麻煩林先生嘅。不過我諗咗呢個階
25 段可能畀其他涉事方問咗先，亦都有可能我有需要再勞煩佢，所以我哋睇下我哋今
26 晚睇完個情況。

27 陸啟康法官：其他涉事方有冇問題想提問？

28 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，我係會有啲問題嘅。

29 係，林先生，首先，我就——杜大律師就有問過你，就係關於一啲你係喺 3 月份
30 嘅時候，2025 年，你仲係喺宏福苑，因為你係 4 月 1 號先至離開，直至到去 10
31 月頭就再返番嚟宏福苑嘅。咁我想問一問番你，喺 3 月嘅時候，有其中一個嘅會議
32 嘅紀錄，咁就麻煩你就去一去——喺呢個 H1-3/第 6076 頁嘅，咁呢個就係 2025
33 年 3 月 15 號嘅大維修工程嘅進度會議，我知道，你頭先亦都講過你就冇去出席呢
34 一個會議，係應該就係置邦，就係黎經理同埋就應該係駱小姐就係去出席嘅，係
35 咪？

36 林文欣先生：唔。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係我哋如果跟住向下再睇一睇，可能我哋去番 6077 頁，咁 6077 頁
2 我哋可以睇到第 12 段嗰度，就頭先杜大律師同你講過，其實就係關於嗰個宏業，
3 就話佢會先進行呢個消防缸嘅防水工程，施工期就大約係個半月。咁我跟住就再想
4 你睇一睇，就係再之後 14 段嗰度，14 段就話「管理處就係表示，就係會喺嗰個開
5 會嘅再之後嗰個星期，就進行呢個水缸嗰個喉管嘅閘掣配件嘅招標報價」，見唔見
6 到？

7 林文欣先生：唔。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，剛才你就同委員會講，其實呢個招標就係你去處理嘅，係咪？

9 林文欣先生：唔。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁我想問，就係當時你去做呢個招標嘅時候，咁呢啲關於嗰個水缸
11 嗰個喉管嘅閘掣配件，咁呢個亦都係包括埋嗰個消防水缸裏面嘅一啲——嗰個喉管嘅
12 閘掣配件嘅，係咪？

13 林文欣先生：係。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：如果係咁，要做呢一方面嘅招標嘅時候，我想問，據你當時嘅理解，其
15 實要做呢一方面嘅招標或者要搵一啲嘅公司去做，係咪都要搵番一啲係即係叫做持
16 牌，或者係即係有一個——即係總之都係一個即係消防裝置嘅一個承辦商，佢哋係去
17 進行或者去處理呢方面嘅工序？

18 林文欣先生：水喉呢 part 就淨係水喉匠佢就可以㗎嘞。因為如果——點解我解釋，我理解就
19 係因為係做水喉嘅嘢，就搵番水喉嘅師傅做。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：呢個係你嘅理解？

21 林文欣先生：係。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，嘎，咁即係——所以當時你就有諗過話呢個會唔會係牽涉一個即係持
23 牌嘅承辦商，呢個你就——就唔係你嘅理解㗎嘅？

24 林文欣先生：唔。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係你當時，不是你嘅理解？

26 林文欣先生：係。

27 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁到到後來你就知道就係有一間叫駿昇嘅公司就係中咗標，如果咁
28 樣講，其實因為你嘅理解係唔需要搵一個持牌嘅承辦商嘅話，咁其實駿昇呢間公司
29 應該都唔係一個持牌嘅消防裝置嘅承辦商，我咁樣講正唔正確？

30 林文欣先生：正確。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。此外，你亦都知道其實係——起碼你就算未離開呢一個宏福苑嗰個管
32 理處之前，即係話喺去到 3 月尾嘅時候，其實你都應該知道宏業係準備就係做一啲
33 大廈上面嘅消防缸嘅工程，呢個你就已經知道，係咪？

34 林文欣先生：係。

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁到你 10 月頭返番去嘅時候，你就知道相關嘅工程仍然係繼續做
36 緊？

1 林文欣先生：相關工...

2 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係消防缸嘅工程係仲係做緊嘅？

3 林文欣先生：係。

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：係咪？好。而家我哋就知道就係--其實喺 WS2 裏面我哋都見到有兩間
5 嘅係叫做分判商，一間就係叫做--如果我哋喺呢一個--可能嗰個文件嘅 index 嘅
6 第 3 頁，我哋會睇到嘅，第 3 頁。咁可能我哋會睇到就係有一間我哋可能而家見到
7 個 index WS2，如果我哋去睇一睇第 3 頁，有兩間公司嘅，或者可能我直接講咗
8 個名先，第一間我哋就見到係一間叫做天雄工程有限公司。你見唔見到呢度有一個
9 叫天雄工程有限公司？

10 林文欣先生：有。

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：第二間就係太陽建設（亞洲）工程有限公司。呢兩間都係宏業就係有搵
12 咗呢兩間公司，就係分別地係對宏福苑其中嘅四座同埋另外嗰四座嘅天面嘅一啲嘅
13 消防水缸就進行呢個工程，呢個你當時你知唔知道宏業係搵咗呢兩間公司？

14 林文欣先生：我唔知。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：你唔知道嘅？

16 林文欣先生：係。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：如果我問你，實際上呢兩間公司其實佢哋係咪都唔係一啲嘅持牌或者註
18 冊嘅呢個消防裝置嘅承辦商，你會唔會都係你唔能夠作答，你有認知嘅呢？

19 林文欣先生：如果要，要 check 番囉，因為而家 check 唔到。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。即係但係如果你自己--而家我就咁問你，你就唔清楚？

21 林文欣先生：唔清楚。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：好。咁我亦都想問，就你喺 4 月 1 號至到應該就係話 10 月 8 號嘅時
23 候，你就唔喺呢個宏福苑，頭先你就有講過就話有一位姓馬嘅，係有段時間係頂替
24 你個位置，嗰個係馬先生，係咪？馬先生？

25 林文欣先生：係，係，係。

26 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係你就有係--即係無論係即係面對面或者係電話，或者通過任何嘅
27 方式，即係同佢做過任何嘅交接或者係問番佢，係你喺唔喺度嘅時候發生咩嘢事，
28 你就有做過嘅？

29 林文欣先生：冇㗎，未見過嘅從來。

30 孫靖乾資深大律師：未見過嘅，係。所以如果我問你當時，譬如頭先我哋講到嗰個工作單，
31 即係就係話叫羅師傅、李師傅就係去協助宏業去就針對嗰啲消防缸去做放水，其後
32 羅師傅亦都去過嗰個消防加壓泵房裏面就係門咗個刀掣等等，如果我問你，譬如話
33 馬先生當時佢知唔知道呢件事，或者係咪在場，咁我諗你都唔清楚嘅，係咪？

34 林文欣先生：唔知。

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。頭先有講過就話你 3 月份嘅時候，你都已經從可能一啲文件，又或
36 者可能你啲同事口中，你知道其實係宏業係打算係做嗰個消防缸嘅一啲工程。而頭

1 先杜大律師問你嘅時候，你都話你大概係知道佢哋諗住係將嗰個消防水缸就係做咗
2 一啲工序之後，就轉--臨時就轉嚟做嗰個食水缸，即係你話呢樣嘢你都係略略知
3 道，係咪？

4 林文欣先生：係。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁針對呢一樣嘢，頭先你所講就係話，你唯一當時知道宏福苑嘅有
6 持牌嘅一個消防裝置嘅承辦商就係宏泰，係咪？

7 林文欣先生：係。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：你就有知道話有其他，係咪？

9 林文欣先生：係。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁既然係咁，你有冇針對呢一啲佢哋準備做嘅消防工程，係去問番呢一
11 個宏泰，話佢哋會唔會參與，或者佢哋有冇啲咩嘢意見，咁樣做有冇問題等等？

12 林文欣先生：冇。

13 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇。然後我就會想問一問你，就係我想你睇一睇你嗰個證人供詞嘅第 17
14 段嘅，咁第 17 段，係，第 17 段，如果可能我哋--稍等。我哋要去到第 1217
15 頁，即係下一頁，咁可能我哋放大少少。呢一度你就睇最靚四行有咁樣講嘅「一般
16 來說」，你睇下見唔見到嗰個 FS251 嗰個字嘅後面，「一般來說」，你話宏泰
17 如果佢要提交一啲消防裝置同埋設備嘅證書，即係講緊嗰個 FS251，就會係一式兩
18 份，一份就會提交畀呢個消防，一份就會存放咗嗰個管理處嘅。咁呢度你就係講
19 緊，譬如如果宏泰佢係針對一啲消防裝置做任何嘅嘢，或者一啲年檢等等，即係總
20 之佢會有一個 FS251，你頭先講叫做 (English Spoken)，我想問一問你呢度
21 話嗰個一式兩份，可唔可以講畀我哋知，畀管理處嗰一份係會點樣畀管理處？

22 林文欣先生：通常佢寄返嚟，(English Spoken) 畀我。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：寄返嚟，(English Spoken) 畀你。即係其實佢都知道係應該係由
24 你去處理，所以佢直情可能係會抬頭畀你，林生？

25 林文欣先生：係。

26 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁你收到嗰個嘅有關嘅譬如話嗰個 FS251 呢啲咁嘅證書嘅時候，
27 咁你會點樣做？即係第一，你會唔會係即係都會睇一睇個內容？

28 林文欣先生：會睇下佢啲啲做晒未，okay 嘞，okay 咪我哋要存檔。

29 孫靖乾資深大律師：你會存檔嘅？

30 林文欣先生：唔。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，即係你係會係嗰一啲 (English Spoken) 存檔備份？

32 林文欣先生：(English Spoken)，要 (English Spoken)。

33 孫靖乾資深大律師：要 (English Spoken) 嘅？

34 林文欣先生：係。

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁會唔會係即係將佢可能都係發放畀其他嘅同事作為紀錄，有冇啲咁嘅
36 嘢？

- 1 林文欣先生：我都會通知經理。
- 2 孫靖乾資深大律師：你會通知經理...
- 3 林文欣先生：物業經理，黎經理。
- 4 孫靖乾資深大律師：黎經理。咁你係會畀一個 (English Spoken) 佢定係電郵畀佢定係
- 5 點？
- 6 林文欣先生：我會話畀佢聽擺喺邊度嘅咁樣。
- 7 孫靖乾資深大律師：擺喺邊度。
- 8 林文欣先生：係。
- 9 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以如果佢想睇，佢都可以知道邊度睇？
- 10 林文欣先生：擺嚟睇嘅，係。
- 11 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。喺你做嗰個存檔嗰個地方，有冇見過除咗係宏泰之外，係其他公
- 12 司，即係包括我哋而家見到呢個中華發展，所做嘅一啲關於消防裝置嘅任何嘅證
- 13 書，或者啲 (English Spoken)，有冇見過？
- 14 林文欣先生：冇。
- 15 孫靖乾資深大律師：冇嘅。
- 16 林文欣先生：我有見過囉。
- 17 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係話你做 (English Spoken) 嗰度就只係有嘅就係宏泰嘅一啲文
- 18 件？
- 19 林文欣先生：係，係。
- 20 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁喺火災之前，你有冇喺任何時候見過就係針對嗰個消防缸嘅一啲
- 21 工程，或者係由呢個中華發展佢所發出嘅一啲嘅——即係我哋叫做 (English
- 22 Spoken)，有冇見過？
- 23 林文欣先生：我有見過。
- 24 孫靖乾資深大律師：你本身有見過？
- 25 林文欣先生：我有見過。
- 26 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁頭先你作證嘅時候，你話你知道掛咗牌？
- 27 林文欣先生：呢個意思就係我喺管理處得知話掛咗牌嘅咁。
- 28 孫靖乾資深大律師：呢個係你幾時得知？
- 29 林文欣先生：我知道話維——呢個要執修，所以我就問下管理處得知嘅。
- 30 孫靖乾資深大律師：你知道要執修，可唔可以講清楚，你係知道係關於個水缸要執修？
- 31 林文欣先生：水缸，係。
- 32 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係應該你意思就係話，你 3 月份——即係 4 月 1 號你離開嘅時候，個
- 33 有關工程就尚未展開？
- 34 林文欣先生：未。
- 35 孫靖乾資深大律師：跟住到 10 月頭，你返番嚟，咁你就從管理處得知，佢就係仍然係針對
- 36 一啲嘅天台嘅消防水缸係進行緊一啲嘅工程，或者你叫做執修？

- 1 林文欣先生：係。
- 2 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁就係跟住管理處就有同事話畀你知，就已經向消防處掛咗牌？
- 3 林文欣先生：係。
- 4 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。你會唔會記得係邊位同事講？
- 5 林文欣先生：邊位同事講，我問過鄭主任。
- 6 孫靖乾資深大律師：你問過鄭主任。
- 7 林文欣先生：係。
- 8 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你作為即係工程部，咁你有冇問鄭主任即係第一，去攞番個文件嚟
- 9 睇一睇？
- 10 林文欣先生：當時我想問嘅，但係未有時間去問，但係我好強調佢哋話有掛牌嘅，咁樣同我
- 11 講，我都追問呢樣嘢嘅，佢話有嘅。
- 12 孫靖乾資深大律師：你想問，但係就未有時間問？
- 13 林文欣先生：未睇到，應該係話。
- 14 孫靖乾資深大律師：未睇到。
- 15 林文欣先生：佢哋會有嘅咁囉。
- 16 孫靖乾資深大律師：當時你有冇諗過去你平時做存檔個位置去睇下，會唔會已經有人係做咗
- 17 個存檔，定係話你已經知道其實有嘅？
- 18 林文欣先生：點樣有？係咩嘢有？
- 19 孫靖乾資深大律師：你話你有個地方，即係個（English Spoken），你係會去將一啲係
- 20 宏泰（Victory Fire）關於啲消防裝置可能係一啲嘅證書等等，你就會擺喺一個
- 21 位置，係咪？
- 22 林文欣先生：係。
- 23 孫靖乾資深大律師：你有幾個月唔喺度，你返番嚟嘅時候有冇試過去睇番個（English
- 24 Spoken）裏面，你唔喺度啲幾個月，有冇突然間多番啲文件？
- 25 林文欣先生：我未睇。
- 26 孫靖乾資深大律師：你直情未去到去睇嘅？
- 27 林文欣先生：係，未去睇，我臨走之前所有嘢都係（English Spoken）嘅，我要擺落啲
- 28 度，即係我做開都有（English Spoken）。
- 29 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以即係我理解個情況，就係你從鄭主任知道向消防處掛咗牌，你都想
- 30 問佢攞個 SDN 睇。不過就...
- 31 林文欣先生：未有機會攞嚟睇。
- 32 孫靖乾資深大律師：...未有機會去攞。
- 33 林文欣先生：係。
- 34 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你亦都未有機會就去睇番你平時存檔嘅個位置，去睇下裏面會唔會
- 35 有相關嘅文件，所以即係話直到火災發生嘅時候，你係從來冇睇過個 SDN 嘅？
- 36 林文欣先生：係。

1 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁我又想問下你，如果你話你都知道係掛咗牌嘅時候，當時有冇問番羅
2 師傅或者李師傅，即係你唔喺度嗰幾個月，針對嗰個工程以至或者掛牌等等嗰啲，
3 有冇啲咩嘢情況發生過，即係你有冇主動去問佢哋，就應該有，係咪？

4 林文欣先生：冇。

5 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁頭先講嗰個即係話你有做啲（English Spoken）存檔，其實因為
6 你都有機會去睇番，所以你應該都唔知道有冇人喺你離開咗公司嗰幾個月去負責呢
7 樣嘢，又或者有冇處理過，其實你都應該唔清楚㗎嘞？

8 林文欣先生：係。

9 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁跟住我就想你一個文件，就係喺呢一個--我哋有個英文嘅版本，其實
10 都係物管局去出嘅一個（English Spoken），嗰個頁碼就會係喺--我哋頭先都
11 睇過，就喺呢個 B2，B2/2625 頁就會有呢個文件。B2/2625 頁嗰個就係一個英
12 文嘅版本，但係主席，我哋而家有個中文嘅版本。

13 陸啟康法官：唔該。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁呢個文件我就想你就係去睇一睇，就係如果我哋個文件係去睇首先譬
15 如話第 2 頁先。第 2 頁就係嗰個背景嗰度有講，就話「持牌物業管理公司」，我諗
16 可能要去番之前嗰頁，之前嗰頁，係嘞。好，就係第 2 段嗰度，持牌物業管理公司
17 就係為其客戶物業提供一啲物業管理服務嘅時候，就會涉及到一啲公用部分嘅消防
18 裝置同設備，咁呢個就會包括譬如係消防栓同喉轆系統，火警嘅警報系統等等，見
19 唔見到？我就係想問你呢一個嘅文件，即係一個處理消防安全工作嘅一個《操守守
20 則》，你之前有冇見過呢份文件？

21 林文欣先生：我有。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：你有見過嘅？

23 林文欣先生：係。

24 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，唔緊要，我理解你有見過呢個文件。所以我都即係公道啲，但係即
25 係我想同你睇一睇可能文件裏面有兩三個地方，想睇下你對裏面一啲嘅內容，你會
26 唔會有任何認知，好唔好？咁可能我哋睇一睇--我哋不如就去睇一睇，就係直接
27 地，如果係咁我就同你睇一睇嗰個有關嘅守則，咁就應該係呢份文件，我睇下先，
28 一、二、三、四，第 6 頁嘅，就係我哋見到而家有啲係灰色咗嘅部分，第一個
29 A(1)，就係話係根據一啲消防嘅裝置同埋設備嘅規例，第 95B 章第 6(1)條，如
30 果有任何非註冊承辦商嘅人，就唔能夠喺任何嘅處所裏面去安裝呢個消防裝置或者
31 個設備，所以因此，就係持牌物管公司，即係譬如好似呢個置邦佢哋係需要去聘請
32 一啲註冊承辦商去安裝有關嗰個消防裝置同設備。呢個咁樣嘅規定，你當時應該
33 都有認知，係知道有啲咁樣嘅要求，係咪？

34 林文欣先生：係。

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：然後，跟住我哋睇一睇下一頁。下一頁，就我哋可能要再--最上面嗰度
36 先，最上面嗰度--可能要去番上面嗰一頁，上少少。即係我哋而家見到嗰個--可能

去到最上，要睇到呢個--再上少少。Okay。如果係咁，可能我哋喺 A(2) 嗰度，我哋就可以睇一睇，就係呢度就有講，就係話如果係同一啲註冊承辦商去訂立合約嘅時候，你跟住見最耐兩行就係話係要對該承辦商有關嘅工作係作出一啲適切嘅監察嘅，呢度你會唔會有認知，其實如果係有啲關於個消防裝置嘅承辦商進行任何工程嘅時候，其實作為物業管理公司係要對佢哋有一啲適當嘅監察，呢個你理唔理解係有個咁樣嘅責任，定你係唔清楚？

林文欣先生：我唔清楚嘅。

孫靖乾資深大律師：你唔清楚。實際上，如果喺嗰個大維修期間，佢哋做嘅一啲工程，即係無論係宏業或者去透過一啲其他嘅分判商去做，咁置邦有冇點樣去譬如話作出一啲嘅監察，呢個就唔係好清楚你本身？

林文欣先生：係。

孫靖乾資深大律師：跟住就再繼續睇埋 A(3) 嗰度，就係根據《消防（裝置及設備）規例》（第 95B 章）第 7(1) 條，任何非註冊承辦商嘅人，均不得保養、檢查同埋修理嗰個裝置喺任何處所內嘅任何消防裝置同埋設備，因此持牌物管公司就係一定要委聘註冊承辦商去保養、檢查或者修理物業公用部分嘅消防裝置同埋設備。呢個應該你都有認知？

林文欣先生：唔。

孫靖乾資深大律師：所以頭先你都講過話，如果當時假如有人同你講話係要你或者你下面嘅師傅係去協助呢一個宏業去做有關嗰個工程嘅話，即係消防水缸，以至入去嗰個加壓嘅消防泵房去問某啲掣，咁你就應該...

林文欣先生：一定制止佢嘅。

孫靖乾資深大律師：一定會制止？

林文欣先生：係。

孫靖乾資深大律師：呢度我淨係想補問，就係當時你喺 10 月份返番去嘅時候，據你當時嘅理解，你係唔係已經喺火災之前知道咗有一啲嘅掣係門咗，定你都係完全唔清楚？

林文欣先生：唔知。

孫靖乾資深大律師：即係就算譬如話做緊嗰個消防水缸嘅時候，即係唔好講總掣，會唔會譬如話有一啲叫做上水泵，即係喺嗰個普通嘅泵房裏面嘅一啲掣係門咗，你唔知道？

林文欣先生：係，我唔知。

孫靖乾資深大律師：以致嗰個加壓泵房裏面有任何嘅掣，包括嗰個（English Spoken），你其實都唔清楚？

林文欣先生：唔係，（English Spoken）我知道，個（English Spoken）我知嘅。

孫靖乾資深大律師：唔係，你知道個（English Spoken），但係你唔知道實際上加壓泵房裏面嘅情況你就唔知道？

林文欣先生：係。

孫靖乾資深大律師：明白。好，咁可能裏面仲有啲其他嘅條款，但係因為你有睇過呢個文

1 件，我就主要問你一啲重點，我跟住仲有少少問題要同你去澄清番嘅。咁就想麻煩
2 你睇一睇你嘅證人供詞，就喺呢個 WS2/1215 頁第 12 段。第 12 段裏面，1215
3 頁，我哋等一等，要去番 1215 頁。係嘞，呢度就係頭先杜大律師都有問過你，就
4 話你 11 段就講喺 25 年 11 月左右，就係知道中標嘅嗰間公司就駿昇，然後你亦
5 都係有去天台就視察下個水缸。我想問你去天台視察水缸嘅時候，當時你有冇去睇
6 下個水缸裏面有冇水㗎？

7 林文欣先生：我有睇，我淨係視察閘掣，我唔係睇...

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：明白。所以你就冇睇過水缸裏面？

9 林文欣先生：係，係。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以就好似頭先杜大律師講，其實你都去到火災當日，你問呢一個宏泰
11 就攞 (English Spoken)，佢話畀你知冇水㗎，咁你先至喺嗰陣時知道係冇水
12 嘅？

13 林文欣先生：係。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：12 段裏面，你話你喺檢查期間，就留意到連接消防水缸嘅喉管係鬆開
15 嘅，我就想問下，咁呢度你見到佢嗰個連接消防水缸喉鬆開，你有冇去即係同任何
16 人去跟進，特別係有冇就針對呢樣嘢去問過下宏泰嘅呢？

17 林文欣先生：冇。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁呢樣嘢仲有冇同其他管理處嘅同事去講或者話畀譬如你嘅經理或者主
19 任聽，你有冇講過？

20 林文欣先生：冇。冇。

21 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，咁我跟住就可能要睇睇你嘅第 17 段，去到 1216 頁，1216。呢個
22 就係頭先你講到喺火災當日，你見到有份完工紙，咁你就問呢個嘅宏泰就攞
23 (English Spoken)，再去到 1217，1217 你就話你打電話畀鍾先生，然後
24 就問佢宏泰幾時可以去提供嗰個 FS251，跟住鍾生話佢暫時唔能夠發出證書，原因
25 係水缸就係冇水嘅。我就係想問一問你，你話當時先第一次知道係水缸冇水，但係
26 據你作為工程部嗰個經驗嚟講，其實呢個水缸冇水，如果佢哋係維修緊一啲消防嘅
27 水缸工程，我就係想問下，呢一樣嘢係唔係正常或者唔尋常嘅呢？

28 林文欣先生：維修係正常嘅。

29 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係佢維修緊嘅時候嗰個水缸冇水，呢個都係正常嘅？

30 林文欣先生：維修係要停水做㗎嘛，但係問題上個時間，即係維修幾耐咁樣囉。

31 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係嗰個你就都唔係好清楚佢實際上做咗幾耐，因為你有幾個月時間唔
32 喺度，你亦都有問番嘅，係咪？

33 林文欣先生：係。

34 孫靖乾資深大律師：我淨係想問，當然即係對你公平啲，呢個係 26 號嘅時候發生，所以可
35 能你唔一定有機會再即係喺嗰一日即刻再跟進，但係直至到發生火災嘅時候，其實
36 你都應該唔知道有關嗰個消防水缸嘅工程係大概喺幾時會完工，或者幾時可以即係

1 有番水，有番所有嘅嘢回復正常，令到宏泰可以出到（English Spoken），即
2 係呢一度其實你都應該唔知道？

3 林文欣先生：係。

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，最後可能問多你一樣嘢，就係純粹關於個大廈嘅消防裝置，我想問
5 下，即係據你所知，無論係工程部或者係管理處，有冇話有特別一啲嘅做法或者措
6 施係會針對消防裝置，即係會有一啲即係耐唔耐或者係定期會去睇一睇佢哋表面有
7 冇損壞等等，定係話其實你哋主要都係倚賴番個宏泰，個情況係點樣樣？

8 林文欣先生：保養商都係，保養商跟進嘅都係。

9 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁宏泰據你所知，有冇話係幾--除咗係年檢之外，即係中間個時間有
10 冇會每隔三個月等等，即係每隔一段時間嚟睇睇個消防裝置嘅情況，有冇㗎？

11 林文欣先生：有，季檢咁嘛，做季檢咪有囉。

12 孫靖乾資深大律師：做季檢嘅？

13 林文欣先生：係，係。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係我哋從宏泰一啲證人嘅證供，似乎佢哋就好似話除咗個 2025 年
15 3 月做過年檢之後，佢話去到火災嘅時候，其實係冇做過呢個季檢，即係定係你其
16 實完全唔知道呢？

17 林文欣先生：我唔知。

18 孫靖乾資深大律師：你唔知道？

19 林文欣先生：係。

20 孫靖乾資深大律師：即係你假設佢哋應該有做季檢，但係實際上有冇做到其實你都唔知道
21 嘅？

22 林文欣先生：係。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，我想可能有好少時間我 check 一 check，應該我就有其他問
24 題，但係 double check 一 check。係，我有其他問題。

25 陸啟康法官：除咗置--係。

26

27 林樂夫大律師：主席，我哋 Victory Fire 會有啲問題問證人嘅，同埋...

28 陸啟康法官：你會問幾耐嘅？

29 林樂夫大律師：唔好意思，問...

30 陸啟康法官：問幾耐？

31 林樂夫大律師：問二十至三十分鐘嘅。

32 陸啟康法官：後面。

33 李峯琦：係，主席，係，我有啲問題想問林先生嘅，咁就五分鐘會問完，不如今天問埋，好
34 唔好？

35 陸啟康法官：不如你而家問先。

36 李峯琦：林生，你好，我係代表幾位居民嘅，有啲問題想問你嘅。頭先杜大律師喺問你嘅時

1 候，最後階段係畀咗一份通告你，話關於嗰啲核實業主簽名嘅通告，畀咗份文件你
2 睇嘅，你有冇印象？

3 林文欣先生：核實？

4 李峯琦：頭先杜大律師最後畀咗份文件你睇嘅，有冇印象？不如可唔可以協助我擺番上去。

5 林文欣先生：呢份唔係我處理個嘢，唔好意思。

6 李峯琦：因為我另外就想畀一啲會議紀錄你睇，咁就係睇下可唔可以協助你回憶番個記憶
7 嘅。主席，咁個會議紀錄我而家會擺上嚟，就唔係個 bundle 入面嘅，因為係咁
8 由呢份文件引申出嚟嘅問題，稍候我會再畀番委員會嘅律師，不過我而家會擺咗上
9 嚟先。

10 陸啟康法官：我諗其實咁嘅做法，因為我而家紀錄就唔知你寫邊份嘅，咁其實就（English
11 Spoken）咗（English Spoken）會好少少嘅。

12 李峯琦：都可以，不如我而家擺上...

13 陸啟康法官：我有一個 number，你可以臨尾擺番個 bundle 入面。請你呢個 mark 1
14 先，好唔好？即係 IC-1。

15 李峯琦：林先生。主席，係右邊嗰份，係一份會議紀錄嚟嘅，就係 2021 年 8 月 9 號，呢份
16 MFI-1。林先生...

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，唔好意思，我打斷一下。因為我留意到如果真係有一啲新嘅文
18 件，我喺度諗緊即係會唔會比較好嘅做法，就係會唔會係可能首先即係提供畀涉事
19 方佢哋都睇一睇，咁然後可能聽日我哋先至進行即係針對呢個問題。我亦都留意
20 到而家嘅時間都四點半，或者公平起見，或者我哋都會想睇一睇，咁然後跟住先
21 至進行發問，我唔知道呢個會唔會係更加好嘅一個做法。

22 陸啟康法官：有冇反對？

23 李峯琦：冇反對，不過其實我問個係關於--不如聽日先問。

24 陸啟康法官：咁樣嘅話，就我哋會...

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢份...

26 陸啟康法官：係。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢份文件應該係文件夾裏面係有嘅。

28 陸啟康法官：咁我諗無論點都好...

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：無論點都好，如果林大律師要半個鍾嘅，可能都要到聽日。

30 陸啟康法官：咁聽日--我哋其實剩番...

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：一位證人，嗰個證人會耐少少嘅，但係應該聽日都會做得完，所以聽日
32 應該會用晒全日或者大部分時間係 ISS 嘅證人。

33 陸啟康法官：Okay，好。如果係咁嘅話，就我哋會係明天。林生，我哋會係明天 10 點鐘繼
34 續，請你聽日再返嚟。我今朝嘅呼籲，我係繼續重申個呼籲，內容我唔再重複。我
35 哋聽日 10 點鐘返嚟，多謝。

36

- 1 16 時 31 分聆訊押後
- 2 (聆訊將於 2026 年 4 月 2 日 10 時 00 分繼續)

就大埔宏福苑火災成立的獨立委員會

聽證會

高等法院原訟法庭陸啟康法官
陳健波議員
歐陽伯權博士

日期：
第五天
2026年3月30日

俞匡庭大律師, 李澍桓大律師, 杜淦堃資深大律師, 馮天榮大律師,
張天風大律師及李俊軒大律師代表獨立委員會

許偉強資深大律師, 何卓衡大律師及楊志聰大律師代表置邦興業有限公司

卓元暢大律師, 孫靖乾資深大律師及劉逸冲大律師代表政府

林樂夫大律師代表宏泰消防工程有限公司

律政司代表

呂世杰資深大律師及阮文躍大律師代表市區重建局

譚俊傑大律師及李峰琦大律師代表宏福苑居民

競爭事務委員會代表

合安管理有限公司代表律師

以下內容乃聆訊數碼錄音謄本

10 時 00 分聆訊恢復

10 時 01 分宏福苑居民證人葉家駒先生開始作供

杜淦堃資深大律師：係，主席、兩位委員，今日我哋會繼續有幾位元宏福苑嘅居民，首先會嚟協助我哋嘅，第一位係葉家駒先生。早晨，葉先生。

葉家駒先生：早晨。

杜淦堃資深大律師：葉先生，首先可唔可以麻煩你企一企起身讀出你前面嘅聲明。

葉家駒先生：本人葉家駒聲明，本人所作嘅證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你，葉生。葉先生，我哋知道你之前都接受過一啲媒體嘅訪問。

葉家駒先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我諗可能在座有好多人都睇過或者接觸過，我哋亦都知道你太太不幸咁喺今次嘅火災裏面遇難，我哋知道呢個情況對你嚟講好困難，亦都特別多謝你喺呢個情況之下都嚟到幫助我哋。葉生，你嘅律師幫你做咗一份頗詳細嘅證人陳述書嘅。我想帶你去睇你證人陳述書裏面嘅一啲段落。

葉家駒先生：好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：睇下你有冇補充，同埋有冇啲咩你想講一講。

葉家駒先生：好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩將葉先生嘅證人陳述書展示出嚟。

陸啟康法官：係咪喺...（聽不清）

杜淦堃資深大律師：係，Bundle 2，O107--O107/1361。葉生喺 1-6 段，我哋慢慢掃落去就會睇到其實都係講述咗一啲你背景同埋你家庭嘅情況，我哋知道你住喺宏泰 1701 室？

葉家駒先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：而火警當日你係同你太太居住喺嗰個單位嘅？

葉家駒先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅幼子同你嘅媳婦都係住喺宏昌閣，佢哋住喺 607？

葉家駒先生：係，佢哋結咗婚之後搬咗出去，咁佢哋喺宏昌閣度買咗個單位。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你係邊一年搬去宏泰閣嗰個單位？

葉家駒先生：2003 年左右。

杜淦堃資深大律師：喺你講述咗背景之後，由第 7 段開始，我哋而家見到螢光幕就講出咗當時發現火警嘅經過，你提到你太太打開咗個窗就睇到宏昌閣起火，就呢一段你同你太太當時嘅對話，你可唔可以講畀我哋知當時嘅情況係點發生火警嘅時候？

1 葉家駒先生：其實嗰陣時我仲喺睡房嗰度瞓緊，咁我太太就淨係話「好似火燭㗎」咁，咁跟
2 住我就起身同佢一齊，我先睇一睇我哋自己屋企有冇嘢，然後佢聞到好大陣火嘅
3 味，因為我哋（English Spoken）嗰個窗推開之後就係望到宏昌閣，亦都望到
4 吐露港。咁佢打開個窗，就見到佢話嗰度好多煙，佢話畀我聽嗰度好似火燭，其實
5 喺嗰一刻佢都唔係好肯定究竟係唔係火燭，佢只係覺得嗰度係火燭。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：你哋之後就發覺㗎，其實宏昌閣個火勢好犀利，我哋見到第 8 段開始。
7 你可唔可以都講一講畀大家聽，你當時係留意到邊度著火？

8 葉家駒先生：我太太叫我落去睇究竟係咪真係火燭，咁我一落去嘅時候，我喺宏泰閣個大門
9 一出去，因為嗰陣時係有一個搭咗築棚嘅一個通道，所以我要行出個通道我先睇
10 到，個位置其實都幾近宏昌嘅，我見到係喺宏昌後邊嗰面有啲火好犀利，係--係喺
11 --喺嗰個時候我見到係喺宏昌後邊嗰度嘅火㗎嘅，嗰陣時我已經見到啲火係湧緊過
12 嚟，同埋嗰個高度係越嚟越高，火燒到，見到佢。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，你喺離開你個單位嗰陣，其實你睇唔到嗰個火警，係咪？

14 葉家駒先生：我係唔知道係火警嘅，因為喺嗰嗰陣時，我當係落街去了解下究竟發生咩嘢
15 事。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋喺閉路電視睇到，你係大概 1.0--3.0，我哋而家睇到，呢個係唔
17 係你㗎㗎？

18 葉家駒先生：係，係。

19 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，我哋見到 3：03 分你落咗嘅。

20 葉家駒先生：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後你提到你經過嗰個單車棚嗰度嘅，係咪？

22 葉家駒先生：嗰度係--嗰陣時係我已經--因為有警察開始話--佢話嗰度好多嘢跌落嚟開
23 始，佢話嗰度好危險，叫我哋離開嗰度去一個安全嘅地方。咁喺嗰陣時，我係行--
24 因為喺嗰度，我係褪番入去，經過單車棚行番出去㗎住，咁喺嗰陣我係已經係要打
25 電話畀我太太，我覺得係佢應該要走。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋亦都睇到喺 3 點 04 分宏昌閣個閉路電視見到呢個畫面，呢個相信
27 都你㗎嘅。

28 葉家駒先生：係。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住你喺你嘅證人陳述書第 8 段及之後，你描述嗰個火勢嘅。我哋去呢
30 度之前，基於啱啱打咗條片出嚟，我都想問一問你，我哋見到呢個影，你都同我哋
31 提過，你之前我哋喺呢個聽證會較早階段嘅時候播過呢條片嘅。

32 葉家駒先生：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係見到你自己？

34 葉家駒先生：係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：而家螢光幕見到係咪你？

36 葉家駒先生：係我㗎嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個就係你啱啱所講稍後你行過呢個位置？
- 2 葉家駒先生：係，我其實喺嗰陣時你會見到隔離嗰位（English Spoken）佢係開始趕我
- 3 走，其實佢嚟出面已經趕我走㗎嘞，佢要我離開個現場，佢話嗰度好危險。其實我
- 4 想返番上去都唔可以返上去。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你證人供詞提到你企咗喺一個位嗰度觀察個火勢嘅。
- 6 葉家駒先生：係。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想畀你睇一睇有一個地圖，A2/IC3，你講唔講到大概喺邊個位？
- 8 葉家駒先生：可以，我點指示到？
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：首先，你講畀我哋聽。
- 10 葉家駒先生：E 座呢個係宏泰。
- 11 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。
- 12 葉家駒先生：藍點就係我哋個出口，即係我哋所謂大門。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。
- 14 葉家駒先生：咁 F 座就宏昌。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。
- 16 葉家駒先生：咁我個位置應該藍點對出少少嗰度。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，呢度，係咪？
- 18 葉家駒先生：後番少少，係，差唔多。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，所以你第 8 段證人供詞裏面你講到你觀察火勢大概喺頭先你指出呢
- 20 個位，係咪？
- 21 葉家駒先生：係。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒。你 8 段嗰度形容你見到啲火屑從宏昌閣跌落地下，亦都燒著咗
- 23 地下嘅一啲物品嘅。
- 24 葉家駒先生：係。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以都就呢一段同我哋講一講你當時嘅觀察？
- 26 葉家駒先生：我嗰陣時見到啲火已經開始慢慢向住宏泰嘅呢個方向蔓延過嚟，亦都見到好
- 27 多火屑，嗰陣時見到，其實我見唔到啲係乜嘢嚟，但係見到好多——佢彈出嚟嘅時
- 28 候，跟住佢有條煙，有條煙咁嘅尾，係好明顯，咁佢周圍彈嘅，我見到有啲彈咗落
- 29 花叢，即係話呢度有條紅線呢個位置，下面呢度，下面。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：下面。
- 31 葉家駒先生：係嘞，係嘞，即係彈過嚟呢面花叢，另外有啲就彈咗過去 G 座嗰面，我見到佢
- 32 彈咗落個棚網嗰度嘅時候，係睇住啲棚網即時著火，而且個火勢係好大嘅。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你個證人供詞提到火屑係四圍亂彈。
- 34 葉家駒先生：係。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到佢彈咗去 G 座嗰度。
- 36 葉家駒先生：有。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：可唔可以話畀我哋知道嗰個高度大概係幾多？高層、中層、低層？
- 2 葉家駒先生：嗰度睇--我記憶嘅就係大概係 4 至 5 樓左右。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，除咗 G 座呢個位，你仲有冇見到彈去第二度？
- 4 葉家駒先生：草叢嗰面囉，同埋垃圾站。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：有冇見到燒著其他嘢？
- 6 葉家駒先生：有，草叢即時著火。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：草叢著咗火？
- 8 葉家駒先生：噏，同埋喺 F 座嗰個對住公路呢面佢有棵大樹，嗰棵大樹都著火。
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：邊個位呀大概嗰棵大樹？
- 10 葉家駒先生：唔係呢度，唔係呢度，過啲，我點講？個平面呢度，呢個係再通過嚟呢面，係
- 11 嘞，係嘞，係嘞，大概高少少。呢個平面呢個位。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個位？
- 13 葉家駒先生：唔係，呢面，下低，下低，係，呢個對出少少，係嘞，大概呢個位置。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你第 8 段亦都講到好快你就見到宏泰閣個正門當時係唔可以離開，係
- 15 咪？
- 16 葉家駒先生：係，因為我見到嗰棵樹著咗火之後，跟住就更加多嘅嘢跌咗落地下，喺嗰個時
- 17 候個地下係即時好似個火海咁樣，係好快啱，即係一個好短嘅時候就「馮」一聲成
- 18 個火海咁。咁而呢啲火係好快速咁嚟住呢個宏泰閣蔓延，亦都燒著咗宏泰出面嗰個
- 19 通道嗰啲棚網。其實喺呢個時候我已經退到後 D 座嗰個位置㗎嘞。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後你睇，如果我哋睇番你嘅證人供詞第 9 段，你描述到你同你太太嘅
- 21 對話嘅，當時。
- 22 葉家駒先生：係。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你嘗試打畀你太太喇。
- 24 葉家駒先生：呢個係第一次打電話㗎嘞，因為我見到嗰啲火已經蔓延得好快，燒到去宏泰閣
- 25 個出口，基本上我喺我嗰個角度見到係已經封住咗出口，係有可能喺嗰度行出去，
- 26 所以我再打電話畀佢，我叫佢唔好落嚟，因為落到嚟佢都出唔到去，我喺嗰個時
- 27 候，我覺得佢返屋企係最安全嘅。
- 28 杜淦堃資深大律師：你打畀太太嘅時候係幾多點？你知唔知？
- 29 葉家駒先生：呢一個我記憶應該係十幾分嘅。
- 30 杜淦堃資深大律師：你提供咗一張照片畀警察嘅，係喺第 6 個 Bundle，B5/47，Bundle
- 31 6/B5/47，係呢張，係咪？
- 32 葉家駒先生：係。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係你打完電話畀太太之後先影嘅，係咪，第二次？
- 34 葉家駒先生：呢個係我第二次打畀我太太之後影嘅，sorry，應該係我影完之後先打畀我太太，
- 35 因為我將呢張相係發咗去我哋家族群組，我其實想話畀我細仔聽，佢嗰度著火
- 36 火燭。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，我哋睇番你嘅證人供詞，你喺第 11 段開始就講述咗你太太捨身
2 救人個經過嘅，你提到你災後你同屋企人排隊攞津貼嘅時候，遇到同層 1706 嘅
3 鄰居同埋另外 1703 嘅鄰居，你可唔可以都講一講畀大家知個情況？

4 葉家駒先生：其實唔係我遇到 1703 嘅，係 1706 個陣時佢同我講，佢話最後見到我太太嘅
5 人應該係 03 嘅個家姐，佢話係佢喺東窗（譯音）個度見到家姐，家姐同佢講番，
6 當日我太太拍佢門叫佢走，其實呢個我係喺一個好偶然嘅機會，同埋事後先知道嘅
7 呢件事。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：你事後知道嗰位——你所講嗰位年輕女士係邊一位咁樣？

9 葉家駒先生：林小姐。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，林燕明小姐？

11 葉家駒先生：係。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：第 11 同 12 段好詳細咁講述咗你發現你太太救人個經過嘅，你會唔會想
13 讀一讀出嚟畀大家聽？

14 葉家駒先生：其實我淨係想講一樣嘢，我太太去拍門只係一個好普通，一個佢認為作為隔籬
15 鄰舍應該要有嘅一個舉動，我相信其實喺其他嘅街坊聽佢哋講番，佢哋都有做相同
16 嘅動作，喺我嚟講其實呢一個一個係好簡單、好普通，而一個一般人都會做嘅一個
17 動作。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺當日你除咗搵你太太之外，我相信你有同警方、同消防都有接觸過
19 嘅？有打過電話嘅？

20 葉家駒先生：有，我打咗警察個緊急熱線，唔知 18 咩嘢 999 個，我打咗好多次，亦都
21 報咗好多次我太太嘅資料、地址，其實喺報呢個警察緊急熱線之前，頭先喺段片見
22 到嘅嗰個（English Spoken），我係第一個同佢報嘅，佢亦都用佢身上面個個
23 對講機同我報咗上去，咁佢同我講，佢話「我已經報咗上去㗎嘞，你放心，有人會
24 救佢㗎嘞」。咁跟住我就離開㗎。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：葉生，你喺——慢慢。

26 葉家駒先生：冇事，冇事。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺 13 段打後，我哋見到 13、14、15 段，你就開始講述當時一啲施工
28 嘅情況嘅。

29 葉家駒先生：係。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋留意到其實你都講得好清楚，發泡膠遮窗嘅日子嘅。

31 葉家駒先生：係，因為我哋有影到相，嗰個日子我哋係憑影相嗰個資料記得番嘅。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你睇一睇有幾張相嘅，應該係由你同——或者你嘅家人拍攝嘅，
33 01/B1/63 頁開始。

34 葉家駒先生：係，呢個係我個仔個單位，呢個係一間房嚟嘅，呢個都係。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋一路睇 65 到 68 頁。

36 葉家駒先生：呢度喺我個面個單位嚟嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：係嘞，63、64 就係你仔仔宏昌 607 個度，係咪？
- 2 葉家駒先生：係。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：而 65 開始呢，就係你宏泰...
- 4 葉家駒先生：宏泰 1701，同埋有一張係 1702 嘅。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。所以你喺證人供詞 14 段中就提，你就話搭棚工程喺 7 月開始喇。
- 6 葉家駒先生：係。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住然之後，你亦都繼續講到喺 9 月 28 號，工人就將啲發泡膠板貼咗
- 8 喺你仔仔個住所個窗戶上高？
- 9 葉家駒先生：係。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：而就宏泰方面，你就講到搭棚工程係喺 2024 年 9 月開始。
- 11 葉家駒先生：係。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：而係喺 11 月 24 日貼上發泡膠板嘅。
- 13 葉家駒先生：係。
- 14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你知唔知道大約 2024 年 9 月到 10 月，有幾多座貼咗發泡膠板，你有
- 15 冇留意？
- 16 葉家駒先生：呢個我唔能夠好準確咁講到。
- 17 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，但係你仔仔個度就好清楚。
- 18 葉家駒先生：係，冇錯，因為佢住得比較低層，我估計佢咁上面個度應該都貼晒㗎嘞，因為
- 19 佢由上面做㗎。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係貼發泡膠板呢個工程係由上而下？
- 21 葉家駒先生：係。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你好清楚記得呢樣嘢嘅？
- 23 葉家駒先生：係。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：去你嘅證人供詞第 18 段，你呢度講到話你印象中，宏業嘅代表曾經話
- 25 畀你哋聽發泡膠板係喺你哋單位外牆附近打鑿嘅時候貼上係一個保護嘅作用，打鑿
- 26 完係會移走嘅，係咪呀？
- 27 葉家駒先生：係，佢哋係咁講過，呢一個只係一個臨時，喺佢哋打鑿嘅時候，為咗防止啲啲
- 28 碎石打爛我哋嘅玻璃而做嘅一個保護作用。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：你記唔記得呢個對話大概係幾時發生？貼咗未㗎個陣你個單位？
- 30 葉家駒先生：未，未。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：未，唔。你記唔記得係同邊個講嘅呢，呢番對話？
- 32 葉家駒先生：我記得應該就係工程會上面，宏業嘅人講嘅。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你幫唔幫到我哋大概係幾時？當時譬如你仔仔個單位貼咗未？
- 34 葉家駒先生：未，個陣時應該係未開始貼呢個發泡膠板嘅。
- 35 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住如果我哋去睇番 20 段，你就提到吸煙嘅問題。
- 36 葉家駒先生：係。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你一直都有投訴吸煙嘅問題，係咪？

2 葉家駒先生：唔，我嗰陣時已經有去參與佢哋嘅工程會，咁其實喺工程會嗰度好早嘅時候已
3 經開始有人投訴，亦都有討論過，咁其實呢個狀態下持續咗一段好長嘅時間，即係
4 話不斷都有人投訴，但係就好似不斷都持續。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道你嘅影咗啲相嘅。

6 葉家駒先生：係，我影咗一張。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果我哋睇番 Bundle 01/B4/70 頁。你自己影咗啲煙頭嘅相，呢個
8 喺邊度？

9 葉家駒先生：呢個係我（English Spoken）嗰個窗推開嗰個所謂窗尾上面，我係影到，
10 見到有支咁嘅煙仔，而呢一隻咁嘅煙，我覺得應該唔係我哋香港人會食嘅煙嘅。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後你有冇跟進你嘅投訴？

12 葉家駒先生：我喺工程會嘅時候交咗——即係我畀咗宏業嘅代表睇過，佢都覺得呢啲煙好似係
13 佢哋嘅工人嘅煙嘅，佢話會幫我跟進。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你投訴之後，喺工程期間，你覺得吸煙嘅問題有冇改善過？

15 葉家駒先生：冇，雖然我有見過，但係陸陸續續都有好多唔同嘅街坊都有講，亦都有提過，
16 我哋甚至乎喺夜晚有陣時落中央公園嗰度，大家都會攞嚟講嘅。

17 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個就係食煙嘅問題，之後你都提到棚網嘅問題，去番你證人供詞第 22
18 段，你提到喺颱風華加沙侵襲之後，有啲棚網受到損毀，你都講到有啲棚網係被更
19 換，你話留意到嗰個顏色有落差係咪，新舊嘅網？

20 葉家駒先生：係，係，嗰個顏色係相差好遠㗎。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，你提到新棚網係比較淺色？

22 葉家駒先生：淺色，同埋單薄，我感覺係好單薄，即係話嗰個棚網嘅網線，我睇落去同以前
23 棚網個網線係有咁粗嘅，係幼身啲㗎，個網眼都好似大啲嘅。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你亦都提到，你話之後有一次工程會議，你有出席到，你亦都有將呢件
25 事擺出嚟討論嘅，係咪？

26 葉家駒先生：嗰個唔算係討論，嗰個差唔多係工程會議完咗，我同 Gordon 講，我畀張相佢
27 睇，佢就係笑笑口，冇回應。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後據你所知，你或者你嘅街坊有冇更進呢件事？

29 葉家駒先生：呢個我唔清楚，我只係估計法團應該有跟進。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：你影咗張相畀 Gordon 睇嘅？

31 葉家駒先生：係。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺 01/B5/71 頁，呢張係你指嗰張相，係咪呀？

33 葉家駒先生：係。以前最早期落咗棚網，我係唔能夠清晰咁望到窗外風嘅景嘅，咁呢一張棚
34 網我可以睇到外面個形狀係乜嘢。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗頭先講到呢幾方面，就大維修嘅其他事情，你有冇一啲觀察或者就
36 嗰個火警風險同大家討論過或者作出過任何投訴？

1 葉家駒先生：就火警風險，我係冇作出過任何投訴嘅。但係對於大維修工程，我哋係有好多
2 意見同埋問題。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你第 25 段打後呢，你嘅證人陳述書你就提到開業主大會嘅一啲問
4 題。

5 葉家駒先生：係。

6 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果我哋睇 26 段，你首先就講授權票嘅問題。

7 葉家駒先生：唔。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：你提到你話發覺有大量嘅授權票就放咗入個投票箱，你哋呢啲授權票邊
9 度嚟就唔清楚嘅，呢一個問題喎——你可唔可以都講講畀我哋知，喺街坊或者居民之
10 間一啲嘅討論。

11 葉家駒先生：或者我咁樣講，喺成個業主大會嗰個有議程要議決嘅時候，一般嚟講親身出席
12 嘅業主就會係用身份證登記，然後就擺到一份所謂投票嘅嗰啲票，咁而授權票則
13 被授權嘅人係會有另外一條隊，喺嗰度亦都係要憑身份證去擺番佢所擁有嘅票，所
14 以換句話講，係每一個人喺進入會場之前其實都已經係擺咗啲票口㗎喇，然後先
15 再入會場嗰度喺現場投票。但係我哋見到嘅就係當喺投票嘅過程中——進行中，置邦
16 嗰啲人——職員佢哋會擺住一個透明嘅箱畀我哋將啲票攞入去。咁我哋見到嘅唔係一
17 個正常坐喺嗰度，或——就算佢係被授權嘅人，佢都應該係坐喺嗰度去投票，而我哋
18 見到嘅並唔係咁樣，係當個票箱差唔多我哋現場嘅人投晒票之後，佢搵上去台準備
19 點票嘅時候係有人喺嗰度攞落去嘅。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：而嗰個數量係多唔多？

21 葉家駒先生：好多，一疊。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺 27 段就提到曾經都被拒絕進入呢啲業主大會，係咪？

23 葉家駒先生：係。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：當時嘅情況係點？

25 葉家駒先生：嗰次我大概喺邊次，我唔記得喇，應該係對上我哋做呢個污水渠嘅時候，咁我
26 同太太係——因為佢 7 點鐘開始，咁我哋係 6 點接近 7 點鐘去到，其實喺嗰陣時，
27 我哋已經見到好多街坊係喺個社區會堂出面，嗰陣時個社區會堂佢個玻璃大門係
28 閉咗，佢話入面已經坐滿人喇，我哋唔能夠入去。其實喺嗰時候我哋都有鼓噪嘅，
29 我哋就係話點解我哋係業主唔入得，而咁我哋亦都——因為嗰個係玻璃門嚟，我哋係
30 可以喺出面望到入面嘅情況，我哋見到好多人其實我哋係唔識嘅。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢件事之後有冇人跟進過？

32 葉家駒先生：冇，因為其實可以咁樣講，當嗰啲需要議決嘅事項係比較重要啲嘅時候，好多
33 時候都係有咁嘅情況出現嘅。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：至於入唔到會場參加呢啲會議，除咗你本人之外，有冇聽過街坊——其他
35 街坊都有類似嘅情況？

36 葉家駒先生：有。當時其實喺我...

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：普唔普遍？

2 葉家駒先生：普唔普遍，因為我之後我哋都有再去嘞，我覺得其實呢啲咁樣嘅業主大會我哋
3 係起唔到咩嘢作用，因為就算我——即係除非我真係好早入咁去，如果唔係嘅話，我
4 其實根本入唔到去。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：接住落嚟，我想你睇一睇第 30 段，你講到——你提到就係喺 2024 年 1
6 月 28 日呢個特別業主大會之前，收唔收到報價呢個問題，即係知唔知個工程？

7 葉家駒先生：唔知嘅。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你係幾時先知道係要總工程價格同埋每戶嗰個要夾幾多錢？

9 葉家駒先生：係佢出——用律師出咗一封信通知我哋，話畀我哋聽係分幾多期，每期分幾多
10 錢，總數幾多錢，嗰陣時我哋先知嘅。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：根據法團嘅紀錄，如果我哋睇 G1/2/46/1506 頁，法團嘅紀錄就話到
12 鴻毅曾經喺 2023 年 12 月 19 日向每一戶派發咗呢個投標價格嘅總括一覽表嘅。

13 葉家駒先生：唔，我唔記得。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：而亦都提過就話，資料提到就話有五十七間承建商，投標資料喺 2024
15 年 1 月 15 至 17 日，亦都有喺會議室嗰度展示嘅。

16 葉家駒先生：呢個有可能，但係呢啲對於我哋嚟講係一啲資料，其實我哋係完全冇 idea 究
17 竟係咩嘢嚟。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：如果睇番你嘅證人供詞第 32 段開始，你就提到新管委會嘅問題。

19 葉家駒先生：係。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你提到舊管委會被罷免，新委員會上任，之後嘅情況係點樣樣，有冇改
21 善，你可唔可以解一解釋畀我哋聽？

22 葉家駒先生：喺新任——即係新管委會上任咗之後，係好多嘢係我哋可以參與到嗰個程度係大
23 咗嘅，咁喺我哋嗰陣時，大家都好著意同埋好關心大維修嘅事，咁所以亦都係因為
24 通過新任管委會，我哋先至可以攞到嗰份合約返屋企慢慢睇、慢慢研究。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：接下來你證人供詞就講到，喺 37 段開始你就有一個投訴就係話，你話
26 鴻毅喺工程會議上畀人嘅感覺係強烈偏袒宏業嘅。

27 葉家駒先生：係。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你提出咗兩個例子嘅，一個就係個外牆用料嘅爭議。

29 葉家駒先生：係。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外個例子就係嗰個窗眉嗰個問題，個鋼筋嘅問題。

31 葉家駒先生：係。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以略略咁講一講畀委員會聽？我知道你證人供詞都提咗，但係
33 如果你想解釋一下。

34 葉家駒先生：其實喺工程合約原本就係以紙皮石作為呢個外牆飾面，咁亦都係我哋本身座大
35 廈原本都係用紙皮石，咁喺舊法團，我用「舊法團」去形容，佢哋簽咗呢份合約之
36 後唔係好耐嘅時候，咁佢哋就同我哋講，當然，呢個我係聽番嚟嘅，話宏業同佢哋

1 講呢啲紙皮石已經停產咗，咁係要轉一隻叫做二四吋瓦仔。但係我哋就會覺得如果
2 一早停產咗，咁宏業又點可以有一個實際嘅報價出到嚟嘅？咁呢度 3 億 3 佢又憑乜
3 嘢去計算出嚟嘅？咁我哋係第一個質疑嚟嘅。

4 跟住宏業就佢哋自己就即刻出咗一個聲明，佢就話唔係佢哋話要去轉二四吋瓦
5 仔，亦都講咗並冇停產，佢話喺國內係有工廠可以幫佢哋起模重新做嘅。咁喺呢件
6 事上面，我哋已經係覺得法團有法團嘅講法，宏業有宏業嘅講法，咁到最後法團係
7 轉咗佢嘅講法，佢話係因為有啲業主想靚啲，所以要求轉二四吋瓦仔，咁呢個前後
8 不一嘅講法，我哋就已經覺得係好有問題㗎喇，咁最主要一樣嘢就係喺成個過程裏
9 面鴻毅所擔當嘅角色，佢係幫宏業係做晒一連串嘅所謂比較價錢，各方面嘅嘢，咁
10 喺佢個比較上面，我哋見得到嘅就係佢係將二四吋瓦仔講到非常之好，紙皮石係
11 一文不值。甚至乎佢畀咗我哋睇嘅報價，紙皮石嘅報價有三個，有晒品牌，有晒產
12 地，紙皮石報價得一個，冇品牌，冇產地。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：瓦仔三個，係咪？你個三個報價係瓦仔，係咪？

14 葉家駒先生：瓦仔，係，紙皮石得一個，冇品牌、冇產地。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，另外你都提出咗個窗眉嘅問題，你可唔可以都講一講？

16 葉家駒先生：係，窗眉嗰度，佢最——佢就話畀我哋聽，最初嗰度係牽涉到三樣嘢，係冷氣機
17 台、窗眉同埋窗扇，咁佢就同我哋講佢打鑿咗之後，佢發覺呢三個地方嘅兩邊都有
18 唔同程度嘅缺失，即係話短咗，佢話呢個短咗係原先喺起樓嘅時候就已經係咁㗎
19 喇，但係嗰個短咗嘅程度係各個單位都唔同嘅，咁當然佢咁樣講，亦都我知道法團
20 都曾經向呢個屋宇署問過，去呢個房委會問過，但係佢嗰陣時係講番出嚟係話，好
21 似即係佢 ICU 嗰陣時，我哋起樓嗰陣時 ICU 都未有嘅，所以佢都有辦法答我哋呢
22 個問題。咁喺呢度，佢係畀咗三個方案畀我哋去選擇，有一個就係由得佢，即係短
23 咗就短咗。但係佢就加咗一句「我哋會可能違反公契」。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係邊個同你講？

25 葉家駒先生：鴻毅佢做嗰個表出嚟嘅時候講嘅，佢話如果我哋咁做，有機會違反公契。另外
26 第二個就係補番佢，即係短咗幾多就補番幾多，咁佢就有個價錢畀我哋去計算。第
27 三個就叫我哋拆咗佢。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：就你見到一啲你哋覺得有問題嘅事情，你第 38 段嗰度提到你同埋江先
29 生，江祥發先生同李國雄（譯音）先生，係咪？

30 葉家駒先生：係。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：曾經喺 2025 年 2 月 14 號去咗市區重建局個辦公室度投訴嘅。

32 葉家駒先生：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以都講一講嗰日嘅情況畀我哋聽？

34 葉家駒先生：嗰日——其實喺嗰日之前，李生、江生同埋我，我哋攞咗份合約之後發覺好多唔
35 合理嘅地方，好多我哋覺得係濫收嘅地方，咁李生就（english spoken）晒所
36 有嘢，圈住我哋覺得有咩嘢問題嘅地方，咁我哋就當時我哋同埋新法團嘅副主席同

1 埋司庫一齊去長沙灣市政局嗰度去見嗰位——一位任生同埋佢另外仲有一個經理。

2 杜淦堃資深大律師：應該係——係咪一位陳先生？

3 葉家駒先生：應該係，佢有兩位人去接見我哋。咁我哋當時就畀佢睇番嗰啲我哋準備咗嘅文
4 件畀佢睇，我哋話畀佢聽邊度唔合理，邊度有問題，咁佢當時話佢將嗰啲文件擺咗
5 去影印，然後就同我哋講佢會將呢啲文件交畀市建局，有兩位獨立嘅顧問，幫佢
6 哋去睇一睇，然後再約下一次開會同我哋再傾嘅。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：之後有咩嘢事發生？

8 葉家駒先生：之後就係冇之後，之後話係——佢係直接同法團聯絡，同法團講，佢哋市建局只
9 係負責資助，呢一類咁嘅情況佢哋係唔理嘅，叫我哋直接搵番顧問。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：個問題喺邊度，你當時覺得？

11 葉家駒先生：問題就係我哋去投訴嘅就係顧問，你又叫我搵番顧問，咁我可以點做？

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：葉先生，你頭先略略咁解釋咗你嘅證人供詞裏面一啲嘅證據，你喺第 61
13 段做咗個總結係關於你太太嘅。

14 葉家駒先生：係。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：委員會會當然睇到你呢個總結，我想問你嘅就係除咗證人供詞裏面講嘅
16 嘢之外，你有冇其他嘅事情想用呢個機會同委員會講？親身。

17 葉家駒先生：有，我可唔可以睇住？

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：可以。

19 葉家駒先生：首先，我多謝你畀個機會我喺度講，其實我真係有啲嘢想同委員會講。由杜大
20 律師喺開案——開場陳詞嗰度，我已經隱約見到真相好似慢慢咁浮出水面，但係我哋
21 希望得到嘅唔單單係還原真相，而係要一個交代，我哋對委員會係絕對信賴，得到
22 一個真實嘅真相畀我哋一個交代，還我哋一個公義，我相信係所有宏福苑嘅人所熱
23 切期盼嘅。

24 喺過去咁多日，我都聽到好多街坊不停咁自責，話自己做得唔夠好，甚至乎我
25 都覺得我做得唔夠好，如果我早一分鐘打電話畀我太太，佢可能會冇事，但係我就
26 見到有一班應該要負責嘅人就千方百計咁去迴避。我係相信政府係願意深入咁改
27 革，但係如果用 1984 戶嘅流離失所，168 條寶貴生命，七十幾個要面對漫長復康
28 之路嚟到做交學費，呢個代價太大。

29 而令到更加可惜嘅就係，政府代表律師嘅陳詞有畀我覺得，原來一貫做法、恒
30 常做法，照足程序，法例有講，依然係根深蒂固咁樣存在嘅一個陋習，成為咗公務
31 員辦事嘅準則。喺佢嘅專業領域裏面佢都唔願意行多一步，冇發揮好佢哋應該要有
32 嘅功能，唔單只係侮辱咗佢哋自己嘅職責，仲侮辱咗佢嘅專業。喺優秀嘅公務員團
33 隊裏面，唔係淨係做咗件事，係要做好件事。換句話講，如果我嘅理解就係，喺某
34 一件事上面，某一個部門佢嘅工作範疇可能因為佢嘅職權或者條例所限，佢覺得佢
35 唔夠，做唔到，唔關佢事。但係調番轉講可唔可以咁樣去諗，喺佢個職責範圍、功
36 能裏面，有冇嘢係關佢事嘅，佢係咪應該去諗下佢有冇嘢係可以做得好啲？而唔係

1 淨係話「唔關我事」就算數。

2 喺成個火災裏面，就係由一連串嘅疏失而導致，少做少錯，唔做唔錯，呢啲咁
3 樣嘅陋習到咗今日，如果需要負責嘅人仍然喺度選擇推卸責任，試問佢點可以畀宏
4 福苑嘅居民一個交代？檢討今次呢個災難，改革陋習，防止悲劇再次發生，好重
5 要。但係有份令到呢件災難發生嘅人如果仲可以輕輕帶過，咁佢點樣向我哋交代？
6 我記得特首曾經講過「無論職位再大，權力再大，要負責嘅人就要負責到底」，我
7 希望係能夠真正落實。

8 同埋我覺得而家對於建築條例可能係有好多唔同程度嘅規管，但係似乎都只係
9 針對緊係一啲新起嘅樓宇，而對於一啲好似我哋宏福苑呢類咁樣大維修，喺做緊工
10 程嘅同時，裏面——有人喺裏面住嘅，嗰個規管係咪應該更加嚴格、要求要更加高？
11 打個比方，可能喺現時所有嘅條例裏面係冇規管到封窗呢樣嘢，因為喺新起嘅大
12 廈，我相信係唔會封窗嘅。但係有冇人去審視過，其實當呢個工程進行時候，裏面
13 係有人喺度居住、有人喺度生活嘅時候，啲條例其實夠唔夠？

14 我想借呢個機會，我係感謝杜大律師團隊佢花咗好多時間，為我哋去還原個真
15 相。我哋都好感謝譚大律師團隊、文律師團隊，佢哋支持我哋，協助我哋。同埋我
16 仲想講多一樣嘢，我想向當日喺火災現場嘅所有前線嘅消防員、救護員、警務人員
17 致敬，佢哋辛苦呀，多謝。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我哋冇其他問題。

19 陸啟康法官：有冇其他涉事方想提問？

20 阮文躍大律師：係，主席、兩位委員，我有一個好簡短嘅問題，就想有少少嘅提問。葉先
21 生，你好，咁我係代表市建局嘅。

22 葉家駒先生：Sorry，聽唔清楚。

23 阮文躍大律師：我係代表市建局嘅。咁頭先你提到就係，或者可以睇番第 38 段，咁有少少
24 問題想同你澄清。

25 葉家駒先生：係。

26 阮文躍大律師：你 38 段就提及到，你同有啲嘅業主同埋副主席、召庫，上到市建局去裏面
27 就作出投訴嘅。裏面嘅其實當時你哋討論嘅內容，就係牽涉到同宏業個合約裏面有
28 啲嘅條款，係咪？

29 葉家駒先生：係。

30 阮文躍大律師：裏面包括咗保險，係咪？

31 葉家駒先生：係。

32 阮文躍大律師：包括窗眉？

33 葉家駒先生：係。

34 阮文躍大律師：亦包括水電嘅接駁？

35 葉家駒先生：係。

36 阮文躍大律師：你喺 38 段亦提到，你哋知道市建局之後有作出回覆嘅？

1 葉家駒先生：係。

2 阮文躍大律師：你知唔知道嗰個回覆係直接回覆--係一個電郵嘅方式回覆嘅？

3 葉家駒先生：呢個我唔清楚，呢個只係法團同我哋講番「冇下一次開會嘞」。

4 阮文躍大律師：明白。咁你知唔知道其實裏面個電郵個回覆，就住頭先提及水電、接駁、窗
5 眉，同埋呢一個嘅保險，亦有一定嘅答覆畀番你哋嘅業主立案法團嘅，你知唔知道
6 裏面嘅內容？

7 葉家駒先生：我係唔知道嘅。

8 阮文躍大律師：好。我冇其他問題，但係我會擱取指示之後，可能會將有關嘅電郵提供畀
9 委員會嘅，唔該晒。

10 陸啟康法官：唔該晒。葉生，我諗你頭先你所講嘅說話，大家都聽得好清楚。我諗你同你太
11 太嘅遭遇，我諗相信都係令到我哋--敲響我哋好多人嘅--香港人嘅心，咁亦都係傳
12 媒嗰度都睇到你嘅無奈，我哋深深感受得到。我哋好多謝你對委員會嘅信任，亦都
13 好多謝你今日咁勇敢出嚟，亦都咁辛苦要將件事再講過一次。我哋冇咩嘢可以講，
14 我哋只可以話畀你聽，我哋委員會一定會盡力，用心去完成我哋嘅調查工作，所以
15 今日好多謝你出席，多謝。

16

17 10 時 49 分宏福苑居民證人葉家駒先生作供完畢

18 10 時 50 分宏福苑居民證人林燕明女士開始作供

19

20 陸啟康法官：我喺度提一提，各個涉事方如果想提問嘅時候，根據呢個嘅通則，其實我哋係
21 要申請嘅，睇下你問嘅問題有冇關係。但係我諗如果你問問題係短嘅話，就唔需
22 要，因為我諗可以--你同我講得完，你都可能問完。如果各位係諗住係要有一個比
23 較長時間嘅盤問或者問問題嘅話，就請你哋跟番個指示係作出或者畀個理由我哋，
24 但係如果好似頭先咁就唔需要嘞，不過我提一提醒你哋係有一個嘅--喺嗰個我哋個
25 程序嗰個章程係有咁嘅規定嘅。係，可以傳召下一位證人。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位證人係林燕明小姐。係，林小姐早晨，同之前證人一樣，
27 我都要麻煩你企起身讀一讀前面嗰份聲明。

28 林燕明女士：本人林燕明聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬事實。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你，林小姐，請坐。林小姐，我哋知道你係住喺宏泰 1703 嘅。

30 林燕明女士：冇錯。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，你係頭先嗰位葉先生嘅鄰居？

32 林燕明女士：係。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：火警發生嘅時候，你喺屋企嘅？

34 林燕明女士：冇錯。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以同大家解釋一下，當時你係點樣知道有火警，同埋你之後所
36 遇到嘅事情？

1 林燕明女士：當日我喺屋企，咁就喺屋企聽到走廊好嘈，所以我就開咗門，開門嘅時候，我
2 見到葉太講緊電話，同埋我隔離屋嘅鄰居都開咗門，咁佢哋兩個係對話緊嘅。咁葉
3 太见到我開咗門之後就同我講話「家姐，宏昌閣火燭，好大火好大煙，你快啲返屋
4 企門番好啲窗」咁樣。咁就我之後門番門之後就入咗屋企個洗手間，咁就開咗個細
5 窗，諗住望一望，睇下會唔會睇到宏昌閣究竟發生咩嘢事，咁就開咗窗之後乜都睇
6 唔到，因為有啲竹棚同埋欄網遮住咗，但係開咗窗之後就聞到少少嘅煙味，咁嗰陣
7 時我就打算換衫，咁就落一落樓梯下究竟發生咩嘢事，咁就但係未意識得到係咁大
8 件事。咁隔咗一陣我換咗衫之後，就再聽到走廊都係葉太把聲，咁我再開門，葉太
9 就同我講話「家姐，你可能要執定嘢」咁樣。之後我門番門之後，我就帶埋隻狗出
10 就再門口，出門口嗰刻我就見到隔離屋嘅鄰居都係啱啱準備出門口，但係我就見唔
11 到葉太喺條走廊度。之後就由 17 樓行樓梯落到樓下大堂...

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：我停一停你先，我哋知道葉生、葉太係 1701 單位嘅住戶。

13 林燕明女士：冇錯。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你頭先提到見到另外嘅鄰居係邊個單位？

15 林燕明女士：正正我隔離個單位。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係 1704？

17 林燕明女士：係，冇錯。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到有幾多位鄰居嗰陣？

19 林燕明女士：我見到應該係有兩個大人、一個小朋友，應該係嫲嫲同埋工人姐姐，再加一個
20 小朋友咁樣。係嘞，咁就我一直行樓梯落去都半信半疑，因為係我唔見到有人，聞
21 唔到煙味，亦都有警鐘，咁就直至我落到樓下大堂，都係好似冇事，點知我一開大
22 堂個門，就見到宏昌閣好大火，係連個花槽都著咗火，咁就好大煙，我喺正門行唔
23 到出去，所以我轉咗左邊擺單車位嗰個位置，咁發覺有十幾個街坊已經企咗喺嗰
24 度，又入唔到屋，又出唔到去，因為當時非常大煙，同埋不停有啲著咗火嘅紙屑跌
25 緊落嚟，咁所以我哋就喺嗰度停留咗一陣咁樣。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：打斷你一下先，我哋螢光幕見到一個畫面，我哋相信係當時你同你隻狗
27 嚟嘅？

28 林燕明女士：冇錯。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋推斷番，呢個係 3 點 12 分，其實係早咗一分鐘嘅應該係，如果用
30 呢個時間去推斷番，你聽到葉太話有火警嘅時候大概會係幾時？

31 林燕明女士：我諗應該 3 點--2 點 55 分左右，佢同我講宏昌閣著火嘅時候。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，如果講番你初初知道有火警嘅時候，你應該係見到葉太兩次
33 嘅，係咪？

34 林燕明女士：冇錯。

35 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺第二次見完葉太之後，你同隻狗就離開咗？

36 林燕明女士：冇錯。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有見過葉太，係咪？

2 林燕明女士：我就--係，因為我一出門口，個樓梯嘅大門就喺我屋企對面，咁我有轉去--我
3 冇行出去嗰條走廊嗰度望到，望下葉太走咗未，嗰刻喺我屋企對出嘅走廊我就見唔
4 到葉太喺度，所以我就以為佢走咗。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你提到--喺你畀委員會嘅資料裏面提到你係由樓梯走嘅，正如你頭先所
6 講。

7 林燕明女士：冇錯。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：走嘅時候，你啱啱講咗你有聽到火警鐘嘅？

9 林燕明女士：冇聽到。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：你另外有一個觀察嘅，就係其實你一路走嗰陣，你知唔知自己走到第幾
11 樓？

12 林燕明女士：唔知道。

13 杜淦堃資深大律師：點解呢？你可唔可以講一講？

14 林燕明女士：因為我隻狗其實嗰個行動都唔係好好，咁佢行得好辛苦，咁我又睇到我究竟行
15 到一層，我發覺係有咗個樓層嘅字數，一路行我都係見唔到樓層嘅字數，我唔知點
16 解會有咗樓層嘅字數，如果唔係因為呢件事，我唔會無端端去行樓梯，我就係嗰一
17 刻我先發覺原來嗰啲樓層嘅字數唔知係唔係畀人用白油油走咗。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，你頭先講到你成功離開咗宏泰閣之後發生嘅事，我打斷咗你，你
19 可唔可以繼續講當日及後嘅情況？

20 林燕明女士：及後就喺宏泰閣放單車嗰個位置，咁我哋就停留咗喺度，都見到有班街坊企咗
21 喺度，因為好大煙同埋好多火屑跌緊落嚟，大家都唔知應該點個囉，咁嗰陣時我有一
22 刻係想抱番隻狗行番入大堂，可唔可以避下啲煙，咁又有另外一個街坊同我哋講
23 話「我哋唔好跑番入去嘞」咁樣。跟住之後宏泰閣佢有個垃圾房嘅位置，有條好窄
24 好窄嘅通道，佢就帶咗我哋一齊喺嗰個位置度跑咗出去，就係咁。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有養狗㗎？

26 林燕明女士：冇錯。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：我相信有養狗嘅人都知道你要帶隻狗可能喺宏福苑嘅附近會去行下平
28 時。

29 林燕明女士：係。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺大維修嘅過程你有經常出入屋苑，亦都有經常喺屋苑附近行？

31 林燕明女士：冇錯。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你對於當時有冇咩嘢特別嘅觀察呢？對於呢個大維修。

33 林燕明女士：當時其實管理處喺維修中途有一啲意見書，我曾經係投訴過，因為我每一日六
34 點幾、七點就會落去放狗，咁一定會經過宏昌閣，宏昌閣後面有個通道可以直接行
35 出去吐露港嘅，我每朝早六點幾、七點嘅時候就會見到有一班工人每朝早都會喺宏
36 昌閣隔離嘅石凳嗰度聚集同埋食煙，咁佢哋每次嗰啲煙頭都會放咗喺--都會擲咗喺

宏昌閣對出--宏昌閣出面佢哋會擺咗啲竹棚同欄網喺下面嘅，咁佢哋每次我都會見到好多煙頭擺咗喺側邊，所以我就喺嗰個意見書嗰度寫過，投訴過。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你投訴咗之後，有冇改善過？

林燕明女士：投訴咗之後，我見到多咗--因為石凳側邊我見到就多咗一個好似一個桶咁樣，畀佢哋裝煙頭，多咗個桶畀佢哋裝煙頭，但係我每一日見到嘅其實都仍然係擺咗喺啲竹棚同埋欄網嗰度，都係喺宏昌閣附近。

杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你。除咗你嗰啲講咗畀我哋知當日嘅經過同埋你之前嘅投訴之外，你有冇其他嘢想藉住呢個機會同委員會講？

林燕明女士：我好想藉呢個機會多謝葉太同埋佢一家人，我希望可以呢件事搵到一個真相，還葉太同埋其他街坊--葉太一個咁善良同埋咁好嘅人，唔應該最後得到咁嘅遭遇，我希望可以搵到一個真相還佢哋一個公道。

杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我有其他問題。

陸啟康法官：有冇其他涉事方想問問題？我諗其實你頭先所講嘅嘢，葉生同埋佢嘅家人都聽到嘅，我哋委員會亦都會盡力完成我哋嘅工作，去還原番個事實出嚟。多謝你喺今日咁困難嘅時候再要嚟到複述一次呢個慘痛嘅經歷，不過但係你嘅作供對我哋非常之有用。多謝你今日出席。

10 時 59 分宏福苑居民證人林燕明女士作供完畢

11 時 00 分宏福苑居民證人羅德沛先生開始作供

杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，接住落嚟下一位證人係羅德沛先生。

陸啟康法官：我諗羅生可以坐喺度讀佢個聲明。

杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝主席。羅生，你可以坐喺度。你見到你前面有個聲明，慢慢你。係，麻煩你將聲明讀出。

羅德沛先生：本人羅德沛聲明，本人所作的證供盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你，羅先生。資料顯示你係住喺宏泰 2008 室嘅，請問你係邊一年搬入宏福苑嘅？

羅德沛先生：確實嘅年齡就講唔到，但係我只係知道我個仔六年級嘅時候我就搬入去，即係而家我個仔四十幾歲，即係大約喺嗰，我記唔到幾時搬入去。

杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。換句話講，你喺宏福苑都住咗好多年，即係都係老街坊。

羅德沛先生：起碼都過咗廿年。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你嘅就係當日發現火警嘅時候，從你提供嘅資料，我哋知道你唔喺你嘅單位裏面，你出咗街，係咪？

羅德沛先生：正確。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我想畀你睇一睇以下呢張相，呢個係你嚟嘅，係咪？

羅德沛先生：係，正確。

1 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，我哋搵到嘅照片，就閉路電視紀錄睇到你應該係 2 點 53 分
2 落樓嘅，呢個快咗一分鐘，所以應該係 2 點 52 分落樓嘅，你點樣發現有火警落咗
3 樓之後？

4 羅德沛先生：我落咗去樓下大堂，出到門口之後，行到去垃圾站，大約係兩分零鐘嘅，就聽
5 到宏昌閣嗰個方向有聲音，哩哩嘞嘞咁嘅聲，咁我擰轉頭望嘅時候，當其時宏昌已
6 經係燒到 3 樓咁上下嘅，咁我跟住就睇到佢係有十分鐘，睇到佢已經燒咗差唔多一
7 半，即係半棟樓咁上下，點解我會大約因到呢，因為我住 20 樓，我住宏泰 20 樓，
8 我睇到佢嗰個燒火嗰個高度同我哋 20 樓唔係差得太遠，即係我估佢當時已經係
9 燒到十幾樓已經。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：我畀你睇一睇一幅地圖，A2/IC3，你可唔可以話到畀我哋知當日你發
11 現火警嘅時候，你企喺邊個位？

12 羅德沛先生：我企喺嗰個垃圾站，即係嗰嗰係近住學校，對住垃圾站嗰個方向，即係嗰嗰橫
13 線嗰個位置。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：呢一度，係咪？

15 羅德沛先生：唔係，呢度，呢度，呢度，佢呢個垃圾站。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：右邊？

17 羅德沛先生：係嘞，右邊呢個垃圾站，嗰嗰你而家紅色嚟住嗰條嘅橫線。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：嚟住嗰度？

19 羅德沛先生：係嘞，係嗰個位置。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：而家箭嘴嗰個位喺唔喺？

21 羅德沛先生：喺㗎嘞，差唔多係嗰個位。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：即係換句話講，你會喺嗰個位睇到 D 座同 G 座嘅，係咪？

23 羅德沛先生：睇到宏昌，睇到宏昌嗰嗰嗰個正門，因為我哋宏泰同宏昌個正門大家係相對
24 嘅，我企嗰個位置就嗰嗰係望到宏昌個正門，同埋睇到喺後面嗰啲火係湧上去嘅，
25 當其時未燒到正門嗰邊嘅，淨係見到啲火喺後面嗰面上嘅。

26 杜淦堃資深大律師：你頭先描述咗個火燒得好快，你都提到有啲火屑嘅。

27 羅德沛先生：係，冇錯。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，就係你見到啲火屑由邊一棟飄去邊一棟？

29 羅德沛先生：喺宏昌嗰度飄過去宏泰。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：幾多樓大概個火屑飄過去？

31 羅德沛先生：如果你話講嗰個火屑飄到去呢，已經係去到 10 樓以上。

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：你見到嘅火屑飄過去嗰陣，你有冇留意到有消防員在場？

33 羅德沛先生：當其時消防員就好快到咗。

34 杜淦堃資深大律師：換句話講，你見到火屑飄嗰陣，其實消防員已經到咗一段時間，係咪？

35 羅德沛先生：應該唔係好耐，唔係好耐。

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗見到火屑由一棟樓飄去第二棟，你仲可唔可以幫到我哋講一講你有

1 冇其他嘅觀察呢，關於嗰個火勢？

2 羅德沛先生：嗰個火屑見到佢飄過去宏泰燒嘅時候，嗰啲棚網係冇熄到，係一路咁燒住，都
3 差唔多分幾鐘都有熄過，嗰啲棚網嗰啲火種。咁就睇到佢嗰啲火屑一路向上飄，嗰
4 個火屑越嚟越高單位，一路高樓層單位都畀佢燒著。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你頭先提過--或者你喺聽之前嘅證人都有提到，就有啲棚網比較深色，
6 有啲比較淺色嘅，你知唔知？

7 羅德沛先生：係，正確，知道，見到嘅。因為佢之前鋪嗰啲棚網係深色到我哋基本上唔係好
8 睇到外面嘅街景，但係後期打完風之後鋪嗰啲就見到好疏，見到外面啲街景嘅。

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：咁你見到燒著嗰啲你有冇留意到係深色定係淺色，定係咩嘢都有？

10 羅德沛先生：因為我當其時睇到佢燒著嘅時候，因為我喺地下嚟，地面嚟嘅，我望番上去，
11 大約即係分唔到佢係深色定淺色嘅。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，我想問下你走嘅過程裏面有冇聽過火警鐘聲？

13 羅德沛先生：冇聽到。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：相信你會聽到消防車嘅聲？

15 羅德沛先生：冇，聽到。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：有冇聽到有人叫人疏散？

17 羅德沛先生：我就聽唔到有人啖疏散，淨係見到嗰啲保安員就啖啲人走，唔好返轉頭。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：另外我想問下你嘅就係喺大維修工程期間，有冇一啲就火警嘅事情你係
19 好擔心或者你投訴過嘅？

20 羅德沛先生：因為我係大約喺 4 月尾嘅，我收到第一張係管理處同埋法團聯合出嘅通告，而
21 嗰個通告就講話會門咗個火警鐘同消防掣。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你等一等，我想睇下你指嘅通告係唔係呢一張。主席，R1/4/78 頁。
23 係唔係類似咁嘅通告？

24 羅德沛先生：係，正確，冇錯。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你想講嘅係--你頭先想講我打斷咗你。

26 羅德沛先生：因為我睇到呢一張通告，佢寫就話因為個工程而門咗呢個消防掣同火警鐘、個
27 個水泵嗰啲問題，我覺得係好大問題嘅，因為當其時我亦都即刻落去保安嗰個座頭
28 問過個保安，確認咗佢係有呢件事同呢個通告。我亦都返番上樓去後樓梯望過有消
29 防嗰個滅火器裝置，冇喺度嘅。當時我亦有打電話去問過管理處，管理處話因為個
30 工程所以先咁做，但係佢當其時亦都有講過話呢工程而門呢個消防掣係要門幾耐嘅
31 時間，冇講過呢樣嘢。因為當其時係 4 月，我有諗過佢會門呢個消防鐘，因為呢一
32 輪先聽到嗰個證詞講話佢陸陸續續門咗半年，我有諗過佢會門咁耐時間。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。我哋見到呢一個通告裏面，就見到承辦商嗰個名稱係中華發展工
34 程有限公司，有個緊急聯絡電話。下面就睇到，佢講到明就係消防栓同埋個喉輓系
35 統涉及由地下到嗰個天台係門咗嘅，至於有一系列其他嘅消防裝置就係呢度有提到
36 係會被關閉嘅，例如火警警報系統。我想問你嘅係除咗呢一張之外，因為我哋見到

1 呢一張只係 2025 年 4 月 2 號去到 20 號嘅——即係 7 號去到 20 號，唔好意思，十
2 四日嘅啫。你哋有冇收過——呢啲咁嘅通告係成日收，定係以你嘅記憶淨係收過一
3 次？

4 羅德沛先生：我係淨係記得係收過一次。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：係。

6 羅德沛先生：所以我有諗過佢問咗半年咁耐，我淨係覺得佢係唔係淨係嗰一次嘅工程而要問
7 呢個消防系統。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗呢個關閉消防系統之外，有冇其他嘢你係曾經作出過投訴或者當時
9 係好擔心？

10 羅德沛先生：擔心就係頭先嗰啲街坊講食煙仔嘅問題，嗰個煙頭由佢工程第一日開始直至到
11 發生事之前，我日日都見到有煙頭嘅，我從冇話冇見過，尤其而家宏昌光井嗰個起
12 火點，我時常——因為我朝頭早係會出去行晨運，我會經嗰個位置去單車徑，日日都
13 見到一大堆煙頭喺度，我就從冇見到佢少過。就咁樣嘅，因為我見好多人都走去投
14 訴呢樣嘢，但係都好似完全冇改進過、冇變過咁囉，就覺得好似投訴都有用。

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你。有冇其他嘢你想藉住呢個機會同委員會講？

16 羅德沛先生：我想借呢個機會就係講出，今次點解嗰啲街坊有百幾人死咗，而係我覺得今次
17 呢件事有好多方面係鋪咗呢條死亡之路喺度，法團主席佢知道嗰啲發泡膠會唔阻
18 燃，佢知嘅，咁點解佢會同我哋全部業主做咗決定係繼續會鋪呢個發泡膠落去呢？
19 點解唔將呢個決定權交番畀我哋業主決定，或者我哋決定換晒佢呢，係咪？

20 好嘞，管理公司我諗會有專業人士亦都會知道呢啲發泡膠唔阻燃，點解管理公
21 司嘅職責冇同我哋業主交代呢個問題呢？因為呢個問題我覺得係非常之嚴重，對今
22 次呢件事裏面，係咪？所以我覺得如果要講追究責任，除咗鴻毅同宏業要承擔責
23 任，管理公司同埋現任嘅業主法團主席都一樣要負呢個責任喺度，因為佢哋根本就
24 同我哋鋪咗呢個死亡之路，係咪？佢如果通過業主法團去投票，決定咗係唔改變，
25 咁大家業主就無話可說。但係完全佢冇做過呢個步驟，就同我哋業主決定咗繼續去
26 鋪呢個發泡膠，亦都有同我哋解釋過，冇講解過話因為發泡膠係唔阻燃呢個問題，
27 冇講過。我相信聽證會今次會——應該會好顯現到呢個事實出嚟，同埋追究涉事人嘅
28 責任同埋單位。

29 同埋我亦都聽到呢一輪嘅證詞講，所有嘅涉及嘅政府部門都只係為咗佢哋呢個
30 制度去辯護，係有一個政府部門會承認係佢哋嘅過錯，冇。只係辯護就辯護佢而家
31 嘅制度，但係喺而家呢個制度裏面呢，好似屋宇署同獨立審裁組已經嚴厲改咗嗰個
32 法規，但係點解唔會落到獨立審查組度，而獨立審查組只係依照舊嗰份規則去做
33 呢？咁呢個就係政府部門與部門之間大家唔可以通達到，係咪？

34 好似消防處，消防處聽佢證詞講就有接過消防話會暫停消防鐘呢個通告，冇接
35 過。但根據呢個消防裝置承辦商講，佢十六次走去延期，我就覺得好出奇，消防處
36 就話冇接過呢個通告，而你承辦商嗰個講就話十六次通告，因為佢十四日、十四日

咁樣延續個通告。我就覺得就奇，一個就講冇收過通告，一個就話講咗十六次嘅通告，咁實質個問題喺邊度呢？係邊一方面去弄虛作假呢？咁呢個問題你一定要追番個原因出嚟，如果唔係，我覺得呢百幾人走咗，極其無辜，對佢哋自己嘅家屬亦都係一個創傷同埋一個好嚴重嘅，因為佢哋咁樣弄虛作假，同埋大家嗰個法例唔可以通達，而令到佢哋係第二次傷害，係咪？咁我表達係咁多，講完。

杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你。

陸啟康法官：有冇其他涉事方想問？如果有呢，我諗羅生你頭先所講嘅嘢大家聽到，呢個係我哋獨立委員會會調查嘅方向，我哋聽咗頭先開案陳詞列出各樣嘢，我哋一定係會查落去，搵出原因喺邊一度。

羅德沛先生：好，唔該，唔該。

陸啟康法官：現階段我哋仲要睇埋好多方面嘅解釋，睇下佢哋，我哋先可以作最終嘅結論嘅。多謝你羅生今日出席。

羅德沛先生：好，唔該。

11 時 17 分宏福苑居民證人羅德沛先生作供完畢

杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我相信呢個可能係一個適當嘅時候小休，可唔可以要二十分鐘？因為安排一啲錄音。

陸啟康法官：而家我哋個聆訊係休息二十分鐘。

11 時 17 分聆訊押後

12 時 06 分聆訊恢復

陸啟康法官：其實大家都可能好感慨，如果事發嗰日宏福苑個警鐘係響就好嘞，亦都可以睇到警鐘嘅重要性。我哋亦都可以睇到消防嘅車好快嚟到，咁所以可能都係一個好好嘅——畀我哋反省一下今次呢件事。咁我哋可以繼續我哋嘅聆訊。

12 時 07 分宏福苑居民證人蘇曉峯先生開始作供

杜淦堃資深大律師：係，多謝主席。下一位嚟到協助我哋嘅係蘇曉峯先生。蘇先生，你好。

蘇曉峯先生：你好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你企一企起身，將你面前嘅聲明讀出嚟。

蘇曉峯先生：本人蘇曉峯聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

陸啟康法官：喺未作供之前我提一提，請坐，請坐。我哋係可以叫個證人喺嗰度 mark 嘅，如果有需要嘅話，佢應該係有支筆可以喺圖嗰度 mark 咗佢做呢個證物嘅，如果有需要可以用呢一個嘅。

- 1 杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝主席。蘇先生，你好，資料顯示你係住喺宏志 604 室嘅？
- 2 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。
- 3 杜淦堃資深大律師：但係我哋睇到其實你父母當時係宏昌 2701？
- 4 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。
- 5 杜淦堃資深大律師：嗰度——爸爸媽媽都係因為喺呢次火災嗰度不幸遇難。
- 6 蘇曉峯先生：係。
- 7 杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你嚟協助我哋。你本身幾時搬入宏福苑嘅？
- 8 蘇曉峯先生：我本身 1984 年至 85 年左右？
- 9 杜淦堃資深大律師：本來係同父母同住？
- 10 蘇曉峯先生：係，搬入嚟之後直都一直同父母同住，直至結咗婚之後，我哋就買咗隔離宏
- 11 志。
- 12 杜淦堃資深大律師：喺大維修過程裏面呢，我哋嘅理解係其實你同父母都有討論過一啲擔
- 13 心，同埋作出過一啲嘅投訴嘅？
- 14 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。
- 15 杜淦堃資深大律師：首先，你可唔可以講一講你哋兩個單位，你哋曾經喺大維修嘅過程裏面
- 16 討論過一啲咩嘢問題？
- 17 蘇曉峯先生：早期係發泡膠比較多，因為知道發泡膠係一種易燃嘅物件，咁我亦都打過去消
- 18 防處嗰度查詢關於發泡膠嗰個問題。
- 19 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗發泡膠嘅問題之外，有冇就第二個範疇都有類似嘅擔心？
- 20 蘇曉峯先生：後期當上年華懋大廈棚網大火之後都擔心過啲棚網係易燃嘅。咁我爹哋佢八十
- 21 幾歲，佢冇相關消防經驗佢都知啲棚網係非常易燃，佢亦都同我哋講如果呢度發
- 22 生咁嘅事情，佢哋就死梗嘞。
- 23 杜淦堃資深大律師：就個發泡膠嘅問題，我哋從證據得知你係曾經有作出過投訴嘅？
- 24 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。
- 25 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想你聽一聽一段錄音，跟住幫一幫我哋。
- 26 蘇曉峯先生：Okay。
- 27
- 28 （播放錄音）
- 29 〔男聲：你好，消防處一般查詢及投訴熱線。
- 30 蘇曉峯先生：你好呀，姓蘇㗎。
- 31 男聲：係，蘇生你好。
- 32 蘇曉峯先生：冇，我想查詢關於我哋屋苑做緊一啲大維修。
- 33 男聲：唔。
- 34 蘇曉峯先生：咁我見啲師傅就用咗啲發泡膠嚟封啲窗呀，其實會唔會有問題呢？
- 35 男聲：唔，你講——你考慮嘅點係？
- 36 蘇曉峯先生：即係發泡膠比較易燃呢，會唔會——佢擺嚟做封窗會唔會有危險，定係啲乜嘢咁

1 樣呢？

2 男聲：等一等呀，你個度個地址...（聽不清）

3 男聲：大埔宏福苑。

4 蘇曉峯先生：宏福苑。

5 男聲：佢個度係做緊啲咩嘢工程？

6 蘇曉峯先生：做一啲即係大維修--屋苑大維修啲啲工程。

7 男聲：唔明，屋苑個大維修嘅工程，即係外牆有啲工程？

8 蘇曉峯先生：係呀，外牆工程囉。

9 男聲：唔。

10 蘇曉峯先生：我諗佢要保護住啲窗，唔好整花或者乜嘢，咁佢攞咗啲發泡膠嚟封。咁啲居民
11 可能都會有個擔憂就係話，喂，啲發泡膠都係易燃嘅物料嚟㗎嘛，咁會唔會有問
12 題呢？係，就係咁樣。

13 男聲：而家我呢度睇呢，即係你問--我呢度見喇，就話窗啲--窗--關於窗戶啲啲嘅--即係
14 關於窗戶上面用咗啲咩嘢封--用啲咩嘢物料封住啲啲呢，咁我呢度睇就應該係有特
15 別話有啲乜嘢規管嘅，係嘞。咁但係如果你有啲個--你有個擔憂嘅話，咁你都可以
16 做個即係投訴，咁我哋都可以安排番人過嚟睇睇，係嘞。

17 蘇曉峯先生：係。

18 男聲：係嘞，你可以作出一個投訴，咁我哋呢度--即係覺得佢個物料個度唔合規格呀即係
19 有啲，咁可以--我哋都可以安排番人嚟睇嘅，咁如果你有需要嘅可以作出一個投
20 訴，咁你而家需唔要做呢個投訴？

21 蘇曉峯先生：咁我叫法團搞，因為我唔係法團啲啲人。

22 男聲：明白，明白，明白嘅。

23 蘇曉峯先生：好。

24 男聲：好，好。

25 蘇曉峯先生：唔該你先。

26 男聲：好，唔該你，唔該。

27 蘇曉峯先生：唔該，拜拜。

28 男聲：拜拜。]

29 （錄音播放完畢）

30

31 陸啟康法官：我想問，呢段錄音都係政府提供畀我哋嘅？

32 杜淦堃資深大律師：消防處提供。講番呢段錄音，資料顯示係喺 2024 年 9 月 13 日你打畀
33 消防處嘅，嗰陣係咩嘢驅使你個日打去呢？

34 蘇曉峯先生：因為嗰日應該係封緊--即係做緊，封緊發泡膠囉開始，我記得就係，所以都係
35 一個擔憂。

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道居民有啲 WhatsApp 嘅群組係同大維修有關嘅，其中一個叫做

1 「宏福大維修監察組」，而你係有加入呢個群組嘅？

2 蘇曉峯先生：係。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋想你睇一睇就呢個 WhatsApp 群組裏面嘅一啲紀錄。我哋而家顯示
4 嘅紀錄呢，係一啲喺 9 月--2024 年 9 月 13 日一啲你哋發畀大家嘅訊息，其中有一
5 個電話我哋將部電話最尾個四個字就遮蓋咗，但係我哋見到呢，喺大螢幕中間有一
6 個「6382」字頭嘅電話，你可唔可以確認嗰個係你個電話？

7 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。

8 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋見到你喺嗰個群組裏面亦都講咗一啲信息，呢個就係我哋啱啱聽完
9 你打去消防處之後嗰日發出嘅資訊嘅，我哋見到喺大銀幕上高睇到你提過「用中空
10 板應該好過用發泡膠」，你見到嗎？

11 蘇曉峯先生：係，冇錯。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：你亦都提到「問下宏業有冇得改？」跟住你話「再唔係問消防用發泡膠
13 得唔得？」跟住有人話「中空板貴好多」，呢度你自己咗嘞，「問咗消防處，佢哋
14 話可以作出投訴，佢哋會搵人過嚟睇睇。」

15 蘇曉峯先生：係。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：就你呢啲訊息，你作出投訴之後，你知唔知道之後有冇跟進呢？

17 蘇曉峯先生：我記得喺 9 月 30 號嗰陣時，我最後一次問消防，再打去問消防處嗰邊，佢哋
18 答覆係「冇相關條例規管呢一樣嘢」。

19 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋都有--消防處都提供咗嗰個錄音嘅。

20 蘇曉峯先生：係。

21 杜淦堃資深大律師：我都想你聽一聽，幫一幫我哋。

22

23 （播放錄音）

24 〔女聲：消防處一般查詢投訴熱線，有咩嘢幫到你。

25 蘇曉峯先生：係，早晨，你好，姓蘇㗎。

26 女聲：係。

27 蘇曉峯先生：咁我哋屋苑就做緊呢個大廈嘅外牆嘅大維修。

28 女聲：係。

29 蘇曉峯先生：咁個承建商就擺咗我唔知發泡膠定乜嘢呢嚟封--即係嚟遮住個窗。

30 女聲：係。

31 蘇曉峯先生：即係每一戶都係㗎嘞，遮住個窗。

32 女聲：係。

33 蘇曉峯先生：可能應該係保護個窗，唔好整花個窗咁㗎。

34 女聲：係。

35 蘇曉峯先生：咁但係我哋就比較擔心嗰啲物料呢，會唔會係佢比較易--易燃呀。

36 女聲：係。

- 1 蘇曉峯先生：比較容易著火呀。
- 2 女聲：係。
- 3 蘇曉峯先生：嘎，係嘞。
- 4 女聲：你等我一陣先呀。即係--即係其實你哋單位出面個窗？
- 5 蘇曉峯先生：係呀，每個單位，即係每一隻窗嚟可以講，嘎。
- 6 女聲：哦，你等等先呀。喂，先生。
- 7 蘇曉峯先生：係。
- 8 女聲：因為我哋消防處就冇任何即係條例就規定即係你窗可以點樣封住或者唔可以點樣封住
- 9 嘅。咁或者你可以問下屋宇署佢哋嗰邊有冇啲咩嘢可以幫到你哋呢個層面。
- 10 蘇曉峯先生：...（聽不清）
- 11 女聲：係嘞，係嘞，冇錯。
- 12 蘇曉峯先生：但係嗰啲物料易燃--唔知易唔易燃㗎㗎，我哋比較係擔心好似英國嗰個大廈大
- 13 火咁樣，燒咗成棟一齊咁呀。
- 14 女聲：唔，唔，唔，唔，明白晒，因為...
- 15 蘇曉峯先生：係驚--係擔心呢樣嘢啫。
- 16 女聲：唔，唔，唔，但係因為我哋嘅層面就冇任何--即係因為佢哋做大廈維修嗰啲呢，其實
- 17 都係跟番屋宇署嗰啲規定去做嘅。
- 18 蘇曉峯先生：嘎。
- 19 女聲：係嘞，係嘞，咁你可以問下屋宇署佢哋相關嘅規定或者佢哋可以點樣幫你哋檢查佢哋
- 20 啲物料係咪即係合乎佢哋嘅規格囉。
- 21 蘇曉峯先生：哦，哦，
- 22 女聲：係嘞，係嘞，係嘞。
- 23 蘇曉峯先生：咁好㗎，唔該你先。
- 24 女聲：唔，好，唔該你先，蘇生，多謝你電話。
- 25 蘇曉峯先生：唔該，拜拜。
- 26 女聲：拜拜。]
- 27 （錄音播放完畢）
- 28
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：蘇先生，我想問下有咩嘢驅使你嗰日又打去消防再作出一個投訴？
- 30 蘇曉峯先生：佢未有一個正式答覆畀我嘛，我咪打多次囉。
- 31 杜淦堃資深大律師：你當時屋企個窗封咗未？
- 32 蘇曉峯先生：當時好似--宏志嗰面好似未，但係我爹哋媽咪嗰邊封咗。
- 33 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔，我想問下你 WhatsApp 裏面提到「中空板貼喺窗就好過發泡膠」，
- 34 你點解會有一呢個概念或者點解你會咁講？
- 35 蘇曉峯先生：一個建議啫，係呀，我都唔識其實，都係一個建議囉。
- 36 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇同法團反映過呢啲問題？

- 1 蘇曉峯先生：WhatsApp 呢度囉。
- 2 杜淦堃資深大律師：WhatsApp 呢度
- 3 蘇曉峯先生：WhatsApp 呢度，嘎。
- 4 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，打完第二個電話之後，你有冇同其他政府部門跟進過呢？
- 5 蘇曉峯先生：冇。
- 6 杜淦堃資深大律師：你及後有冇參加過同大維修有關嘅會議？
- 7 蘇曉峯先生：你講係維修啲啲？冇。
- 8 杜淦堃資深大律師：法團啲啲，你父母呢，你父母有冇參加，你知唔知？
- 9 蘇曉峯先生：佢落去開會啲啲會有囉，即係投票，投票啲啲我都有。
- 10 杜淦堃資深大律師：除咗發泡膠同埋你頭先提過棚網啲啲問題之外，你仲有冇同父母傾過另
- 11 外一啲同火警有關嘅問題或者再作出過其他嘅投訴？
- 12 蘇曉峯先生：主要都係——最後期主要都係擔心棚網同發泡膠都係。
- 13 杜淦堃資深大律師：好嘞，我想去問一問你火警當日嘅情況，你當日係點樣知道有火警同埋
- 14 係大概幾多點？
- 15 蘇曉峯先生：喺 3 點 07 分嘅時候我媽媽打畀我話呢度火燭，佢同爹哋而家落樓。
- 16 杜淦堃資深大律師：你呢個對話除咗講頭先以上嘅事情，仲有冇其他嘅資料可以話到畀我哋
- 17 知？
- 18 蘇曉峯先生：隔咗有幾耐，我聽到我媽媽講「今次——唉，今次死嘞」，之後我就再聽唔到佢
- 19 嘅聲嘞。個電話一直都有斷到，直至四點十左右囉。
- 20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你一路都同佢保持？
- 21 蘇曉峯先生：一路都係，但係一路都——叫佢都聽唔到。
- 22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你一路都同媽媽去溝通嘅？
- 23 蘇曉峯先生：媽媽，係。
- 24 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問你，咁你個日有冇打 999？
- 25 蘇曉峯先生：應該好夜先至打，因為我當場直接見到差人就同佢講咗我爹哋媽咪喺 27 樓，
- 26 跟住我同消防都講過。
- 27 杜淦堃資深大律師：根據你提供嘅紀錄，你再有機會見到你父母。
- 28 蘇曉峯先生：冇嘞。
- 29 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋知道喺聽證會嘅第一日我哋播咗一段 999 嘅錄音，係你父母打去求
- 30 助嘅。
- 31 蘇曉峯先生：係。
- 32 杜淦堃資深大律師：我哋都討論過，如果你稍候你情緒平復，你想聽番嘅，我哋可以安排。
- 33 但係今日我哋唔會再播嗰段錄音，你有冇其他嘢想同委員會講？
- 34 蘇曉峯先生：有嘅。喺聽證會第一日我知道爹哋媽咪佢哋打電話報咗警，之後媽咪打電話畀
- 35 我話而家落樓，我有辦法想像佢哋當時幾咁彷徨無助。佢哋已經好叻、好勇敢，與
- 36 此同時當日嘅聽證會我亦都知道消防員何偉豪先生係接到 order 上去救我爹哋媽

1 咪。我聽到呢個消息之後，個心好難過，好唔開心。當所有人逃離火場嘅時候，消
2 防嘅前線就係衝入火場，所謂嘅就係拯救生命，呢啲消防嘅前線喺我心目中絕對係
3 百分百真英雄。我好想多謝佢哋，但係請容許我講一句「對唔住」，請何偉豪先生
4 嘅屋企人好好保重。

5 今次呢場聽證會唔單止係事實嘅追尋，更是一面照出制度漏洞、人性光輝同埋
6 集體創傷嘅一面鏡子，今次嘅災難係系統性失靈嘅必然結果。證據顯示所有保障生
7 命安全嘅設施徹底失效，產生出嚟嘅結果就係 168 位人士付出咗沉痛嘅生命代價，
8 以及 1984 戶家庭流離失所。

9 之前有人同我講，話我哋貪得無厭，係，我的確承認嘅，我哋貪嘅係一個真
10 相，我哋貪嘅係一個公義，我哋希望還死者一個公道。當知道真相之後，我哋希望
11 能夠改善制度嘅漏洞，冇人想再次發生同類嘅災難，宏福苑只能示範一次，希望所
12 有有關人士引以為戒。

13 四個月前嘅大火奪去咗我父母，奪去咗我嘅家，呢四個月係我人生入面最艱
14 難、最痛苦嘅日子，有幸得到身邊好多朋友、親戚嘅鼓勵同埋安慰，心情可以得到
15 暫時嘅舒暢。我喺呢度亦好衷心咁多謝一啲幫過我哋宏福苑嘅人士，無論係金錢、
16 物資或者心靈上支援我哋嘅朋友。

17 近排聽聽證會或者上樓嘅安排，可能會帶番畀一啲居民嘅一啲衝擊，一啲創傷
18 後遺症有機會陸續浮現出嚟，所以千祈千祈唔好收埋自己，儘快尋求有關嘅支援。
19 身為宏福苑嘅街坊，雖然大家都有唔同嘅困難，但係我哋都係坐同一條船，我希望
20 大家好似之前咁團結，團結先有機會爭取到各自嘅所需嘅一切，亦都希望大家可以
21 好快咁過番正常嘅生活，各位街坊加油。好多謝杜律師，好多謝主席。

22 陸啟康法官：請問各位涉事方有冇人想提問？

23 李峰琦大律師：主席，我有少少問題係想關於啲工程解說會嘅想問一問蘇先生。

24 蘇先生，你好，我代表幾位居民嘅，有啲關於工程解說會嘅問題，想向你了解
25 下個情況嘅。我哋睇到資料顯示，喺 2024 年嘅 7 月 19 號，宏業同鴻毅係喺浸信
26 會嗰度，就住宏志閣係有一個工程嘅解說會嘅，我想了解下當天你有冇出席嗰個解
27 說會？

28 蘇曉峯先生：我有嘅，夜晚嚟㗎嘛嗰個好似，有嘅。

29 李峰琦大律師：我睇番啲通告，嗰晚係咪係有啲爭執，同埋啲唔愉快嘅事情發生，你可唔可
30 以講述下其實嗰晚係發生咩嘢事？

31 蘇曉峯先生：好似係佢哋啲——嗰陣時仲係舊法團，冇記錯，係唔畀我哋啲居民入去。

32 李峰琦大律師：仲有冇可以講多少少個情況？

33 蘇曉峯先生：佢哋攔住個門口話——詳細都唔係好記得太清楚，總之係唔畀我哋——即係其實入
34 邊仲有位嘅我知道，但係佢好似係指定係宏志先入得定唔知係點樣，就唔畀其他人
35 入去。

36 李峰琦大律師：係咪之後仲發生咗個報警嘅事件，有冇認知？

1 蘇曉峯先生：呢個有印象。

2 李峰琦大律師：可唔可以再講下你個認知係點樣樣？

3 蘇曉峯先生：警察嚟到，跟住——真係唔係好記得，唔好意思。

4 李峰琦大律師：好，係，好，唔緊要，唔該你，蘇先生，我有其他問題。

5 陸啟康法官：仲有冇其他問題？冇，咁蘇生，我諗其實聽完你嘅作供，同埋好多宏福苑居民
6 嘅作供，我諗相信嚟度——我諗大概咁講，其實我哋好多人都應該為宏福苑嘅居民鼓
7 掌。咁我覺得你哋好勇敢去面對呢件事，即使係即係家人離去，都係好勇敢去面
8 對。咁我哋只可以話節哀順變，我哋一定會去搵出個事實真相，同埋我亦都好相信
9 你頭先講嘅說話，香港所有嘅消防員同埋何偉豪先生嘅家人都會聽得到嘅，好多謝
10 羅（蘇？）先生你今日嚟證供，多謝你。

11

12 12 時 29 分宏福苑居民證人蘇曉峯先生作供完畢

13 12 時 29 分宏福苑居民證人周志偉先生開始作供

14

15 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位嚟協助我哋嘅居民係周志偉先生。周先生，麻煩你企起身
16 讀一讀你面前嘅聲明。

17 周志偉先生：本人周志偉聲明，本人喺呢度所講嘅證供，全部係現場憶述我所知嘅嘢，全部
18 屬實，並無虛言。

19 陸啟康法官：請坐，周生。

20 杜淦堃資深大律師：你好，周先生，資料顯示你嘅單位係喺宏昌閣 207 號室？

21 周志偉先生：係。

22 杜淦堃資深大律師：你喺火警嘅時候，你同邊位屋企人同住嘅係？

23 周志偉先生：喺火警發生嘅時間，我同我太太都喺現場嘅。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：好，我哋未講火警當日，我想你講一講火警之前一啲你嘅觀察，或者你
25 擔心嘅地方，因為你單位位置，所以可能你會睇到一啲對於委員會有用嘅事情嘅，
26 麻煩你一一講出嚟。

27 周志偉先生：當時我就喺間屋度，我老婆就去咗沖涼。

28 杜淦堃資深大律師：我係想——唔好意思，打斷你。我係想你講一講喺火警之前，...

29 周志偉先生：係火警之前嘅。

30 杜淦堃資深大律師：係，對於——唔係火警當日，你對呢個維修有啲咩嘢觀察，有啲咩嘢令到
31 你哋擔心？尤其是火警風險嗰個範疇。

32 周志偉先生：維修嗰啲就我哋通常佢就——我哋都唔理㗎喇，佢就咪——就三億三做——我哋都
33 唔理佢，咁佢就初初就同我哋講就分三期嚟大維修嘅，即係我哋嗰座就係 F 座，跟
34 住——我哋嗰度宏昌，跟住宏盛、宏志，三座做嘅。咁搭棚，就搭晒棚，嗰三座，做
35 咗個零月，就全部成個屋苑又搭晒棚㗎，咁你之前你同我哋講話分三期㗎嘛，咁點
36 解會全部做晒呢？咪搞到咁樣，火燭咪全部火燒連環船，如果三座嚟做，就我相信

就唔會燒晒成個屋苑，呢啲係我嘅感覺。

但係嗰個法團，個新法團，我哋有投訴佢，我話點解你嗰陣時嗰個大維修嗰個宏業話分三期做㗎嘛，點解你容許佢畀佢一次過搭晒棚？咁佢亦有咁多人做，我哋之後我哋嗰啲都丟空咗喺度，嗰啲工人就走去做出面嗰幾座，即係做宏仁、宏道、宏新嗰啲，我哋宏昌嗰啲、宏盛嗰啲就擺喺度，咁後期發生呢件咁嘅嘢火燭，一燒咪全部燒晒囉，如果佢唔係全部搭晒棚，我相信就唔會惹到人哋嗰啲嘅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問一問你，你個單位嗰度應該係會見到 1 樓嗰個光井平台，係咪？

周志偉先生：睇就睇唔到，我嗰度睇唔到嘅，但係知道嗰度起火，嗰度有火走上嚟，咁我想講講個現場情況你聽，好唔好？

杜淦堃資深大律師：好。

周志偉先生：個現場就我當時我就喺屋度，我老婆就見到話「點解個天咁紅嘅」咁，我話「個天咁紅？」我話「冇理由㗎」，咁我——跟住我就喺番個廳度，突然間聽到出面就好嘈，即係嗰垃圾同埋好大風咁吹，咁我打開個窗睇，嘩，嗰啲竹棚同埋嗰樹枝周圍飛，同埋見到有少少嗰啲火屑㗎，咁我之後就門番個窗，即刻打電話去管理處，管理處就唔係即時聽嘅，等得好耐，我話「有冇搞錯，喂，上面工人係咪做嘢啲嘢係咁擲落嚟？」佢話「唔係擲落嚟呀，係火燭呀」咁，我話「火燭，點解你個警鐘唔響呀？」我就鬧鬼佢，佢又有出聲，咁之後就收咗線。咁我之後就返番——跟住我就再睇下個廁所同埋個大房，因為嗰度好似好紅。

杜淦堃資深大律師：停一停先，停一停先，你會唔會講到畀我哋知，你大約幾多點打落管理處？

周志偉先生：應該嗰陣時係差唔多挨住 3 點，應該係兩點十至十一，兩點十至兩點十一嘅，大約，就唔敢肯定。

杜淦堃資深大律師：好，好，我打斷你先，你想講一講你之後見到嘅情況，你繼續。

周志偉先生：之後就我就見到佢咁樣，咁我就走咗入去廁所嗰度睇下個環境同埋個大房，見到嗰啲發泡膠著火㗎，睇住佢著火嘅，跟住就燒爆咗我哋啲玻璃，啲火想湧入嚟，即係我第一時間就喺個廁所嗰度，咁我就嘗試用個花灑嗰條喉嚟用水嚟救，但係好犀利啲火，搶得好犀利。跟住到我大房嗰度，因為嗰個廁所同個大房喺隔離，又係咁樣嘅情形，咁我老婆見到好驚，就攞住我「走呀，走呀」，咁我話「好呀，好呀，走嘞，走嘞，冇得攞嘞，冇得攞嘞，救唔到呀。」咁我連手機又有攞，荷包又有攞，鎖匙又有，淨係攞咗條毛巾，兩公婆一人掩住個鼻走出去。走出去之後，就嗰條走廊好大煙，好大煙我老婆就好似好驚，又驚又盛。咁我哋走咗去——本應沿住嗰條樓梯落嘅，即係慣習嗰條樓梯落大堂嘅，點知我哋見到嗰面好大煙，同埋好似好多人，我哋就行咗嗰面個樓梯，即係行咗 203、204 嗰面個樓梯落。

杜淦堃資深大律師：呢個係落後門嘅，係咪？

周志偉先生：係，嗰條落後門嘅，但係我哋冇落到，我哋一路嗌，喺條樓——喺條走廊嗌「火燭呀，火燭呀」，拍隔離嗰啲街坊嗰啲屋，咁畀我哋拍到隔離嗰啲都有人——冇回

應，咁拍到嗰個 203 嗰個後生仔姓李嘅，就開門畀我入去，我兩公婆入去，我話「火燭呀，我哋快啲入嚟先，入嚟」，因為嗰陣時已經好大煙，我都頂唔順嘞，好咳呀，我哋跟住入咗去即刻門門，咁喺佢入面嗰度逗留咗都有兩三個鐘頭，咁我喺佢嗰度，喺佢間屋望出去就有呢啲，風平浪靜，冇乜事，因為佢嗰間屋同我嗰間屋係與我嘅--我係 7 號單位，佢係 3 號單位，咁即係打對角，佢嗰面應該未有咁嚴重。

咁之後，咁我話「火燭得好犀利，我哋好大煙，我都唔敢攞嘢，冇嘢，乜都有攞。」之後佢話「嘩，死喇，咁點呀？」咁佢就越嚟越驚咁樣，都係後生仔嚟嘅。我話「唔使驚㗎，大家後生，怕咩嘢呀？」咁，之後佢話--我就話「我哋唔會死喺呢度嘅」，我話「定啲㗎」，因為我平時都有做運動，我話「唔會死喺度㗎」，我話「快啲攞螺絲批嚟，拆晒啲窗花先」，我話「必要時，就擒出去竹棚嗰度落樓梯」，我話「出面出唔到去㗎嘞，好大煙呀」，我話「有可能係著咗火呀，下面嗰度」，我話「喺窗口走」，咁之後就拆完窗就見到有火燭車喺佢嗰度樓下嗰度，即係大約有 50 米嘍，有火燭車，有幾個嗰啲消防員喺度行行下咁樣。我哋猛拍啲玻璃，拍到手都痛埋，我話「救人，救命，救命」咁樣，佢就睇我哋唔到，樓底嗰個姓李嗰個戶主又開埋閃光燈照佢哋，等跟住讓畀佢睇到，都係睇唔到，拍到後--樓底，咁我話「唔好嘞」，我話「如果好似而家我望過斜對面間屋」，即係應該嗰度係 6 號單位，就開始有火，我話「死嘞，越嚟越逼埋嚟㗎」，我話「唔好嘞，李仔」，我話「我哋戴晒帽，著厚啲嘅衫，着埋鞋，綁緊啲自己，必要時喺樓--喺窗門出去」，我話「嗰啲消防員睇我哋唔到呀」，樓底後期就我哋--我老婆就嘗試係咁拍啲玻璃，拍得好犀利，拍到樓底後期好似畀佢睇到，睇到㗎，之後點，...

杜淦堃資深大律師：「畀佢睇到」即係畀邊個睇到？

周志偉先生：睇到我哋有人喺度叫救命呀。

杜淦堃資深大律師：畀係消防員睇到，係咪？

周志偉先生：睇到我哋，咁嗰個消防員都好醒目，即刻同啲同僚講，係咪？「喂，嗰度叫救命㗎」，咁我哋話，我哋就打開個窗，佢都聽到我哋講嘢嘅應該，咁我哋就話「救命，救命，我呢度出唔到去，我哋出面火燭」，咁佢就伸支長臂猿，跟住我哋見到嗰支係有長臂猿嚟嘅，伸支長臂猿埋去我哋嗰個 203 個窗口嗰度，我哋逐個爬出去，爬出去，逐個逐個救落嚟，就畀佢啡到成身都濕晒，逐個逐個，只可以--每一次只可以載一個人，三次喇。

同埋有一件好感動，啱啱未爬出去之前，我話「李生，你唔好唔出嚟」，我話「你話晒你都係喺嗰度救咗我，我都係喺你嗰度暫避」，我話「你唔好唔出嚟」，咁佢就喺個電話度講咗啲好感人嘅嘢，打畀佢老婆，佢話「老婆，你睇住啲細路呀，我同你道別呀」，諗住要死喺嗰度，我話「唔使驚㗎」，我話「我哋最多喺度爬落去㗎，佢--消防睇我哋唔到我哋咪爬落去囉，我哋嗰度 2 樓咋嘛，2 樓咋嘛，嗰度爬落去唔死得嘅」我話。之後消防就搵一啲長臂猿救咗我哋落去地下嗰

1 度，件事就咁樣。

2 杜淦堃資深大律師：明白。呢個係火警當日個...

3 周志偉先生：當日嘅現場，係嘅。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問番你嘅火燭之前，你有嘅屋苑度行，途徑一啲位置係望到 1 樓天
5 井，係咪？

6 周志偉先生：望唔到嘅。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你出面都望唔到，你意思係？

8 周志偉先生：望唔到，淨係可以望到嗰啲街景，即係我哋出面係園景嚟嘅，即係望到吐露港
9 單車徑嘅。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：我唔係講緊你嘅單位裏面，你有出出入入，係咪？

11 周志偉先生：係。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇個屋苑度行下？

13 周志偉先生：有。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：你嘅屋苑行下嘅時候，你係唔係曾經見過嗰個天井嘅情況？

15 周志偉先生：天井嘅情況就咁樣，通常嗰啲天井嘅情況就係嗰啲工人嘅嗰度出出入入嘅，因
16 為我哋大堂嗰度就即係唔畀佢嘅嗰度出入，因為佢又攞住啲架生，呢度又繩又嘢，
17 佢就通常就係嗰條後樓梯嗰度出入嘅，同埋嗰個天井嗰度出入。咁又點解呢，我又
18 補充番一句，我哋開個窗出去望呢，佢個工作台，即係佢搭咗棚，就好多垃圾
19 嘅，嗰個垃圾一路環繞住--佢又攞紙皮石，啲紙皮石咪搵咗啲紙皮嘅，咪掉到咁
20 咁都係，成個竹棚都係，佢就有清掃嘅，佢就一層推落一層，我哋低層吓嘛，佢係
21 上面掉落嚟，變咗我哋低層咪好似個垃圾崗咁囉，個天井咪堆晒好似個山仔咁囉，
22 佢一食煙，啲煙頭掉落去，我就唔話佢喇，即係就係起火，就係食煙嘅應該就，一
23 炳著就全部燒，由我哋嗰度低層一路燒上去。

24 杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以話畀委員會知--講清楚少少，你頭先講嘅紙皮石，跟住另外
25 仲係你話有啲紙皮嘅，係咪？嗰啲紙皮係做紙皮石工程嘅時候，你見到一層層跌落
26 嚟嘅，係咪？

27 周志偉先生：嗰啲紙皮石就係佢未鋪上去就叨住塊紙皮嘅，即係一呎丁方嘅，咁當佢攞咗落
28 埗牆，佢就濕咗水㗎嘛，咁佢要搵番塊紙皮出嚟，搵番出嚟咪好多紙皮，好多嗰啲
29 紙皮石啲紙皮，咪掉到工作台咁咁咁都係。同埋佢哋食咗，啲餐具、飯盒、水掉到
30 咁咁咁都係，我哋見到佢咁多垃圾嘅，咁後期就火燭。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔該晒你，周先生，我有其他問題。

32 周志偉先生：好，好，好。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我有其他問題。

34 陸啟康法官：有冇其他涉事方想問問題？

35 周志偉先生：就問我，係咪？

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇其他嘢想同委員會講或者？

周志偉先生：就咁樣，我就覺得呢個大維修導致今次火燭，即係個問題癥結都有幾樣嘢，一來嗰個管理處嗰個火警鐘唔響，完全唔響，我亦聽唔到有火燭車聲，聽唔到嘅，即係我係實話實講，聽唔到。但係唔知係咪我位置嘅問題，我嗰個單位望落去就有火燭車嘅，有可能嗰啲火燭車埋唔到去，就係嗰個姓李嗰個單位就望到。咁佢個消防鐘唔響呢，就對於我哋嚟逃生係好大問題嘅，我哋個個都唔知道，有啲仲馴緊覺。好似我隔離單位嗰個靚女，咁佢做保安嘅，都係嗰度燒死㗎。我隔離印傭同埋嗰個阿婆行動不便都——我嗰層都燒死㗎四個人咁樣。

即係令我最大感慨就係呢個立案法團，即係點解啲市民成日都投訴話即係啲人喺度食煙嘅，佢又置之不理；佢用發泡膠嘅，佢又唔理；仲有你分三期做大維修，點解一次過搭晒棚，佢又唔理。呢個姓徐嘅，我唔好講佢個名，佢姓徐嘅，佢未選嗰陣時，即係個舊法團喺度，話要推走佢哋，咁佢喺公園仔嗰度就舉手舉腳，又點樣着埋制服。當佢選㗎之後佢即係變㗎第二個人，兩面人，即係唔知係唔係受到有好處呢啲，我估㗎。咁就完全當啲市民講嗰啲嘢完全都有表態、冇反映、冇做嘢，直情唔睬我哋，咁導致今次火燭佢都有好大責任嘅，同埋呢個管理處都好大責任，唔使講嗰個承建商都好多問題，咪係呀？就係咁，我所講嘅嘢就咁多。

陸啟康法官：有冇其他任何人想提問？如果有，就好多謝周生你今日出席畀證供，唔該晒你。

周志偉先生：好，好，多謝你哋。

12 時 47 分宏福苑居民證人周志偉先生作供完畢

12 時 48 分宏福苑居民證人黃盛勤先生開始作供

杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，下一位證人係黃盛勤先生。

陸啟康法官：唔該。

杜淦堃資深大律師：黃先生，你好。

黃盛勤先生：係，你好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你讀出你前面嘅聲明。

黃盛勤先生：好，好。本人黃盛勤聲明，本人所作的證供盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

杜淦堃資深大律師：黃先生，你好。

黃盛勤先生：你好。

杜淦堃資深大律師：請坐。資料顯示你係宏建閣 2108 號嘅居民？

黃盛勤先生：係，冇錯。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你幾時搬入宏福苑？

黃盛勤先生：應該差唔多 98 年左右，係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：我嘅理解係喺大廈大維修工程期間，其實你都有啲擔心嘅地方，亦都作

1 出咗過一啲投訴嘅，你可唔可以用呢個機會話畀委員會聽？

2 黃盛勤先生：係咁嘅，即係我個太太就佢曾經喺 2024 年嘅年尾，就喺我哋個廳個窗嘅出
3 面見到個煙頭嘅，咁佢影咗張相同個管理處嗰度反映，但係管理處嗰度就話會跟
4 進，但係之後都好似冇乜下文，主要係呢件嘢，其他其實就有乜。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你都有--如果你記得嘅話，你都有提過後喺樓梯嗰啲窗換咗嘅問題，你
6 可唔可以講一講？個生口嗰個問題。

7 黃盛勤先生：生口嘅問題，嗰個窗嗰度就好似換咗啲木板係釘咗即係原本喺窗嘅位置，其實
8 當時我都唔係太為意嘅，因為我哋諗住佢哋可能係即係需要喺嗰度做一啲工程，可
9 能臨時嗰啲木板遮住嗰個窗位，所以嗰樣嘢我有咩嘢行動。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：講番火警當日，你係點樣首先發現有火警？

11 黃盛勤先生：當日初初就聽到樓下啲乒鈴嘖啲聲，我初初以為係樓下收啲舊家私喺度
12 搬嘢啲聲，乒鈴嘖啲。跟住過咗一陣間，我就聞到好似膠燒著啲味，跟住我就
13 試下開個窗去睇，但係都睇唔到啲乜嘢，因為啲網遮住咗。跟住但係個味道就好似
14 都幾大嘅，咁我打電話，根據個電話紀錄就 3 點 14 分，11 月 26 號打咗兩個電話
15 畀管理處，但係都係打唔通，當時兩個電話都打唔通。跟住有幾耐，應該一兩分鐘
16 之後，我隔離個王（譯音）太，就 2107 單位嗰個王太佢就拍我個門，佢同我講
17 話佢個廚房出面有火苗，跟住我當時好驚，做乜有火苗咁大件事，我就推開個門
18 就出去，同王太去佢個廚房嗰度睇下咩嘢事，見到出面真係有啲火喺嗰個網度燒
19 下燒下，嗰個 size 我都提過，就係差唔多即係 10cm 乘 10cm 約莫咁大，有幾處
20 嘅。

21 跟住我同王太拿拿聲去嗰個消防喉嘅位置，即係我哋個層樓嗰個走廊嗰個消防
22 喉嘅位置拉個條條消防喉，跟住打開消防喉個頭嗰個掣，冇水，跟住就又到嗰個消
23 防喉嗰度睇下，即係拉消防喉出嚟嗰個箱嗰度睇睇有啲咩嘢可以開關諸有此類嘅
24 嘢，跟住發覺嗰度真係有個水龍頭，扭咗之後都係冇水，跟住我哋就去咗廚房，有
25 個水喉，咁就揮啲水倒出去，但係都有乜作用。後畀王太嚟出面就搵咗即係嗰個滅
26 火筒返嚟，滅火筒本身佢本身有個釘嘅，其實我都唔係好識用，但係好彩王太佢識
27 得將個釘唔知點樣搵開咗跟住我哋就將個滅火筒對住嗰啲火係咁嘖嘖嘖嘖嘖，就差
28 唔多全部都嘖熄咗，但係就遠處嗰啲應該係 2106 號單位嗰邊都係有啲火苗，嗰邊
29 嗰啲我哋就救唔到，同埋嗰個滅火筒入面嗰啲液體都嘖晒出嚟，冇嘢可以嘖到出
30 嚟，大致係咁。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：嘖唔到嘞，你用晒嘞...

32 黃盛勤先生：冇晒即係嗰啲嘢嘞。

33 杜淦堃資深大律師：...之後你點做？

34 黃盛勤先生：之後我哋搵啲水--揮啲水去--睇下可唔可以用啲水即係整到呢個火嗰邊，睇下
35 可唔可以即係滅咗啲火佢。

36 杜淦堃資深大律師：跟住呢？

1 黃盛勤先生：跟住王太佢就搵咗——喺佢個廁所嗰度搵咗花灑出嚟，跟住駁落去嗰個廚房嗰
2 個水龍頭，跟住唔夠力噴唔到，跟住王太佢屋企人就打電話畀佢，佢講完個電話之
3 後，佢就同我講，佢話佢屋企人叫佢拿拿聲走。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係唔係同佢一齊走跟住？

5 黃盛勤先生：我哋各自返屋企執嘢，即係諗住如果係火燭，萬一如果係著起上嚟，即係睇下
6 屋企有冇輕擊嗰啲同埋貴重嗰啲拿拿聲拎走。

7 杜淦堃資深大律師：你係點走㗎？

8 黃盛勤先生：我係經後樓梯行落去。我走之前我有揸王太即係隔離佢個鐘，因為當時我以為
9 佢喺屋企執嘢，點知佢冇反應，所以我就知道佢可能已經係自己行咗落去，跟住我
10 就沿住我哋嗰個電梯大堂嗰個走廊就行，即係一路行經隔離嗰啲，就揸嗰啲鐘，冇
11 人反應，跟住我就行咗落去，即係沿住個樓梯一路行落去。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：你沿住樓梯喺宏建樓行落去，有冇煙樓梯？

13 黃盛勤先生：樓梯冇煙嘅，當時冇煙嘅，同埋都睇到樓梯級嘅，我就冇留意係燈光定係乜
14 嘢，但係就係我行落去都好順利嘅，冇煙嘅。但係我當時有戴個口罩，我落到大堂
15 嗰陣時——唔係，我出咗去火場之後，攞個口罩出嚟，發覺個口罩黑咁咁嘅。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：我想問下你，你講唔講到畀我哋聽你係幾時開始逃走嘅，離開你個單
17 位？

18 黃盛勤先生：個時間我就係跟番嗰個電話紀錄嗰度，就係我當時執嘢嗰陣時就約莫 3 點 43
19 分，前前後後嗰五分至十分鐘，跟住因為嗰陣時我個仔有打過電話畀我嘅，佢叫我
20 儘快走。我就 4 點 20 分就出咗火場，就走嘅時間我估計應該係 4 點 10 分鐘左
21 右，離開我屋企 21 樓，離開宏建閣 21 樓。4 點 20 分嗰陣時我就行到去隔離嗰個
22 廣福邨商場嗰邊，我就打咗個電話同我個仔報平安。

23 杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你。

24 黃盛勤先生：係。

25 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇其他嘢同委員會講？用呢個機會。

26 黃盛勤先生：其他居民都差唔多講晒嗰啲嘢，我想講佢哋講晒。

27 杜淦堃資深大律師：多謝你。主席。

28 陸啟康法官：請問其他涉事方有冇其他提問？如果有嘅，黃生。

29 黃盛勤先生：係。

30 陸啟康法官：非常多謝你今日能夠出席，你嘅證供對我哋調查非常之有用。

31 杜淦堃資深大律師：法官閣下，我諗我哋可以晝晝繼續。

32 陸啟康法官：我哋押後到下晝 2 點 15 分。

34 12 時 29 分宏福苑居民證人周志偉先生作供完畢

36 12 時 59 分聆訊押後

1 14 時 15 分聆訊恢復

2
3 陸啟康法官：係，杜律師。

4 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，今日最後一位嚟協助我哋嘅居民係王惠琛。

5
6 14 時 16 分宏福苑居民證人王惠琛先生開始作供

7
8 杜淦堃資深大律師：王先生，你好。

9 王惠琛先生：係。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：王先生，你面前有一份聲明，麻煩你企起身讀出嚟。

11 王惠琛先生：本人王惠琛聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

12 杜淦堃資深大律師：麻煩你。

13 陸啟康法官：請坐，王生。

14 杜淦堃資深大律師：王先生，資料顯示你係住喺宏建閣樓 1807 室，係咪？

15 王惠琛先生：係。

16 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有咩屋企人係同住㗎？

17 王惠琛先生：我太太同我。

18 杜淦堃資深大律師：火警發生當日，你係首先點樣發現有火警嘅呢？

19 王惠琛先生：嗰日大概 3 點鐘到，我太太就話聽到好多嘈雜聲，「霹靂拍嘞」聲，咁我仲同
20 佢講話「係咪嗰啲建築公司倒嗰啲廢料，成日都倒嗰啲廢料，霹靂拍嘞聲㗎咁」，
21 佢話「唔係㗎，有燂味㗎咁，同埋好多警車啲火燭車嗰啲聲，就停咗我哋樓下」，
22 我就喺個廳度開窗望出去睇下咩嘢事，咁就睇到對面宏盛閣大概 10 樓至 12 樓度有
23 啲火，就係--跟住我再望去宏昌嗰邊好多煙，同埋嗰啲棚網嗰啲火屑就全部飛去宏
24 昌嗰邊--飛去宏盛嗰邊 10 至 12 樓。咁我太太就喺房望向宏泰--宏昌嗰邊，個窗
25 度開窗一睇佢話嗰度，佢話「哎吔，嗰度燒--火燭燒呀」咁，嗰啲火就已經燒到差
26 唔多成 10 樓至 12 樓之間。咁我同太太講話「好危險，啲火屎周圍飛」。跟住就門
27 窗，問好晒啲窗，跟住同太太講「你唔好喺度--留低喺度，你不如，你落街睇喇」
28 咁樣。咁跟住我哋落街。

29 杜淦堃資深大律師：你同佢一齊落，係咪呀？

30 王惠琛先生：兩個一齊落，即刻出去搭𨋖，搭𨋖落，落去大概三點兩個字嘅，行到出門口，
31 就見啲消防員已經喺宏建閣對出嗰個消防栓嗰度準備開喉救嘅，佢第一次--我見啲
32 消防員擰個掣開係冇水出嘅。我同我太太一路行，一路行就行到去公園中間嘅就
33 擰番轉頭就望下，就影咗幾幅相，影咗啲（English Spoken）。咁啲火就一路
34 已經燒，宏昌嗰度，第一次影相嘅時間都仲係 16、17 樓嘅嘅，跟住多一兩分鐘
35 啲火已經燒到好犀利，燒到上頂。咁我就一路行，行到去出面巴士站嗰度望番轉
36 頭，一路一路睇，到三點四個字嘅，好似係啲風向又變，啲風由宏昌嗰邊吹去宏

泰，咁就有啲火，即係棚網嗰啲碎連埋啲火就已經炳著咗宏泰高層嘅地方，有啲已經吹咗去宏建，咁我話「死喇，又燒埋我哋嗰層喇」咁講。咁亦都最始見到即係消防喉開到就水射到，射到喺宏建大約我住嗰層，咁上下嘅位置嘅最多，即係只係射到嗰個位置，咁我就個心好似定啲咁，因為我以為即係已經消防喉開始救喇已經，因為嗰段時間啲水--個水泵車喺宏福--即係宏--廣福邨巴士站隔離嗰度嗰個水龍頭嗰度駁水，一路駁到入去開到水射，咁我睇到三點半，我就下晝要去覆診。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你提到你聽到消防車嘅聲？

王惠琛先生：係，係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇聽過火警鐘嘅聲？喺你個棟。

王惠琛先生：冇。

杜淦堃資深大律師：你可唔可以講到畀我哋聽，你落樓嘅時間大概係幾多點？

王惠琛先生：三點一個幾字嘅，唔，唔。

杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。你走嘅時候有冇--你棟大廈裏面你有冇聞到--再聞到有煙味或者睇到有煙？

王惠琛先生：冇。

杜淦堃資深大律師：落到到電梯大堂嗰個情況，我哋回一回帶，返去較早前嘅情況，係咪好多人走緊，亂唔亂呢個陣？

王惠琛先生：聽唔到。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係咪好多人走緊呢你去--你走嘅時候，亂唔亂呢？

王惠琛先生：係，已經有好多人離開座大廈，嗰個看更都開晒個大閘等啲人即係唔使揸掣即刻可以出去，亦都有消防員入嚟我哋嗰座好似。

杜淦堃資深大律師：好喇，我想講一講番火警之前，大維修期間。

王惠琛先生：係。

杜淦堃資深大律師：喺大維修期間，你有冇啲咩嘢嘅觀察令到你擔心火警安全嘅問題呢？

王惠琛先生：之後係--之後我有個（English Spoken）囉，就係我有好多次都有參加嗰啲解說會。

杜淦堃資深大律師：火警之前呢？

王惠琛先生：火警之前，火警之前。

杜淦堃資深大律師：係。

王惠琛先生：咁佢有一次解說會就話，即係第一個就講話分三期進行大維修，咁先做一座，睇下個情況點樣，跟住再做其他，做完之後先再做埋咁樣。我心諗咪要做成兩年囉咁樣，以我咁計條數，呢個第一點。第二點就佢話要封窗，因為要保護啲窗，即係驚鑿磚仔嘅時間會撞爛啲窗或者整花啲窗，咁封窗嘅時間會用一啲叫鋁塑板，我話鋁塑板係咩嘢嚟（口架）？當時宏業就有個人畀塊板，灰色嘅鋁塑板嘅嘢，咁我話「咩嘢係鋁塑板嚟㗎？」咁當時嗰個--宏業有個人就畀番一板係嗰啲灰色嘅一個板，鋁塑板，就話會用呢啲愛嚟做護個窗㗎咁。但係一到封窗嘅時間就全部變晒發

1 泡膠，咁呢個我已經有個擔心。咁但係即係--跟住屋苑裏面已經好多人已經討論呢
2 樣嘢，所以我有參與討論，呢個就已經係之後嘅嘢嚟喇已經。

3 杜淦堃資深大律師：棚網嘅問題你哋當時有冇討論過或者有冇作出過投訴呢？

4 王惠琛先生：都有。

5 杜淦堃資深大律師：你有冇留意到啲棚網有冇咩嘢特別嘅地方，你想講畀委員會聽？

6 王惠琛先生：棚網係經過兩次，十號風球打風爛咗棚網補棚網之後，我就已經有發覺啲棚
7 網有啲補番嚟啲係顏色唔同，同埋佢補呢就好技巧地喺中間補嘅，即係唔係由頂
8 到底嘅，係中間咁一段補到去 5、6 樓就停嘞，一段一段咁樣補，就唔係由頂到底
9 嘅咁樣。

10 杜淦堃資深大律師：唔。我有其他問題，多謝你，王先生。

11 王惠琛先生：係。

12 陸啟康法官：有冇其他人，涉事方想提問？如果有嘅，王先生，好多謝你今日嚟畀證供，多
13 謝你。

14 王惠琛先生：其實即係我--即係呢件事仲有一個--即係仲有幾個問題囉，即係我心裏面成日
15 覺得。第一個就係個顧問公司個問題，第二個就係嗰個授權票嘅問題。由對上兩
16 屆，即係鄧國權最後做嗰屆選立案法團嘅時間，有幾個委員啲票係一模一樣嘅，
17 即係我哋--即係選票唔係計戶數口架嘛，係計單位幾多㗎，即係一個 unit 係十
18 四，一啲十六咁樣，有三個委員係一模一樣嘅，五千幾嘅，全部即係已經配咗票。
19 咁再到顧問公司，即係我有疑問就係話請鴻毅做顧問公司，即係\$22 萬--做一個顧
20 問公司，一萬幾千釐做一個顧問公司，即係咁平㗎咁樣，做到啲乜嘢呢咁樣。到由
21 鋁塑板到八座一齊維修，呢個咁嘅排列，顧問公司就--第一就講話「咁樣咪減--縮
22 短咗個施工期，咁你哋唔使焗住焗咁耐囉」咁樣。即係個顧問公司全部即係只係會
23 偏向嗰個建築公司嗰方面。

24 你話圍標個問題，上個禮拜先話畀人告嗰個，其中一間偉豪（譯音）--其實喺
25 宏福苑裏面而家居民揀最高票就係宏業，第二高票就是偉豪。即係其實圍標一個問
26 題，第二就係配票，即係擺晒啲授權票，然後啲咩嘢配票。即係點樣都會圍標啲
27 啲，同埋鴻毅（English Spoken）嗰個合約，咁佢會唔會可以隱藏咗一啲屋苑
28 暗嘅問題，留番中標嗰間公司，之後就話發現呢個問題，發現嗰個問題，就可以加
29 呢樣、加嗰樣，就擺埋即係嗰個維修裏面有 5%（English Spoken）儲備嘅。可
30 以擺埋嗰個，好似話鏟啲牆嘅時間，發覺啲橫眉裏面有啲崩，即係想掘埋啲嚟
31 錢，即係個顧問公司嗰個角色其實喺個大維修裏面，點樣去監察住呢樣嘢囉。即係
32 嗰個會唔會係一個中間人，佢擺咗--即係佢係擺到晒呢一啲內幕嘅資料去
33 （English Spoken）一張（English Spoken）然後點去派--配票，即係呢
34 個我一路都係有（English Spoken）呢樣嘢，去問，咁其實都有途徑去問。即
35 係我一路都係講，（English Spoken）呢樣，但係有--有任何途徑去發表。係
36 咁多。

1 陸啟康法官：有冇其他嘢，其他涉事方有提問？有嘅話，王先生好多謝你。

2 王惠琛先生：多謝。

3 陸啟康法官：你嘅證供會對我哋嘅調查好有幫助嘅。

4 王惠琛先生：Okay，唔該晒。

5 陸啟康法官：唔該。

6

7 14 時 29 分宏福苑居民證人王惠琛先生作供完畢

8

9 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，我哋...

10 陸啟康法官：係，杜律師。

11 杜淦堃資深大律師：主席，今日晏晝我哋安排咗三位 Victory Fire 宏泰嘅僱員嚟作供
12 嘅，呢三位證人會係李大律師去處理。

13 李澍桓大律師：主席，下一位證人係黃健華先生。係，黃先生，喺你面前應該有一張聲明詞
14 嘅。

15 黃健華先生：見到。

16 李澍桓大律師：麻煩你企起身讀出聲明。

17

18 14 時 30 分宏泰消防工程有限公司電工證人黃健華先生開始作供

19

20 黃健華先生：本人黃健華聲明，本人所作的證供，盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

21 李澍桓大律師：好，請坐。黃先生，我哋知道你係一間叫做宏泰消防工程嘅一個雇員，係
22 咪？

23 黃健華先生：係。

24 李澍桓大律師：你嘅職位其實就係一個電工。

25 黃健華先生：係。

26 李澍桓大律師：咁而呢間公司呢，我哋知道應該直接啲講老闆就應該係一位叫鍾傑文先生，
27 係咪？

28 黃健華先生：係，係。

29 李澍桓大律師：就住宏福苑大火嘅今次呢個事件呢，我哋知道你係第一，首先係向警方曾經
30 作出過一份口供嘅，係咪？

31 黃健華先生：係。

32 李澍桓大律師：另外，你亦都因應今次呢個聽證會向獨立委員會就提供過一份書面嘅供詞，
33 係咪？

34 黃健華先生：係。

35 李澍桓大律師：我相信呢兩份口供，即係畀警方嘅又好，畀獨立委員會嘅又好，你都可以確
36 認入面講嘅嘢係以你所知係準確真實，係咪？

- 1 黃健華先生：係。
- 2 李澍桓大律師：先認識多你同埋公司多少少先。
- 3 黃健華先生：好呀。
- 4 李澍桓大律師：等我哋知道宏泰消防嗰個角色，剛才所講你就係電工，就應該係 2010 年加
- 5 入宏泰消防。
- 6 黃健華先生：大約，係嘞。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：你應該同樣地做電嘅呢，其實仲有一位可能年資冇你咁長嘅同事，就叫做李
- 8 俊賢先生，係咪？
- 9 黃健華先生：李俊賢，係。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：李俊賢，佢都係做電工。可唔可以咁講，你就係李先生嘅主管？
- 11 黃健華先生：可以嘅。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：正如我剛才所講話鍾先生就係宏泰消防嘅老闆。
- 13 黃健華先生：僱主，係嘞。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：主要日常嗰個工作嘅安排係咪都係鍾先生畀指示你，然後你再做進一步嘅
- 15 安排？
- 16 黃健華先生：唔可以話係全部。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 18 黃健華先生：係嘞，有時鍾生會同公司個小姐會可能要約啲客戶嘅時間，啲啲我未必知嘅。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 20 黃健華先生：我諗係大約知道最近幾日，或者——唔係，未來幾日或者下個禮拜嘅工作，我就
- 21 會自己去諗一諗，睇下點樣安排咁樣。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：係咪應該你講「公司嗰位小姐」係咪一位張...
- 23 黃健華先生：嘉敏。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：張嘉敏小姐，係咪呀？
- 25 黃健華先生：張小姐，係嘞。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：我哋知道宏泰消防就住宏福苑嗰個工作方面呢，佢應該係 2016 年開始，就
- 27 有參與宏福苑消防裝備嘅年檢工作嘅。
- 28 黃健華先生：實際年份我唔係好記得，我諗大約都有十年八年呢個時間。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：一定唔係 2025 年先開始喇，係咪呀？
- 30 黃健華先生：係，係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：因為根據鍾先生畀我哋資料，就應該係 2016 年開始，就除咗 2024 年嗰一
- 32 年之外呢，去到 2025 年都係由宏泰消防負責去做年檢嘅？
- 33 黃健華先生：應該係。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：你可唔可以都確認，即係其實你就唔係 2025 年先至第一次接觸宏福苑嗰個
- 35 工程？
- 36 黃健華先生：可以，可以確認。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：即係你之前都一路有參與嗰個年檢嘅工作，係咪？
- 2 黃健華先生：有，有。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：所以可唔可以咁理解？你其實對於宏福苑嗰個消防嘅設備呢，其實你都有一
- 4 定嘅認識嘅，係咪？
- 5 黃健華先生：可以。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：唔，我就只係識啲皮毛嘅啫，所以我睇下我嘅理解，你話番畀我知，我嘅理
- 7 解啱唔啱嘞。
- 8 黃健華先生：Okay。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：喺一個--譬如以宏福苑住宅樓宇為例呢，其實有兩套嘅所謂消防裝備嘅，一
- 10 套就似乎個講法就應該係咪叫做主動式嘅一個消防裝備，即係例如喉轆、警鐘呢啲
- 11 咁樣嘅裝備，係咪呀？
- 12 黃健華先生：係。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：另一個就當然係我哋所理解，應該就叫做被動式，即係話可能係啲防火門、
- 14 樓梯要幾闊、後樓梯要幾闊，呢啲就係屬於一啲建築結構上面要處理嘅，係咪呀？
- 15 黃健華先生：係。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：所以喺宏泰消防去做年檢嘅工作呢，主要就係...
- 17 黃健華先生：主動式。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：...主動式啲啲警鐘、喉轆呀啲啲咁嘅情況嘅，係咪？
- 19 黃健華先生：係。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：因為正如我所講，我哋知嘅，起碼我本人就好皮毛嘅啫，所以我想就住呢個
- 21 主動式嘅呢啲消防裝備，透過黃生你幫一幫我哋去了解每一個地方嘅啲啲作用，好
- 22 唔好呀？
- 23 黃健華先生：可以。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：我一陣間會同埋畀啲相你睇嘅。不過，我想先確認就係當你去做年檢嘅時
- 25 候，係咪你都有個習慣就係如果發覺邊度有問題，需要可能係報告要更換嘅呢，你
- 26 都會影低張相嘅，係咪？
- 27 黃健華先生：正常係嘅。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：所以2025年我哋知道宏泰消防就喺3月24到26號呢幾日入面做咗--替宏
- 29 福苑八座大廈入面做咗個消防裝備嘅年檢，係咪？
- 30 黃健華先生：係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：期間你亦都有影咗一啲相，做咗一啲報告就話邊啲設備需要更換，係咪？
- 32 黃健華先生：係。
- 33 李澍桓大律師：嗰個消防裝備，我想由天台開始講起，好唔好呀？
- 34 黃健華先生：可以。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：天台，我哋知道就應該有一個叫做消防水缸嘅，係咪？
- 36 黃健華先生：係。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：呢個消防水缸顧名思義就係愛嚟儲水嘅。
- 2 黃健華先生：係。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：你記唔記得呢個消防水缸，以我喺現場去過睇過呢，你 31 樓再上一層就係
- 4 個天台，係咪？
- 5 黃健華先生：天面。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：佢哋叫天面。但係個水缸就唔係直接喺個天面上面嘅，因為佢仲有另一個建
- 7 構物呢，就要上幾條樓梯，先至去到個水缸嘅。
- 8 黃健華先生：係，上幾層樓梯再要擒條貓梯先到個水缸面。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 10 黃健華先生：係喇。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：我想問呢個水缸係純粹消防水缸，即係咁樣架高咗，定還是我哋知道有--
- 12 應該仲有食水缸、鹹水缸㗎係咪上面？
- 13 黃健華先生：現場係有嘅，但係食水缸同鹹水缸我就有細心去留意，我知道係有嘅。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：係。所以我個理解就係其實嗰個--即係天面嗰個消防水缸呢，就唔係直接貼
- 15 住 31 樓嗰個天花板嘅？
- 16 黃健華先生：係。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：呢個我未有相畀你睇嘅，不過跟住落嚟，由天台落去樓層，就開始有啲相片
- 18 我想你幫一幫手確認一下。
- 19 黃健華先生：可以。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：我先講樓層嘅走廊，如果我用宏志閣為例，即係 H 座。
- 21 黃健華先生：唔。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：首先或者我哋睇一睇嗰個文件冊 R1 / 第 238 頁，喺你面前嗰個螢光幕都應該
- 23 會睇到。
- 24 黃健華先生：Okay，好。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：首先，第一個所謂消防設備就係火警鐘，係咪呀？
- 26 黃健華先生：係。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：火警鐘，如果我哋跟住睇 237 頁。
- 28 黃健華先生：237 頁。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：我哋會轉㗎喇。
- 30 黃健華先生：Okay。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：237 頁我哋見到底下嗰兩張相，我哋就見到所謂有一個叫做「拎手」，係咪
- 32 呀？
- 33 黃健華先生：係。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：呢個其實就係如果喺火警嘅時候呢，你就係去將佢揸著佢，就觸發嗰個火警
- 35 警報，係咪咁樣？
- 36 黃健華先生：係，打爛塊玻璃佢就正常就會響。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：我哋見到其實有兩種，左手邊嗰種 24 樓嗰個呢，就應該係塊玻璃嘅，係咪
2 呀？
- 3 黃健華先生：唔，唔。
- 4 李澍桓大律師：就要敲爛塊玻璃先至觸及到嗰個掣，係咪呀？
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：另外，右手邊 30 樓嗰個呢，就應該係就咁樣係冇玻璃，就咁樣掣嘅？
- 7 黃健華先生：都有玻璃嘅，有玻璃㗎，都有玻璃。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：都有玻璃嘅？
- 9 黃健華先生：係㗎。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：其實嗰塊玻璃係咩嘢作用㗎？
- 11 黃健華先生：嗰個玻璃其實佢就係我哋叫做頂住一個叫（English Spoken）掣，一個
12 掣，係，當塊玻璃爛，個掣彈咗出嚟，咁就會令到個消防泵行，同埋個警鐘會響。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：即係話其實你唔需要另外再掣，只要塊玻璃一爛咗，個掣一彈出嚟，即係
14 嗰個控制嘅方式就唔係話掣個掣落去，係等個掣彈出嚟，係咪咁？
- 15 黃健華先生：可以咁講，因為個--兩個拎手嗰個方法會有少少唔同，但大致上個原理就係咁
16 樣。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：呢個警鐘同埋個--即係火警鐘同埋個拎手，我哋都知道都喺走廊嗰個...
- 18 黃健華先生：喉轆位附近，係。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：跟住再睇如果第 234 頁，234 我哋就見到右下角嗰個 2 樓嗰度，我哋見到
20 有部分就係呢個喉轆，係咪？
- 21 黃健華先生：係。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：咁如果喉轆，我哋睇 235 頁，另外仲有包含住有啲唔同嘅部分嘅。如果我哋
23 睇 235 頁，呢個影入去就係喉轆嘅部分，我哋右手邊，基本上呢度四張相都係講
24 緊，右手邊就比較清晰，就係有一個叫做閘掣，呢個其實就係即係或者俗話所講嘅
25 「蓮花掣」，係咪？
- 26 黃健華先生：我諗我叫--我比較會稱--常叫就叫閘掣。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：呢個就基本上長期應該開住泵水嘅？
- 28 黃健華先生：長期關嘅。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：長期關嘅。如果當有火警要用呢個喉轆嘅時候，咁我哋知道就如果睇 237
30 頁，右上角就有一個叫做射嘴，呢個就嚟住嗰個喉轆嗰條喉嘅。
- 31 黃健華先生：係。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：咁究竟應該係我就咁樣開呢個喉轆，係咪呢個噴嘴會有一個掣畀我開，就會
33 射水出嚟？定要開個閘掣？
- 34 黃健華先生：要先開閘掣，跟住--咁開個閘掣，咁呢個喉轆條膠喉就會沖咗水入去，正常個
35 泵行嘅情況下就會加壓，咁先會有水壓入咗個喉轆，跟住就將條喉轆拉到去個火場
36 附近，或者你想去救個火嗰個位置，跟住先開個射嘴，咁啲水就會噴出嚟。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：係，所以個閘掣就平時應該係停咗個供水嘅？
- 2 黃健華先生：係，長門嘅。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：有火警嘅時候，就使用嘅話就要自己手動去開？
- 4 黃健華先生：要自己手動開，係。
- 5 李澍桓大律師：同樣地，喉轆嘅呢一組設備，都係喺走廊，應該就喺個水錶房或者有個水錶
- 6 箱上面嘅？
- 7 黃健華先生：係。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：呢個就講緊走廊，跟住我想睇一睇後樓梯，就睇可能——我哋要睇宏道閣第
- 9 200 頁有一張相，第 200 頁我哋左上角就見到有個 17 樓嗰個，其實係影緊部分一
- 10 個叫做消防栓，係咪？
- 11 黃健華先生：係。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：呢個就其實係每一層嘅後樓梯都有嘅，係咪？
- 13 黃健華先生：係。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：個作用就係當消防員要入去火場，入咗大廈入面救火，佢哋可能要擲水嘅時
- 15 候就會喺後樓梯嘅呢個消防栓度擲水喇？
- 16 黃健華先生：係。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：所以如果個消防栓係有損壞，好似你呢度所講，話有啲膠圈要損壞，咁同樣
- 18 地都係由年檢時候要睇埋，然後之後就要跟住作出一個修補嘅？
- 19 黃健華先生：係。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：咁呢個就講緊樓層。
- 21 黃健華先生：唔㗎。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：好，咁我跟住落嚟就想問一問你關於地下，因為地下似乎就好似比較多啲唔
- 23 同嘅一啲裝備要做年檢嘅。
- 24 黃健華先生：唔。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：咁首先我想你睇一睇一個關於叫做水泵嘅問題，喺地下嗰度係咪有一個叫做—
- 26 —所謂叫做上水泵嘅機器、裝置？
- 27 黃健華先生：係。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：呢個上水泵以我嘅理解其實就係將喺地下，如果嗰個天面嘅嗰個消防水缸用
- 29 咗啲水，佢低過某一個水位嘅話，咁當然就要補充番啲水上去，因為佢係供應個喉
- 30 轆出水救火㗎嘛？
- 31 黃健華先生：你指係天台個消防缸？
- 32 李澍桓大律師：天台嗰個消防缸。
- 33 黃健華先生：係。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：所以就要喺地下嘅上水泵就扯啲水上去天面，去注滿番呢一個消防水缸，係
- 35 咪？
- 36 黃健華先生：係，係。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：所以如果--而個天面嗰個水缸係咪有個裝置就有個浮波跌咗去某一個水位嘅
2 話，其實就會自動啟動呢個上水泵，再泵啲水上番去，正常運作嘅情況之下？
- 3 黃健華先生：係，有個叫做豬膽掣或者係浮波。
- 4 李澍桓大律師：另外有一個就應該叫做加壓泵，消防嘅加壓泵，呢個就唔係上水泵嘅作用㗎
5 嘞？
- 6 黃健華先生：係。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：呢個加壓嘅消防泵係愛嚟做乜，就係當真係消防員嚟救火嘅時候，由於一般
8 我哋家用嘅水喉嗰個水力可能唔夠，所以就要開動呢一個加壓泵，加大個水壓，愛
9 嚟幫助救火嘅？
- 10 黃健華先生：可以咁講。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：係咪？即係一般嘅理解就係？
- 12 黃健華先生：係。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：一陣間我再返轉頭講番呢兩個水泵。呢啲水泵喺地下嘅呢啲水泵就有地方要
14 擺嘅，所以...
- 15 黃健華先生：Sorry，有地方？
- 16 李澍桓大律師：要搵地方擺㗎嘛。
- 17 黃健華先生：係，係。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：所以我第一樣嘢，我想先問你就有一個叫做泵房嘅地方，係咪？
- 19 黃健華先生：佢有兩--啱啱你所講嘅，消防上水泵同加壓泵，佢係分開兩個地方擺嘅。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：所以我想講嘅就係其實有兩個泵房嘅？
- 21 黃健華先生：係。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：係咪？我哋先睇一個我叫佢做普通嘅泵房先，好唔好？如果我哋睇第 B2 文
23 件冊/第 1883 頁。
- 24 陸啟康法官：B2。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋睇最頂嗰個，呢個就我哋由消防提供畀我哋嘅一啲資料，首先雖然
26 唔係影到成個，但係呢個就喺地下嘅一個--第一張相，最頂嗰張相，就係地下嘅嗰
27 個叫做運轉缸。
- 28 黃健華先生：係。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：消防嘅運轉缸，係咪？
- 30 黃健華先生：係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：中間嗰個，其實即係我哋睇到入面嘅一個情況，呢個其實就係天面所講嘅消
32 防缸？
- 33 黃健華先生：係。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：你見到 (English Spoken)
- 35 黃健華先生：(English Spoken)
- 36 李澍桓大律師：跟住下面嗰個，我哋見到就有一個叫做 (English Spoken)，其實應該

1 就係上水泵，係咪？

2 黃健華先生：係。

3 李澍桓大律師：呢一個就係普通嘅一個泵房入面嘅，係咪？

4 黃健華先生：係，佢同食水、咸水個上水泵都係同一個泵房。

5 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋再睇 C1 號文件冊 part 3，第 3 部分，C5 (h) 嗰度，我哋有啲
6 相，如果我哋睇 C5 (h) -2-5，應該係 1643 頁開始嘅。

7 陸啟康法官：C1-2。

8 李澍桓大律師：我諗如果簡單啲應該係 C1-2，就去到個頁碼就係 1643 開始，咁我哋見到
9 呢度就係嗰個所謂泵房嘅情況。如果我哋揭後一頁 1644，我哋見到就係泵房入面
10 嘅一啲其中一個角度睇到㗎喇。跟住再睇 1645 頁，呢個就係咪應該就係嗰個上水
11 泵嘅？

12 黃健華先生：呢個我睇應該唔似係消防上水泵。

13 李澍桓大律師：唔似？如果咁你睇呢個係一個乜嘢嘅泵嚟？

14 黃健華先生：我--呢個可能係--我可以肯定話畀你知，呢個一定唔係消防上水泵，點解咁
15 講，因為你見到有個消防水缸，即係後面石屎有啲裂紋嗰個，咁佢有兩個掣喺個缸
16 度出嚟嘅，咁佢而家兩個掣出嚟就駁咗去兩台泵，咁呢個就肯定唔係消防上水缸，
17 因為消防只係得一台上水泵嘅啫，咁佢唔會有兩個掣出嚟嘅，我睇相估唔到佢係食
18 水定咸水。

19 李澍桓大律師：如果 1646 頁呢？如果我哋睇後面嗰張，有個牌仔擱住喺個牆嗰度。

20 黃健華先生：係。

21 李澍桓大律師：其實我哋就見到佢寫住「消防」...

22 黃健華先生：哦，見到，見到嗰個指示牌。

23 李澍桓大律師：跟住見到前面應該有兩個黑色，然後有個膠桶反轉咗喺度嘅，咁呢一組會唔
24 會有機會就係個上水泵？

25 黃健華先生：應該都唔係，呢個喺兩台泵嘅後面，嗰度佢消防上水泵我有記錯佢係橫身嘅，
26 佢唔係企身嘅。

27 李澍桓大律師：睇後一張相，1647。呢度見唔見到嗰個...

28 黃健華先生：呢度見到嘞，呢度見到。

29 李澍桓大律師：就係擱住嗰堵牆，有個喺近底部有個藍色掣，黑色掣，即係扭嘅掣嗰度，係
30 咪？

31 黃健華先生：係，應該係，嗰個係個消防轉運缸個出水閘掣。

32 陸啟康法官：呢個就係上水泵？

33 黃健華先生：上水泵。

34 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋再睇 1651 頁，呢個以我理解都仍然係喺個--頭先我哋所謂嗰個泵
35 房裏面嘅一啲控制面板嚟嘅。

36 黃健華先生：係。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋睇右手邊綠色嗰個就應該係控制一個沖廁水嘅水泵。
- 2 黃健華先生：係。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：中間嗰個以你所知係一個乜嘢嘅泵嚟？
- 4 黃健華先生：我睇相估應該係食水嘅上水泵（English Spoken），控制（English
- 5 Spoken）。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：左手邊紅色嗰個呢？
- 7 黃健華先生：消防上水泵。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：消防嘅上水泵。如果你睇 1654 頁，我哋可能有個較為清楚啲嘅，喺呢一個
- 9 紅色消防上水泵嘅呢一個控制箱上面，我可唔可以請你首先睇，我哋有--最頂有三
- 10 個燈。
- 11 黃健華先生：係。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：跟住落嚟我哋就見到有一個好似指標咁樣嘅一個白色嘅面板。
- 13 黃健華先生：係。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：隔離跟住有個「危險」嘅貼紙，再隔離好似有一個掣嘅。
- 15 黃健華先生：見到。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：呢個掣係控制啲咩嘢？好似一個逼迫掣咁樣嘅。
- 17 黃健華先生：呢個掣係控制個上水泵嘅電源。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：係。而家呢一個你見到嘅呢一個狀態，即係佢似乎個掣係掣咗向上，係代表
- 19 開定門？
- 20 黃健華先生：係，開咗。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：開咗。因為我哋似乎都合理，因為上面嗰三眼燈好似著咗。
- 22 黃健華先生：係。
- 23 李澍桓大律師：如果門咗呢一個掣嘅話，我嘅理解係咪個消防上水泵就會門咗㗎嘞，就有電
- 24 源㗎嘞？
- 25 黃健華先生：你意思係嗰個黑色嗰個細細嗰個掣？
- 26 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 27 黃健華先生：係。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：亦都即係話，如果天面嘅嗰個消防缸係啲水位下降都好，而由於下面嘅--假
- 29 如呢個消防上水泵係門咗嘅話，我嘅理解就係理所當然就唔會有水注番上去個天面
- 30 嘅消防水缸度？
- 31 黃健華先生：係。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋好快咁睇埋就係下面仲有一啲--似乎有一個按鈕喺左手邊，即係消
- 33 防用水泵嗰塊牌下面，就有一個叫做「發動」，綠色嘅掣，呢個掣係做咩嘢？
- 34 黃健華先生：呢個唔係掣，呢個係燈嚟。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：燈嚟嘅，okay。
- 36 黃健華先生：係。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：左手邊紅色嗰個都係燈？
- 2 黃健華先生：都係燈，係。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：即係過載，係有咩嘢情況出現？
- 4 黃健華先生：你嘅意思係如果呢盞--嗰盞燈著咗，有咩嘢情況？台泵會唔行。
- 5 李澍桓大律師：係。跟住我哋再見綠色同紅色燈中間有一個好似--係咪都係一個掣？扭嘅
- 6 掣？
- 7 黃健華先生：呢個係一個選擇掣，咁就佢嘅作用如果我睇現場呢幅圖，就應該係睇--擺嚟選
- 8 擇畀--可能要上番少少幅相，唔好意思。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 10 黃健華先生：有個好大個白色嗰個「機」字，有個錶，有個指針錶咁樣嘅，呢個就係擺嚟扭
- 11 嗰個，你要睇嗰個--呢個係三相泵，睇每一相個電流，佢就要扭，你想睇第一相，
- 12 咁就--或者我哋叫紅相，咁就要扭去紅相，咁個指針就會話畀佢知紅相係有幾多--
- 13 行緊幾多嘅電流。咁佢有三檔嘅，一、二、三，就講緊三相電，咁零就應該就係有
- 14 嘅。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：平時需唔需要--即係喺一個正常運作，呢個泵--假如係正常運作、有電源嘅
- 16 情況之下，需唔需要每日或者每一段時間要入去擰下呢啲掣，需唔需要？
- 17 黃健華先生：唔需要嘅。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：咁你做年檢嘅時候，呢一個咁樣嘅泵或者呢一個控制嘅面板，我叫佢。
- 19 黃健華先生：唔。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：屬唔屬於你年檢嘅即係範圍一部分？
- 21 黃健華先生：屬於。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：係，咁要檢查啲咩嘢，其實就住呢個上水泵？
- 23 黃健華先生：我哋首先要檢查啲你講個天台水缸，佢有個豬膽掣，咁我哋會模擬佢有水
- 24 嘅，咁就可能會抽乾個豬膽掣，模擬佢有水，咁睇下個上水泵會唔會喺個自動狀態
- 25 下識唔識上水。跟住我哋都會可能會手動，因為佢再下面有個選擇掣嘅。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 27 黃健華先生：跟住睇睇個--有個手動，咁我哋試下手動，個泵會唔會可以喺手動狀態下佢自
- 28 己行，係，跟住就會睇下啲指示燈有冇燒，跟住或者我哋要檢查埋個轉運缸有冇水
- 29 咁樣。
- 30 李澍桓大律師：當然，嗰個食水或者咸水嗰度就唔係你檢查？
- 31 黃健華先生：係。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：平時呢一個紅色嗰個面板控制呢個消防上水泵，以你所知係咪任何一個人都
- 33 可以入去控制定還是需要啲咩嘢資格先可以控制？
- 34 黃健華先生：呢個係消防裝置，理應應該由消防承辦商去做嘅。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：係。即係宏泰消防就係其中一個持牌嘅承辦商可以...
- 36 黃健華先生：係，其中一個，係。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：即係有資格去...
- 2 黃健華先生：係，檢查或者...
- 3 李澍桓大律師：...掂或者檢查呢個面板。其實我相信唔係淨係呢個面板，所有嘅消防裝
- 4 備，我頭先我哋睇過嘅警鐘、喉轆、噴嘴呢啲，其實嚴格上嚟講都要係由一個註冊
- 5 嘅消防裝備承辦商去負責做年檢同埋去做維修咁樣？
- 6 黃健華先生：係，年檢、維修一定係。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：即係我唔可以喺街邊求其搵個水電師傅就叫佢去整下呢啲裝備嘅？
- 8 黃健華先生：唔可以。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：不能夠嘅？
- 10 黃健華先生：係。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：跟住我想你睇一睇 1635 頁，頭先我哋講咗一個我叫普通嘅泵房，咁我想你
- 12 睇睇另外一個。1635 頁，我哋見到個門嗰度其實就已經印住，呢個就叫做「消防
- 13 加壓泵房」。
- 14 黃健華先生：見到。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：係咪？
- 16 黃健華先生：係。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：呢個就係--係咪就係入面其中愛嚟設置咗，就係我哋頭先有講過嘅一個消防
- 18 嘅加壓泵，就係加大水壓嗰個裝置？
- 19 黃健華先生：係。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：所以如果我哋喺 1637 頁，我哋就開始見到跟住啲兩--1638 嗰張相都係，
- 21 其實就係嗰個加壓泵，係咪？
- 22 黃健華先生：係。
- 23 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋放大少少，同樣地嗰個加壓泵都有兩--起碼兩處位置其實掛住張警
- 24 告牌嘅。
- 25 黃健華先生：警告牌。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：嗰張警告牌應該就係話如果唔係合資格嘅人士，就唔可以去干擾呢一個裝
- 27 備，係咪？
- 28 黃健華先生：係，同埋有個檢查日期。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：係。1639，我哋見到呢個加壓泵房入面，又有一啲控制嘅裝置喺度，一啲面
- 30 板喺度，如果我哋先睇 1641 頁，就係其實而家呢一頁入面左手邊大嗰個箱嚟嘅。
- 31 黃健華先生：見到。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：呢個箱可唔可以講一講其實係做啲咩嘢，有啲咩嘢作用？
- 33 黃健華先生：呢個箱佢有兩個功用，第一就係控制個消防加壓泵自動行，係，自動行，同埋
- 34 入面有個--呢度面板可能睇唔到，入面會有啲組件係當收到個樓層個消防拎手畀人
- 35 打爛咗，咁正常就會個警鐘會響，同埋自動個消防泵會行，咁係喺入面先會睇到嗰
- 36 啲組件嘅有機會。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：呢一個平時喺一般嘅情況入面，日常如果佢係正常運作嘅話，需唔需要每日入
2 去做一啲開關？即係純粹大呢個箱。
- 3 黃健華先生：你意思係每日？
- 4 李澍桓大律師：噯，即係或者需唔需要每定時要做開關咁樣？
- 5 黃健華先生：你嘅「開關」意思係？唔係好明。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：開著某一啲--呢個加壓泵。
- 7 黃健華先生：每年最少一次。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：每年最少一次。但係日常即係你開住咗，開住咗佢就唔需要熄㗎嘛，唔需要
9 每日去熄㗎嘛，係咪？
- 10 黃健華先生：個電源掣係要長期保持開啟嘅，每日都要保持開啟。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：呢度睇唔睇到個電源掣？
- 12 黃健華先生：見到。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：即係喺呢個大箱上面㗎？
- 14 黃健華先生：見到，有一號泵同二號泵，有兩個掣嘅。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋睇中間嗰個--中間嗰度，上面呢度左手邊我哋見到有個銀色一條
16 嘢，類似一個鎖頭咁樣嘅嘢。
- 17 黃健華先生：係。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：跟住我哋見到就應該有一個--隱約見到就應該係「1 號泵掣」。
- 19 黃健華先生：泵掣，係。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：跟住係應該 (English Spoken) 。
- 21 黃健華先生：係。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：佢呢度都有一個掣嘅，係咪？
- 23 黃健華先生：係。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：我哋見到而家就似乎應該係處於一個...
- 25 黃健華先生：門咗。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：...即係關嘅位置，off 嘅位置，係咪？
- 27 黃健華先生：向上係門定開呢？
- 28 李澍桓大律師：唔緊要，如果唔清楚嘅話，我哋睇埋相片右手邊同一行，同一個水平。
- 29 黃健華先生：係。
- 30 李澍桓大律師：我哋見到「(English Spoken) 2 號泵掣」，呢個就好明顯嗰個標示就
31 寫住“off”。
- 32 黃健華先生：見到。
- 33 李澍桓大律師：個掣就係似乎掙咗去上面。
- 34 黃健華先生：係。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：如果咁樣嘅顯示，我嘅理解就應該係 1 號同 2 號泵都熄咗嘅，我嘅理解㗎唔
36 㗎？

1 黃健華先生：應該，我唔肯定，因為有機會有啲掣係上熄或者係向下熄先係熄嘅，而家咁樣
2 睇，我估應該係熄嘅，佢 show 咗個 off 出嚟。

3 李澍桓大律師：因為我諗嗰個指示就係話畀你知個掣處於乜嘢嘅狀態，係咪？

4 黃健華先生：可以，認同。

5 李澍桓大律師：咁我想問呢兩個，即係 1 號泵、2 號泵嘅呢兩個掣，其實係控制啲乜嘢嘢？

6 黃健華先生：呢兩個掣其實顧名思義，即係控制嗰佢上面嗰塊牌寫嗰個泵嘅，咁就兩個掣，
7 左手邊有一個 1 號泵掣，跟住呢個門咗，1 號消防泵係唔會識運行嘅。咁 2 號泵個
8 掣一樣，如果門咗情況下，個 2 號泵係唔識運行嘅。

9 李澍桓大律師：但係佢呢個泵係--因我哋之前有講過有個上水泵，就喺一個普通嘅泵房入
10 面，咁呢一個就其實係控制嗰兩個...

11 黃健華先生：消防加壓泵。

12 李澍桓大律師：加壓泵係唔係有一個定兩個？

13 黃健華先生：兩個。

14 李澍桓大律師：點解要有兩個嘅？

15 黃健華先生：因為當時起樓嘅設計，同埋我諗佢嘅主要個目的就係當一個泵壞咗，佢會有一
16 個士啤泵嘅作用。

17 李澍桓大律師：但係如果根據你剛剛解釋畀我哋知，就算乜嘢原因都好，我要問咗呢個加壓
18 泵，我喺應該大呢個箱嘅版面上面其實係唔係可以控制到佢開關嘅？

19 黃健華先生：你意思淨係個泵？

20 李澍桓大律師：淨係個泵。

21 黃健華先生：可以。

22 李澍桓大律師：呢個版面你有冇見到佢仲控制其他嘢或者標示其他嘢？

23 黃健華先生：有嘅，當然有其他泵--或者可能 2 號泵上面有個叫做「警鐘靜止掣」嘅，如果
24 呢個掣係扭咗嘅情況下，個警鐘係唔識響嘅。

25 李澍桓大律師：你講嘅警鐘係即係每...

26 黃健華先生：樓層。

27 李澍桓大律師：...一個樓層，頭先睇過嗰啲警鐘，係咪？

28 黃健華先生：係嘞。

29 李澍桓大律師：如果呢個即係話我可以獨立去問咗個警鐘嘅？

30 黃健華先生：呢個扭咗就個警鐘會唔響，可以，可以咁講，即係扭咗個掣，個鐘係唔會響
31 嘅。

32 李澍桓大律師：係。而家我哋就用緊宏志閣睇呢一個控制嘅版面，以你所知係唔係每一座，
33 即係宏福苑八座入面其實嗰個設計都係相類似，就係有一個咁樣嘅版面，嗰啲掣係
34 可以喺版面上面--假如係當係一個合資格嘅人士去到要開要門，其實就喺個版面度
35 控制到嘅？

36 黃健華先生：可以嘅。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：即係八座都係咁樣嘅設計？
- 2 黃健華先生：相同設計，差唔多咁樣樣。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：因為我知有一樣嘢可能係有少少分別嘅，就係如果我哋睇 1642 頁，我哋就
- 4 見到喺呢個大嘅版面入面，其實隔離就有呢個細嘅版面，同埋好簡單，就似乎得一個
- 5 個掣，呢個係一個乜嘢嘅裝置？
- 6 黃健華先生：係，呢個係消防泵嘅總掣，總電掣。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：你講消防泵，因為我哋...
- 8 黃健華先生：消防加壓泵。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：加壓泵？
- 10 黃健華先生：係。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：嘅總電掣？
- 12 黃健華先生：係。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：咁即係話我可以選擇即係頭先我哋大版面上面 1 號泵、2 號泵嗰個掣，亦都
- 14 可以選擇喺呢度直接門咗個泵佢？
- 15 黃健華先生：要睇你個目的性係咩嘢。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：有啲咩嘢目的或者咩嘢情況之下，你覺得係需要門呢一個總電掣呢？
- 17 黃健華先生：因為我想講一講，呢個總電掣除咗係控制個消防泵之外，會個警鐘拎手個電源
- 18 都係呢個掣畀出去嘅。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 20 黃健華先生：係嘞，如果我唔想--我唔使兩台泵行，淨係可以門咗兩台泵嗰兩個細掣，如果
- 21 你想連埋個警鐘拎手要停，或者可能一啲工程我唔知可能有其他工程，想可能要維
- 22 修呢個 (English Spoken) 箱嘅，可能要門咗呢個總掣，咁就 cut 咗隔離嗰啲
- 23 電。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：咁如果--總結一下先，即係如果我淨係想個上水泵唔運作嘅話呢，我就去番
- 25 嗰個另一個泵房度就門咗個上水泵佢，係咪？
- 26 黃健華先生：係。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：如果我淨係想個加壓泵唔運作嘅，咁就喺呢一個加壓泵房度就熄咗
- 28 (English Spoken) ？
- 29 黃健華先生：係。
- 30 李澍桓大律師：如果我想唔搞個泵，但係我淨係想大廈嗰個消防響鬧裝置熄咗佢嘅，我就喺
- 31 大個面版度就...
- 32 黃健華先生：(English Spoken) 咗個總...
- 33 李澍桓大律師：Mute 咗佢，即係靜音咗佢？
- 34 黃健華先生：我補充少少，因為你大廈消防警鐘，如果你淨係純粹想換個警鐘嘅時候，你可
- 35 以 (English Spoken) 到個鐘掣嘅，但係如果你要換一個 (English
- 36 Spoken)，即係我講緊個拎手掣就唔可以嘅，即係一定要門個掣先換到嘅。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：因為 1641 我哋就見到有頭先所講嘅所謂靜音掣，1642 我哋就見到有個總
2 掣，你意思就係如果我要換拎手嘅時候，即係打爛塊玻璃嗰兩個嘢嘅時候，就要門
3 呢一個總掣？
- 4 黃健華先生：係嘅。
- 5 李澍桓大律師：喺度停一停，就住門總掣，同樣地，係咪任何一個人都可以有權入去--即係
6 有資格入去門㗎？
- 7 黃健華先生：以我理解，唔係。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：咁以你嘅理解係？
- 9 黃健華先生：應該係消防承辦商。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：即係例如宏泰消防就有咁嘅資格可以去門？
- 11 黃健華先生：係。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：譬如就咁講門呢個總掣，作為都喺宏泰消防做咗咁耐，以你所知，有冇法例
13 上或者消防處有冇一啲規定要做啲咩嘢嘢，你先可以即係關咗呢一個總掣？
- 14 黃健華先生：相關工程。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：相關...
- 16 黃健華先生：唔好意思，可唔可以再問多一次？
- 17 李澍桓大律師：即係我可唔可以就咁樣唔話畀任何人知，簡單講得白啲，我自己走入去門咗
18 個總掣佢，得唔得？
- 19 黃健華先生：如果唔係做緊工程，唔可以。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：就算做緊工程嘅時候，以我所知，係唔係要通知消防處？
- 21 黃健華先生：維修係唔使嘅。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：維修唔使？
- 23 黃健華先生：係嘞。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：即係維修嗰個裝置本身唔使？
- 25 黃健華先生：係，因為正常咁講，當我哋去做維修，咁係一個好短暫嘅工程，可能一個鐘、
26 兩個鐘，我哋可以門咗，維修員開番，咁唔使再通知消防處嘅。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：舉個例，譬如話我某一個樓層，頭先你所講個拎手我要換，咁你個講法就係
28 就一定要門個總掣，即係靜音都唔得？
- 29 黃健華先生：係。
- 30 李澍桓大律師：咁我去門呢個總掣換個拎手嘅時候，你嘅講法就係我唔需要通知消防？
- 31 黃健華先生：係。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：我哋喺呢個聽證會入面期間都有聽過有一啲文件叫做（English
33 Spoken），SDN，關閉嘅通知書，呢一樣嘢如果係咁樣，幾時先要用？
- 34 黃健華先生：關閉呢個電掣超過廿四小時或者（English Spoken），先要去入嗰張
35 （English Spoken）。
- 36 李澍桓大律師：所以如果以你嘅經驗，就係話如果我可以當日已經完成咗換呢個拎手嘅，即

1 係用番我頭先嘅例子，其實可能一個鐘、兩個鐘都已經完成咗嗰個工程，咁可以跟
2 住開番佢，咁呢個情況之下就唔需要額外通知消防嘅？

3 黃健華先生：消防處，係。

4 李澍桓大律師：同樣地想了解多少少啫，呢一個消防加壓泵，你係點樣去測試佢個運作係咪
5 正常㗎？

6 黃健華先生：點樣測試佢運作係咪正常？

7 李澍桓大律師：即係做年檢嗰陣時。

8 黃健華先生：首先我哋會去現場，咁就試一試佢個手動係唔係可以——個泵係唔係識正常轉
9 動，跟住我哋就會去試一啲相關連嘅測試，咁係啲咩嘢呢？可能就正如啱啱講過打
10 爛個（English Spoken），咁個泵就應該自動會行。跟住就會試一試個消防
11 鐘，睇下個消防鐘係唔係會響，大致上係呢啲。咁同埋會睇睇個（English
12 Spoken）面可能會唔會有啲明顯嘅損壞，啲燈掣燒咗唔著咁樣。

13 李澍桓大律師：我哋講番宏泰消防同埋黃生你本人。

14 黃健華先生：唔。

15 李澍桓大律師：我哋知道 2025 年嘅話，就喺 3 月 24 號到 26 號做咗一個年檢嘅？

16 黃健華先生：係。

17 李澍桓大律師：咁我哋亦都知道你係影咗啲相，就話某——每一座大廈需要更換嘅一啲設備
18 呢，咁你就向你嘅老闆做咗個紀錄，亦都匯報咗嘅，係咪？

19 黃健華先生：係。

20 李澍桓大律師：我一陣間會再同你講多少少關於嗰個年檢上面一啲細節。但係純粹一般性嚟
21 講，當你做完呢個年檢，你話咗所謂報告畀鍾生聽，我嘅理解係唔係鍾生跟住就要
22 做番一份表格上報畀消防處嘅？

23 黃健華先生：你個表格係？

24 李澍桓大律師：係唔係好似有一份叫 251 咁樣嘅？

25 黃健華先生：251 嗰張係一張證書嚟嘅。另外應該有啲叫做消防核對表，咁年檢嘅要求要一
26 齊交埋去消防處嘅。

27 李澍桓大律師：咁消防處就要收到呢一份表格之後，通常因為我見到喺呢件案入面，我哋就
28 有啲地方係需要註明咗，就話要修理嘅。

29 黃健華先生：係。

30 李澍桓大律師：消防處有冇規定話幾時個業主就一定要修理好呢一啲損毀咗嘅裝備？

31 黃健華先生：呢個我唔太清楚即係個期限要幾耐。

32 李澍桓大律師：係。

33 黃健華先生：大約...

34 李澍桓大律師：咁另外一樣嘢，當你要去做呢個所謂維修，我相信或者你未必直接知道，但
35 係我相信就中間都要經宏福苑去做一啲報價，然後佢哋批准咗，你哋先可以去
36 做，係咪？

1 黃健華先生：係。

2 李澍桓大律師：所以以我哋知道嗰個資料就似乎應該係就住一啲水喉工嘅修補工作，就應該
3 係 2025 年 10 月嘅，就係你哋做一啲水喉嘅同事開始去做，係咪？

4 黃健華先生：係。

5 李澍桓大律師：佢哋處理完呢啲水喉工程之後，你就應該係唔係 11 月 19 號開始就去做另
6 外...（聽不清）嗰啲裝置？

7 黃健華先生：係。

8 李澍桓大律師：應該係唔係仲有牽涉到有一位梁先生？

9 黃健華先生：梁先生，係，佢係個外判商，咁佢就負責換啲後樓梯啲緊急照明燈，或者可能
10 一啲射嘴啲可能好簡單嘅工程。

11 李澍桓大律師：喺水缸嘅呢個問題上面。

12 黃健華先生：係。

13 李澍桓大律師：跳番少少，去番 2025 年 3 月嗰個年檢。

14 黃健華先生：唔。

15 李澍桓大律師：以你所記得，你做完個檢查，或者你同你嘅同事做完檢查之後，天面嘅消防
16 水缸有冇發覺有問題需要做一啲修葺、維修嘅工程？

17 黃健華先生：冇發覺。

18 李澍桓大律師：通常就住天面嘅水缸，你哋要做乜嘢檢查？

19 黃健華先生：我哋會試下佢係唔係一個自動會上水嘅狀態。

20 李澍桓大律師：係。

21 黃健華先生：係嘞。

22 李澍桓大律師：除此之外，譬如水缸如果有人話漏水，你使唔使去睇㗎？

23 黃健華先生：如果收到人話個水缸漏水，我哋會去望。

24 李澍桓大律師：咁喺 2025 年 3 月嘅時候，你去做呢個年檢，有冇任何人畀過指示你話就住
25 水缸嘅問題係出現咗漏水，叫你去檢查？

26 黃健華先生：冇。

27 李澍桓大律師：我想你去睇一睇有一個文件，都係喺 R1 嗰個文件冊，頁碼係 361 頁，呢個
28 首先第一，係唔係就係你所講其中一個所謂叫做核對表？

29 黃健華先生：係。

30 李澍桓大律師：另外我哋都可以再睇埋 305 頁，咁呢個又係有一個供水系統年檢核對表，咁
31 同我哋頭先睇到--係，等一等吓。而家呢張我哋見到 305 頁，我哋見到個頂頂嗰
32 度就寫住「供水系統年檢核對表」，睇多少少，我哋就見到係 3 月 24 號有關於宏
33 仁閣 A 座嘅一個表格嚟嘅，係咪？

34 黃健華先生：唔。

35 李澍桓大律師：我哋見到年檢嘅日期就 3 月 24，跟住入面就有好多格格，是、否、不適用
36 咁樣嘅，有好多欄目嘅，呢張表格係邊個做㗎？

- 1 黃健華先生：我剔嘅。
- 2 李澍桓大律師：你剔嘅？
- 3 黃健華先生：係。
- 4 李澍桓大律師：即係黃生你做嘅？
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：咁呢個係唔係反映到你當時就係做年檢嗰陣時嗰個實際嘅情況？
- 7 黃健華先生：係。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：我哋頭先講，就有另一張嘅表格相類似嘅，我哋如果睇 361 頁，跟住我哋又
- 9 見到個頂頂嗰度，呢度就寫住「消防栓／喉轆系統年檢核對表」，同樣都係宏仁
- 10 閣，3 月 24 號。
- 11 黃健華先生：係。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：呢一個我嘅理解其實係唔係就係同之前睇嗰張相類似，不過檢查嘅裝置唔同，
- 13 所以有唔同嘅表格要填？
- 14 黃健華先生：係。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：咁我可唔可以理解呢一個都係由你去負責制備呢一個咁樣嘅表格，係咪？
- 16 黃健華先生：個表格唔係我哋制定嘅，消防處制定嘅。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：但係剔嗰啲係你剔呢？
- 18 黃健華先生：係我剔嘅。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：你剔嘅，就係因應做你去做個檢查時候，個結果係點，你就係咁剔，係咪
- 20 黃健華先生：係。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：如果係咁，譬如舉個例，362 頁，喺第 5 項嗰個欄目上面呢，我哋見到就係
- 22 關於消防喉轆，跟住 5(a)，我就見到你剔咗個「否」嘅，咁呢度係代表啲咩嘢意
- 23 思？
- 24 黃健華先生：反映到我哋年檢喺就住呢個消防喉轆入面，咁佢下半寫住包括主體有一堆可能
- 25 膠喉、射嘴，...（聽不清）玻璃之類嘅，咁我哋發現有損壞，我哋就要剔個
- 26 「否」喇。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：咁做完呢個表格之後，就住你哋年檢上面仲有啲乜嘢嘢要處理㗎？
- 28 黃健華先生：要出個 F.S.251。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：係，就係你剛才講嗰個證書？
- 30 黃健華先生：係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：譬如我哋啲第 657 頁，咁我哋呢度見到又係關於宏仁閣嘅一張表格，咁如果
- 32 我哋見到個——佢三部分嘅，第一部分又列出咗一啲嘢，你可唔可以先講第一部分紫
- 33 色用於年檢事項，跟住下面有啲代號，11、16、13，呢個係代表啲乜嘢意思㗎？
- 34 黃健華先生：呢方面我唔係好熟悉，因為我好少處理呢啲文件嘅。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：呢啲文件唔係你做嘅？
- 36 黃健華先生：唔係我做嘅。

1 李澍桓大律師：咁我留番，似乎應該就係鍾生做，咁我留番問鍾生。做完呢個年檢，我哋--
2 正如剛才所講，你就應該係 2025 年 11 月 19 號嘅時候，就再次喺宏福苑出現，
3 因為要做一啲維修嘅工作，係咪？

4 黃健華先生：係。

5 李澍桓大律師：咁你都曾經喺你嘅口供入面有講過，就需要先去--原本因為你要問咗個電
6 掣，係咪？

7 黃健華先生：唔係我，李俊賢。

8 李澍桓大律師：因為個原因就係好似驚會有漏電嘅風險？

9 黃健華先生：係嘞，因為正如所講，我哋要換（English Spoken），所以就要問咗個總
10 掣，咁先可以安全情況下換個（English Spoken）嘅。

11 李澍桓大律師：即係我哋之前睇到加壓泵房入面細個紅色板面個，係唔係你哋叫刀仔？

12 黃健華先生：刀仔。

13 李澍桓大律師：咁就要問咗佢，但係一問咗就會連個消防個響鬧裝置都會問埋個囉嗎？

14 黃健華先生：係，但係唔係我哋問嘅。

15 李澍桓大律師：呢度我就想問多少少，因為我知道個資料顯示，就係話李生去到嘅時候，就
16 發覺八座個刀仔都已經畀人問咗，係咪？

17 黃健華先生：係。

18 李澍桓大律師：咁我哋亦都見到似乎應該係鍾生提供番畀我哋，就係話有一啲 WhatsApp，
19 就係即時係唔係應該李生就影低咗相，就喺你哋群組上面有匯報番啲掣畀人問咗
20 咁樣，你記唔記得？

21 黃健華先生：唔記得，你講李俊賢先生，係咪？

22 李澍桓大律師：係，不如咁講，我試下--我問得唔好。喺你哋做 11 月呢一個維修工作嘅時
23 候呢，你記唔記得其實你哋自己同事，即係包括鍾生係唔係應該有一個 WhatsApp
24 群組？

25 黃健華先生：好似係。

26 李澍桓大律師：每一座都有？

27 黃健華先生：應該係，我印象中好似係。

28 李澍桓大律師：我不如畀番個 WhatsApp 紀錄你睇，我哋可以。主席，因為我諗我都要啲時
29 間搵番啲 WhatsApp，唔知好唔好而家係一個方便嘅時間？

30 陸啟康法官：係，我哋而家休庭十分鐘。

31
32 15 時 23 分聆訊押後

33 15 時 34 分聆訊繼續

34
35 陸啟康法官：李律師，請繼續。

36 李澍桓大律師：唔該，主席。黃先生，我想你再睇頭先我哋睇過啲版面啲掣呢。

- 1 黃健華先生：好。
- 2 李澍桓大律師：我跳去下一個題目之前，我想你再睇多一張，1579 頁，C1 嗰個文件冊。你
- 3 見到呢一個相類似嘅一大一細嘅設計，隔籬嗰個就都係一個我哋之前睇過嘅嗰個控
- 4 制嘅版面，係咪？
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：咁基本上都一樣㗎嘞，我哋見到就似乎呢個好似打開咗，但係我哋都見到有
- 7 所謂 (English Spoken) 同 (English Spoken) 嘅 (English Spoken)
- 8 嗰啲掣，係咪？
- 9 黃健華先生：係。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：以你理解，你頭先都講過，就係其實都係——應該個設計都係大致一樣？
- 11 黃健華先生：係。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：都係可以喺個版面度控制佢開關，係咪？
- 13 黃健華先生：係。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：亦都上面有一個所謂消防警鐘嘅靜音掣，係咪呀？
- 15 黃健華先生：係。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：喺嗰左手邊，呢個就好似有少少同嗰個細嘅，之前睇過嘅就唔同嘞，但係呢
- 17 個都係——以我理解都係一個總掣嘅刀掣㗎嘅。
- 18 黃健華先生：正確。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：只不過呢個就係向上向下拉推嘅一個裝置？
- 20 黃健華先生：係。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：就同之前向左右擰嘅就有唔同。
- 22 黃健華先生：係。
- 23 李澍桓大律師：但係同樣地我哋而家喺宏建閣，呢張相見到嘅呢個裝置呢，細嘅呢個箱都係
- 24 如果一閃咗嘅話，就消防鐘、泵嗰個電源都會係切斷？
- 25 黃健華先生：正確。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：同樣地，如果你去做宏建閣嗰個修補工程嘅時候，當要熄個總掣你就係熄
- 27 呢一個宏建閣嘅呢個刀掣，係咪呀？
- 28 黃健華先生：係。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：問多你一樣嘢，大嗰個控制版面，其實嗰個箱係可以就咁樣開到出嚟，係咪
- 30 呀？有個...
- 31 黃健華先生：可以，可以，可以，用少少力其實可以開到個面板出嚟。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：係，唔需要鎖匙，咩嘢都唔需要？
- 33 黃健華先生：呢個唔需要嘅。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：係。我剛才就有講過話一啲——想你睇一睇一啲 WhatsApp 嘅截圖嘅。
- 35 黃健華先生：唔。
- 36 李澍桓大律師：如果我哋睇 R1/686 頁為例，你見到頂嗰度就寫住，個群組個名，似乎就係

- 1 宏福苑 A 座，宏仁閣喇？
- 2 黃健華先生：
- 3 李澍桓大律師：咁如果我哋睇 R1 嗰個文件冊第 686 頁為例呢，咁你見到頂嗰度就寫住，嗰
- 4 群組嘅名似乎就係「宏福苑 A 座宏仁閣」？
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：嗰啲最--之前嗰兩張相應該就係換咗一啲零件之後做一個...
- 7 黃健華先生：紀錄。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：...紀錄嘅一啲相片。跟住我哋見到接近個尾，即係頁底嗰度，我哋就見到
- 9 11 月 19 號星期三。
- 10 黃健華先生：係。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：跟住有一個「9757」，我哋就劃咗嗰個阿 Jack 嘅電話嚟嘅。
- 12 黃健華先生：係。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：阿 Jack 係你定係李生呀？
- 14 黃健華先生：9757 應該係李生電話。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：係，跟住我哋見到呢個頁底嗰度有一個訊息，就寫住「消防泵被關」。11 點
- 16 54 分？
- 17 黃健華先生：係，係。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：呢個係咪就係你所講，當日 11 月 19 號諗住去做維修，即係做裝備嗰個切換
- 19 嘅時候就發覺個總掣已經畀人閘咗？
- 20 黃健華先生：係，李生發現嘅。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：以你所知，呢個消防泵係--我哋知道有兩個㗎嘛，一個上水泵、一個加壓
- 22 泵，佢所講「消防泵被關」。
- 23 黃健華先生：加壓泵。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：加壓泵。
- 25 黃健華先生：係。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：即係話我哋頭先睇到兩個版面，一大一細嘅嗰個泵？
- 27 黃健華先生：係。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：除咗喺呢個訊息上面，李生有冇另外再同你講究竟呢個消防泵被關係純粹--
- 29 因為我哋頭先都睇到，大嗰個版面可以閘個泵㗎咋嘛，佢係話畀你知嗰個泵閘咗
- 30 咁，定係個總掣？
- 31 黃健華先生：總掣。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：總掣閘咗？
- 33 黃健華先生：係。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：佢係呢度，佢淨係純粹講消防泵咋嘛。
- 35 黃健華先生：係。
- 36 李澍桓大律師：你點知係講緊...

- 1 黃健華先生：我嗰日 19 號我有落現場，咁我大約十一點零、十二點鐘咁去到見到李生，佢
2 就同我講話個消防泵總掣畀人問咗。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：呢一個群組呢，因為如果你其實揭去後一頁，687 我哋見到有另一個群組
4 嘅，就係「宏福苑 B 座宏道閣」，其實如此類推，一路落去，似乎每一個，除咗 D
5 座呢度有提供到出嚟，一路每一座都似乎你哋都有一個 WhatsApp 嘅群組嘅？
- 6 黃健華先生：係。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：係咪？你都記得有呢樣嘢？
- 8 黃健華先生：我想講一講，呢個群組，我唔喺入面嘅。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：你唔喺入面嘅？
- 10 黃健華先生：係，我唔喺入面嚟嘅。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：係，咁即係應該淨係得阿 Jack，即係李生？
- 12 黃健華先生：我想講講，阿 Jack 就係講緊個梁生。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：梁生。
- 14 黃健華先生：係嘞，梁生，9575 就係係李生，跟住 5542，呢個應該我哋有個學徒嘅，應該
15 都喺入面嘅。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：係，咁鍾生喺唔喺咪呢個群組嗰度㗎？
- 17 黃健華先生：應該唔喺。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 19 生唔見佢嘅電話，係嘞，鍾意唔見佢個電話，係嘞。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：Okay，或者我一陣間先再問阿李生，但係如果我想你睇 692 頁呢，首先
21 692 頁（English Spoken）上水泵房，跟住張相上面攞住一個零件，呢個係咩
22 嘢零件㗎㗎？
- 23 黃健華先生：（English Spoken）斷容器。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：即係--或者斷容器，係咪呀？
- 25 黃健華先生：係嘞。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：係換喺邊度嘅一個？
- 27 黃健華先生：喺上水泵個控制箱入面一啲組件嚟嘅，一啲（English Spoken）嚟嘅。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：係，喺同一頁上面，即係 692 頁，你見到個頂頂宏福苑 H 座宏志閣，就你頭
29 先都講，有個 5542 嘅呢個電話就應該係一位學徒嘅電話。
- 30 黃健華先生：係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：9757 就係李生。
- 32 黃健華先生：係。
- 33 李澍桓大律師：Jack 係叫做梁文仲（譯音）先生。
- 34 黃健華先生：梁生，係。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：呢個你呢，其實因為呢個 WhatsApp 嘅截圖其實係鍾生提供畀我哋嘅，即係
36 提供畀消防嘅亦都有。

1 黃健華先生：係。

2 李澍桓大律師：所以我估，就反為倒番轉，你頭先講可能係啱嘅，你自己本人，黃生你就唔
3 係群組入面嘅？

4 黃健華先生：係。

5 李澍桓大律師：唔。就住水缸，我頭先再講水缸嗰個問題呢，事後我哋有一啲——委員會收到
6 一啲證據或者一啲口供呢，佢就話其實個水缸呢，即係天面嗰八個水缸呢。

7 黃健華先生：唔。

8 李澍桓大律師：出現有結構性嘅問題、有漏水、入面有好多啲沉積物，對於呢一個嘅講法，
9 你有冇啲乜嘢回應，同唔同意呢個講法？

10 黃健華先生：我有見過以上情況。

11 李澍桓大律師：你有見過，即係唔同意呢個講法？

12 黃健華先生：麻煩可唔可以問多次？

13 李澍桓大律師：有人話上面個水缸其實漏水嘅？

14 黃健華先生：係。

15 李澍桓大律師：當然，佢講嘅時候似乎就係 2025 年 9 月。你做年檢 2025 年 3 月嘅時候，
16 有冇人同你表示過話有漏水嘅問題？

17 黃健華先生：冇。

18 李澍桓大律師：當你檢查入面嘅時候，嗰個天面嗰個消防水缸呢，有冇發覺入面個結構係有
19 問題？

20 黃健華先生：冇發覺。

21 李澍桓大律師：到臨畀兩個嘅議題，首先，第一，喺 11 月 26 號呢，大火當日，我哋知道你
22 就因應鍾生嘅要求呢，原本你走咗㗎嘞。

23

24 黃健華先生：係。

25 李澍桓大律師：中午嘅就完成咗你嘅維修嘅工程。

26 黃健華先生：係。

27 李澍桓大律師：但係大火嘅時候你旁晚就返番去宏福苑睇下有咩嘢幫到手嘅，係咪？

28 黃健華先生：係。

29 李澍桓大律師：似乎根據你嘅講法，你記唔記得就係返到去嘅時候你有嘗試問番置邦嗰邊嘅
30 一啲管理人員呢，就好像話想問番佢哋擺嗰啲所謂叫做（English Spoken），
31 係咪？

32 黃健華先生：係。

33 李澍桓大律師：當然我哋而家知道呢一個（English Spoken）係由 2025 年 4 月左右由另一間
34 消防裝備嘅註冊承辦商去入嘅，係咪，中華發展。

35 黃健華先生：係。

36 李澍桓大律師：你當要問阿王小姐佢哋囉——鄭小姐佢哋擺番呢一啲咁樣嘅文件，有冇咩嘢特

- 1 別原因？
- 2 黃健華先生：就係想係咪真係有消防公司去暫停咗個消防系統。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 4 黃健華先生：想求證。
- 5 李澍桓大律師：但係你應該喺較早前已經有人話咗畀你知，因為有維修嘅工程，所以就掛咗
- 6 牌。
- 7 黃健華先生：係。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：已經停咗㗎喇嘛。
- 9 黃健華先生：係。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：咁呢個亦都唔係由你去入㗎嘛？
- 11 黃健華先生：唔係我哋入嘅。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：所以其實嚴格上嚟講，照道理，對於你哋宏泰消防都有乜緊要㗎，有冇呢一
- 13 張（English Spoken），因為根據你哋嘅講法，唔關你哋事㗎嘛？
- 14 黃健華先生：因為我哋見到佢個系——即係個消防總掣畀人門咗，咁我唔知佢哋知唔知道。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 16 黃健華先生：係喇，咁我就走去搵阿鄭小姐問佢知唔知咁嘅情況。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 18 黃健華先生：咁佢就回覆話係佢哋有消防工程做緊，咁就要門咗個總掣，跟住因為個消防——
- 19 佢話個宏業，即係嗰間大判就請咗佢哋嘅消防公司承辦商去暫停咗個系統，跟住我
- 20 走去問佢，「如果你暫停系統有冇掛牌呀？」即係我意思就係咁講，SDN 有冇掛
- 21 牌，佢就話佢哋有掛牌嘅。同埋...
- 22 李澍桓大律師：呢個係喺 11 月 19 號你知悉咗個總掣畀人門咗嘅時候問，定係 11 月 26
- 23 號...（聽不清）
- 24 黃健華先生：19 號，19 號。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：19 號你已經問咗？
- 26 黃健華先生：係喇。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：咁你當時就已經有向佢要求過話睇嗰啲 SDN？
- 28 黃健華先生：係。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：但係佢畀唔畀到你呀？
- 30 黃健華先生：佢話搵唔到，即係嗰一刻搵唔到。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：係，就甚至乎根據你嘅講法就去到 11 月 26 號大火嘅時間。
- 32 黃健華先生：佢都畀唔到我哋睇。
- 33 李澍桓大律師：佢都仲係畀唔到你？
- 34 黃健華先生：係。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：另一個議題就係，你哋 25 年 10 月又好、25 年 11 月又好，當返去替呢一
- 36 啲消防裝備做維修嘅時候，睇下我理解啱唔啱，其實個工作就包括兩部分嘅，第一

- 1 當然係更換啲損壞咗嘅零件，係咪？
- 2 黃健華先生：係。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：第二個，同埋我覺得都重要嘅工作呢，就係替換咗呢一啲零件之後，就去做
- 4 一啲測試。
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：因為換完你都要知道（English Spoken）唔（English Spoken）㗎
- 7 嘛。
- 8 黃健華先生：（English Spoken）唔（English Spoken）。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：但由於舉個例，你頭先都講到，譬如個拎手換完，但係由於個總掣畀人熄
- 10 咗，所以其實你哋換完都好，測試唔到個新嘅拎手係咪（English Spoken）㗎
- 11 喎。
- 12 黃健華先生：係。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：同唔同意我嘅講法，無論個原因係喺邊度㗎都好，你嘅工作其實未做完㗎
- 14 喎，同唔同意呀？因為你未測試咗嘛。
- 15 黃健華先生：同意。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：你做完嗰個更換嘅程序之後呢，換咗新零件之後呢，有冇當你同鄭小姐任何
- 17 時間話「喂，我哋要測試，叫佢開番個總掣」？
- 18 黃健華先生：我有叫過。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：有冇乜嘢原因令到你唔去提出呢個要求？
- 20 黃健華先生：因為佢同我講係有一間消防承辦商門咗個掣，咁我唔知道佢門咗個掣嘅目的係
- 21 乜嘢？
- 22 李澍桓大律師：咁你有冇問過另一間嘅消防承辦商點解佢哋要門咗個掣？
- 23 黃健華先生：佢話因為要做個水缸，所以要門咗個總掣。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：即係你有問？
- 25 黃健華先生：我有問。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：你問邊一個？
- 27 黃健華先生：鄭小姐。
- 28 李澍桓大律師：我個意思係——我個問題係有冇問過中華發展？
- 29 黃健華先生：冇，sorry，冇。。
- 30 李澍桓大律師：有冇問過宏業？
- 31 黃健華先生：冇。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：係。咁所以去到——即係去到你哋火警嘅時候，某個程度上就算開番個掣，某
- 33 部分嘅消防裝備係咪運作正常，你都唔知㗎喎？
- 34 黃健華先生：你講火警，26 號當日？
- 35 李澍桓大律師：26 號當日，因為你換完之後都未試咗嘛。
- 36 黃健華先生：係。

1 李澍桓大律師：唔。主席，冇其他問題。

2 陸啟康法官：我諗今次有涉事方想問問題，係咪？咁我諗我都可以理解嘅，我批准你盤問。

3 許偉強資深大律師：唔該，唔該。黃先生，我係代表 ISS，即係管理公司嘅。

4 黃健華先生：明白。

5 許偉強資深大律師：有幾個問題希望同你提出。首先麻煩你，我想睇一睇你為咗呢一次委員
6 會作嘅證人口供，麻煩你睇 WS2/1545 頁，如果我哋去一去 1546 頁，你嘅第 6
7 段，剛才委員會大律師都有同你探討過，就住 2025 年 11 月 19 號，當時你去到
8 宏福苑，希望作進一步嘅執修工程所發現嘅事項嘅。噏，首先我想問一問呢，就係
9 你嘅口供入面提到，李俊賢就發現八座嘅呢一個總電掣，即係我哋所稱嗰個消防
10 泵房嗰個總電掣。

11 黃健華先生：加壓泵房。

12 許偉強資深大律師：係嘞，加壓泵房個總電掣。

13 黃健華先生：Okay。

14 許偉強資深大律師：已經被問咗喇，呢個就係李俊賢佢發現先嘅？

15 黃健華先生：係。

16 許偉強資深大律師：然後佢就通知你嘅，當時？

17 黃健華先生：係。

18 許偉強資深大律師：你哋知道咗之後，有冇第一時都通知番 Victory Fire 嘅其中一個老
19 闆，即係鍾先生，當時有冇通知佢㗎？

20 黃健華先生：我好似有打過電話畀佢嘅。

21 許偉強資深大律師：當時對於作為一個好似你咁樣有經驗同埋有資格去處理呢啲消防裝置工
22 程嘅技術人員嚟講，如果當時你發現到八座個消防泵總電掣都係問咗，你覺唔覺得
23 詫異呀？

24 黃健華先生：覺得。

25 許偉強資深大律師：當時你同埋你公司有冇其他人係有討論過，需唔需要調查一下問咗呢個
26 總掣個原因喺邊度呀？

27 黃健華先生：有。

28 許偉強資深大律師：當時有冇你或者係你公司啲人要希望調查一下幾時開始係咁樣嘅情況，
29 即係幾時開始呢個總掣係被問咗嘅，有冇討論過呢個問題？

30 黃健華先生：唔好意思，問多次。

31 許偉強資深大律師：當時--11 月 19 號發現呢個總掣被關上之後，你或者你公司任何同事有
32 冇去考慮要調查下呢一個總掣係大概幾時被關上，即係問咗幾耐呢？

33 黃健華先生：唔--有冇考慮過？我哋有考慮過問阿鄭小姐知唔知？

34 許偉強資深大律師：唔。你自己就有特別去問鄭小姐幾時開始問咗呢個總掣嘅，同唔同意
35 呀？

36 黃健華先生：同意。

1 許偉強資深大律師：唔。就住你個證人口供呢度所講，我哋睇下最後嗰四行，或者五行，
2 「其後」開始，「我立即向宏福苑管理處鄭小姐當面查詢，並得知宏福苑共八座大
3 廈當時正在進行大維修工程，其中包括維修水缸，故需要暫停消防，故需要暫停消
4 防系統，並已就此向消防處掛牌，即係向消防處填入消防裝置關閉通知書，下稱
5 『掛牌』」。我哋停一停呢度先，呢度你當時同——喺當日同鄭小姐嘅談話入面，你
6 呢度講出咗就話知道鄭小姐有個回應，就係話八座大廈就做緊大維修工程，包括維
7 修水缸，所以需要暫停消防系統嘅。呢度你有特別提到有關嗰個加壓泵房入面個
8 總電掣被關上呢個問題嘅，睇唔睇到？

9 黃健華先生：見到。

10 許偉強資深大律師：我想問一問你，你而家記番起，你當時同鄭小姐嘅對話入面有冇特別係
11 提到有關呢一個總電掣被關上嘅問題定係你...

12 黃健華先生：有。

13 許偉強資深大律師：好，唔該。我想問下你呢一度講及就係話需要暫停呢個消防系統，同埋
14 向消防處掛牌。你呢一度講緊 11 月 19 號，你有冇直接向鄭小姐問過有關掛牌嗰啲
15 文件，叫佢畀你睇？

16 黃健華先生：有。

17 許偉強資深大律師：但係我哋從你第 6 段呢度就睇唔到你當時同鄭小姐係有查詢過或者問過
18 佢，要提供有關嘅文件唔，同唔同意？

19 黃健華先生：呢份文件。

20 許偉強資深大律師：呢個係你嘅證人供詞入面就有特別提到你當天——好似你剛才咁講，係有
21 直接問過鄭小姐，叫佢提供有關呢啲掛牌嘅文件。

22 黃健華先生：呢度冇顯示出嚟。

23 許偉強資深大律師：如果我哋睇番你同呢一個委員會提供嘅口供入面，你呢一度提過嘅消防
24 系統，剛才我哋討論過，就有特別去指出有關嗰個泵房，加壓泵房個總掣嗰個問題
25 嘅。呢個問題其實直至到你喺向警方所提出嘅口供入面，我哋先至見到你當時有提
26 出呢個問題。而家我哋睇下你同警方嗰邊嘅口供 C1-2/1152、1153，喺第 6 段呢
27 度你就咁樣講嘅，我哋如果睇下最尾嗰四行，呢度都係講緊 11 月 19 號所發生嘅
28 事，鄭小姐表示由於上址正進行大維修，當中包括維修消防水缸事宜，所以由負責
29 嘅另一間消防維修公司要求關閉消防泵總電掣，呢次就係如果我哋比較你剛才嗰份
30 口供，就喺呢一份入面你有提過呢個關閉消防泵總電掣呢件事，跟住你就「而我從
31 鄭小姐口中得知，該間消防維修公司亦都已經通知消防處，俗稱『掛牌』，同埋加
32 置咗呢個臨時嘅滅火筒，鄭小姐並冇提及邊一間公司，而我亦都有追問，直至維修
33 工程完成之前，我再冇入過宏福苑去了解嗰個有關嘅事情嘞。」你呢度都有講到就
34 話，鄭小姐同你提過有另外一間公司做咗掛牌，你有追問，所以我想問多你一次，
35 就係其實喺 11 月 19 號，你並冇向鄭小姐要求佢提供有關掛牌嘅文件，你同唔同
36 意？

1 黃健華先生：唔同意。

2 許偉強資深大律師：另外就係，其實--因為鄭小姐遲啲都會嚟作供嘅，如果我同你講話，其
3 實當時你同鄭小姐個交談入面，鄭小姐係有特別提到有關消防泵房總電掣門咗呢
4 個問題，你同唔同意？

5 黃健華先生：麻煩你講多次，唔好意思。

6 許偉強資深大律師：好。喺 11 月 19 號，你同鄭小姐嘅交談入面，鄭小姐其實係有特別去提
7 到有關呢個消防泵總電掣被關上呢個情況，佢係有提到嘅？

8 黃健華先生：佢有提過。

9 許偉強資深大律師：我最後有一個問題想問一問你，就係你作為一個合資格處理消防裝置嘅
10 技術人員，你應該都了解係咪消防處都會有一啲守則係需要遵守嘅，就住維修、檢
11 查呢啲咁嘅裝置，你知唔知有呢個咁嘅守則？

12 黃健華先生：係，知道。

13 許偉強資深大律師：或者我哋可以好快咁去睇一睇守則其中有一部分，呢個守則係 B2 嘅
14 880，如果我哋--呢個就係有關檢查、測試同埋維修有關呢啲消防裝置系統嘅時候
15 嘅一個守則嚟嘅。呢個係 2022 年 9 月份嘅版本，如果我哋可以睇一睇第 912
16 頁，呢個就係一個守則入面嘅附件 4，附件 4 就係關於一個測試入面嘅一個
17 (English Spoken)。

18 咁就入面如果我哋可以睇一睇第 919 頁，3.8.2 呢度就有一個咁樣嘅要求
19 嘅，就係佢話“(English Spoken)”，即係我哋啱啱睇過嘅一啲裝置，
20 (English Spoken) 同埋 (English Spoken)，咁佢就話如果你必須要睇一
21 啲未經授權嘅人士係唔可以進入嘅情況，同埋一啲未經授權嘅一啲行動都唔可以係
22 掂到或者去處理呢啲咁嘅 (English Spoken) 或者 (English Spoken)。
23 (c) 嗰度我哋見到就係話如果有呢啲咁嘅裝置，係需要 (English Spoken)，
24 即係話你要畀啲標籤佢嘅。咁 (c) 嗰度其中一個就係 (English Spoken)，就
25 係一個警告，就係「此電掣同時控制火警警報系統電源」。

26 我想帶一帶你去睇一睇一啲相片，就係喺 B2，B2 嘅 1902 頁先。呢個我哋剛
27 才委員會大律師都有向你展示過，呢個就係嗰個加壓泵房入面嘅總掣。如果我哋睇
28 一張清楚少少嘅圖，1910，睇到嘛？黃生。

29 黃健華先生：見到。

30 許偉強資深大律師：呢度我哋如果純粹喺個照片度睇，我哋就睇唔到有任何一啲警告嘅一個
31 顯示，就話即係呢一個電掣係同時控制呢一個火警電報系統電源嘅。首先我想問一
32 問你，就係我相信都唔會有爭議，就係呢一個總電掣都係會控制到呢個火警警報系
33 統嘅電源嘅，同意嘛？

34 黃健華先生：係，同意。

35 許偉強資深大律師：咁你剛才喺回答委員會大律師嘅問題嗰陣時都有講過，就係喺 2025 年
36 3 月做呢個年檢之前，其實你都有參與過呢一個屋苑嘅年檢嘅一啲工作嘅？

1 黃健華先生：有。

2 許偉強資深大律師：咁我想問一問你，就住呢一個總掣入面，冇附上或者有一個標籤，入面
3 寫上係一個警告嘅一啲嘅字句，就講明呢一個電掣同時控制係火警警報系統嘅電
4 源，即係好似守則入面所要求嘅一個咁嘅標籤，你覺得有一個咁嘅標籤，喺咁嘅情
5 況係咪唔係好適當？係咪應該有一個咁嘅標籤係較為安全？

6 黃健華先生：同意。

7 許偉強資深大律師：唔該，我有其他問題。

8 李澍桓大律師：主席，唔好意思，就住剛剛嗰個問題，我想做一個好快嘅跟進啫。

9 就睇番呢度呢張相，剛才大律師都問過你，就有一個標籤就似乎唔係咁恰當。
10 我頭先問漏咗，我自己，呢一個加壓泵房入面我哋見到有道門㗎嘛。

11 黃健華先生：你講個泵房門？

12 李澍桓大律師：㗎。

13 黃健華先生：Okay。

14 李澍桓大律師：嗰道門平時係應該鎖埋定係打開？

15 黃健華先生：鎖，上鎖。

16 李澍桓大律師：鎖匙喺邊個度？

17 黃健華先生：應該喺管理處嘅。

18 李澍桓大律師：如果你哋要進入去嘅時候，你要去邊度攞鎖匙先可以入到去？

19 黃健華先生：管理處借鎖匙。

20 李澍桓大律師：冇其他問題，主席。

21 陸啟康法官：或者（English Spoken），你有冇嘢想跟進？

22 許偉強資深大律師：我有跟進嘅問題，唔該主席。

23 孫靖乾資深大律師：主席，我會有啲問題問黃先生。

24 主席：好。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：黃先生，首先我就想睇番你嗰個證人供詞——黃先生，咁我就係代表政府
26 嘅大律師，咁你嗰個證人供詞裏面，喺 WS2/1546 頁，咁頭先就係許資深大律師亦
27 都有問過。1546 頁嗰度，我亦都想去番呢個第 6 段嘅最尾嗰四行，呢度係關於喺
28 10 月 19 號，就係首先就係李先生就發現咗嗰個嘅總掣，即係話嗰個消防嘅加壓泵
29 房裏面嗰個總掣係八座大廈都門晒，咁亦都通知咗你，你頭先都有咁講過，係咪？

30 黃健華先生：係。

31 許偉強資深大律師：然之後你就話你有親自去到宏福苑嘅現場去睇過，係咪？

32 黃健華先生：你嘅意思係睇嗰八座？

33 許偉強資深大律師：係。

34 黃健華先生：我有睇過嗰八座。

35 許偉強資深大律師：你話你有——親自去到宏福苑嘅現場，喺 19 號？

36 黃健華先生：係，我有去過宏福苑，19 號。

1 許偉強資深大律師：咁你去到宏福苑嘅現場嘅時候，你係冇睇過嗰八座嘅加壓泵房？

2 黃健華先生：係。

3 許偉強資深大律師：咁你係直接地係做過啲咩嘢？你就係同呢個管理處鄭小姐？

4 黃健華先生：唔係，我--因為李俊賢先生同我講過佢八座大樓嘅消防泵總掣畀人門咗，咁我
5 就打咗電話畀我老闆鍾生，跟住鍾生就叫我「喂，如果咁樣，不如就睇埋個上水系
6 統，即係個上水泵，係，咁我就走咗去睇咗其中三座嘅上水泵，發覺都係畀人門咗
7 嘅，個電源掣。

8 孫靖乾資深大律師：唔噃。

9 黃健華先生：係，跟住我就見到咁嘅情況，咁我就直接就再去搵咗鄭小姐。

10 孫靖乾資深大律師：頭先你都有講過，作為一個即係嗰呢一方面，即係我哋叫（English
11 Spoken），即係關於一啲嘅消防設備嘅一個註冊嘅承辦商，你亦都係有呢一方面
12 嘅一個嘅即係叫做係專業嘅知識，係咪？

13 黃健華先生：可以咁講。

14 孫靖乾資深大律師：所以你都知知道嗰個總掣門咗嘅時候，係會令嗰個警鐘系統，即係嗰個
15 （English Spoken）都會係關閉嘅？

16 黃健華先生：係。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你就--根據你呢個證供，你就係話你同咗管理處嘅鄭小姐去查詢，咁
18 就知道當時嗰八座大廈都喺度進行緊一個大廈嘅維修工程，就包括係呢個維修個水
19 缸嘅，係咪？

20 黃健華先生：係。

21 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁首先你應該知道嗰當日嚟講，其實呢一個宏泰其實就正正係負責就係
22 針對係包括就係呢個警鐘嘅系統，係有一啲嘅工程或者有一啲嘅替換工程去做，係
23 咪？

24 黃健華先生：係。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，咁如果係咁，你有冇去同其他呢一個宏泰嘅同事去傾過，就係話如
26 果係要去維修水缸嘅話，其實照道理係唔需要係去關閉嗰個總掣或者唔需要去關閉
27 咗嗰個嘅警鐘系統嘅呢？

28 黃健華先生：我同我老闆傾過，鍾生。

29 孫靖乾資深大律師：你同你老闆傾過，就係話即係如果用，如果係維修個水缸，係正常嚟講
30 應該唔需要去門咗一個總掣，令到嗰個警鐘系統都係運作唔到，係咪？

31 黃健華先生：係。

32 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁我想請問咁你同你個老闆傾過之後，咁你哋係當日係--可唔可以講一
33 講畀我哋聽嗰個討論嘅內容先？

34 黃健華先生：我同老闆，係咪？

35 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，冇錯。

36 黃健華先生：咁就當我知道李俊賢發覺嗰八座個消防總掣畀人門咗，跟住就我就亦都走去睇

1 咗個上水--其中三座嘅上水泵個電掣都係畀人閃咗，咁就同老闆溝通過之後就話，
2 正常情況下唔應該個總掣畀人閃嘅，淨係可以閃咗嗰兩個（English
3 Spoken），即係消防泵嗰兩個（English Spoken）。

4 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。

5 黃健華先生：咁發覺好似係有啲問題，咁就老闆就叫我去搵鄭小姐，問下佢知唔知道係呢啲
6 系統畀人閃咗咁樣。

7 孫靖乾資深大律師：既然係咁，你哋都傾咗，知道係有問題，亦都問鄭小姐，咁鄭小姐--咁
8 你有冇--問鄭小姐嘅時候，有冇問點解如果係只係做一個維修呢個水箱嗰個--消防
9 水箱個工程，係需要閃個總掣呢？

10 黃健華先生：冇。

11 孫靖乾資深大律師：又有冇問其實係邊一個嘅承建商去負責處理嗰個水箱嘅工程？

12 黃健華先生：我有問過佢係咪搵個消防承辦商去閃嘅。

13 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你問佢有冇搵個消防承辦商去閃，佢就話畀你知「有」？

14 黃健華先生：係。

15 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係你就冇問嗰個承辦商係邊一位？

16 黃健華先生：冇。

17 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。當時既然你哋宏泰都覺得呢個係有問題，咁有冇啲咩嘢原因，你哋
18 唔會去搵嗰個承辦商去問一問，點解只係進行一個水箱嘅工程，係需要熄到個--閃
19 到個總掣？

20 黃健華先生：因為我當時得知鄭小姐同我講佢哋搵咗一間承辦商去閃，咁我哋就覺得佢搵得
21 嗰個承辦商去閃，咁佢應該知道自己閃咗啲乜嘢，咁我就冇再追問落去。

22 孫靖乾資深大律師：但係即使即係話你知道係唔係淨係閃咗嗰個（English Spoken），
23 係閃埋個總掣，你就冇再進一步去問佢？

24 黃健華先生：係。

25 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁另一方面，就係你哋作為一個嘅--即係都係一個註冊嘅消防裝備嗰個
26 承辦商，咁喺當時嚟講，如果唔係有其他人閃咗嗰個總掣嘅時候，其實你哋都係需
27 要閃嗰個總掣去替換嗰個叫做嗰個（English Spoken），係咪？即係嗰個警鐘
28 系統裏面其中一個玻璃，係咪？

29 黃健華先生：麻煩可唔可以再問多次？

30 孫靖乾資深大律師：當時你亦都有講過你係要去替換嗰個警鐘系統裏面嗰個玻璃，即係嗰個
31 警鐘裏面有嗰個拎手個玻璃嗰部分。

32 黃健華先生：係。

33 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，所以如果喺嗰個情況嚟講，就係需要去閃嗰個總掣，但係係閃一個
34 好短嘅時間。

35 黃健華先生：係。

36 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁由於係閃一個好短嘅時間，就根據有關嘅一啲嘅規定，你哋當時如果

- 1 係撇好短嘅時間，如果唔超過二十四小時，或者唔係過夜嘅時候，就唔需要去入個
2 個（English Spoken）？
- 3 黃健華先生：係。
- 4 孫靖乾資深大律師：係，即係亦都唔需要去掛牌？
- 5 黃健華先生：係。
- 6 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。但係你都知道係當時係講個情況就係已經發現個總掣係門咗？
- 7 黃健華先生：係。
- 8 孫靖乾資深大律師：而且喺基於當時嘅情況，你亦都會知道其實應該門咗會係即係超過呢個
9 二十四小時或者係過夜，係咪？
- 10 黃健華先生：當時我哋唔知佢幾時畀人門嘅。
- 11 孫靖乾資深大律師：你當時唔知佢幾時畀人門，但係你知道你仲有啲嘅——譬如話頭先測試個
12 個警鐘系統呢個未做，你知道嘅？
- 13 黃健華先生：係。
- 14 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁你亦都知道，即係如果係咁，你係——嘅工程你係未完成嘅？
- 15 黃健華先生：係。
- 16 孫靖乾資深大律師：如果你唔去將個嘅總掣開番嘅時候，咁其實個總掣就會繼續係持——處
17 於一個關閉嘅狀態？
- 18 黃健華先生：係。
- 19 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁呢個亦都將會係超過二十四小時，即係可能係過咗 19 號之後？
- 20 黃健華先生：係。
- 21 孫靖乾資深大律師：有冇諗過喺嗰陣時候係需要向呢個消防處係入番一個嘅（English
22 Spoken），話畀佢知其實一個咁重要嘅警鐘系統原來係會係多過二十四小時或者
23 過夜係會持續地係處於一個關閉嘅狀態？
- 24 黃健華先生：冇諗過會入嘅。
- 25 孫靖乾資深大律師：係。咁而最後就我想問一問，頭先你有講過就話有問鄭小姐去攞個嘅
26 （English Spoken），即係你話係即係有，咁佢當時就畀唔到文件畀你？
- 27 黃健華先生：係。
- 28 孫靖乾資深大律師：咁有冇諗過直接問佢究竟嗰個有關嘅嗰個另一個嘅消防嘅註冊裝置嘅承
29 辦商係邊一位，咁從而可以聯絡佢哋，去睇下個（English Spoken）？
- 30 黃健華先生：當時冇考慮過要問另外一間承辦商攞嘅。
- 31 孫靖乾資深大律師：好，唔該晒主席、兩位委員。
- 32 陸啟康法官：唔該，仲有冇其他想跟進？
- 33 林樂夫大律師：主席，我係代表 Victory Fire 嘅，我淨係得兩個問題想覆問嘅，係。
34 係，黃生，第一個問題就係關於你畀兩份口供嘅時序嘅。第一個就麻煩你睇下 C1-
35 2 警察嘅口供，係第 1152 頁嘅，係，我哋去番頂嗰度，係嘞，咁我哋會見到喺個
36 螢光幕較底嘅位置，呢個係你嘅證人口供，係畀員警嘅，係咪？

1 黃健華先生：係。

2 林樂夫大律師：咁日期我哋見到 2025 年 12 月 1 號，見唔見到？

3 黃健華先生：見到。

4 林樂夫大律師：係，咁我哋對比下呢，你為咗呢一個委員會嘅證人陳述書，咁我哋去睇係
5 WS2 嘅 1545 頁，我哋見到第一頁有你嘅名，係咪？

6 黃健華先生：見到。

7 林樂夫大律師：咁我哋去到第 1547 頁，個底個位置，簽名嘅位，我哋見到為咗呢個委員會
8 證人口供就係 2026 年 2 月 25 號，係咪？

9 黃健華先生：係。

10 林樂夫大律師：咁即係我哋會見到日子嘅對比，就係你做咗員警證人口供先嘅，係咪？

11 黃健華先生：係。

12 林樂夫大律師：即係我哋會見到日子嗰度，就係你做咗個警察嘅證人口供先嘅，係咪？

13 黃健華先生：係。

14 林樂夫大律師：呢個第一個嘅問題。第二個問題就係啱啱政府嘅孫資深大律師就問你，你係
15 有冇諗過係用一個 SDN 通知消防嘅？

16 黃健華先生：冇諗過。

17 林樂夫大律師：係嘞，點解？

18 黃健華先生：因為個掣唔係我哋門，所以我哋唔可以入個 SDN，因為 SDN 入面係要填關閉日
19 期，咁我哋唔知道個關閉日期，我哋係填唔到個資料，所以畀唔到消防處嘅。

20 林樂夫大律師：唔該晒。主席，我有其他問題，唔該。

21 陸啟康法官：仲有冇其他涉事方想提問？如果有嘅，唔該晒你黃先生，你可以離開。

22 黃健華先生：Thank you。

23

24 16 時 14 分宏泰消防工程有限公司電工證人黃健華先生作供完畢

25 16 時 14 分宏泰消防工程有限公司董事及工程師證人鍾傑文先生開始作供

26

27 李澍桓大律師：主席，為咗善用時間，下一位係鍾傑文先生。

28 陸啟康法官：好。

29 李澍桓大律師：鍾生，首先麻煩你喺作供之前先企起身，喺你面前有一張聲明詞嘅，就麻煩
30 你讀出嚟。

31 鍾傑文先生：本人鍾傑文聲明，本人所作的證供盡本人所知、所悉及所信，均屬真實。

32 李澍桓大律師：係，請坐。我哋先搞清楚個時序，就你因應今次宏福苑大火事件入面，你曾
33 經向警方就提供咗一份口供。

34 鍾傑文先生：冇錯嘅。

35 李澍桓大律師：個時間就係 2025 年 12 月 1 號嘅。

36 鍾傑文先生：係嘅。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：咁亦都喺事後因應呢個獨立委員會嘅要求，你就透過律師呈交咗一個你自己
2 嘅書面口供，咁個時間就係 2026 年 2 月 25 號嘅，係咪？
- 3 鍾傑文先生：正確。
- 4 李澍桓大律師：我相信兩份口供入面你所講——提供嘅資料都係以你所知係真實、準確，係
5 咪？
- 6 鍾傑文先生：冇錯，冇錯。
- 7 李澍桓大律師：好快講一講你個背景，我哋知道你就係宏泰消防工程有限公司嘅一個董事，
8 係咪？
- 9 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：你亦都係一個自己本身喺個教育上面係有一個電機工程系嘅博士嘅學歷，係
11 咪？
- 12 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：喺你哋一間公司，即係宏泰消防，你就大概係 2010 年加入？
- 14 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 15 李澍桓大律師：就喺 12 年左右，係唔係應該——一兩年之後就正式做咗董事？
- 16 鍾傑文先生：13 年嘅 3 月。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：13 年？
- 18 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：咁除咗日常處理即係實際一啲消防裝備工程之外，我相信你嘅工作亦都要包
20 埋就係去應對客戶，亦都就住某一啲啲可能要求你哋做嘅工程就做一啲報價咁樣嘅
21 工作嘅？
- 22 鍾傑文先生：冇錯嘅。
- 23 李澍桓大律師：剛才都講過，16 年開始，其實宏泰消防就開始替宏福苑做呢個裝備嘅年檢，
24 一直去到 2025 年，即係除咗 2024 年一年你哋應該有做嘅？
- 25 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 26 李澍桓大律師：有冇乜嘢原因，點解 2024 年你哋冇做㗎？
- 27 鍾傑文先生：其實就 2024 年我哋畀咗個報價佢，但係就我有收到佢簽返嚟，直到就 2025
28 年 3 月嘅時候，林文恩工程主任就 send 咗呢一份簽回嘅報價畀我，就話原來 24
29 年就批咗畀我哋，我話「我有見過㗎，我唔認㗎。」跟住後畀應該 4 號或者 5 號
30 嘅，黎經理，黎永利就打畀我，就同我講話「哎咗，個委員會批咗㗎喇」點樣點
31 樣，咁想我哋做年檢。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：咁但係就斬一斬斷你。咁到最後，其實 2024 年宏泰消防有冇做？
- 33 鍾傑文先生：冇做過嘅。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：冇做到。就係直至到 2025 年我哋知道 3 月嘅時候就做番個年檢？
- 35 鍾傑文先生：冇錯，冇錯。
- 36 李澍桓大律師：我想你——因為頭先嗰個年檢嘅工作，消防裝備，你個同事黃生都好仔細畀咗

1 證供我啦，我哋知道喺做完年檢嘅時候，有啲所謂叫做核對表，就要做咗交界嘅？

2 鍾傑文先生：係，冇錯。

3 李澍桓大律師：你就根據呢啲年檢嘅核對表，即係佢哋年檢嘅一啲結果，你就要做另一份文
4 件就叫做 F.S.251 嘅證書嘅，係咪？

5 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

6 李澍桓大律師：我想你而家睇一睇呢個 R1 嘅文件冊第 657 頁，呢度我哋見到就係其中一張
7 所謂叫做 F.S.251 嘅一個表格，係咪？

8 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

9 李澍桓大律師：喺上面我哋見到呢一張就係關於 A 座宏仁閣嘅一個證書？

10 鍾傑文先生：係呀。

11 李澍桓大律師：我哋跟住喺入面見到有三個方格，就有三部分，第一部分就係話你哋年檢嘅
12 事項嘅，咁有啲代號，有啲裝置嘅類型，你可唔可以好快講一講其實第一格呢度想
13 表達啲咩？

14 鍾傑文先生：第一格嗰度就係只可以年檢嘅時候填，年檢完之後，你要填番個系統類型，
15 同埋你檢查嘅位置，同埋狀況評述。如果完全冇問題，我哋就會寫「(English
16 Spoken)」，咁如果有問題就會括弧加埋「(English Spoken)」，咁裏面
17 會寫番就係完成日期，24 年--3 月 2025 年，下次到期嘅檢查日期。

18 李澍桓大律師：所以我哋舉個例，譬如你第一個格見到代號就係“11”，裝置類型就係
19 (English Spoken)。

20 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

21 李澍桓大律師：跟住嗰個情況就係全座位置，你嘅講法就係話都符合消防條例，不過除咗有
22 有一啲喺第三部註明嘅一啲瑕疵或者一啲損毀，咁嗰個就係修理㗎嘞？

23 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

24 李澍桓大律師：中間第二部分，裝置改裝、修理、檢查工作，呢個我見係留白咗寫「有」
25 嘅，係乜嘢意思？

26 鍾傑文先生：呢一個就係話你做呢一單工程，如果有啲乜嘢維修，乜嘢做完就要填呢個
27 (English Spoken)，我哋行內就叫 (English Spoken)。

28 李澍桓大律師：第三部分，損壞事項，係咪就係要顧名思義，將你嗰座見到有損壞咗嘅一啲
29 零件裝備就要喺呢度列明？

30 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

31 李澍桓大律師：以你作為一個註冊嘅持牌人士，即係就住呢個消防裝備，有冇講話第三部分
32 呢度要幾耐--即係有冇法例上或者消防處有冇一啲限時要你幾時做完㗎？

33 鍾傑文先生：其實消防處就要儘快嘅，儘快到基本上係越快越好嘅，如果唔係以我所知，就
34 違反 95 章 B 咁樣。

35 李澍桓大律師：但係喺呢個案件入面，我哋起碼知道你 25 年 3 月最遲 26 號就做完年檢，
36 而其實開始去做執修就 2025 年 10 月開始做嘅？

- 1 鍾傑文先生：係，冇錯。
- 2 李澍桓大律師：咁呢一個相差咗有六七個月時間，呢度係一個可接受，定還是以你所知係唔
- 3 合規矩嘅一個做法？
- 4 鍾傑文先生：唔理想嘅，不過理解，即係我哋知道就好多都係會咁，因為大廈可能招標所有
- 5 嘢咁樣囉。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：另一個議題，就想問一問你水缸嘅問題。
- 7 鍾傑文先生：係。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：我哋知道天面有個叫做消防水缸嘅？
- 9 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：如果呢個消防水缸假設係結構上有問題，唔符合消防處嘅一啲裝備嘅規定，
- 11 喺呢張表格上面，你需唔需要註明？
- 12 鍾傑文先生：需要。
- 13 李澍桓大律師：咁如果我睇過咁多張表格都有睇個水缸有問題，我可唔可以理解就係個年檢
- 14 嘅結果，就係個水缸有嘢需要執修？
- 15 鍾傑文先生：可以。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：呢張其實同其他嘅十幾張 251 呢張表格，我如果有錯嘅話，個日期我哋喺右
- 17 下角睇到係 2025 年 3 月 31 日嘅，係咪？
- 18 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：咁就上面我見到有鍾生你嘅簽名同埋公司蓋印？
- 20 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：呢張文件跟住會點要處理？交去邊度？
- 22 鍾傑文先生：我哋會副本寄畀消防處。
- 23 李澍桓大律師：係。
- 24 鍾傑文先生：十四日內。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：消防處有冇邊一個特定部門定係當區嘅消防局去收嘅？
- 26 鍾傑文先生：冇嘅，佢哋一概都會寄去消防總處，尖沙咀嗰個，用郵寄嘅方法。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：Okay，我哋記住 2025 年 3 月 31 號。另外，我想有一張文件唔係你做嘅，
- 28 但係我都想你睇一睇嘅。就係如果我哋睇一間叫做--你有聽過一間叫做中華發展嘅
- 29 公司，係咪？
- 30 鍾傑文先生：係。
- 31 李澍桓大律師：想你睇番就係佢哋有一啲所謂叫（English Spoken），我想你睇一睇
- 32 嘅。
- 33 鍾傑文先生：可以。
- 34 李澍桓大律師：喺同樣都係 R1 嘅第 62 頁，咁你見到呢一張就叫做 2025 年 4 月 7 號，左
- 35 上角，如果唔係我哋放大少少。跟住我哋見到呢一張就係一個消防裝置關閉通知書
- 36 嘅。

- 1 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 2 李澍桓大律師：上面講咗其中宏志閣，然後跟住佢就有講需要某一啲裝置就閃超過二十四
- 3 個小時，就其中譬如以呢張為例，我哋見到嗰格就剔咗消防栓／喉轆系統嘅。
- 4 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 5 李澍桓大律師：咁我哋喺呢件案件入面，其實我哋都知道，即係宏福苑呢個個案入面呢，其
- 6 實呢啲咁樣嘅裝置嘅關閉通知書就一路由呢一間中華發展向消防處稟報，就話要延
- 7 期。
- 8 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 9 李澍桓大律師：即使去到 11 月 26 號大火當日，其實都仲係處於一個延期嘅狀態嘅。
- 10 鍾傑文先生：係。
- 11 李澍桓大律師：呢張通知書就 4 月 7 號由另一間承辦商入嘅，你嗰張 251 就係一個禮拜
- 12 前，3 月 31 號就寄出嘅？
- 13 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 14 李澍桓大律師：4 月 7 號到 11 月 26 號中間嘅呢段時間，消防處有冇接觸過你關於點解要
- 15 閃咗個消防裝備？
- 16 鍾傑文先生：冇。
- 17 李澍桓大律師：有冇人懷疑過消防處話你嗰個年檢係咪有問題？
- 18 鍾傑文先生：冇。
- 19 李澍桓大律師：點解而家要維修咁耐？
- 20 鍾傑文先生：冇。
- 21 李澍桓大律師：喺中華發展又好或者置邦又好，當佢哋要入呢張裝置關閉通知書嘅時候，佢
- 22 哋有冇通知你話「我哋要做呢樣嘢」？
- 23 鍾傑文先生：冇。
- 24 李澍桓大律師：我哋知道第一部分嘅執修工作就喺 2025 年 10 月先由你做水工嘅同事先進
- 25 行，係咪？
- 26 鍾傑文先生：冇錯，14、16。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：做水喉工嘅同事，就唔係頭先嗰位黃先生負責嘅？
- 28 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：其中一樣嘢佢要換嗰啲所謂頭先我哋見到一啲噴嘴、喉轆、閘掣嗰啲咁樣嘅
- 30 工作，係咪？
- 31 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 32 李澍桓大律師：睇下我嘅理解啱唔啱，要做呢個工程嘅話，首先第一，就要將天面嗰個消防
- 33 缸嗰個出水掣就閃咗佢先嘅？
- 34 鍾傑文先生：正確。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：因為你可能跟住就要開下面嗰啲喉轆嚟做更換吓嘛？
- 36 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。

- 1 李澍桓大律師：問咗個水箱嘅目的就係等佢唔好有水出嚟？
- 2 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 3 李澍桓大律師：喺當日，即係 10 月份嘅時候，當你嘅同事去到原本做呢啲水喉工程嘅時
- 4 候，係咪已經告知咗你就話個水缸嗰個出水嗰度係冇水出？
- 5 鍾傑文先生：係，五點幾嘅時候。
- 6 李澍桓大律師：佢哋有冇話畀你知或者你知唔知點解個水缸冇水？
- 7 鍾傑文先生：有，佢有話畀我聽。
- 8 李澍桓大律師：邊個話畀你知？
- 9 鍾傑文先生：我嘅伙計。
- 10 李澍桓大律師：邊位？
- 11 鍾傑文先生：唐小明（譯音）或者唐慶倫（譯音）。
- 12 李澍桓大律師：佢同你講乜嘢？
- 13 鍾傑文先生：佢問我——佢話個水缸嗰度冇水，我話「吓，點解呀？」佢話佢問過現場，咁就
- 14 做緊水缸大維修，咁所以就——跟住「有冇掛牌呀？」咁問佢，有問過佢有冇掛牌，
- 15 「有」，我話“okay”。
- 16 李澍桓大律師：你講「掛牌」意思就即係話入 SDN？
- 17 鍾傑文先生：入 SDN，係喇。
- 18 李澍桓大律師：你嘅同事我哋知道佢就照做呢啲維修，更換部件嘅呢啲工作嘅？
- 19 鍾傑文先生：係。
- 20 李澍桓大律師：同唔同意更換係一個程序，其實之後要做檢測，都係一個重要嘅步驟㗎嘅？
- 21 鍾傑文先生：絕對重要，最重要嘅步驟。
- 22 李澍桓大律師：而喺呢個水喉嘅工序上面呢，佢換完啲部件，由於水缸冇水，你哋或者你嘅
- 23 同事，即係宏泰消防嘅同事係冇就呢啲裝備做到測試嘅？
- 24 鍾傑文先生：係，冇錯。
- 25 李澍桓大律師：如果我嘅講法話所以呢一部分嘅工作其實係未做完嘅？
- 26 鍾傑文先生：冇錯。
- 27 李澍桓大律師：公道㗎嘛？
- 28 鍾傑文先生：公道，我哋未出 F.S.251 作實㗎嘛。
- 29 李澍桓大律師：主席，我留意到個時間，我會跳落去下一個部分，我唔知我哋係咪一個適當
- 30 嘅時間？
- 31 陸啟康法官：都會有啲時間，係咪？
- 32 李澍桓大律師：有啲時間，可能有十至十五分鐘㗎。
- 33 陸啟康法官：Okay。咁我諗如果係咁，我哋今日就完，好唔好？咁我哋押後到聽日 10 點鐘
- 34 繼續我哋嘅聽證會。
- 35 李澍桓大律師：鍾先生，麻煩你明天早上再返嚟。
- 36 鍾傑文先生：可以，冇問題。

- 1 陸啟康法官：Okay，唔該。
- 2
- 3 16 時 29 分聆訊押後
- 4 （聆訊將於 2026 年 3 月 31 日 10 時 00 分繼續）